Results for 'Perceptual scepticism'

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  1. Scepticism, Perceptual Knowledge, and Doxastic Responsibility.Alan Millar - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):353-372.
    Arguments for scepticism about perceptual knowledge are often said to have intuitively plausible premises. In this discussion I question this view in relation to an argument from ignorance and argue that the supposed persuasiveness of the argument depends on debatable background assumptions about knowledge or justification. A reasonable response to scepticism has to show there is a plausible epistemological perspective that can make sense of our having perceptual knowledge. I present such a perspective. In order give (...)
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  2.  39
    Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism.Frank Barel - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):21-43.
    This paper explores the bearing of Tyler Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement on the problem of scepticism. Perceptual entitlement is an external form of warrant, connected with his perceptual anti-individualism. According to his view, an individual can be entitled to a perceptual belief without having reasons warranting the belief. On the face of it, this suggests that the view may have anti-sceptical resources. In short, the question is whether Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement allows (...)
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  3. Wright Contra McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):467 - 479.
    One of the key debates in contemporary epistemology is that between Crispin Wright and John McDowell on the topic of radical scepticism. Whereas both of them endorse a form of epistemic internalism, the very different internalist conceptions of perceptual knowledge that they offer lead them to draw radically different conclusions when it comes to the sceptical problem. The aim of this paper is to maintain that McDowell's view, at least when suitably supplemented with further argumentation (argumentation that he (...)
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  4. A Vindication of a Refutation of Global Scepticism, a Refutation of Global Perceptual Scepticism and a Refutation of Global Existential Scepticism.Ken Gemes - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):63-70.
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  5.  68
    Scepticism and Perceptual Justification.Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    How can experience provide knowledge, or even justified belief, about the objective world outside our minds? This volume presents original essays by prominent contemporary epistemologists, who show how philosophical progress on foundational issues can improve our understanding of, and suggest a solution to, this famous sceptical question.
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  6.  22
    Counterfeiting Perceptual Experience: Scepticism, Internalism, and the Disjunctive Conception of Experience.Tommaso Piazza - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (7-8):100-131.
    Along with what McDowell has called the disjunctive conception of experience (DCE), and against a venerable tradition, the veridical experience that P and the subjectively indistinguishable hallucination that P are not type-identical mental states. According to McDowell, a powerful motivation for DCE is that it makes available the sole internalistically acceptable way out of a sceptical argument targeting the possibility of perceptual knowledge. In this paper I state in explicit terms the sceptical argument McDowell worries about, and show that (...)
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  7.  34
    Scepticism and Perceptual Justification Edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini: New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, Viii + 363, US$74. [REVIEW]Stephen Hetherington - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):817-818.
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  8.  73
    Scepticism and Perceptual Justification.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):211-224.
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  9. Perceptual Relativism, Scepticism, and Thomas Reid.René Van Woudenberg - 2000 - Reid Studies 3 (2):65-85.
     
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  10. Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Scepticism.Luca Moretti - forthcoming - Episteme:1-11.
    Crispin Wright maintains that the architecture of perceptual justification is such that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this principle doesn’t elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright’s contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don’t remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don’t (...)
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  11. Disjunctivism and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & Diego E. Machuca (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic.
    An overview of the import of disjunctivism to the problem of radical scepticism is offered. In particular, the disjunctivist account of perceptual experience is set out, along with the manner in which it intersects with related positions such as naïve realism and intentionalism, and it is shown how this account can be used to a motivate an anti-sceptical proposal. In addition, a variety of disjunctivism known as epistemological disjunctivism is described, and it is explained how this proposal offers (...)
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  12.  36
    The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):114-135.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 114 - 135 It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot (...)
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  13.  16
    Deontological Conservatism and Perceptual Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2017 - Theoria 83 (3):206-224.
    Crispin Wright has advanced a number of arguments to show that, in addition to evidential warrant, we have a species of non-evidential warrant, namely, “entitlement”, which forms the basis of a particular view of the architecture of perceptual justification known as “epistemic conservatism”. It is widely known, however, that Wright's conservative view is beset by a number of problems. In this article, I shall argue that the kind of warrant that emerges from Wright's account is not the standard truth-conducive (...)
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  14. McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism Etc.Alex Byrne - 2014 - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    On the assumption that we may learn from our elders and betters, this paper approaches some fundamental questions in perceptual epistemology through a dispute between McDowell and Wright about external world scepticism.
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  15. Probability and Scepticism.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - In Dylan Dodd Elia Zardini (ed.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press. pp. 71-86.
    If we add as an extra premise that the agent does know H, then it is possible for her to know E — H, we get the conclusion that the agent does not really know H. But even without that closure premise, or something like it, the conclusion seems quite dramatic. One possible response to the argument, floated by both Descartes and Hume, is to accept the conclusion and embrace scepticism. We cannot know anything that goes beyond our evidence, (...)
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  16.  17
    ¿Qué está mal con el dogmatismo de Pryor?Jorge Ornelas Bernal & G. Cíntora - 2014 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 26 (1):7-31.
    It is argued that Pryor's criticism of scepticism of perceptual justification misses the point: while Pryor's dogmatism can provide a successful explication of the perceptual justification of first order empirical beliefs ( i.e. , an explication of propositional justification), it is barren vis à vis second order sceptical criticisms about the epistemic status of beliefs justified via perception (that is, criticisms pointing to the lack of doxastic justification). We argue that the two main motivations that Pryor offers (...)
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  17.  34
    Inference and Scepticism.Jose L. Zalabardo - 2014 - In Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press.
    I focus on a family of inferences that are intuitively incapable of producing knowledge of their conclusions, although they appear to satisfy sufficient conditions for inferential knowledge postulated by plausible epistemological theories. They include Moorean inferences and inductive-bootstrapping inferences. I provide an account of why these inferences are not capable of producing knowledge. I argue that the reason why these inferences fail to produce knowledge of their conclusions is that inferential knowledge requires that the subject is more likely to believe (...)
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  18. In Defence of Dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.
    According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, you often have prima facie justification for believing p that doesn’t rest on your independent justification for believing any proposition. Although dogmatism has an intuitive appeal and seems to have an antisceptical bite, it has been targeted by various objections. This paper principally aims to answer the objections by Roger White according to which dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian account of how evidence affects our rational credences. (...)
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  19. Scepticism and the Senses.Barry Stroud - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):559-570.
    Abstract: This paper is an attempt to identify and to suggest reasons to reject those assumptions about the nature and scope of perceptual knowledge that appear to make an unacceptable scepticism the only strictly defensible answer to the philosophical problem of knowledge of the world in general. The suggestion is that our knowing things about the world around us by perception can be satisfactorily explained only if we can be understood to sometimes perceive that such-and-such is so, where (...)
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  20. Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem.José Zalabardo - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):615-627.
    I argue that Epistemic Disjunctivism doesn’t sustain a successful anti-sceptical strategy. I contend, in particular, that the treatment of scepticism that Duncan Pritchard puts forward on behalf of Epistemic Disjunctivism is unsatisfactory.
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  21.  12
    Scepticism and the Senses.Barry Stroud - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):559-570.
    : This paper is an attempt to identify and to suggest reasons to reject those assumptions about the nature and scope of perceptual knowledge that appear to make an unacceptable scepticism the only strictly defensible answer to the philosophical problem of knowledge of the world in general. The suggestion is that our knowing things about the world around us by perception can be satisfactorily explained only if we can be understood to sometimes perceive that such‐and‐such is so, where (...)
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  22. On Metaepistemological Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - 2016 - In Michael Bergmann & Brett Brett Coppenger (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press.
    Fumerton’s distinctive brand of metaepistemological scepticism is compared and contrasted with the related position outlined by Stroud. It is argued that there are at least three interesting points of contact between Fumerton and Stroud’s metaepistemology. The first point of contact is that both Fumerton and Stroud think that (1) externalist theories of justification permit a kind of non-inferential, perceptual justification for our beliefs about non-psychological reality, but it’s not sufficient for philosophical assurance. However, Fumerton claims, while Stroud denies, (...)
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  23. Effective Sceptical Hypotheses.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Theoria 79 (3):262-278.
    The familiar Cartesian sceptical arguments all involve an explanation of our experiences. An account of the persuasive power of the sceptical arguments should explain why this is so. This supports a diagnosis of the error in Cartesian sceptical arguments according to which they mislead us into regarding our perceptual beliefs as if they were justified as inferences to the best explanation. I argue that they have instead a perceptual justification that does not involve inference to the best explanation (...)
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  24. Adequate Ideas and Modest Scepticism in Hume's Metaphysics of Space.Donald C. Ainslie - 2010 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 92 (1):39-67.
    In the Treatise of Human Nature , Hume argues that, because we have adequate ideas of the smallest parts of space, we can infer that space itself must conform to our representations of it. The paper examines two challenges to this argument based on Descartes's and Locke's treatments of adequate ideas, ideas that fully capture the objects they represent. The first challenge, posed by Arnauld in his Objections to the Meditations , asks how we can know that an idea is (...)
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  25.  96
    Radical Scepticism Without Epistemic Closure.Sven Rosenkranz - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):692-718.
    This paper contributes to the current debate about radical scepticism and the structure of warrant. After a presentation of the standard version of the radical sceptic’s challenge, both in its barest and its more refined form, three anti-sceptical responses, and their respective commitments, are being identified: the Dogmatist response, the Conservativist response and the Dretskean response. It is then argued that both the Dretskean and the Conservativist are right that the anti-sceptical hypothesis cannot inherit any perceptual warrants from (...)
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  26. Perceptual Knowledge and the Metaphysics of Experience.Michael Pace - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):642-664.
    There is a long-Standing tradition in philosophy that certain metaphysical theories of perceptual experience, if true, would lead to scepticism about the external world, whereas other theories, if true, would develop a non-sceptkal epistemology. I investigate these claims in the context of current metaphysical theories of sense-perception and argue that choice of perceptual ontology is of very limited help in developing a non-sceptical epistemology. Theorists who hold that perception is an intentional state have some advantage in explaining (...)
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  27.  13
    Perception and Metaphysical Scepticism.Paul Coates - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):1-28.
    In this paper I introduce and critically examine a paradox about perceiving that is in some ways analogous to the paradox about meaning which Kripke puts forward in his exegesis of Wittgenstein's views on Rule-following. When applied to vision, the paradox of perceiving raises a metaphysical scepticism about which object a person is seeing if he looks, for example, at an apple on a tree directly in front of him. Physical objects can be seen when their appearance is distorted (...)
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  28.  48
    McDowell on Transcendental Arguments, Scepticism and “Error Theory”.Alan Thomas - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (2):109-124.
    John McDowell has recently changed his line of response to philosophical scepticism about the external world. He now claims to be in a position to use the strategy of transcendental argumentation in order to show the falsity of the sceptic’s misrepresentation of our ordinary epistemic standpoint. Since this transcendental argument begins from a weak and widely shared assumption shared with the sceptic herself the falsity of external world scepticism is now demonstrable even to her. Building on the account (...)
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  29.  57
    Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Skepticism.Anthony Brueckner - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):145-151.
    In “Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism,“ Frank Barel explores some important and under-discussed questions regarding the relation between Tyler Burge's views on perceptual entitlement, on the one hand, and the problem of skepticism, on the other. In this note, I would like to comment on a couple of aspects of Barel's article. First, I have my own take, different from Barel's, on the question of whether we can sketch an a priori anti-skeptical argument proceeding from perceptual (...)
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  30. Perception and Metaphysical Scepticism.Paul Coates - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 72:1-28.
    In this paper I introduce and critically examine a paradox about perceiving that is in some ways analogous to the paradox about meaning which Kripke puts forward in his exegesis of Wittgenstein's views on Rule-following. When applied to vision, the paradox of perceiving raises a metaphysical scepticism about which object a person is seeing if he looks, for example, at an apple on a tree directly in front of him. Physical objects can be seen when their appearance is distorted (...)
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  31.  9
    Radical Scepticism and Transcendental Arguments.Ju Wang - unknown
    I aim to provide a satisfying response to radical scepticism, a view according to which our knowledge of the external world is impossible. In the first chapter I investigate into the nature and the source of scepticism. Radical scepticism is motivated both by the closureRK-based and the underdeterminationRK-based sceptical arguments. Because these two sceptical arguments are logically independent, any satisfying anti-sceptical proposal must take both of them into consideration. Also, scepticism is a paradox, albeit a spurious (...)
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  32.  87
    "Antiscepticism and Easy Justification" - Ch 5 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this chapter I investigate epistemological consequences of the fact that seeming-based justification is elusive, in the sense that the subject can lose this justification simply by reflecting on her seemings. I argue that since seeming-based justification is elusive, the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism is importantly limited. I also contend that since seeming-based justification has this feature, phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually afflicted by easy justification problems.
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  33.  29
    Levelling the Analysis of Knowledge Via Methodological Scepticism.William A. Brant - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):293-304.
    ABSTRACT: In this essay I provide one methodology that yields the level of analysis of an alleged knowledge-claim under investigation via its relations to varying gradations of scepticism. Each proposed knowledge-claim possesses a specified relationship with: (i) a globally sceptical argument; (ii) the least sceptical but successful argument that casts it into doubt; and (iii) the most sceptical yet unsuccessful argument, which is conceivably hypothesized to repudiate it but fails to do so. Yielding this specified set of relations, by (...)
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  34. The Relativity of Perceptual Knowledge.William S. Boardman - 1993 - Synthese 94 (2):145-169.
    Since the most promising path to a solution to the problem of skepticism regarding perceptual knowledge seems to rest on a sharp distinction between perceiving and inferring, I begin by clarifying and defending that distinction. Next, I discuss the chief obstacle to success by this path, the difficulty in making the required distinction between merely logical possibilities that one is mistaken and the real (Austin) or relevant (Dretske) possibilities which would exclude knowledge. I argue that this distinction cannot be (...)
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  35. On Epistemic Alchemy.Aidan McGlynn - 2014 - In Dylan Dodd Elia Zardini (ed.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press. pp. 173-189.
    Crispin Wright has proposed that one has entitlements to accept certain propositions that play a foundational role within one’s body of belief. Such an entitlement is a kind of warrant that does not require the possessor to have acquired evidence speaking in favor of the proposition in question. The proposal allows Wright to concede much of the force of the most powerful arguments for scepticism, while avoiding the truly sceptical conclusion that one lacks warrant for most of one’s beliefs. (...)
     
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  36.  96
    Perceptual Knowledge.John L. Pollock - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (3):287-319.
  37.  69
    Perceptual Relativity and Ideas in the Mind.Phillip Cummins - 1963 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (December):202-214.
  38.  24
    Skepticism and Perceptual Content.Umit D. Yaluin - 1997 - Philosophical Papers 26 (2):179-194.
  39. . Knowledge and Scepticism.Robert Nozick - 1988 - In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Robert Nozick (1938-2002) was Pellegrino University Professor at Harvard University. His early book in political theory, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, was very influential, and he followed it with Philosophical Explanations, The Examined Life, The Nature of Rationality, Socratic Puzzles, and Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World.
     
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  40.  41
    McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism?Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3):202-217.
    In a series of recent articles, Duncan Pritchard argues for a ‘neo-Moorean’ interpretation of John McDowell’s anti-sceptical strategy. Pritchard introduces a distinction between ‘favouring’ and ‘discriminating’ epistemic grounds in order to show that within the radical sceptical context an absence of ‘discriminating’ epistemic grounds allowing one to distinguish brain-in-a-vat from non-brain-in-a-vat scenarios does not preclude possessing knowledge of the denials of sceptical hypotheses. I argue that Pritchard’s reading is mistaken for three reasons. First, the distinction between ‘favouring’ and ‘discriminating’ epistemic (...)
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  41.  33
    The Sources and Scope of Cyrenaic Scepticism.Tim O'Keefe - 2015 - In Ugo Zilioli (ed.), From the Socratics to the Socratic Schools: Classical Ethics, Metaphysics and Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 99-113.
    This paper focuses on two questions: (I) why do the Cyrenaics deny that we can gain knowledge concerning "external things," and (II) how wide-ranging is this denial? On the first question, I argue that the Cyrenaics are skeptical because of their contrast between the indubitable grasp we have of own affections, versus the inaccessibility of external things that cause these affections. Furthermore, this inaccessibility is due to our cognitive and perceptual limitations--it is an epistemological doctrine rooted in their psychology--and (...)
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  42. Disjunctivism and the Urgency of Scepticism.Søren Overgaard - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):5-21.
    This paper argues that McDowell is right to claim that disjunctivism has anti-sceptical implications. While the disjunctive conception of experience leaves unaffected the Cartesian sceptical challenge, it undermines another type of sceptical challenge. Moreover, the sceptical challenge against which disjunctivism militates has some philosophical urgency in that it threatens the very notion that perceptual experience can acquaint us with the world around us.
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  43.  14
    From Scepticism to Nihilism: A Nihilistic Interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s Refutations.Shaoyong Ye - 2019 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 47 (4):749-777.
    On the basis of Nāgārjuna’s works, especially the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, this paper proposes a sceptic presupposition as the departure point of Nāgārjuna’s refutations. This presupposition invalidates perceptual knowledge, and thus the identities of existents can only be deemed as referents assumed by concepts. Then the “confinement principle,” a theorem tacitly applied in Nāgārjuna’s arguments, is justified, i.e., any definition or description of a concept would necessarily confine its assumed referent to an invariable and isolated state. This principle enables Nāgārjuna to (...)
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  44.  41
    Hume's Reflective Return to the Vulgar.James R. O'Shea - 1996 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2):285 – 315.
    Each of the standard outlooks in the philosophy of perception --phenomenalism, direct realism, indirect realism, scepticism -- has thus been viewed as Hume's own considered position in the eyes of informed commentators. I argue that Hume does not ascribe univocally to any one of the traditional stances in the philosophy of perception, nor does he leave us only a schizophrenic or 'mood' scepticism. Hume attempted to resolve the traditional philosophical problem (or perhaps more accurately, to set it aside (...)
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  45. On Being Alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
    Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hallucination. The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. That is to say, taking experiences to be episodes or events, the naïve realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-independent objects. In turn, the disjunctivist claims that in a case (...)
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  46. Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
    Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content (...)
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  47. Perceptual Entitlement.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.
    The paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called "entitlement", that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. The conception is situated within an account of animal perception and unsophisticated perceptual belief. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is apriori associated with a certain representational function that can be known apriori to be a function of perception. The paper connects anti-individualism, a thesis about (...)
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  48. Hegel on Scepticism in the Logic of Essence.Ioannis Trisokkas - 2017 - In Klaus Vieweg, Stella Synegianni, Georges Faraklas & Jannis Kozatsas (eds.), Hegel and Scepticism. De Gruyter. pp. 99-120.
    Early in the Logic of Essence, the second main part of Hegelian Logic, Hegel identifies a logical structure, seeming (Schein), with “the phenomenon of scepticism.” The present paper has two aims: first, to flesh this identification out by describing the argument that leads up to it; and, second, to argue that it is mistaken. I will proceed as follows. Section 1 deciphers the opening statement of the Logic of Essence, “the truth of being is essence,” by specifying the meaning (...)
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  49. The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.
    I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views (...)
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  50. An Early Critic of Locke: The Anti-Scepticism of Henry Lee.Han Thomas Adriaenssen - 2011 - Locke Studies 11:17-47.
    Although Henry Lee is often recognized to be an important early critic of Locke's 'way of ideas', his Anti-Scepticism (1702) has hardly received the scholarly attention it deserves. This paper seeks to fill that lacuna. It argues that Lee's criticism of Locke's alleged representationalism was original, and that it was quite different from the more familiar kind of criticism that was launched against Locke's theory of ideas by such thinkers as John Sergeant and Thomas Reid. In addition, the paper (...)
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