The mind body problem in psychoanalytic theory and practice -- Philosophy and the mind-body problem, influences on psychoanalysis -- Psyche and soma in the work of Sigmund Freud : psychoanalytic foundations -- Psyche and soma in Klein and object relations : contemporary developments -- Psyche and soma in Kohutian, intersubjective, and relational theories -- Attachment theory and neuropsychoanalysis -- Conclusions.
Simone Weil was a defining figure of the twentieth century; a philosopher, Christian, resistance fighter, Labour activist and teacher, described by Albert Camus as 'the only great spirit of our time'. In 1941 Weil was introduced to Father Joseph-Marie Perrin, a Dominican priest whose friendship became a key influence on her life. When Weil asked Perrin for work as a farm hand he sent her to Gustave Thibon, a farmer and Christian philosopher. Weil stayed with the Thibon family, (...) working in the fields and writing the notebooks which became _Gravity and Grace _and other posthumous works. Perrin and Thibon met Weil at a time when her spiritual life and creative genius were at their height. During the short but deep period of their acquaintance with her, they came to know her as she actually was. First published in English in 1953, and now introduced by J.P. Little, this unique portrait depicts Weil through the eyes of her friends, not as a strange and unaccountable genius but as an ardent and human person in search of truth and knowledge. (shrink)
In 1941 Simone Weil was introduced to Father Jean-Marie Perrin, a priest of the Dominican order whose friendship became one of the most significant influences on her spiritual development. It was for Father Perrin that she wrote her 'spiritual autobiography', contained in Waiting for God, and to him that she later wrote 'Letter to a Priest'. When Weil requested work as a field hand, Perrin sent her to Gustave Thibon, a farmer and Christian philosopher. From 1941-2, Weil (...) stayed with the Thibon family, working in the fields by day while writing by night the notebooks which posthumously became Gravity and Grace and other seminal works. Perrin and Thibon met Weil at a time when her interior life and her creative genius were at the height of their glowing maturity. During the short but deep period of their acquaintance with her, they came to know her as she actually was. Their accounts of this time reveal her to us in the bare parlour of the Dominican convent at Marseilles where, after waiting her turn among a stream of refugees, she discussed her personal problems with Father Perrin. They show her to us in the vineyards of Ardèche, and on the stone seat by the fountain overlooking the Rhone valley where she read Plato to Thibon, her host. First published in 1953, and now newly introduced by Patricia Little, this unique portrait depicts Weil through the eyes of her friends, not as a strange and unaccountable genius but as an ardent and very human young person in search of truth and knowledge. (shrink)
Showing a very early interest in Descartes, after having first considered him as a Christian thinker in the perspective of a deconstruction of religious life, Heidegger soon regards him as the major obstacle to the phenomenological analyses he wants to develop, as part of the first ontological search he gave himself: that of a hermeneutics of facticity. Therefore, the latter immediately takes in his work the shape of a hermeneutics of the I think, therefore I am, its author being blamed (...) for having entirely ignored the sense of being in the I am, focused as he is on the thinking ego, the ins and outs of which he develops. But the criticism also applying to Husserl, it is by laying the blame on his master, that Heidegger intends to radicalize the project of his own master, hence the necessity to throw light on the origin and the foundations of what we can call the Cartesian question in Heidegger. (shrink)
The clinical and para-clinical examination of residual self-consciousness in non-communicative severely brain damaged patients remains exceptionally challenging. Passive presentation of the patient’s own name and own face are known to be effective attention-grabbing stimuli when clinically assessing consciousness at the patient’s bedside. Event-related potential and functional neuroimaging studies using such self-referential stimuli are currently being used to disentangle the cognitive hierarchy of self-processing. We here review neuropsychological, neuropathological, electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies using the own name and own face paradigm obtained (...) in conscious waking, sleep, pharmacological coma, pathological coma and related disorders of consciousness. Based on these results we discuss what we currently do and do not know about the functional significance of the neural network involved in “automatic” and “conscious” self-referential processing. (shrink)
Although episodic memory is a widely studied form of memory both in philosophy and psychology, it still raises many burning questions regarding its definition and even its acceptance. Over the last two decades, cross-disciplinary discussions between these two fields have increased as they tackle shared concerns, such as the phenomenology of recollection, and therefore allow for fruitful interaction. This editorial introduction aims to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date presentation of the main existing conceptions and issues on the topic. After delineating (...) Tulving’s chief theoretical import and multifaceted legacy, it goes on to chart the different attempts to capture the episodicity feature of memory according to three categories: a first approach aims to show the cognitive abilities required for a subject to episodically remember; the second defines episodicity as a stage-specific feature; the last explains episodicity in terms of the epistemological properties of episodic memory. This state of the art thereby sets the stage for the contributions of the present volume, which will be introduced in conclusion. (shrink)
This paper argues that there exists a Heideggerian antonomology and this not only in the broad sense of a simple study, but also in the strict sense of a full doctrine of personal pronouns. Traversing the whole of Heidegger’s work, I reconstitute the framework of this antonomology, from the connection of mineness and ipseity, to the difference between the I and the Self within the precedence of the latter over the former. I then rehearse its drama, from the They who (...) answers the question of the who of Dasein to the We who asks the question of the who of man. (shrink)
On the occasion of its recent centennial, we trace the remarkable history of Herbert Spencer's 2,240 page Principles of Sociology , the most inductive, systematic, and comprehensive study of human society ever attempted. Spencer's bold aim was to establish empirically and then to explain (after the manner of the natural sciences) the 'relations of co-existence and sequence' among social phenomena. The database ('mass of evidence') required was so vast that it was published as a separate work, some eight folio volumes (...) called Descriptive Sociology . A major force in the making of both scientific sociology and anthropology in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Spencer's magnum opus was all but lost to these fields by the early decades of the twentieth century. The present generation, however, is witnessing a growing revival of interest in Spencer's thought. For many, his confident vision of a natural science of society still offers the best hope for understanding human societies and how they have come to be as they are. (shrink)
We present a short introduction to, and the first English language translation of, Theodor W. Adorno's 1964 article, "Meinungsforschung und Öffentlichkeit." In this article, Adorno situates the misunderstanding of public opinion within a dialectic of elements of publicness itself: empirical publicness' dependence on a normative ideology of publicness, and modern publicness' tendency to undermine its own principles. He also locates it in the dual role of mass media as both fora for the expression of opinion and, as he calls them, (...) "organs of public opinion." The introduction provides a discussion of Adorno's reception in the American academy, arguing that contemporary sociological practice should be concerned with the problems Adorno raises. We suggest that Adorno's relegation to the fields of philosophy and aesthetics belies his relevance to empirical sociological research. (shrink)
Loin d’être circonscrit à Sein und Zeit , dont il est un motif central de l’analytique existentiale, le On heideggérien — das Man — n’est ni une notion ordinaire, ni un hapax arbitraire. Comme tout concept philosophique, il possède une histoire que son auteur ne cesse d’ailleurs d’écrire avant la publication de son œuvre majeure. S’y employant dès 1922, dans le cadre de l’herméneutique de la vie facticielle, il s’en détache pourtant en 1927 pour, de fait, y renoncer définitivement. Animé (...) du désir d’en faire mieux comprendre le sens, en nous appuyant sur ses occurrences, c’est le devenir de ce motif singulier que, de sa naissance à son évanescence, nous aimerions retracer. (shrink)
Relations between J. A. C. Chaptal, pioneer of heavy chemical industry in France, and A. L. Lavoisier, reformer of chemical theory, are examined in the light of unpublished correspondence they exchanged in the period 1784–1790. The letters, together with Chaptal's early publications, allow a reconstruction of his conversion to Lavoisier's antiphlogistic chemistry. They also reveal a series of petitions that Chaptal made to Lavoisier, in the latter's official capacity as a director of the Régie des poudres et salpêtres, for relief (...) from the controlled price of saltpetre for his acid works in Languedoc. Finally, the relationship is explored as a window on the interplay between chemical theory and industrial practice during the period of the Industrial Revolution. (shrink)
This contribution provides theoretical insights into a planned dissertation project which discusses the mass media as a stakeholder of a company, suggesting that a complex understanding of the mass media, their public-sphere function and their mode of operation is crucial for analyzing the media’s role in conferring corporate legitimacy. Terms such as ‘corporate citizen’ or ‘stakeholder democracy’ or the notion of corporations as civil or political actors imply a link to the public sphere, which in modern democracies is primarily constituted (...) through the mass media. However, up to now, there has been hardly any discussion about the role of the mass media and the public sphere in the realm of stakeholder theory. (shrink)
What does it mean to ‘make love?’ Or, rather, what are we doing when we ‘make love?’ This expression makes of love a praxis on which the history of philosophy, rather modest, has said little. Philosophy has certainly evoked love, but always as a passion, an emotion, a feeling, and rarely as an action, exercise or even as a test. It is this aspect of the issue that it is important to study in order to determine it. At bottom, only (...) a definition will be in question. (shrink)
Although Sartre denounces Descartes' two principles, he nevertheless draws inspiration from him. No doubt this is close to being paradoxical; we shall have to be no less paradoxical in our explanation. For although the text entitled “Cartesian Freedom,” which introduces a volume of selections from Descartes, , confers some coherence on this apparent non-sense, once the texts surrounding this work have been taken into account, we have to conclude not only that this text predates , even though it was published (...) afterwards, but that it is a collection of Descartes' writings on Sartre, even though it is a writing by Sartre on Descartes. For beyond the Sartrean analysis of the Cartesian analyses of the , we find Sartre's existential psychoanalysis of his predecessor, in which takes place not a transference, but a counter-transference. French S'il déclame contre les deux principes qui sont ceux de Descartes, Sartre se réclame pourtant de lui. Sans doute n'est-il pas à un paradoxe près. Reste qu'il nous faudra ne pas l'être moins pour expliquer le sien. Car certes, le sens du texte qu'il intitule « La li berté cartésienne » et qui articule ce volume de morceaux choisis qu'est Descartes 1596-1650 confère quelque cohérence à cet apparent non-sens. Mais une fois présenté de cette œuvre le paratexte, il nous faudra affirmer non seulement que celle-ci se lit avant L'être et le néant quoiqu'elle ait été publiée après, mais, plus encore, qu'elle est un ensemble d'écrits de Descartes sur Sartre quoiqu'elle soit un écrit de Sartre sur Descartes. C'est qu'outre l'analyse sartrienne des analyses cartésiennes de la Méditation quatrième , on y trouve une psychanalyse existentielle par l'auteur de son devancier, à l'occasion de laquelle a lieu non pas un transfert, mais un contre-transfert. (shrink)
Corporate success is understood as stakeholder value, which is based on three licenses: the licenses to innovate, to compete, and to operate. Stakeholders contribute to these three licenses through their benefit and risk potentials. Based on four cases, a stakeholder value management system is developed which provides managers with a tool to systematically use the benefit potentials that lie in stakeholder relations. The links between corporate value creation and stakeholders are identified.
Both the USA and Europe limit access to care by undocumented immigrants. In the debate over what level of access to confer to IMs, there are various public policy rationales operating either explicitly, or below the surface, ranging from minimalist humanitarianism to full cosmopolitan equality, with several intermediate positions between these two poles. This article informs the international debate by providing a conceptual mapping of these underlying policy rationales. Each position is based on different lines of reasoning or bodies of (...) evidence, and each leads to somewhat different conclusions about the extent to which IMs should have access to different types of health care. It is unlikely that broad consensus will be achieved in this ongoing debate. However, by articulating the ethical, legal, pragmatic and conceptual reasons to support or oppose various positions, we hope to help determine where in the landscape of reasoned argument various positions lie, and how each position might be best supported or refuted. In particular, we see in this debate an illustration of Michael Walzer’s classic analysis of competing spheres of justice. Various positions depend to a considerable extent on whether their advocates approach this issue from the health policy sphere rather than the sphere of immigration policy, or whether they attempt to blend the two spheres. (shrink)
The history of philosophy would not have needed to wait for Heidegger if Hegel had taught us that the transformation from hypokeimenon to subiectum introduced by Descartes is due to the transformation from truth to certainty, which he introduces too. So, taking for subject this certainty, which makes the certainty of subject, we aim to understand that before the truth of man was distorted, the truth itself? the ontological and antepredicative truth, i.e. aletheia? was with him.
Cet article opère une comparaison des théories de la proposition — entendue dans sa double dimension sémantique et gnoséologique — du Wittgenstein des Philosophische Bemerkungen et du Russell de The Analysis of Mind . Après avoir rappelé le statut sémantique nouveau que ces théories accordent au temps en intégrant le fait qu’un délai sépare, pour un grand nombre de nos énoncés, leur occurrence et leur vérification , il établit que la notion d’attente est chargée, chez Wittgenstein comme chez Russell , (...) de combler cet écart temporel. Mais — c’est le deuxième point — une notion différente est mobilisée par chacun de ces deux auteurs, et dans un projet théorique à chaque fois différent : alors que Wittgenstein vise à étendre la notion tractatuséenne de relation interne aux relations sémantiques temporelles et à défendre un intentionnalisme logique, Russell cherche au contraire à soutenir une conception externaliste de ces relations de façon à faire droit aux cas où elles sont non-intentionnelles. Pour cela, Wittgenstein adopte un concept appelé ici « intentionnel » de l’attente, alors que Russell s’appuie sur un concept dit « non-intentionnel ». Une conséquence majeure de cette différence — c’est le troisième point — est que la célèbre critique par Wittgenstein de l’analyse russellienne de l’attente se révèle être largement erronée dans la mesure où elle se donne pour cible un concept qui n’est pas celui de Russell. Le quatrième point défendu par l’article est qu’une fois rétabli le concept de Russell, l’externalisme que celui-ci défend est doté d’arguments susceptibles de contrer efficacement la position internaliste et intentionnaliste de Wittgenstein.This paper carries out a comparison between the theories of the proposition — in its semantical and epistemic significance — elaborated respectively by Wittgenstein in Philosophische Bemerkungen and by Russell in The Analysis of Mind . Having recalled that time is endowed with a new semantical status by both theories through acknowledging there is a lapse between many of our utterances and their verification , it brings out that the notion of Erwartung by Wittgenstein and the notion of expectation by Russell are meant to bridge this temporal gap. But — this is the second point — those two notions have two different meanings and they belong to a different theoretical framework by each of those authors : while Wittgenstein’s goal is to extend the Tractarian notion of internal relations to temporal semantic relations in order to support a logical version of intentionalism, Russell aims at favoring an externalist view of those relations and to put forward cases in which they are non-intentional. For these respective purposes, the Erwartung notion elaborated by Wittgenstein is a “intentional” notion, whereas the notion of expectation that Russell adopts is a “non-intentional” notion. One chief consequence of this difference — this is the third point — is that Wittgenstein’s famous criticism of Russell’s analysis of expectation falls short because it targets a notion that is not Russell’s own notion. The fourth point of the paper is that acknowledging Russell’s notion provides externalism with some strong arguments to counter Wittgenstein’s internalist and intentionalist position. (shrink)
Este artigo enfoca a questão da temporalidade no período intermediário de Wittgenstein. Primeiro, ele estabelece a evolução do tratamento que o filósofo dispensa à idéia “fenomenológica”, de origem empirista, de um presente da consciência incessantemente fluente: de início simplesmente adotada (em 1929) como uma descrição da experiência imediata, essa idéia é, em seguida, criticada em 1930-32 como a expressão de uma das tentações mais características do espírito filosófico. Depois, o artigo examina, num caso particular (o da lembrança), o modo pelo (...) qual Wittgenstein lida com os efeitos desse mito na reflexão filosófica. Endereçada sobretudo à concepção russelliana de 1921 da intencionalidade mnemônica, a crítica wittgensteiniana consiste em trazer à luz as confusões que levam a crer que a lembrança só pode manter uma relação externa com seu objeto. Ao restabelecer assim o papel das relações internas, Wittgenstein pretende romper o feitiço do mito do presente sobre a filosofia da memória. (shrink)
What is needed now is a critical method which does justice to an evangelist's literary activity and yet moves beyond concern for authorial activity and theology to include a concern for the text of the Gospel as a totality.
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I carry out an application of the debate between simulationism and theory theory to the issue of episodic memory. I first criticize the approach favored by the theory theory. Then I advance a simulationist conception of the relationship between the phenomenology of episodic memory and its specific kind of self-consciousness. On my view, subjectivity belongs to the very content of episodic memory, not as an element of its content, but as the perspective it gives to the (...) content that makes the simulation of past experience possible. In support of that view, I provide an analysis inspired by J. Perry of the semantics of de se thought. It gives the remembering subject a non-representational presence in the mnesic content. RÉSUMÉ: Dans cette étude, je propose d’appliquer au cas du souvenir épisodique le débat qui oppose le simulationnisme à l’approche théorie-théorique. Après avoir critiqué l’approche théorie-théorique, je défends une solution simulationniste du problème du rapport entre la phénoménologie du souvenir épisodique et la conscience de soi qui s’y manifeste. Je soutiens que la subjectivité s’introduit dans le contenu même du souvenir épisodique, mais qu’elle le fait non pas en tant qu’élément du contenu mais sous la forme du caractère perspectif qu’elle donne à celui-ci et qui permet la simulation de l’expérience passée. À l’appui de cette thèse, je procède à une analyse sémantique inspirée par J. Perry des pensées de se qui confère au sujet du souvenir épisodique une inhérence non-représentationnelle au contenu mnésique. (shrink)
Tenue par Heidegger pour un concept fondamental de la métaphysique et pourtant tue le plus souvent dans ses travaux publics, la solitude intrigue. Arpentant son chemin de pensée moins en historien de la philosophie qu’en géographe, nous suivrons donc dans son œuvre le chemin de traverse que nous semble constituer ce motif. De la nécessaire solitude du penseur à la salutaire solitude de l’homme en passant par la solitude sociale du Dasein , pourra ainsi être recomposée une conception exigeante de (...) la solitude ( Einsamkeit ) qui la distingue et de l’isolement ( Vereinsamung ), et de l’être-seul ( Alleinsein ), pour la faire désigner finalement un certain esseulement ( Vereinzelung ), permettant à l’étant que nous sommes de s’approcher au plus près de son être, comme de l’être lui-même. (shrink)
For some fifteen years in his chemistry lectures in Edinburgh, Joseph Black taught that phlogiston possesses absolute levity. It was not an aberration on Black's part: he justified the notion on experimental grounds. Moreover, the existence of a nongravitating substance capable of entering the composition of bodies raised intriguing possibilities for uniting physical and chemical phenomena. The doctrine became something of a tradition in Edinburgh, but was subject to growing criticism, particulary with the growth of pneumatic chemistry. By the early (...) 1780s, Black found the hypothesis was no longer tenable and quietly dropped it, leaving a void in the explanation of weight relations in combustion which his students were quick to fill with Lavoisier's oxygen theory. (shrink)