18 found
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  1. In Defense of Objectivism About Moral Obligation.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):88-115.
    There is a debate in normative ethics about whether or not our moral obligations depend solely on either our evidence concerning, or our beliefs about, the world. Subjectivists maintain that they do and objectivists maintain that they do not. I shall offer some arguments in support of objectivism and respond to the strongest argument for subjectivism. I shall also briefly consider the significance of my discussion to the debate over whether one’s future voluntary actions are relevant to one’s current moral (...)
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  2. A Sketch of a Theory of Moral Blameworthiness.Peter A. Graham - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):388-409.
    In this paper I sketch an account of moral blame and blameworthiness. I begin by clarifying what I take blame to be and explaining how blameworthiness is to be analyzed in terms of it. I then consider different accounts of the conditions of blameworthiness and, in the end, settle on one according to which a person is blameworthy for φ-ing just in case, in φ-ing, she violates one of a particular class of moral requirements governing the attitudes we bear, and (...)
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  3.  31
    Deontological Decision Theory and Lesser-Evil Options.Seth Lazar & Peter A. Graham - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
    Normative ethical theories owe us an account of how to evaluate decisions under risk and uncertainty. Deontologists seem at a disadvantage here: our best decision theories seem tailor-made for consequentialism. For example, decision theory enjoins us to always perform our best option; deontology is more permissive. In this paper, we discuss and defend the idea that, when some pro-tanto wrongful act is all-things considered permissible, because it is a ‘lesser evil’, it is often merely permissible, by the lights of deontology. (...)
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  4. A Defense of Local Miracle Compatibilism.Peter A. Graham - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):65 - 82.
    David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.
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  5. Fischer on Blameworthiness and “Ought” Implies “Can”.Peter A. Graham - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):63-80.
    I argue that Fischer’s attempts to undermine the “Ought” Implies “Can” principle (OIC) fail. I argue both against his construal of the natural motivation for OIC and against his argument for the falsity of OIC. I also consider some attempts to salvage Fischer’s arguments and argue that they can work only if the true moral theory is motive determinative--i.e., it is such that, necessarily, any action performed from a motive which renders one of the blame emotions appropriate is morally impermissible, (...)
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  6. Against the Mind Argument.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):273-294.
    The Mind Argument is an argument for the incompatibility of indeterminism and anyone's having a choice about anything that happens. Peter van Inwagen rejects the Mind Argument not because he is able to point out the flaw in it, but because he accepts both that determinism is incompatible with anyone's having a choice about anything that happens and that it is possible for someone to have a choice about something that happens. In this paper I first diagnose and clear up (...)
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  7.  47
    The Numbers Count.Peter A. Graham - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):129-134.
    Numbers Skeptics deny that when faced with a choice between saving some innocent people from harm and saving a larger number of different, though equally innocent, people from suffering a similar harm you ought to save the larger number. In this article, I aim to put pressure on Numbers Skepticism.
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  8.  52
    Warfield on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom.Peter A. Graham - 2008 - Faith and Philosophy 25 (1):75-78.
    Warfield (1997, 2000) argues that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible. He assumes for conditional proof that there is a necessarilyexistent omniscient being. He also assumes that it is possible for there to be a person who both does something and could have avoided doing it. As supportfor this latter premise he points to the fact that nearly every participant to the debate accepts the falsity of logical fatalism. Appealing to this consensus, however, renders the argument question-begging, for that (...)
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  9.  45
    An Argument for Objective Possibilism.Peter A. Graham - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
  10.  88
    Avoidable Harm.Peter A. Graham - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):175-199.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  11.  73
    Blame: Its Nature and Norms by D Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini.Peter A. Graham - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):181-183.
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  12.  31
    Fiona Woollard, Doing and Allowing Harm , Pp. 239.Peter A. Graham - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (3):369-373.
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  13.  35
    M.S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics.Peter A. Graham - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):244-246.
  14.  26
    “Secondary Permissibility” and the Ethics of Harming.Peter A. Graham - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (2):156-177.
    There is a moral phenomenon of “Secondary Permissibility” in which an otherwise morally impermissible option is made morally permissible by the presence of another option. In this paper I explain how this phenomenon works and argue that understanding how it works suggests a new model for the structure of the ethics of harming.
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  15.  4
    Subjective Versus Objective Moral Wrongness.Peter A. Graham - 2021 - Cambridge University Press.
    There is presently a debate between Subjectivists and Objectivists about moral wrongness. Subjectivism is the view that the moral status of our actions, whether they are morally wrong or not, is grounded in our subjective circumstances – either our beliefs about, or our evidence concerning, the world around us. Objectivism, on the other hand, is the view that the moral status of our actions is grounded in our objective circumstances – all those facts other than those which comprise our subjective (...)
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  16.  40
    Two Arguments for Objectivism About Moral Permissibility.Peter A. Graham - forthcoming - Tandf: Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
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  17.  20
    Two Arguments for Objectivism About Moral Permissibility.Peter A. Graham - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):100-113.
    ABSTRACT Is what we’re morally permitted to do grounded in our subjective situation? Subjectivists maintain that it is. Objectivists deny this. I shall offer two arguments for Objectivism about moral permissibility.
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  18. The Standard Argument for Blame Incompatibilism.Peter A. Graham - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):697-726.
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