4 found
Peter A. Sutton [4]Peter Andrew Sutton [1]
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Peter A. Sutton
Virginia Union University
  1. Moore's "New" Open Question Argument.Peter A. Sutton - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):681-693.
    For more than 100 years, metaethicists have overlooked the best version of G. E. Moore’s Open Question argument. This despite the fact that it appears on the same page of Principia Ethica as his other, weaker versions of the argument. This better Open Question Argument does not rely on introspection of the meanings of ethical terms, and so does not fall to the standard criticisms of Moore. In this paper, I present this ‘new’ Open Question Argument and show that Moore (...)
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  2. Biting Gaunilo's Bullet.Peter A. Sutton - manuscript
    Gaunilo assumes that there is no greatest conceivable island, and most philosophers have followed him in this assumption. But the option was open for Anselm (and remains open for us) to bite the bullet and ‘give him his island.’ I argue that such a response is perfectly reasonable for a Platonist like Anselm, and that even a theist who isn’t a Platonist can tolerate the island as a fairly minor addition his or her ontology.
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  3. "Weeping Angels and Many Worlds".Peter A. Sutton - 2015 - In Courtland Lewis Paula Smithka (ed.), More Doctor Who and Philosophy. Open Court Press. pp. 69-76.
    The Doctor, like many time-travelers, often finds himself in the midst of a causal loop. Events in the future cause events in the past, which in turn cause the future events. There is a worry that a person in this situation could never have true libertarian freedom: facts about the past entail their future actions, so they couldn't do otherwise than they in fact do. -/- In this paper, I argue that there are logically coherent (though perhaps unlikely!) ways of (...)
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  4. Why the Comparative Utility Argument Is a Red Herring.Peter A. Sutton - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (4):499-506.
    The comparative utility argument holds that the descendants of African slaves in America are not owed any compensation because they have not been harmed by slavery. Rather, slavery in America was beneficial to the descendants of slaves because they are now able to live in a country that is considerably richer today than any of the African countries from which slaves were taken. In this paper, I show that the comparative utility argument is a red herring with no bearing whatsoever (...)
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