Der Essay geht der Frage nach, ob es eine besondere, methodisch einheitliche Art der Philosophie gibt, die man mit gutem Grund ‚Analytische Philosophie’ nennen könnte. Als Beispiele werden Kriterien wie Klarheit, gedankliche Übersicht und das Gewicht von Argumenten besprochen. Das Ergebnis der Suche ist negativ. Die These lautet, dass die interessante analytische Philosophie nicht deshalb interessant ist, weil sie analytisch ist, sondern weil sie gute Philosophie ist.

Jakmile někdo začne mluvit o „analytické filosofii“, vytváří tím dojem, jako kdyby existoval nějaký zvláštní druh filosofie, kterou lze odlišit od ostatních druhů, a to pomocí jisté metody, tzv. „analýzy“. Otázky, které si chci v této souvislosti položit, znějí následovně: O jaké názory se opírá představa, že skutečně existuje takovýto zvláštní druh filosofie? Které z nich je třeba považovat za neopodstatněná dogmata a u kterých se naopak jedná o opravdové myšlenky? A konečně: V jakém světle se nám filosofie ukáže, když (...) dogmata zavrhneme a přidržíme se myšlenek? (shrink)

Dignity is humanitys most prized possession. We experience the loss of dignity as a terrible humiliation: when we lose our dignity we feel deprived of something without which life no longer seems worth living. But what exactly is this trait that we value so highly? In this important new book, distinguished philosopher Peter Bieri looks afresh at the notion of human dignity. In contrast to most traditional views, he argues that dignity is not an innate quality of human beings or (...) a right that we possess by virtue of being human. Rather, dignity is a certain way to lead ones life. It is a pattern of thought, experience and action – in other words, a way of living. In Bieris account, there are three key dimensions to dignity as a way of living. The first is the way I am treated by others: they can treat me in a way that leaves my dignity intact or they can destroy my dignity. The second dimension concerns the way that I treat other people: do I treat them in a way that allows me to live a dignified life? The third dimension concerns the view that I have of myself: which ways of seeing and treating myself allow me to maintain a sense of dignity? In the actual flow of day-to-day life these three dimensions of dignity are often interwoven, and this accounts in part for the complexity of the situations and experiences in which our dignity is at stake. So, why did we invent dignity and what role does it play in our lives? As thinking and acting beings, our lives are fragile and constantly under threat. A dignified way of living, argues Bieri, is humanitys way of coping with this threat. In our constantly endangered lives, it is important to stand our ground with confidence. Thus a dignified way of living is not any way of living: it is a particular way of responding to the existential experience of being under threat. It is also a particular way of answering the question: What kind of life do we wish to live? This beautifully written reflection on our most cherished human value will be of interest to a wide readership. (shrink)

Most analyses of our mental states in analytical philosophy rest on a particular conception of experience, which we can call the nominalist conception. Absent from this conception is what is traditionally called the inner experience of mental states. Any attempt to describe this inner experience inevitably comes into conflict with the nominalist conception of experience. I believe both that the nominalist conception is the right conception of experience, and that there is inner experience of mental states. Hence I see a (...) problem. It is this problem which I will develop in what follows. (shrink)

Most analyses of our mental states in analytical philosophy rest on a particular conception of experience, which we can call the nominalist conception. Absent from this conception is what is traditionally called the inner experience of mental states. Any attempt to describe this inner experience inevitably comes into conflict with the nominalist conception of experience. I believe both that the nominalist conception is the right conception of experience, and that there is inner experience of mental states. Hence I see a (...) problem. It is this problem which I will develop in what follows. (shrink)