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Peter D. Klein [49]Peter David Klein [1]
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Peter Klein
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
  1. Useful False Beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--63.
  2.  24
    Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):225.
  3. Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:297-325.
  4. Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1981 - University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
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  5.  28
    Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):297-325.
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  6. Reply to Ginet.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  7. What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166-171.
    There are many things that could be wrong with foundationalism. For example, some have claimed that a so-called basic belief cannot be both 1) a reason for non-basic beliefs and 2) such that it cannot be provided with at least prima facie justification. If something is a reason, they say, then that something has to be a proposition and if it is a proposition, then it is the kind of thing that requires a reason in order to be even prima (...)
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  8. A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
  9. Certainty.Peter D. Klein - 1998 - In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
     
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  10.  23
    Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):108-116.
  11. How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Press. pp. 75--94.
  12. Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Epistemology 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  13. Epistemology.Peter D. Klein - 1998 - In Craig Edward (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1998.
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  14. Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility.Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
  15. Infinitism.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 245-256.
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  16.  86
    Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):108 - 116.
  17.  76
    Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):153-172.
    O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com as teorias daqueles que sustentam 1) que o conhecimento requer certeza e que uma tal forma (...)
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  18.  27
    How to Get Certain Knowledge From Fallible Justification.Peter D. Klein - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):395-412.
    “Real knowledge,” as I use the term, is the most highly prized form of true belief sought by an epistemic agent. This paper argues that defeasible infinitism provides a good way to characterize real knowledge and it shows how real knowledge can arise from fallible justification. Then, I argue that there are two ways of interpreting Ernest Sosa's account of real knowledge as belief that is aptly formed and capable of being fully defended. On the one hand, if beliefs are (...)
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  19. Infinitism is the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  20. The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Acta Analytica 15 (24):7-24.
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  21.  30
    Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  22.  51
    Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Diego Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer.
  23. Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. de Gruyter. pp. 487-508.
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  24.  96
    Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification.Peter D. Klein - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.
  25. Infinitism in Epistemology.Peter D. Klein & John Turri - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Infinitism in Epistemology. This article provides an overview of infinitism in epistemology. Infinitism is a family of views in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. It contrasts naturally with coherentism and foundationalism. All three views agree that knowledge or justification requires an appropriately structured chain of reasons. What form may such a […].
     
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  26. Misleading "Misleading Defeaters".Peter D. Klein - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
  27. Radical Interpretation and Global Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1986 - In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  28.  16
    What Makes Knowledge the Most Highly Prized Form of True Belief?Peter D. Klein - 2012 - In Tim Black & Kelly Becker (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology.
    This chapter provides grounds for thinking that it is the quality of the reasons for the propositional content of our belief-states with true propositional contents, rather than the etiology of those belief-states, that determines whether the belief-state qualifies as knowledge. Normative epistemology rather than naturalized epistemology holds the key to understanding knowledge. This chapter delineates some important features of epistemic luck. It explores the etiology view and presents reasons for concluding that it cannot adequately account for epistemic luck. The chapter (...)
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  29. Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism and Defeasibility.Peter D. Klein - 1996 - In Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield.
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  30. 30. There is No Good Reason to Be an Academic Skeptic.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 299.
  31. Real Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief (...)
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  32. Ascent and Assent?Peter D. Klein - 2004 - In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics.
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  33. Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.Peter D. Klein - 1986 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
  34. On Behalf of the Skeptic.Peter D. Klein - 1987 - In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Rowman & Littlefield.
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  35.  89
    The Private Language Argument and the Sense-Datum Theory.Peter D. Klein - 1969 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):325-343.
  36. Epistemic Compatibilism and Cannonical Beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 1990 - In Roth Michael & Ross Glenn (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  37. Knowledge is True, Non-Defeated Justified Belief.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Luper Steven (ed.), Essential Knowledge. :ongman.
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  38.  30
    Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 281--297.
  39.  18
    Keith Lehrer: Profiles. [REVIEW]Peter D. Klein - 1983 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (3):409-419.
  40.  35
    Theprivate Language Argument Andthesense-Datum Theory.Peter D. Klein - 1969 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):325-343.
  41.  17
    Reply to Professor Odegard.Peter D. Klein - 1982 - Philosophical Books 23 (4):409-19.
  42. Review of Armstrong's Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Philosophical Review, 85.2 1976, 225-227. [REVIEW]Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Philosophical Review 82 (5):225-227.
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  43. Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem.Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter D. Klein (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.
     
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  44. Closure.Peter D. Klein - 1995 - In Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
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  45. Contemporary Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1992, 2010 - In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companion ti Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  46. Recent Publications.Peter D. Klein - 1983 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (3):421.
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  47. Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1992, 2010 - In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companiion to Epistemology.
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  48. Self-Profile.Peter D. Klein - 2010 - Blackwell Companion to Epistemology.
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  49. Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism.John Turri & Peter D. Klein (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume presents new work on infinitism, the view that there are no foundational reasons for beliefs--an ancient view in epistemology, now growing again in popularity. Leading epistemologists illuminate its strengths and weaknesses, and address questions new and old about justification, reasoning, responsibility, disagreement, and trust.
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