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Peter D. Klein [51]Peter David Klein [1]
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Profile: Peter Klein (Rutgers University - New Brunswick)
  1. Useful False Beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--63.
  2. Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.
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  3. Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1981 - University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
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  4. Reply to Ginet.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  5. A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
  6. What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166–171.
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  7.  6
    Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Peter D. Klein & D. M. Armstrong - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):225.
  8. How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Press. pp. 75--94.
     
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  9. Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility.Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
  10. Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Epistemology 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  11. Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. de Gruyter. pp. 487-508.
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  12. Certainty.Peter D. Klein - 1998 - In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
     
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  13.  62
    Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):108 - 116.
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  14.  4
    Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):108-116.
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  15.  57
    Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):153-172.
    O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com as teorias daqueles que sustentam 1) que o conhecimento requer certeza e que uma tal forma (...)
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  16. The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Acta Analytica 15 (24):7-24.
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  17.  70
    Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification.Peter D. Klein - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.
  18.  91
    Misleading "Misleading Defeaters".Peter D. Klein - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
  19. Ascent and Assent?Peter D. Klein - 2004 - In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics.
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  20. Infinitism is the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  21. Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.Peter D. Klein - 1986 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
  22.  71
    Infinitism in Epistemology.Peter D. Klein & John Turri - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Infinitism in Epistemology This article provides an overview of infinitism in epistemology. Infinitism is a family of views in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. It contrasts naturally with coherentism and foundationalism. All three views agree that knowledge or justification requires an appropriately structured chain of reasons. What form may such a […].
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  23. Epistemology.Peter D. Klein - 1998 - In Craig Edward (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1998.
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  24.  88
    Real Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief (...)
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  25. Infinitism.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 245-256.
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  26. Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1984 - Noûs 18 (3):531-533.
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  27.  37
    Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Diego Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer.
  28.  9
    Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):297-325.
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  29.  69
    The Private Language Argument and the Sense-Datum Theory.Peter D. Klein - 1969 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):325-343.
  30.  1
    Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (4):560-565.
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  31. 30. There is No Good Reason to Be an Academic Skeptic.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 299.
  32.  25
    Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 281--297.
  33. Epistemic Compatibilism and Cannonical Beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 1990 - In Roth Michael & Ross Glenn (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  34. Radical Interpretation and Global Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1986 - In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  35.  11
    Reply to Professor Odegard.Peter D. Klein - 1982 - Philosophical Books 23 (4):409-19.
  36.  18
    Theprivate Language Argument Andthesense-Datum Theory.Peter D. Klein - 1969 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):325-343.
  37.  3
    Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  38.  2
    What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166-171.
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  39. Review of Armstrong's Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Philosophical Review, 85.2 1976, 225-227. [REVIEW]Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Philosophical Review 82 (5):225-227.
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  40.  1
    What Makes Knowledge the Most Highly Prized Form of True Belief?Peter D. Klein - 2012 - In Tim Black & Kelly Becker (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology.
    This chapter provides grounds for thinking that it is the quality of the reasons for the propositional content of our belief-states with true propositional contents, rather than the etiology of those belief-states, that determines whether the belief-state qualifies as knowledge. Normative epistemology rather than naturalized epistemology holds the key to understanding knowledge. This chapter delineates some important features of epistemic luck. It explores the etiology view and presents reasons for concluding that it cannot adequately account for epistemic luck. The chapter (...)
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  41. Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem.Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter D. Klein (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    This is an edited collection of twenty-three (23) new papers on the Gettier Problem and the issues connected with it. The set of authors includes many of the major figures in contemporary epistemology who have developed some of the well-known responses to the Problem, and the list contains some younger epistemologists who bring new perspectives to the issues raised in the literature. Together, they cover the state of the art scholarship on virtually every epistemological and methodological aspect of the Gettier (...)
     
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  42. Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem.Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter D. Klein (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.
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  43. Closure.Peter D. Klein - 1995 - In Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
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  44. Contemporary Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1992, 2010 - In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companion ti Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  45. Knowledge is True, Non-Defeated Justified Belief.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Luper Steven (ed.), Essential Knowledge. :ongman.
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  46. "Keith Lehrer: Profiles" by Radu J. Bogdan, Editor. [REVIEW]Peter D. Klein - 1983 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (3):409.
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  47. On Behalf of the Skeptic.Peter D. Klein - 1987 - In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Rowman & Littlefield.
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  48. Recent Publications.Peter D. Klein - 1983 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (3):421.
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  49. Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1992, 2010 - In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companiion to Epistemology.
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  50. Self-Profile.Peter D. Klein - 2010 - Blackwell Companion to Epistemology.
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