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Peter Eldridge-Smith
Australian National University
  1.  31
    Two Paradoxes of Satisfaction.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2015 - Mind 124 (493):85-119.
    There are two paradoxes of satisfaction, and they are of different kinds. The classic satisfaction paradox is a version of Grelling’s: does ‘does not satisfy itself’ satisfy itself? The Unsatisfied paradox finds a predicate, P, such that Px if and only if x does not satisfy that predicate: paradox results for any x. The two are intuitively different as their predicates have different paradoxical extensions. Analysis reduces each paradoxical argument to differing rule sets, wherein their respective pathologies lie. Having different (...)
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  2. Paradoxes and Hypodoxes of Time Travel.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2007 - In Jan Lloyd Jones, Paul Campbell & Peter Wylie (eds.), Art and Time. Australian Scholarly Publishing. pp. 172--189.
    I distinguish paradoxes and hypodoxes among the conundrums of time travel. I introduce ‘hypodoxes’ as a term for seemingly consistent conundrums that seem to be related to various paradoxes, as the Truth-teller is related to the Liar. In this article, I briefly compare paradoxes and hypodoxes of time travel with Liar paradoxes and Truth-teller hypodoxes. I also discuss Lewis’ treatment of time travel paradoxes, which I characterise as a Laissez Faire theory of time travel. Time travel paradoxes are impossible according (...)
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  3.  15
    The Liar Hypodox: A Truth-Teller’s Guide to Defusing Proofs of the Liar Paradox.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2019 - Open Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):152-171.
    It seems that the Truth-teller is either true or false, but there is no accepted principle determining which it is. From this point of view, the Truth-teller is a hypodox. A hypodox is a conundrum like a paradox, but consistent. Sometimes, accepting an additional principle will convert a hypodox into a paradox. Conversely, in some cases, retracting or restricting a principle will convert a paradox to a hypodox. This last point suggests a new method of avoiding inconsistency. This article provides (...)
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  4.  9
    Two Fallacies in Proofs of the Liar Paradox.Peter Eldridge-Smith - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-20.
    At some step in proving the Liar Paradox in natural language, a sentence is derived that seems overdetermined with respect to its semantic value. This is complemented by Tarski’s Theorem that a formal language cannot consistently contain a naive truth predicate given the laws of logic used in proving the Liar paradox. I argue that proofs of the Eubulidean Liar either use a principle of truth with non-canonical names in a fallacious way or make a fallacious use of substitution of (...)
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    Pinocchio Against the Semantic Hierarchies.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):817-830.
    The Liar paradox is an obstacle to a theory of truth, but a Liar sentence need not contain a semantic predicate. The Pinocchio paradox, devised by Veronique Eldridge-Smith, was the first published paradox to show this. Pinocchio’s nose grows if, and only if, what Pinocchio is saying is untrue. What happens if Pinocchio says that his nose is growing? Eldridge-Smith and Eldridge-Smith : 212-5, 2010) posed the Pinocchio paradox against the Tarskian-Kripkean solutions to the Liar paradox that use language hierarchies. (...)
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  6. The Pinocchio Paradox.Peter Eldridge-Smith & Veronique Eldridge-Smith - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):212-215.
    The Pinocchio paradox, devised by Veronique Eldridge-Smith in February 2001, is a counter-example to solutions to the Liar that restrict the use or definition of semantic predicates. Pinocchio’s nose grows if and only if what he is stating is false, and Pinocchio says ‘My nose is growing’. In this statement, ‘is growing’ has its normal meaning and is not a semantic predicate. If Pinocchio’s nose is growing it is because he is saying something false; otherwise, it is not growing. ‘Because’ (...)
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  7. Pinocchio Beards the Barber.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):749-752.
    The Pinocchio paradox poses one dialetheia too many for semantic dialetheists (Eldridge-Smith 2011). However, Beall (2011) thinks that the Pinocchio scenario is merely an impossible story, like that of the village barber who shaves just those villagers who do not shave themselves. Meanwhile, Beall maintains that Liar paradoxes generate dialetheia. The Barber scenario is self-contradictory, yet the Pinocchio scenario requires a principle of truth for a contradiction. In this and other respects the Pinocchio paradox is a version of the Liar, (...)
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