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Peter Forrest [124]Peter V. Forrest [1]
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Peter V. Forrest
Oxford University
  1. The Real but Dead Past: A Reply to Braddon-Mitchell.Peter Forrest - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):358–362.
    In "How Do We Know It Is Now Now?" David Braddon-Mitchell (Analysis 2004) develops an objection to the thesis that the past is real but the future is not. He notes my response to this, namely that the past, although real, is lifeless and (a fortiori?) lacking in sentience. He argues, however, that this response, which I call 'the past is dead hypothesis', is not tenable if combined with 'special relativity'. My purpose in this reply is to argue that, on (...)
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  2.  44
    A Speculative Solution to the Instantiation and Structure Problems for Universals.Peter Forrest - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):141-152.
    Typical structural universals are not just the mereological sum of their constituents. Hence, there is the Structure Problem of explaining this non-mereological structure. The Instantiation Problem is that the predicate "U is instantiated by x, y, etc., in that order" is ill-suited to be a primitive, unanalyzed predicate. The proposed solution to these problems is based on the observation that if universal U is said to supervene upon universals V, W, etc., then it is the instantiation of U that supervenes (...)
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  3. Is motion change of location?Peter Forrest - 1984 - Analysis 44 (4):177.
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  4.  13
    Neutralism, Naturalism and Emergence: A Critical Examination of Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation.Peter Forrest - 2019 - Metaphysica 20 (2):239-254.
    In his “Are Properties, Particular, Universal, or Neither?” Javier Cumpa argues that science not metaphysics explains how properties are instantiated. I accept this conclusion provided physics can be stated using rather few primitive predicates. In addition, he uses his scientific theory of instantiation to argue for Neutralism, his thesis that the “tie” between properties and their instances implies neither that properties are particular nor that they are universals. Neutralism, I claim, is a thesis that realist about universals have independent reason (...)
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  5. Ways Worlds Could Be.Peter Forrest - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):15 – 24.
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  6. Can a Soufflé Rise Twice? Van Inwagen’s Irresponsible Time-Travelers.Peter Forrest - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:29-39.
  7. Quantum Metaphysics.Peter Forrest - 1988 - Blackwell.
    The book comprises an enquiry into what quantum theory shows us about the world. Its aim is to sort out which metaphysical speculations are tenable and which are not. After an initial discussion of realism, the author provides a non-technical exposition of quantum theory and a criticism of the proposal that quantum theory should make us revise our beliefs about logic. He then discusses the various problems and puzzles which make quantum theory both interesting and perplexing. The text defends three (...)
     
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  8. Is Space-Time Discrete or Continuous? — An Empirical Question.Peter Forrest - 1995 - Synthese 103 (3):327--354.
    In this paper I present the Discrete Space-Time Thesis, in a way which enables me to defend it against various well-known objections, and which extends to the discrete versions of Special and General Relativity with only minor difficulties. The point of this presentation is not to convince readers that space-time really is discrete but rather to convince them that we do not yet know whether or not it is. Having argued that it is an open question whether or not space-time (...)
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  9.  66
    The Mereology of Structural Universals.Peter Forrest - 2016 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 25 (3):259-283.
    This paper explores the mereology of structural universals, using the structural richness of a non-classical mereology without unique fusions. The paper focuses on a problem posed by David Lewis, who using the example of methane, and assuming classical mereology, argues against any purely mereological theory of structural universals. The problem is that being a methane molecule would have to contain being a hydrogen atom four times over, but mereology does not have the concept of the same part occurring several times. (...)
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  10.  72
    The Identity of Indiscernibles.Peter Forrest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  11.  58
    Developmental Theism: From Pure Will to Unbounded Love.Peter Forrest - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Introduction -- Overview -- Theism, simplicity, and properly anthropocentric metaphysics -- Materialism and dualism -- The power, knowledge, and motives of the primordial God -- The existence of the primordial God -- God changes -- Understanding evil -- The Trinity -- The Incarnation -- Concluding remarks.
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  12. Universals as Sense-Data.Peter Forrest - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):622 - 631.
    This paper concerns the structure of appearances. I argue that to be appeared to in a certain way is to be aware of one or more universals. Universals therefore function like the sense-data, once highly favoured but now out of fashion. For instance, to be appeared to treely, in a visual way, is to be aware of the complex relation, being tree-shaped and tree-coloured and being in front of, a relation of a kind which could be instantiated by a material (...)
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  13.  73
    Neither Magic nor Mereology: A Reply to Lewis.Peter Forrest - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):89 – 91.
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  14.  73
    Nonclassical Mereology and Its Application to Sets.Peter Forrest - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2):79-94.
    Part One of this paper is a case against classical mereology and for Heyting mereology. This case proceeds by first undermining the appeal of classical mereology and then showing how it fails to cohere with our intuitions about a measure of quantity. Part Two shows how Heyting mereology provides an account of sets and classes without resort to any nonmereological primitive.
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  15.  72
    Can Phenomenology Determine the Content of Thought?Peter Forrest - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):403-424.
    According to a number of popular intentionalist theories in philosophy of mind, phenomenology is essentially and intrinsically intentional: phenomenal properties are identical to intentional properties of a certain type, or at least, the phenomenal character of an experience necessarily fixes a type of intentional content. These views are attractive, but it is questionable whether the reasons for accepting them generalize from sensory-perceptual experience to other kinds of experience: for example, agentive, moral, aesthetic, or cognitive experience. Meanwhile, a number of philosophers (...)
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  16. The Operator Theory of Instantiation.Peter Forrest - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):213 – 228.
    Armstrong holds the Supervenience Theory of instantiation, namely that the instantiation of universals by particulars supervenes upon what particulars and what universals there are, where supervenience is stipulated to be explanatory or dependent supervenience. I begin by rejecting the Supervenience Theory of instantiation. Having done so it is then tempting to take instantiation as primitive. This has, however, an awkward consequence, undermining one of the main advantages universals have over tropes. So I examine another account hinted at by Armstrong. This (...)
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  17.  90
    The Incarnation: A Philosophical Case for Kenosis.Peter Forrest - 2000 - Religious Studies 36 (2):127-140.
    As a preliminary, I shall clarify the kenotic position by arguing that a position which is often called kenotic is actually a quasi-kenotic version of the classical account, according to which Jesus had normal divine powers but chose not to exercise them. After this preliminary, I discuss three problems with the strict kenotic account. The first is that kenosis conflicts with the standard list of attributes considered essential to God. The second problem is posed by the Exaltation, namely the resumption (...)
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  18. An Argument Against David Lewis' Theory of Possible Worlds.Peter Forrest & D. M. Armstrong - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):164 – 168.
  19. Introduction: Truth Maker and its Variants.Peter Forrest & Drew Khlentzos - 2000 - Logique Et Analyse 43 (169-170):3-15.
     
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  20.  82
    General Facts, Physical Necessity and the Metaphysics of Time.Peter Forrest - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:137-154.
    In this chapter I assume that we accept, perhaps reluctantly, general facts, that is states of affairs corresponding to universal generalizations. I then argue that, without any addition, this ontology provides us with physical necessities, and moreover with various grades of physical necessity, including the strongest grade, which I call absolute physical necessity. In addition there are consequences for our understanding of time. For this account, which I call the Mortmain Theory, provides a defence of No Futurism against an otherwise (...)
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  21.  77
    The Nature of Number.Peter Forrest & D. M. Armstrong - 1987 - Philosophical Papers 16 (3):165-186.
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  22. Grit or Gunk: Implications of the Banach-Tarski Paradox.Peter Forrest - 2004 - The Monist 87 (3):351-370.
    This paper concerns the structure of any spatially extended things, including regions of space or spacetime. I shall use intuitions about the quantity of extended things to argue for a dichotomy: either a given finite extended thing is point-free gunk, that is, it has no points as parts, or it is made of grit, that is there are only finitely many points.
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  23.  11
    The Limits of Perceptual Phenomenal Content.Peter V. Forrest - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    There is an ongoing debate in philosophy of mind and epistemology about whether perceptual experience only represents those “thin” features of our environment that are apprehended by our senses, or whether, in addition to these, at least some perceptual experiences represent more complex, “thick” properties. My aim in this paper is to articulate an important difference between thin and thick properties, and thus to diagnose a key intuitive resistance many proponents of the thin view feel towards the thick view. My (...)
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  24. The Epistemology of Religion.Peter Forrest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Contemporary epistemology of religion may conveniently be treated as adebate over whether evidentialism applies to thebelief-component of religious faith, or whether we should insteadadopt a more permissive epistemology. Here evidentialism is theinitially plausible position that a belief is justified only if``it is proportioned to the evidence''. For example, supposea local weather forecaster has noticed that over the two hundred yearssince records began a wetter than average Winter is followed in 85% ofcases by a hotter than average Summer. Then, assuming for (...)
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  25. Uniform Grounding of Truth and the Growing Block Theory: A Reply to Heathwood.Peter Forrest - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):161–163.
    Chris Heathwood requires the sentence 'Caesar was conscious when he crossed the Rubicon' to be made true in much the same way as 'Caesar was wet when he crossed the Rubicon'. Yet because the Growing Block theorist is committed to the zombiedom of the past,the former is not made true by past objects, although the latter is. Heathwood demands a uniform account of the grounding of truths and he will be given a uniform account. But we should exercise care in (...)
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  26. Occam’s Razor and Possible Worlds.Peter Forrest - 1982 - The Monist 65 (4):456-464.
    In this paper I argue against Realism about Possible Worlds by showing how it leads to a counter-intuitive scepticism about the rationality of Occam’s razor. This can be thought of as a transcendental argument from Logic to Metaphysics. It should be contrasted with a straightforward application of Logic to Metaphysics, as when we apply Occam’s razor to reject a category of entities which we judge to be redundant.
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  27. Mereotopology without Mereology.Peter Forrest - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):229-254.
    Mereotopology is that branch of the theory of regions concerned with topological properties such as connectedness. It is usually developed by considering the parthood relation that characterizes the, perhaps non-classical, mereology of Space (or Spacetime, or a substance filling Space or Spacetime) and then considering an extra primitive relation. My preferred choice of mereotopological primitive is interior parthood . This choice will have the advantage that filters may be defined with respect to it, constructing “points”, as Peter Roeper has done (...)
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  28.  65
    From Ontology to Topology in the Theory of Regions.Peter Forrest - 1996 - The Monist 79 (1):34--50.
    My enquiry will be within the scope of two suppositions. The first is that Space is continuous, not discrete. The second is that we are to adopt realism about either points or regions or both. That does not, however, preclude a choice of categories—substance or property—for these entities. Thus we could think of either regions or points as properties of the things in those regions or at those points. Alternatively, we could think of regions or points as substances which themselves (...)
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  29.  66
    Divine Fission: A New Way of Moderating Social Trinitarianism.Peter Forrest - 1998 - Religious Studies 34 (3):281-297.
    This paper is a contribution to the programme of moderating Social Trinitarianism to achieve a fairly orthodox result. I follow Swinburne in relying heavily on divine thisnessless and in the important speculation that the Trinity arose from a primordial 'unitarian' God. In this paper I explain why I disagree with Swinburnes's account of how the Trinity came into being and I propose an alternative in which the primordial God fissions into three divine persons for the sake of a loving community.
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  30.  70
    Why Most of Us Should Be Scientific Realists: A Reply to Van Fraassen.Peter Forrest - 1994 - The Monist 77 (1):47-70.
    As part of his Constructive Empiricism, Van Fraassen commends agnosticism about the existence of the unobservable entities posited by the physical sciences. This position of Scientific Agnosticism is compatible with the acceptance, in his sense, of Science. For to accept Science is, he says, to accept it as empirically adequate, but to refrain from deciding between the realistically interpreted theory and the as-if variant, according to which the observations are as if the theory is correct but the theory is not (...)
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  31. The Dynamics of Belief: A Normative Logic.Peter Forrest - 1986 - Blackwell.
  32.  61
    The Problem of Evil: Two Neglected Defences. [REVIEW]Peter Forrest - 1981 - Sophia 20 (1):49-54.
    Theism can be defended against the Philosophical Problem of Evil, provided one rejects the Principle of Perfectionism, without relying on the Greater Good Defence or, unless one is a libertarian, the Free-Will Defence.A corollary of the All Good Possible Worlds Defence and the No Best Possible World Defence, is that God’s goodness need not determine God’s choice to create. The reasons, if any, which God has are relevant to the Theological Problem of Evil but not to the Philosophical Problem of (...)
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  33.  65
    Collective Guilt; Individual Shame.Peter Forrest - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):145–153.
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  34.  75
    Supervenience: The Grand-Property Hypothesis.Peter Forrest - 1988 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (1):1-12.
    THE ARTICLE IS AN ATTACK ON THE MYSTERY OR REDUCTION DILEMMA FOR SUPERVENIENCE. THIS IS THE DILEMMA THAT EITHER SUPERVENIENCE IS MYSTERIOUS OR THE SUPERVENIENT IS REDUCIBLE TO THE SUBVENIENT. A NONMYSTERIOUS, NONREDUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF SUPERVENIENCE IS PROPOSED, BASED ON THE METAPHYSICAL SPECULATION THAT SUPERVENIENT TERMS AND PHRASES APPLY TO OBJECTS WHOSE INTRINSIC NATURES THEMSELVES HAVE AN APPROPRIATE PROPERTY. SINCE THIS IS A PROPERTY OF A NATURE IT IS A PROPERTY OF A PROPERTY, THAT IS, A GRAND-PROPERTY. SUPERVENIENCE FOLLOWS FROM (...)
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  35.  73
    Exemplification and Parthood.Peter Forrest - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (2):323-341.
    Consider the things that exist—the entities—and let us suppose they are mereologically structured, that is, some are parts of others. The project of ontology within the bounds of bare mereology use this structure to say which of these entities belong to various ontological kinds, such as properties and particulars. My purpose in this paper is to defend the most radical section of the project, the mereological theory of the exemplification of universals. Along the way I help myself to several hypotheses: (...)
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  36.  48
    Counting the Cost of Modal Realism.Peter Forrest - 2001 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 93--103.
    Conceivability is, I say, prima facie evidence for possibility. Hence, we may count the cost of theories about possibility by listing the ways in which, according to the theory in question, something conceivable is said nonetheless to be impossible. More succinctly we may state a principle, Hume's razor to put alongside Ockham's. Hume's razor says that necessities are not to be multiplied more than necessary. In this paper I count the cost of David Lewis's modal realism, showing that many of (...)
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  37. A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism – John Foster.Peter Forrest - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):740-743.
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  38.  72
    Mereological Summation and the Question of Unique Fusion.Peter Forrest - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):237–242.
  39. How Innocent is Mereology?Peter Forrest - 1996 - Analysis 56 (3):127–131.
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  40.  5
    Fictional Possibilities Grounded in Foundational Nominalism.Peter Forrest - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-16.
    David Armstrong in his A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility proposes that non-actual possibilities may be treated as fictions grounded in instantiated universals. In this paper, I first provide some objections to his theory. Then I make the case for Foundational Nominalism, the Armstrong inspired thesis that the whole of ontology supervenes on particulars described much as in the Quinean Nominalism that Armstrong rejected as an ontological ostrich. Finally, I argue that Foundational Nominalism permits a fictional theory of possibilities similar to (...)
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  41.  26
    The Antipodean Philosopher: Public Lectures on Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand.John Bigelow, Raymond D. Bradley, Andrew Brennan, Tony Coady, Peter Forrest, James Franklin, Karen Green, Russell Grigg, Matthew Sharpe, Jeanette Kennett, Neil Levy, Catriona Mackenzie, Gary Malinas, Chris Mortensen, Robert Nola & Paul Patton - 2011 - Lexington Books.
    Series of lectures on many aspects of philosophy in Australia.
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  42. Why Richard Swinburne Won’T ‘Rot in Hell’: A Defense of Tough-Minded Theodicy. [REVIEW]Peter Forrest - 2010 - Sophia 49 (1):37-47.
    In his recent paper in Sophia , ‘Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?’ Nick Trakakis endorses the position that theodicy, whether intellectually successful or not, is a morally obnoxious enterprise. My aim in this paper is to defend theodicy from this accusation. I concede that God the Creator is a moral monster by human standards and neither to be likened to a loving parent nor imitated. Nonetheless, God is morally perfect. What is abhorrent (...)
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  43. Backwards Causation in Defense of Free Will.Peter Forrest - 1985 - Mind 94 (April):210-17.
  44.  50
    Replying to the Anti-God Challenge: A God Without Moral Character Acts Well.Peter Forrest - 2012 - Religious Studies 48 (1):35 - 43.
    Several authors, including Stephen Law in this journal, have argued that the case for an evil God is (about) as strong as for a good God. In this article I take up the challenge on behalf of theists who, like Richard Swinburne, argue for an agent of unrestricted power and knowledge as the ultimate explanation of all contingent truths. I shall argue that an evil God is much less probable than a good one. I do so by (1) distinguishing the (...)
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  45.  34
    Not Enough Powers.Peter Forrest - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (3):25--37.
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  46. General Facts, Physical Necessity, and the Metaphysics of Time.Peter Forrest - 2006 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 2. Oxford University Press.
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  47.  40
    New Problems with Repeatable Properties and with Change.Peter Forrest - 1990 - Noûs 24 (4):543-556.
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  48.  20
    Space Curvature and Repeatable Properties: Mormann's Perspectival Theory.Peter Forrest - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):319 – 323.
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  49.  64
    Pantheism and Science.Peter Forrest - 1997 - The Monist 80 (2):307-319.
    Does contemporary science tend to favour pantheism over its rivals or vice versa? Here I take the rivals to be the other members of a five-point spectrum: atheism, polytheism, pantheism, panentheism, and transcendent theism. And the features of contemporary science that I shall consider are: that the Universe has only existed for a finite time; that the Universe is expanding; that there are ubiquitous and pervasive laws of nature; and the ‘fine tuning’ required for life.
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  50. In Defence of Anthropomorphic Theism.Peter Forrest - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):105 - 122.
    I reply to seven objections to anthropomorphic theism: (1) That anthropomorphic theism is idolatrous. In reply I rely on the concept/conception distinction. (2) That faith requires certainty. In reply I argue that full belief may be based on probable inference. (3) That the truly infinite is incomprehensible. In reply I distinguish two senses of knowing what you mean. (4) "You Kant say that!" In reply I distinguish shallow from deep Kantianism. (5) "Shall Old Aquinas be forgot?" In reply I discuss (...)
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