Peter Gardner; Religious Upbringing and the Liberal Ideal of Religious Autonomy, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 89–1.

Michael Hand's recent paper, ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered', re-opens a debate that was flourishing over a decade ago in this journal and, long before that, in the works of others. In this response I examine Hand's claims that earlier contributions to the debate passed over the central problem and that he can solve that problem. I endeavour to show that several of Hand's arguments, such as those dealing with indoctrination, as well as his claims may be flawed, that the relevance of (...) his inquiries is open to question, but that his hidden and, apparently, unacknowledged agenda should not remain hidden or passed over. (shrink)

The recommendation that we encourage children to be open-minded has been gathering strength. Yet given the everyday meaning of ‘being open-minded about something’, we may decide to reject this recommendation because it proscribes teaching and learning. There again, recent philosophical accounts of open-mindedness seem to oppose everyday meaning and lead to the absurd conclusion that the Pope is open-minded about the existence of God. This paper suggests two ways of looking at these problems, the second of which reconciles ordinary usage (...) with open-mindedness as a desirable educational objective. (shrink)

Peter Gardner; Personal Autonomy and Religious Upbringing: the ‘problem’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 25, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 69–81, http.

Peter Gardner; The Paradox of Moral Education: a reassessment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 39–48, https://doi.org.

In this symposium Michael Hand presents a rejoinder to criticisms of his ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered’ (Journal of Philosophy of Education, 36.4) by Jim Mackenzie, Peter Gardner and Charlene Tan. Defending the idea of the logical possibility of non-indoctrinatory religious upbringing, he attempts to show that none of their various objections is successful. Mackenzie, Gardner and Tan each offer a response.

In suppport of the idea that education should encourage open-mindedness, Hare and McLaughlin have argued that being open-minded about an issue, in a philosophically well-supported sense of ‘open-mindedness’, need not prevent one from holding a firm belief on that issue. In this paper I examine the lack of cohesion in this sense of ‘open-mindedness’, explain why I continue to be anxious about the tensions between open-mindedness and holding firm beliefs and present three further reasons for having reservations about Hare and (...) McLaughlin's proposals. (shrink)

Peter Gardner; On Some Paradoxes in Moral Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 65–76, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.

Peter Gardner; Religious Education: in defence of non-commitment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 157–168, https://do.

Victor Quinn advocates teaching critical thinking as a curriculum subject. He has accused Professor John E. McPeck, a vehement critic of such proposals, not only of being wrong but also of being in need of such a critical thinking course himself. In this paper we examine the five supposed critical thinking weaknesses of which McPeck is accused and consider what Quinn's arguments tell us about critical thinking, its skills, its priorities and its claims to subject status.

Within the school of thought known as Critical Thinking, identifying or finding missing assumptions is viewed as one of the principal thinking skills. Within the new subject in schools and colleges, usually called Critical Thinking, the skill of finding missing assumptions is similarly prominent, as it is in that subject's public examinations. In this article we examine how school- and college-focused texts explain and teach ‘this very important skill’. The same texts also deal with the nature of assumptions, validity and (...) the role of stated reasons in arguments, and the way these matters are tackled will also be examined in our inquiry. In addition we explore what respected contributors to the critical thinking movement have had to say about some of these issues. (shrink)

Peter Gardner; The Compulsory Curriculum and Beyond: a consideration of some aspects of the educational philosophy of J. P. White, Journal of Philosophy of Educ.

Michael Hand has recently challenged certain religious organisations that run Academies in the United Kingdom to devise and pursue their own faith-based curricula in their schools. In this short article I examine some of the problems Hand's challenge might encounter, including whether religious conceptions of worthwhile activities and of human flourishing can be as devoid of religious beliefs as Hand would seem to wish and whether his challenge can be met.

At a conference I attended not so long ago I suggested to someone who had just read a paper that beneath his apparent commitment to a kind of ethical relativism he was in fact an ethical absolutist. The person I was addressing seemed quite upset by my suggestion and proceeded to argue that my understanding of his paper was somewhat awry. This experience was not new to me. Having taught ethics and philosophy of education courses for many years, courses which (...) have been taken by undergraduates and by members of the teaching profession, I know that if I ever say to those I teach that they are adopting or favouring an absolutist position, then, more than likely, they will regard my remark as something to be opposed and they will often suggest that there must be some misunderstanding on my part. Judging by my experiences, ‘absolutist’ is a label most undergraduates and teachers wish to disown, particularly at the outset of ethics and philosophy courses, even though many of these disowners seem to subscribe to absolutist positions on such issues as racism, rape and child abuse. In his book Ethics; Discovering Right and Wrong Louis P. Pojman, talking about his own findings in this area, makes it clear that my teaching experiences are not unique. Over a period of several years and in several universities Pojman found that most of the students who took his ethics or philosophy courses explicitly rejected absolutism and affirmed support for some kind of relativism even though several of these aspiring relativists subscribed to absolutist positions on various ethical matters. (shrink)

Although it is primarily concerned with the value of liberty and the justification of compulsory education, what lies behind much of this paper is the question ‘;Why treat children like children?’ The fact is that we do not regard children as having the same rights, privileges and liberties as adults, and children may not be thought of as deserving the same degree of respect or consideration as their seniors. In the past this has led to some horrific states of affairs, (...) and while matters have undoubtedly improved, it is still the case that most people accept what Graham Haydon describes as ‘;the assumption that one thing can go for children and quite another for adults’. One likely consequence of this, and an important example of the different treatment reserved for children is compulsory education. Illiterate and innumerate adults are not compelled to practise their letters or play with counters or watch prescribed television programmes. Even when, to quote Mill, we have an adult ‘;who shows rashness, obstinacy and self-conceit—who cannot live within moderate means—who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgencies—who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect’, we do not subject him to character-building games or uplifting scripture readings, or initiate him into the mysteries of home economics, or read Shakespeare at him. But we compulsorily do all of this and more to children. Moreover, compulsory education, as we have it, is not something from which the young can gain remission. The law that requires ‘;every child of compulsory school age…to receive an efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability, and aptitude’ effectively defines an approach where what counts is the arbitrariness of chronology, not standards or excellence. (shrink)

Peter Gardner; Paternalism and Consent in Education, or One Day You’ll be Grateful, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 5.

Peter Gardner; ‘Private Judgement’, Mill and Tocqueville: an apology, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 26, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 113–115, https.

Peter Gardner; Some Errors in Moral Education, or D. Z. Phillips and the‘Educational Argument’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 1, 30 May 2.

One of my main concerns with Hand’s original paper (see Gardner, 2004, p. 121 and pp. 126–127) was and still is the matter of its relevance. Hand insists in tha.

Peter Gardner; The Compulsory Curriculum and Beyond: a rejoinder to John White, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 271–2.

Since early in this century, a number of cultural anthropologists and archaeologists have been theorizing that some of the very culture traits Boehm regards as ‘primitive’ are, in fact, partial products of the difficult circumstances of the last few thousand years. For instance, the mobility and egalitarianism of some foragers may have been amplified by their culture contact experiences. Boehm must consider these theories if he hopes to identify foragers whose cultures may be representative of the past.

Steven Higgins and Vivienne Baumfield have recently attempted to defend the much discussed idea of general thinking skills against attacks from three quarters: what they regard as a priori objections, which they liken to Zeno's paradox that Achilles will not catch the tortoise; domains theories of knowledge, which oppose the idea of thinking skills being general and transcending domains; and the claim that experts use subject specific knowledge, and don't use general thinking skills. We examine these defences and find them (...) flawed and worrying. We conclude that this is a domain in serious need of a priori approaches. (shrink)