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Peter Van Inwagen [35]Peter Inwagen [12]
  1. Inwagen Peter van (2008). How to Think About the Problem of Free Will. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):327 - 341.
    In this essay I present what is, I contend, the free-will problem properly thought through, or at least presented in a form in which it is possible to think about it without being constantly led astray by bad terminology and confused ideas. Bad terminology and confused ideas are not uncommon in current discussions of the problem. The worst such pieces of terminology are "libertarian free will" and "compatibilist free will." The essay consists partly of a defense of the thesis that (...)
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  2.  31
    Harold W. Noonan & Peter Van Inwagen (1992). Material Beings. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):239.
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  3. Inwagen Peter Van (1989). When is the Will Free? Philosophical Perspectives 3:399 - 422.
  4. Peter Van Inwagen (1994). Composition as Identity. Philosophical Perspectives 8:207 - 220.
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  5. Peter Van Inwagen (1975). The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.
    In this paper I shall define a thesis I shall call ' determinism ', and argue that it is incompatible with the thesis that we are able to act otherwise than we do. Other theses, some of them very different from what I shall call ' determinism ', have at least an equal right to this name, and, therefore, I do not claim to show that every thesis that could be called ' determinism ' without historical impropriety is incompatible with (...)
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  6.  41
    Peter van Inwagen (1986). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
  7. Inwagen Peter Van (1977). Creatures of Fiction. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (4):299 - 308.
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  8.  21
    Peter Inwagen (forthcoming). The Neo-Carnapians. Synthese:1-26.
    This essay defends the neo-Quinean approach to ontology against the criticisms of two neo-Carnapians, Huw Price and Amie Thomasson.
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  9. Inwagen Peter van (2008). McGinn on Existence. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):36 - 58.
    I compare the theory of existence and being (and of non-existence and non-being) presented in Colin McGinn's 'Logical Properties' with those of well known predecessors such as Quine, Frege and Meinong. More recently, neo-Meinongians have held that being and existence are different concepts, and that although nothing lach bang, there are things which do not exist; possibilists have held that there are mere possibilia, things which possibly exist but do not actually exist. I examine a thesis advanced by McGinn which (...)
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  10.  39
    McKay Thomas & Inwagen Peter Van (1977). Counterfactuals with Disjunctive Antecedents. Philosophical Studies 31 (5):353 - 356.
  11. Inwagen Peter van (2008). Was George Orwell a Metaphysical Realist? Philosophia Scientiae 12 (1):161-185.
    The core of George Orwell’s novel 1984 is the debate between Winston Smith and O’Brien in the cells of the Ministry of Love. It is natural to read this debate as a debate between a realist and an anti-realist. I offer a few representative passages from the book that demonstrate, I believe, that if this is not the only possible way to understand the debate, it is one very natural way.RésuméLe coeur de la nouvelle de George Orwell, 1984, est le (...)
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  12.  15
    Peter Inwagen (2002). The Number of Things. Philosophical Issues 12 (1):176-196.
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  13. Inwagen Peter Van (1978). Ability and Responsibility. Philosophical Review 87 (2):201 - 224.
  14. Inwagen Peter Van (2004). The Self: The Incredulous Stare Articulated. Ratio 17 (4):478-491.
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  15. Inwagen Peter van (2000). Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time. The Monist 83 (3):437 - 459.
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  16. Inwagen Peter Van (1985). On Two Arguments for Compatibilism. Analysis 45 (3):161 - 163.
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  17.  56
    Inwagen Peter (1994). When the Will is Not Free. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):95-113.
  18.  3
    Peter van Inwagen (2002). What Do We Refer to When We Say “I”? In Richard M. Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 175-189.
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  19. Inwagen Peter Van (1974). A Formal Approach to the Problem of Free Will and Determinism. Theoria 40 (1):9-22.
  20.  25
    Peter Inwagen (1997). Against Middle Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 21 (1):225-236.
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  21.  88
    Peter Inwagen (1978). The Possibility of Resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (2):114 - 121.
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  22.  14
    Peter Van Inwagen (1993). Reply to Reviewers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):709 - 719.
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  23.  76
    Inwagen Peter Van (1993). Précis of Material Beings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):683 - 686.
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  24.  47
    Peter Van Inwagen (2000). Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture. Noûs 34 (s14):1 - 19.
  25.  98
    Peter Inwagen (1981). Why I Don't Understand Substitutional Quantification. Philosophical Studies 39 (3):281 - 285.
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  26.  11
    Peter van Inwagen (2015). Nothing Is Impossible. In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas. De Gruyter. pp. 33-58.
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  27.  6
    Peter van Inwagen (2016). In Defense of Transcendent Universals. In Francesco Federico Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong. De Gruyter. pp. 51-70.
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  28.  10
    Peter Inwagen (1978). A Definition of Chisholm's Notion of Immanent Causation. Philosophia 7 (3-4):567-581.
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  29.  13
    Peter Van Inwagen (2012). Three Versions of the Ontological Argument. In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today. Ontos Verlag. pp. 143.
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  30.  27
    Peter Inwagen (2002). “Carnap” and “the Polish Logician”. Acta Analytica 17 (1):7-17.
    InThe Many Faces of Realism and elsewhere, Hilary Putnam has presented an argument for the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter as to how many objects there are. In brief: Carnap says that a certain imaginary world contains three objects, ×1, ×2, and ×3. The Polish logician says that this same world must contain four other objects (×1 + ×2, ×1 + ×2 + ×3, etc.). Putnam maintains that there can be no fact of the matter as (...)
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  31.  34
    Peter Inwagen (1972). Lehrer on Determinism, Free Will, and Evidence. Philosophical Studies 23 (5):351 - 357.
  32.  13
    Peter Van Inwagen (1996). Problems In Philosophy. Philosophical Review 105 (2):253-256.
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  33.  20
    Inwagen Peter Van (2000). The Argument From Particular Horrendous Evils. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 74:65-80.
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  34.  20
    Peter Van Inwagen (1980). Compatibilism and the Burden of Proof. Analysis 40 (2):98 - 100.
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  35.  18
    Peter Inwagen (1988). On Always Being Wrong. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):95-111.
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  36.  1
    Peter Van Inwagen & Anthony Kenny (1978). Will, Freedom and Power. Philosophical Review 87 (1):99.
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  37.  16
    Peter Inwagen (1997). Fischer on Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):373 - 381.
  38.  12
    Peter Van Inwagen (2002). Persons and Bodies. Philosophical Review 111 (1):138-141.
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  39.  14
    Peter Inwagen (2002). Why Vagueness is a Mystery. Acta Analytica 17 (2):11-17.
    This paper considers two mysteries having to do with vagueness. The first pertains to existence. An argument is presented for the following conclusion: there are possible cases in which ‘There exists something that is F’ is of indeterminate truth-value and with respect to which it is not assertable that there are borderline-cases of being F. It is contended that we have no conception of vagueness that makes this result intelligible. The second mystery has to do with ordinary vague predicates, such (...)
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  40.  7
    Peter Van Inwagen (1997). Review: Fischer on Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):373 - 381.
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  41.  6
    Peter Van Inwagen (1986). Critical Notice. Mind 95 (378):246 - 257.
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  42.  1
    Peter van Inwagen (2008). Was George Orwell a Metaphysical Realist? Philosophia Scientae 12:161-185.
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  43.  2
    Peter van Inwagen (2008). Objectividade. Critica.
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  44. John Martin Fischer & Peter Van Inwagen (1988). An Essay on Free Will. Philosophical Review 97 (3):401.
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  45. Peter van Inwagen (2014). Existence: Essays in Ontology. Cambridge University Press.
    The problem of the nature of being was central to ancient and medieval philosophy, and continues to be relevant today. In this collection of thirteen recent essays, Peter van Inwagen applies the techniques of analytical philosophy to a wide variety of problems in ontology and meta-ontology. Topics discussed include the nature of being, the meaning of the existential quantifier, ontological commitment, recent attacks on metaphysics and ontology, the concept of ontological structure, fictional entities, mereological sums, and the ontology of mental (...)
     
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  46. Eleonore Stump & Peter Van Inwagen (1997). God, Knowledge, and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Philosophical Review 106 (3):464.
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  47. Michael Tye & Peter Van Inwagen (1992). Material Beings. Philosophical Review 101 (4):881.
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