1.  77
    Probability: Subjective and Mathematical.Peter J. R. Millican - 1984 - Analysis 44 (1):33 - 37.
  2. Hume, Induction and Reason.Peter J. R. Millican - unknown
    Hume’s view of reason is notoriously hard to pin down, not least because of the apparently contradictory positions which he appears to adopt in different places. The problem is perhaps most clear in his writings concerning induction - in his famous argument of Treatise I iii 6 and Enquiry IV, on the one hand, he seems to conclude that “probable inference” has no rational basis, while elsewhere, for example in much of his writing on natural theology, he seems happy to (...)
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  3.  63
    Mackie's Defence of Induction.Peter J. R. Millican - 1982 - Analysis 42 (1):19 - 24.