98 found
Order:
See also
Peter Klein
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
  1. Useful False Beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--63.
  2. Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.
  3.  18
    Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Peter D. Klein & D. M. Armstrong - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):225.
  4. Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  5. ``Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails".Peter Klein - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213-236.
  6. What Price Coherence?Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):129 - 132.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  7. Reply to Ginet.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  8. Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1981 - University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  9. How to Be an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):25 - 29.
  10. When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious.Peter Klein - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.
  11. A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
  12.  87
    Review: Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. [REVIEW]Peter Klein - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919 - 925.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  13. What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166–171.
  14. The Virtues of Inconsistency.Peter Klein - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):105-135.
    I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  15.  19
    Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):297-325.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  16. Closure Matters: Academic Skepticism and Easy Knowledge.Peter Klein - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):165–184.
  17. Certainty.Peter D. Klein - 1998 - In Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  18. How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Press. pp. 75--94.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  19. Knowledge, Causality, and Defeasibility.Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
  20. No Help for the Coherentist.Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):118–121.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  21. Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma.Peter Klein - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    This article discusses contemporary response to the epistemic regress problem or Agrippa's trilemma. The epistemic regress problem is considered the most crucial in the entire theory of knowledge and it is a major concern for many contemporary epistemologists. However, only two of the three alternative solutions have been developed in any detail, foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism was not seriously considered as a solution because of the finite-mind objection. This article also provides a brief evaluation of foundationalism, emergent coherentism, and infinitism.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22.  10
    Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1984 - Noûs 18 (3):531-533.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  23. Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Epistemology 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  24. Epistemology.Peter D. Klein - 1998 - In Craig Edward (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1998.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  25.  19
    Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):108-116.
  26.  79
    Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):108 - 116.
  27.  13
    Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails.Peter Klein - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213-236.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  28.  10
    Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. [REVIEW]Peter Klein - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  29. Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. de Gruyter. pp. 487-508.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  4
    Infinitism’s Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - Veritas 50 (4).
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31.  5
    What Price Coherence?Peter Klein & Alonso Church - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):129.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  32. Infinitism.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 245-256.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33.  1
    Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of ReasonsMetaepistemology and Skepticism.Peter Klein & Richard Fumerton - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  34.  66
    Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):153-172.
    O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com as teorias daqueles que sustentam 1) que o conhecimento requer certeza e que uma tal forma (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  35.  92
    Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification.Peter D. Klein - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.
  36. The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Acta Analytica 15 (24):7-24.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  37.  7
    What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166-171.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  38. Misleading "Misleading Defeaters".Peter D. Klein - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
  39.  10
    Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (4):560-565.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  40.  5
    When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious.Peter Klein - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718-729.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41. Infinitism is the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42.  21
    Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  43. ``Useful False Beliefs&Quot.Peter Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 25-63.
  44.  38
    Immune Belief Systems.Peter Klein - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.
  45.  45
    Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Diego Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer.
  46. ``Closure Matters: Skepticism and Easy Knowledge".Peter Klein - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):165--184.
  47. Ascent and Assent?Peter D. Klein - 2004 - In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  48. 30. There is No Good Reason to Be an Academic Skeptic.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 299.
  49.  8
    Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter Klein - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919-925.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  50. Real Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 98