5 found
Order:
  1. Europa! Europa?: The Avant-Garde, Modernism and the Fate of a Continent.Sascha Bru, Jan Baetens, Benedikt Hjartarson, Peter Nicholls, Tania Ørum & Hubert van den Berg (eds.) - 2009 - Walter de Gruyter.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2.  56
    Kripke’s Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori.Peter Nicholls & Dan Passell - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:481-489.
    We think that Kripke’s arguments that there are contingent a priori truths and that there are necessary a posteriori truths about named and essentially described entities fail. They fail for the reasons that there are ambiguities in each of the three eases. In the first ease, what is known apriori is not what is contingent. In the latter two cases, what is necessary or essential is not what is known a posteriori.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  25
    A Necessary Blindness: Ezra Pound and Rhythm.Peter Nicholls - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry 6 (13):28-40.
    Modernism is often characterised by its appeal to painting rather than to music as a model of literary form. This essay explores what is taken to be a continuing dependence on metre and rhythm as types of signification. From Swinburne and Mallarmé through to Pound and Eliot, it is argued, poets looked to “musical” effects of verse as rich sources of memory and association.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  22
    Late Pound.Peter Nicholls - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry 8 (20):1-16.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  14
    Kripke’s Contingent A Priori and Necessary A Posteriori.Peter Nicholls & Dan Passell - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:481-489.
    We think that Kripke’s arguments that there are contingent a priori truths and that there are necessary a posteriori truths about named and essentially described entities fail. They fail for the reasons that there are ambiguities in each of the three eases. In the first ease, what is known apriori is not what is contingent. In the latter two cases, what is necessary or essential is not what is known a posteriori.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark