A topological description of space is given, based on the relation of connection among regions and the property of being limited. A minimal set of 10 constraints is shown to permit definitions of points and of open and closed sets of points and to be characteristic of locally compact T2 spaces. The effect of adding further constraints is investigated, especially those that characterise continua. Finally, the properties of mappings in region-based topology are studied. Not all such mappings correspond to point (...) functions and those that do correspond to continuous functions. (shrink)

It is argued that the usual proposals for dealing with mass-Quantification--All x is f--Are inadequate with the predicate is complex or when multiple quantification is considered. Mass-Quantification is seen as a generalisation of ordinary (thing) quantification in that the specialising assumption that the domain of quantification is atomic is not made. It is suggested that the semantic values of predicates are complete ideals of the boolean algebra consisting of the quantity which is the domain of quantification and all its sub-Quantities, (...) While logical connectives are represented by operations on complete ideals. (shrink)

While the classical account of the linear continuum takes it to be a totality of points, which are its ultimate parts, Aristotle conceives of it as continuous and infinitely divisible, without ultimate parts. A formal account of this conception can be given employing a theory of quantification for nonatomic domains and a theory of region-based topology.

Frege regarded Hume's Principle as insufficient for a logicist account of arithmetic, as it does not identify the numbers; it does not tell us which objects the numbers are. His solution, generally regarded as a failure, was to propose certain sets as the referents of numerical terms. I suggest instead that numbers are properties of pluralities, where these properties are treated as objects. Given this identification, the truth-conditions of the statements of arithmetic can be obtained from logical principles with the (...) help of definitions, just as the logicist thesis maintains. (shrink)

Provided here is an account, both syntactic and semantic, of first-order and monadic second-order quantification theory for domains that may be non-atomic. Although the rules of inference largely parallel those of classical logic, there are important differences in connection with the identification of argument places and the significance of the identity relation.

This paper offers a justification of the ‘Hilbert-Bernays Derivability Conditions’ by considering what is required of a theory which gives an account of provability in itself.

The aim of the paper is to formulate rules of inference for the predicate 'is true' applied to sentences. A distinction is recognised between (ordinary) truth and definite truth and consequently between two notions of validity, depending on whether truth or definite truth is the property preserved in valid arguments. Appropriate sets of rules of inference governing the two predicates are devised. In each case the consequence relation is in harmony with the respective predicate. Particularly appealing is a set of (...) ND rules for ordinary truth in which premises and assumptions play different roles, premises being taken to assert definite truth, assumptions to suppose truth. This set of rules can be said to capture everyday reasoning with truth. Also presented are formal characterisations, in the meta-language and in the object language, of paradoxical and 'truth teller'-like sentences. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although Frege’s theory of real numbers in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Vol. II, is incomplete, it is possible to provide a logicist justification for the approach he is taking and to construct a plausible completion of his account by an extrapolation which parallels his theory of cardinal numbers.

Gentzen's account of logical consequence is extended so as to become a matter of degree. We characterize and study two kinds of function G, where G(X,Y) takes values between 0 and 1, which represent the degree to which the set X of statements (understood conjunctively) logically implies the set Y of statements (understood disjunctively). It is then shown that these functions are essentially the same as the absolute and the relative probability functions described by Carnap.

The logical independence of two statements is tantamount to their probabilistic independence, the latter understood in a sense that derives from stochastic independence. And analogous logical and probabilistic senses of having the same factual content similarly coincide. These results are extended to notions of non-symmetrical independence and independence among more than two statements.

Peter Gärdenfors has developed a semantics for conditional logic, based on the operations of expansion and revision applied to states of information. The account amounts to a formalisation of the Ramsey test for conditionals. A conditional A > B is declared accepted in a state of information K if B is accepted in the state of information which is the result of revising K with respect to A. While Gärdenfors's account takes the truth-functional part of the logic as given, the (...) present paper proposes a semantics entirely based on epistemic states and operations on these states. The semantics is accompanied by a syntactic treatment of conditional logic which is formally similar to Gentzen's sequent formulation of natural deduction rules. Three of David Lewis's systems of conditional logic are represented. The formulations are attractive by virtue of their transparency and simplicity. (shrink)

Provided here is a characterisation of absolute probability functions for intuitionistic (propositional) logic L, i.e. a set of constraints on the unary functions P from the statements of L to the reals, which insures that (i) if a statement A of L is provable in L, then P(A) = 1 for every P, L's axiomatisation being thus sound in the probabilistic sense, and (ii) if P(A) = 1 for every P, then A is provable in L, L's axiomatisation being thus (...) complete in the probabilistic sense. As there are theorems of classical (propositional) logic that are not intuitionistic ones, there are unary probability functions for intuitionistic logic that are not classical ones. Provided here because of this is a means of singling out the classical probability functions from among the intuitionistic ones. (shrink)

This paper studies the extent to which probability functions are recursively definable. It proves, in particular, that the (absolute) probability of a statement A is recursively definable from a certain point on, to wit: from the (absolute) probabilities of certain atomic components and conjunctions of atomic components of A on, but to no further extent. And it proves that, generally, the probability of a statement A relative to a statement B is recursively definable from a certain point on, to wit: (...) from the probabilities relative to that very B of certain atomic components and conjunctions of atomic components of A, but again to no further extent. These and other results are extended to the less studied case where A and B are compounded from atomic statements by means of `` ∀ '' as well as `` ∼ '' and "&". The absolute probability functions considered are those of Kolmogorov and Carnap, and the relative ones are those of Kolmogorov, Carnap, Renyi, and Popper. (shrink)

Shown here is that a constraint used by Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) for calculating the absolute probability of a universal quantification, and one introduced by Stalnaker in "Probability and Conditionals" (1970, 70) for calculating the relative probability of a negation, are too weak for the job. The constraint wanted in the first case is in Bendall (1979) and that wanted in the second case is in Popper (1959).