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Peter Slezak [51]Peter Paul Slezak [1]Peter P. Slezak [1]
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Profile: Peter Slezak (University of New South Wales)
  1.  63
    Linguistic Explanation and ‘Psychological Reality’.Peter Slezak - 2009 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):3-20.
    Methodological questions concerning Chomsky’s generative approach to linguistics have been debated without consensus. The status of linguistics as psychology, the psychological reality of grammars, the character of tacit knowledge and the role of intuitions as data remain heatedly disputed today. I argue that the recalcitrance of these disputes is symptomatic of deep misunderstandings. I focus attention on Michael Devitt’s recent extended critique of Chomskyan linguistics and I suggest that his complaints are based on a failure to appreciate the special status (...)
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  2. The Relevance of Cognitive Science to Teaching.Peter Slezak - 2007 - Journal of Cognitive Science 8 (2):171-205.
    The Relevance of Cognitive Science to Teaching, Proceedings of the 6th International History, Philosophy & Science Teaching Conference (IHPST), Denver, Colorado, November 7-10, 2001. (PDF).
     
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  3. Cartesian ‘Ideas’ and the First (C17 Th) Cognitive Revolution.Peter Slezak - manuscript
  4. Doubts About Descartes' Indubitability: The Cogito as Intuition and Inference.Peter Slezak - 2010 - Philosophical Forum 41 (4):389-412.
    Kirsten Besheer has recently considered Descartes’ doubting appropriately in the context of his physiological theories in the spirit of recent important re-appraisals of his natural philosophy. However, Besheer does not address the notorious indubitability and its source that Descartes claims to have discovered. David Cunning has remarked that Descartes’ insistence on the indubitability of his existence presents “an intractable problem of interpretation” in the light of passages that suggest his existence is “just as dubitable as anything else”. However, although the (...)
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  5.  9
    Realizing Newcomb's Problem.Peter Slezak - unknown
    Richard Jeffrey said that Newcomb’s Problem may be seen “as a rock on which... Bayesianism... must founder” and the problem has been almost universally conceived as reconciling the science-fictional features of the decision problem with a plausible causal analysis. Later, Jeffrey renounced his earlier position that accepted Newcomb problems as genuine decision problems, suggesting “Newcomb problems are like Escher’s famous staircase”. We may interpret this to mean that we know there can be no such thing, though we see no local (...)
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  6. The Mind-Brain Problem.Peter Slezak - 2000 - In Evian Gordon (ed.), Integrative Neuroscience. Harwood Academic Publishers.
    The problem of explaining the mind persists essentially unchanged today since the time of Plato and Aristotle. For the ancients, of course, it was not a question of the relation of mind to brain, though the question was fundamentally the same nonetheless. For Plato, the mind was conceived as distinct from the body and was posited in order to explain knowledge which transcends that available to the senses. For his successor, Aristotle, the mind was conceived as intimately related to the (...)
     
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  7.  93
    Descartes's Diagonal Deduction.Peter Slezak - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (March):13-36.
    I OFFER AN ANALYSIS OF DESCARTES'S COGITO WHICH IS RADICALLY NOVEL WHILE INCORPORATING MUCH AVAILABLE INSIGHT. BY ENLARGING FOCUS FROM THE DICTUM ITSELF TO THE REASONING OF DOUBT, DREAMING AND DEMON, I DEMONSTRATE A CLOSE PARALLEL TO THE LOGIC OF THE LIAR PARADOX. THIS HELPS TO EXPLAIN FAMILIAR PARADOXICAL FEATURES OF DESCARTES'S ARGUMENT. THE ACCOUNT PROVES TO BE TEXTUALLY ELEGANT AND, MOREOVER, HAS CONSIDERABLE INDEPENDENT PHILOSOPHICAL PLAUSIBILITY AS AN ACCOUNT OF MIND AND SELF.
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  8.  97
    The Social Construction of Social Constructionism.Peter Slezak - 1994 - Inquiry 37 (2):139 – 157.
    The republication of David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery is evidence of the continuing interest and importance of the work but also provides the clearest evidence of the shortcomings of the enterprise. The new Afterword of Bloor's second edition addresses criticisms of the Strong Programme, but the theses which Bloor now defends are substantially weaker claims than the iconoclastic tenets of the original manifesto. Moreover, in a related strategy, Bloor asserts that criticisms made since 1975 have given him no reason (...)
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  9.  59
    Demons, Deceivers And Liars: Newcomb's Malin Génie. [REVIEW]Peter Slezak - 2006 - Theory and Decision 61 (3):277-303.
    A fully adequate solution to Newcomb’s Problem (Nozick 1969) should reveal the source of its extraordinary elusiveness and persistent intractability. Recently, a few accounts have independently sought to meet this criterion of adequacy by exposing the underlying source of the problem’s profound puzzlement. Thus, Sorensen (1987), Slezak (1998), Priest (2002) and Maitzen and Wilson (2003) share the ‘no box’ view according to which the very idea that there is a right choice is misconceived since the problem is ill-formed or incoherent (...)
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  10.  41
    Godel's Theorem and the Mind.Peter Slezak - 1982 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (March):41-52.
  11. Situated Cognition.Peter Slezak - 1999 - Perspectives on Cognitive Science.
    The self-advertising, at least, suggests that 'situated cognition' involves the most fundamental conceptual re-organization in AI and cognitive science, even appearing to deny that cognition is to be explained by mental representations. In their defence of the orthodox symbolic representational theory, A. Vera and H. Simon have rebutted many of these claims, but they overlook an important reading of situated arguments which may, after all, involve a revolutionary insight. I show that the whole debate turns on puzzles familiar from the (...)
     
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  12.  72
    The Tripartite Model of Representation.Peter Slezak - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):239-270.
    Robert Cummins [(1996) Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT, p. 1] has characterized the vexed problem of mental representation as "the topic in the philosophy of mind for some time now." This remark is something of an understatement. The same topic was central to the famous controversy between Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld in the 17th century and remained central to the entire philosophical tradition of "ideas" in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant. However, the scholarly, (...)
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  13.  70
    Thinking About Thinking: Language, Thought and Introspection.Peter Slezak - 2002 - Language and Communication 22 (3):353-373.
    I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences. (G.E. Moore, 1942, p. 14).
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  14.  13
    Bloor's Bluff: Behaviourism and the Strong Programme.Peter Slezak - 1991 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (3):241 – 256.
    Abstract The accumulated case studies in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge have been taken to establish the Strong Programme's thesis that beliefs have social causes in contradistinction to psychological ones. This externalism is essentially a commitment to the stimulus control of behaviour which was the principal tenet of orthodox Skinnerian Behaviorism. Offered as ?straight forward scientific hypotheses? these claims of social determination are asserted to be ?beyond dispute?. However, the causes of beliefs and especially their contents has also been the (...)
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  15.  80
    The Imagery Debate: Déjà Vu All Over Again? Commentary on Zenon Pylyshyn.Peter Slezak - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):209-210.
    The imagery debate re-enacts controversies persisting since Descartes. The controversy remains important less for what we can learn about visual imagery than about cognitive science itself. In the tradition of Arnauld, Reid, Bartlett, Austin and Ryle, Pylyshyn’s critique exposes notorious mistakes being unwittingly rehearsed not only regarding imagery but also in several independent domains of research in modern cognitive science.
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  16.  52
    Was Descartes a Liar? Diagonal Doubt Defended.Peter Slezak - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):379-388.
  17. Can Images Be Rotated and Inspected? A Test of the Pictorial Medium Theory.Peter Slezak - 1991 - Proceedings.
    images. But clearly, it only begs the deeper questions.
     
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  18.  52
    Language and Psychological Reality: A Discussion of Rudolf Botha's Study.Peter Slezak - 1981 - Synthese 49 (December):427-439.
  19.  40
    A Second Look at David Bloor's: Knowledge and Social Imagery.Peter Slezak - 1994 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (3):336-361.
    The recent republication of David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery in a second edition provides an occasion to reappraise the celebrated work which launched the so-called Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. This work embodies the general outlook and foundational principles in a way that is still characteristic of its descendents. Above all, the recent republication of Bloor's original book is evidence of the continuing interest and importance of the work, but it also provides the clearest evidence of (...)
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  20.  14
    Talking to Ourselves: The Intelligibility of Inner Speech.Peter P. Slezak - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):699-700.
    The possible role of language in intermodular communication and non-domain-specific thinking is an empirical issue that is independent of the “vehicle” claim that natural language is “constitutive” of some thoughts. Despite noting objections to various forms of the thesis that we think in language, Carruthers entirely neglects a potentially fatal objection to his own preferred version of this “cognitive conception.”.
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  21. The “Philosophical” Case Against Visual Images.Peter Slezak - 1995 - In P. Slezak, T. Caelli & R. Clark (eds.), Perspectives on Cognitive Science, Volume 1: Theories, Experiments, and Foundations. Ablex Publishing.
    In their study of reasoning with diagrammatic and non-diagrammatic representations, Larkin and Simon (1987) are concerned with _external_ representations and explicitly avoid drawing inferences about the bearing of their work on the issue of internal, mental representations. Nonetheless, we may infer the bearing of their work on internal representations from the theories of Kosslyn, Finke and other ‘pictorialists’ who take internal representations to be importantly like external ones regarding their ‘privileged’ spatial properties of depicting and resembling their referents. Thus, Finke (...)
     
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  22.  59
    Reinterpreting Images.Peter Slezak - 1990 - Analysis (October) 235 (October):235-243.
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  23.  12
    Philosophers, Autistics & Three Year Olds - Semantics & Intuition.Peter Slezak - unknown
    Externalist theories in natural language semantics have become the orthodoxy since Kripke is widely thought to have refuted descriptive theories involving internal cognitive representation of meaning. This shift may be seen in developments in philosophy of language of the 1970s – the direct reference “revolution against Frege”. I consider Fodor’s heretical thought that something has gone “awfully wrong” in this philosophical consensus, perhaps confirming Chomsky’s view that the whole field of philosophical semantics is “utterly wrongheaded” and “crazy” by virtue of (...)
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  24.  16
    Appraising Constructivism in Science Education.Peter Slezak - 2014 - In Michael R. Matthews (ed.), International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy and Science Teaching. Springer. pp. 1023-1055.
    Two varieties of constructivism are distinguished. In part 1, the psychological or “radical” constructivism of von Glasersfeld is discussed. Despite its dominant influence in science education, radical constructivism has been controversial, with challenges to its principles and practices. In part 2, social constructivism is discussed in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Social constructivism has not been primarily concerned with education but has the most direct consequences in view of its challenge to the most fundamental, traditional assumptions in the philosophy of (...)
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  25.  9
    On Rhetorical Strategies: Verstehen Sie?Peter Slezak - 1990 - Social Epistemology 4 (4):357 – 360.
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  26. Doubts About Indubitability.Peter Slezak - 2010 - Philosophical Forum 41 (4):389-412.
    Kirsten Besheer has recently considered Descartes’ doubting appropriately in the context of his physiological theories in the spirit of recent important re-appraisals of his natural philosophy. However, Besheer does not address the notorious indubitability and its source that Descartes claims to have discovered. David Cunning has remarked that Descartes’ insistence on the indubitability of his existence presents “an intractable problem of interpretation” in the light of passages that suggest his existence is “just as dubitable as anything else”. However, although the (...)
     
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  27.  18
    There's More to Vision Than Meets the Eye.Peter Slezak - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (7):291-293.
  28.  46
    Actions, Cognition and the Self.Peter Slezak - 1986 - Synthese 66 (3):405 - 435.
  29.  13
    Man Not a Subject for Science?Peter Slezak - 1990 - Social Epistemology 4 (4):327 – 342.
  30.  23
    Minds, Machines and Self-Reference.Peter Slezak - 1984 - Dialectica 38 (1):17-34.
    SummaryJ.R. Lucas has argued that it follows from Godel's Theorem that the mind cannot be a machine or represented by any formal system. Although this notorious argument against the mechanism thesis has received considerable attention in the literature, it has not been decisively rebutted, even though mechanism is generally thought to be the only plausible view of the mind. In this paper I offer an analysis of Lucas's argument which shows that it derives its persuasiveness from a subtle confusion. In (...)
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  31. Computers, Brains and Minds.Peter Slezak (ed.) - 1989 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  32. Descartes' Startling Doctrine of the Reverse-Sign Relation.Peter Slezak - 2000 - In John Schuster, Stephen Gaukroger & John Sutton (eds.), Descartes' Natural Philosophy. Routledge.
     
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  33.  4
    Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and Science Education Part 2: Laboratory Life Under the Microscope.Peter Slezak - 1994 - Science and Education 3 (4):329-355.
  34.  11
    Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory by Myles Brand. [REVIEW]Peter Slezak - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):49-54.
  35.  3
    Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and Scientific Education: Part I.Peter Slezak - 1994 - Science and Education 3 (3):265-294.
  36. Should Philosophy of Science Be Rated X Too?Peter Slezak - manuscript
    Proceedings of the Sixth International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Conference (IHPST), Denver, Colorado, November 7-10, 2001; and Australasian Association of History, Philosophy & Social Studies of Science (AAHPSSS), Melbourne University, June 25-28, 2001 (PDF).
     
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  37. Devitt’s ‘Ignorance of Language’.Peter Slezak - manuscript
     
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  38.  11
    Suchting and the Sleep of Reason.Peter Slezak - 1994 - Science and Education 3 (1):69-72.
  39. The World Gone Wrong? Images, Illusions, Mistakes and Misrepresentations.Peter Slezak - 2004 - In Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation. Elsevier.
    In seeking to understand the extraordinary persistence and recalcitrance of the problems of intentionality, it is instructive to focus attention on one particular facet of the issue. The question of misrepresentation has been discussed recently as a puzzling aspect of the overall problem of the semantics of mental representation (Fodor 1984, 1994, Dretske 1994) and I propose to explore this issue as a loose thread which may be pulled to unravel the rest of the tangled ball.
     
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  40.  13
    Review Symposia.Martin Rudwick, Naomi Oreskes, David Oldroyd, David Philip Miller, Alan Chalmers, John Forge, David Turnbull, Peter Slezak, David Bloor, Craig Callender, Keith Hutchison, Steven Savitt & Huw Price - 1996 - Metascience 5 (1):7-85.
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  41.  15
    Review of John H. Sceski, Popper, Objectivity and the Growth of Knowledge[REVIEW]Peter Slezak - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (5).
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  42. Frankfurt Examples: The Moral of the Stories.Peter Slezak - manuscript
     
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  43.  5
    The Mind of God: Science and the Search for Ultimate Meaning.Peter Slezak - 1996 - Science and Education 5 (2):201-212.
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  44. When Can Visual Images Be Re-Interpreted? Non-Chronometric Tests of Pictorialism.Peter Slezak - manuscript
    are needed on which the contending accounts deliver different predictions. The question of re-interpreting images can be seen.
     
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  45. Is Cognitive Science Relevant to Science Teaching?Peter Slezak - manuscript
    The Relevance of Cognitive Science to Teaching, Proceedings of the 6th International History, Philosophy & Science Teaching Conference (IHPST), Denver, Colorado, November 7-10, 2001. (PDF).
     
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  46.  2
    How Not to Naturalize the Theory of Action.Peter Slezak - 1989 - In Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 137--166.
  47. Symposium on "Computer Discovery and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge".David Edge & Peter Slezak - 1989 - Sage Publications.
     
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  48. Intending and Acting: Toward a NaturalizedAction Theory by Myles Brand. [REVIEW]Peter Slezak - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):49-54.
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  49. Minds, Machines and Self‐Reference.Peter Slezak - 1984 - Dialectica 38 (1):17-34.
    SummaryJ.R. Lucas has argued that it follows from Godel's Theorem that the mind cannot be a machine or represented by any formal system. Although this notorious argument against the mechanism thesis has received considerable attention in the literature, it has not been decisively rebutted, even though mechanism is generally thought to be the only plausible view of the mind. In this paper I offer an analysis of Lucas's argument which shows that it derives its persuasiveness from a subtle confusion. In (...)
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  50. Reinterpreting images.Peter Slezak - 1990 - Erkenntnis 50 (4):235.
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