In 2014, the first three volumes of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks—the personal and philosophical notebooks that he kept during the war years—were published in Germany. These notebooks provide the first textual evidence of anti-Semitism in Heidegger’s philosophy, not simply in passing remarks, but as incorporated into his philosophical and political thinking itself. In Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy, Peter Trawny, the editor of those notebooks, offers the first evaluation of Heidegger’s philosophical project in light of the Black (...) Notebooks. While Heidegger’s affiliation with National Socialism is well known, the anti-Semitic dimension of that engagement could not be fully told until now. Trawny traces Heidegger’s development of a grand “narrative” of the history of being, the “being-historical thinking” at the center of Heidegger’s work after Being and Time. Two of the protagonists of this narrative are well known to Heidegger’s readers: the Greeks and the Germans. The world-historical antagonist of this narrative, however, has remained hitherto undisclosed: the Jews, or, more specifically, “world Judaism.” As Trawny shows, world Judaism emerges as a racialized, destructive, and technological threat to the German homeland, indeed, to any homeland whatsoever. Trawny pinpoints recurrent, anti-Semitic themes in the Notebooks, including Heidegger’s adoption of crude cultural stereotypes, his assigning of racial reasons to philosophical decisions, his endorsement of a Jewish “world conspiracy,” and his first published remarks on the extermination camps and gas chambers. Trawny concludes with a thoughtful meditation on how Heidegger’s achievements might still be valued despite these horrifying facets. Unflinching and systematic, this is one of the most important assessments of one of the most important philosophers in our history. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger is widely regarded as one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth-century, and his seminal text Being and Time is considered one of the most significant texts in contemporary philosophy. Yet his name has also been mired in controversy because of his affiliations with the Nazi regime, his failure to criticize its genocidal politics and his subsequent silence about the holocaust. Now, according to Heidegger's wishes, and to complete the publication of his multi-volume Complete Works, his highly (...) controversial and secret 'Black Notebooks' have been released to the public. These notebooks reveal the extent to which Heidegger's 'personal Nazism' was neither incidental nor opportunistic, but part of his philosophical ethos. So, why would Heidegger, far from destroying them, allow these notebooks, which contain examples of this extreme thinking, to be published? In this revealing new book, Peter Trawny, editor of Heidegger's complete works in German, confronts these questions and, by way of a compelling study of his theoretical work, shows that Heidegger was committed to a conception of freedom that is only beholden to the judgement of the history of being; that is, that to be free means to be free from the prejudices, norms, or mores of one's time. Whoever thinks the truth of being freely exposes themselves to the danger of epochal errancy. For this reason, Heidegger's decision to publish his notebooks, including their anti-Jewish passages, was an exercise of this anarchical freedom. In the course of a wide-ranging discussion of Heidegger's views on truth, ethics, the truth of being, tragedy and his relationship to other figures such as Nietzsche and Schmitt, Trawny provides a compelling argument for why Heidegger wanted the explosive material in his Black Notebooks to be published, whilst also offering an original and provocative interpretation of Heidegger's work. (shrink)

How do we challenge the structures of late capitalism if all possible media through which to do do is inescapably capitalist? This urgent political question is at the heart of Peter Trawny's major new work. With searing precision Trawny demonstrates how our world has become wholly determined by technology, capital, and the medium. In this world of the 'TCM', we universal subjects remain in a state of apathy that is temporarily punctuated, but also reinforced, by the phantasmatic dream of difference (...) offered us by the 'Hollywood machine.' Our sole motivation is to gain money and the power it brings. The only meaningful difference in the world of the TCM universal is the difference between wealth and poverty. Freedom here is then the freedom to dispose of things (particularly technological objects) and to gain pleasure. It makes our relation to our surroundings essentially 'touristic,' and our relation to the earth an essentially exploitative one. The notion of personal or societal freedom has never been more controversial or, seemingly, more far from our grasp. While exploring in details the difficulties we face in our attempts to be free, Trawny builds an almost Utopian vision of how to break out of the mediums in which we operate and experience a new kind of freedom – both one of intimacy, and one through philosophy. An ambitious and lively yet completely rigorous work, this book offers a fascinating vision of how to live and live well. (shrink)

In the article “The Modern Age as World War” Heidegger’s and Patočka’s considerations of the First and the Second World War are interpreted as a reflection on the modern age. The historical background of this reflection goes back through an important influence of Ernst Jünger to Heraclitus’ thought of an all-ruling πόλεμος, which brings forth the close affinity between Heidegger and Patočka. Here it is unavoidable to pay heed to the question, whether war that is understood on the basis of (...) the Heraclitean πόλεμος is a historical (geschichtliches) event or not. Besides this, Heidegger’s and Patočka’s philosophical approaches to the world war are set back in the context of their thoughts, which we can find by Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, or Clausewitz. In the end, we argue that Heidegger’s and Patočka’s thinking of war is a contribution to the almost refused self-knowledge of the modern age itself. (shrink)

In the article “The Modern Age as World War” Heidegger’s and Patočka’s considerations of the First and the Second World War are interpreted as a reflection on the modern age. The historical background of this reflection goes back through an important influence of Ernst Jünger to Heraclitus’ thought of an all-ruling πόλεμος, which brings forth the close affinity between Heidegger and Patočka. Here it is unavoidable to pay heed to the question, whether war that is understood on the basis of (...) the Heraclitean πόλεμος is a historical (geschichtliches) event or not. Besides this, Heidegger’s and Patočka’s philosophical approaches to the world war are set back in the context of their thoughts, which we can find by Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, or Clausewitz. In the end, we argue that Heidegger’s and Patočka’s thinking of war is a contribution to the almost refused self-knowledge of the modern age itself. (shrink)

Tatjana Noemi Tömmel and Florian Grosser speak with Peter Trawny, the philosopher whose editions and interpretations of Martin Heidegger's work have strongly and lastingly shaped the view of Heidegger's thought.

Continental philosophy tells the story of its origin as thaumazein, as wonder. But Aristotle set himself against a specific "warning", which gives us mortals the advice not to deal with immortal things. The "warning" comes from Delphic-tragic ethics, which is incarnated in god Apollo. Aristotle contradicts this "warning" because of the restriction of man. He does not contradict the divinness of knowledge, which is defended by Apollo. The founding of continental philosophy, which owns in theory its highest knowledge, is thus (...) aiming immediately at reaching god. An attack on Delphic ethics precedes wonder. In this sense, philosophy does not begin with wonder, but with hubris. (shrink)

Desde su publicación a principios de 2014 los Cuadernos negros de Martin Heidegger incitaron a un debate tanto en la academia como en la esfera intelectual pública. Supuestamente estos cuadernos ponen en evidencia cómo Heidegger comulgaba con el antisemitismo y el nacionalsocialismo. A partir del análisis elaborado por David Nirenberg en su libro Antijudaísmo: la tradición occidental, se discute si el referente del antijudaísmo representa un fenómeno real o si el antijudaísmo es una visión del mundo en donde el significado (...) de “los judíos” representa una función en la autocomprensión de aquellos que hablan de “judío” o “ser judío”, sin que este significado posea un referente real. Aquello que aquí se denomina ‘referencia real o fáctica’ representa un problema constante para la filosofía. Si ésta tuviera siempre que remitirse a algo real, sería entonces una ciencia particular como la biología. El “objeto” de la filosofía parece ser, no obstante, un problema filosófico. Por ello, en este caso se trata llanamente de la cuestión de si el discurso filosófico de Heidegger en los Cuadernos negros se corresponde o no con algo del mundo. Se trata, en pocas palabras, de definir el tipo de antisemitismo que se expresa en los Cuadernos negros. (shrink)

Since the beginning of its history philosophy deals with the question for the meaning of war. This question, however, was always understood as the question for the causes of war: Why is there war? Where does it come from? The article presupposes that only this question and the attempts to respond to it can shed light onto the interpretation of the historical reality of war, which is finally the only reason to reflect on its causation. The article refers to a (...) set of notions and texts, which belong to a discourse on war unfolding through the centuries of European thinking. These notions are: contradictions, body, justice, nature, right, politics, and morals. Even if this sequence is only one possible sequence of the philosophical reflection on warfare, I consider it to be one of greater importance. We see, how a plurality of causes creates a context, in which we could try to analyze actual events: For it is evident that no war has only one reason. And the article has finally one other intention, namely to show that probably every possible sequence of causes of war will have the same consequence. This con-sequence will be the final destruction of the world, the coming of the ash. (shrink)

The European ethos can be characterized in two different modes. On the one hand the European ethos has its origin in the radical formula of Socrates that acting unjustly is in every respect bad and that even suffering injustice is better than that. In this perspective the good life in a Socratic signification is the self-withdrawal of mere social acting in the sense of being socially successful. But because this origin of the European ethos is a “dynamite for civil society” (...) we have to refer to Aristotle and his concept of ethics. There, on the other hand, we have to notice the habits and customs as a balance of the radical Socratic beginning. Considering these two origins of ethics we can recognize that moral austerity and ethical moderation are both two traditions of the European ethos and politics without being an alternative. For only the unity of these origins can demonstrate the universal sense of the European humanism. (shrink)

Philosophy of History is in crisis. This crisis has a structural origin in separating a finitude of the one (fate, destiny, nation, people, identity) from an infinitude of the many (individuals, biographies, contingencies, banalities). This difference seems to produce an aporia. Where could history be that would talk of both?

Philosophy of History is in crisis. This crisis has a structural origin in separating a finitude of the one from an infinitude of the many. This difference seems to produce an aporia. Where could history be that would talk of both?

This introduction by leading scholar Peter Trawny is the first to tackle the Black Notebooks, whose recent publication revealed the extent of Heidegger's anti-Semitism. Trawny directly confronts the most problematic aspects of Heidegger's thought, also fully surveying his work, from early writings to his magnum opus, Being and Time.

Ende Oktober 2014 organisierte das Martin-Heidegger-Institut in Wuppertal die erste internationale Tagung uber Heideggers "Schwarze Hefte" in Deutschland. Im Fruhjahr desselben Jahres hatte die Veroffentlichung der "Uberlegungen," der ersten Reihe der "Schwarzen Hefte," gezeigt, dass Heidegger zwischen 1938 und 1941 in seinen Aufzeichnungen antisemitische Gedanken auftreten lasst. Es war und ist die Frage, welche Motive den Philosophen dabei leiteten. Wie sind jene Ausserungen zu verstehen? Wie weit betreffen sie Heideggers Denken uberhaupt? Der Band versammelt die Resultate dieser Tagung. Er enthalt (...) Aufsatze von Jean-Luc Nancy, Donatella Di Cesare, Francoise Dastur, Danielle Cohen-Levinas u.a. (shrink)

La publication des " Cahiers noirs " de Heidegger en Allemagne a mis au jour plusieurs passages, écrits dans les années 1938-1941, au contenu antisémite incontestable. Peter Trawny, spécialiste de Heidegger et éditeur de ces " Cahiers ", affronte ici le choc de ces pages mettant en question la thèse prédominante jusqu'à aujourd'hui qui voudrait que l'engagement de Heidegger dans le national-socialisme n'ait pas impliqué de sa part une adhésion à l'antisémitisme. Selon Peter Trawny, si Heidegger s'écarte de l'antisémitisme "vulgaire" (...) des nazis, il en donne bien une reformulation en termes d'" histoire de l'être ". Autrement dit, il intègre l'antisémitisme à son interprétation philosophique de l'Histoire mondiale. Comment penser ce désastre du jugement de la part d'un des plus grands philosophes du XXe siècle, qui a exercé une profonde influence sur Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault et tant d'autres? Avec tout le sérieux scientifique, le sens historique et philosophique qui s'imposent à l'interprète, l'auteur cherche à répondre aux questions que soulève cette découverte. (shrink)

Penser, ce n’est pas s’immuniser contre les risques. C’est une « mise à découvert », « une relation périlleuse d’approche de la vérité comme événement de vie », un va-et-vient entre « ouverture » et « retrait », entre pics, jaillissements et gouffres, fourvoiements et catastrophes – dans le cas de Heidegger, l’antisémitisme. Bref, une « errance », une chorégraphie entre des lieux extrêmes, une dramaturgie.On comprendra comment ce texte d’une liberté « abyssale », qui renvoie à leur médiocrité nos (...) faux philosophes devenus des « machines à calculer au plus juste le bien-être de l’humanité », prend place chez Indigène.« L’histoire de l’être est histoire de l’errance. Elle donne asile au monstre comme au monstrueux. Elle en fait partie », écrit Peter Trawny. On comprendra, oui, qu’après Stéphane Hessel, Federico Garcia Lorca, Ken Loach… nous accueillions ce « dangereux » philosophe qu’est Peter Trawny. [quatrième de couverture]Ce texte inédit, rédigé à la demande d’Indigène éditions, va au-delà de « l’affaire Heidegger » qui fait suite à la publication des « Cahiers noirs ». Il parait simultanément en France et à Berlin, et sort la pensée de l’enclave fonctionnelle où notre monde l’enferme, « un monde qui a renoncé au mythe ! », nous dit Peter Trawny. Peter Trawny est directeur de l'Institut Martin Heidegger et professeur à l'université de Wuppertal, responsable de l'édition des "Cahiers noirs" de Heidegger. Il est également l'auteur de monographies sur Hannah Arendt, Socrate et Ernst Jünger. (shrink)

Eine Einfuhrung in die Philosophie Martin Heideggers ist nach der Veroffentlichung der "Schwarzen Hefte" ein Wagnis. Heideggers Auaerungen uber das "Weltjudentum" und seine politische Hartnackigkeit nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg belasten sein Denken schwer. Wie kann man in diese Philosophie einfuhren, ohne gleichzeitig den Boden zu bereiten, auf dem diese inakzeptablen Ideen wachsen konnen? Peter Trawny versteht seine kritische Einfuhrung als eine Darstellung auch und gerade des Problematischen von Heideggers Denken. Zugleich versucht sie allerdings, seine auaergewohnliche Bedeutung im Kontext der Philosophie (...) des 20. Jahrhunderts zu erfassen. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt v svoji interpretaciji Kantove teorije »razsodne moči«, le-to vzame iz njenega prvotnega sobesedila, razmisleka o dobrem in lepem, ter ji podeli politični pomen. Po eni strani Kantov pojem »reflektirajoče razsodne moči« Arendtovi omogoči prikaz določene nujnosti v politični presoji, za katero je značilno, da se vedno odvija v singularnih okoliščinah in se ne more sklicevati na nobeno vnaprejšnje, univerzalno ali splošno merilo. Po drugi strani Arendtova interpretira »nezainteresirano ugajanje«, ki je pri Kantu predpostavka za estetsko sodbo, kot nujni (...) pogoj teoretičnega motrenja zgodovine. Pomembni interpreti, kot sta Beiner in Vollrath, so na osnovi tega trdili, da gre za protislovje. V svojem besedilu želim pokazati, da se to protislovje razreši v »hermenevtični etiki«, ki jo je možno pokazati v delih Hannah Arendt, celo v najbolj zgodnjih.Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of Kant’s conception of the »power of judgment« extracts this faculty from its intended context, considerations of the beautiful and of nature, and grants it a political significance. On the one hand, Kant’s conception of a »reflective power of judgment« offers Arendt the possibility of referring to a certain necessity in political judgments; judgments which always take place under singular conditions and which cannot presume a universal or general measure. On the other hand, Arendt interprets »disinterested pleasure«, which is for Kant a presupposition of aesthetic judgment, as a necessary condition for theoretical considerations of history. Between these two aspects of Arendt’s Kant interpretation, important scholars, such as Beiner and Vollrath, have claimed to find a contradiction. In my article I would like to show that this contradiction is dissolved by way of a »hermeneutical ethics«, which can be identified throughout the work of Hannah Arendt, even in its earliest forms. (shrink)

e medium and the revolution exclude each other, insofar as two kinds of violence, restlessly ghting for domination, collide. e ght is a ght for the ght itself. e violence of the medium can namely suppress the ght the revolution needs. e violence of this suppression of violence, the violence of nonviolence produces the psycho-somatic state of depression. In this depression the body is drawn together, onto itself. It does not experience anything anymore. e violence of »the ancient« directs itself (...) therefore only towards itself alone. us the immediate and its origin are veiled. e medium excludes them. e origin cannot return, it remains in absence. e violence of the revolution cannot awaken anymore. e absence of the revolution is the absent origin itself. (shrink)

Entrevista a Peter Trawny por Soraya Guimarães Hoepfner.

Hannah Arendts Kant-Lektüre findet ihren Abschluß in einer Interpretation der „Urteilskraft“. Im „Urteilen“ entdeckt sie einerseits das zentrale Vermögen des politischen Handelns, andererseits die eigentliche Tätigkeit eines notwendig sich von allem Handeln zurückziehenden die Geschichte betrachtenden Denkens. Daraus entsteht der Anschein, die Denkerin habe ihre Politische Philosophie zuletzt durch einen Widerspruch ruiniert. Auf der Basis des von Seyla Benhabib in die Diskussion gebrachten Begriffs des „narrativen Handelns“ läßt sich jedoch zeigen, daß dieser Widerspruch nur ein Scheinproblem darstellt. Arendts Philosophieren findet (...) in der Auslegung der „Urteilskraft“ die Möglichkeit, ihrer Hermeneutik der „totalen Herrschaft“ ein ethisches Fundament zu verschaffen. Das durch einen tiefgreifenden „Traditionsbruch“ gestörte „Verstehen“ der politischen Sphäre findet in der „moralischen Urteilskraft“ einen Anhaltspunkt, sich den Gefahren einer durch den Totalitarismus bedrohten Moderne zu stellen. So wird es möglich, die wichtigste Intention von Arendts Denken als eine „politische Ethik“ zu charakterisieren. (shrink)

Hannah Arendts Kant-Lektüre findet ihren Abschluß in einer Interpretation der „Urteilskraft“. Im „Urteilen“ entdeckt sie einerseits das zentrale Vermögen des politischen Handelns, andererseits die eigentliche Tätigkeit eines notwendig sich von allem Handeln zurückziehenden die Geschichte betrachtenden Denkens. Daraus entsteht der Anschein, die Denkerin habe ihre Politische Philosophie zuletzt durch einen Widerspruch ruiniert. Auf der Basis des von Seyla Benhabib in die Diskussion gebrachten Begriffs des „narrativen Handelns“ läßt sich jedoch zeigen, daß dieser Widerspruch nur ein Scheinproblem darstellt. Arendts Philosophieren findet (...) in der Auslegung der „Urteilskraft“ die Möglichkeit, ihrer Hermeneutik der „totalen Herrschaft“ ein ethisches Fundament zu verschaffen. Das durch einen tiefgreifenden „Traditionsbruch“ gestörte „Verstehen“ der politischen Sphäre findet in der „moralischen Urteilskraft“ einen Anhaltspunkt, sich den Gefahren einer durch den Totalitarismus bedrohten Moderne zu stellen. So wird es möglich, die wichtigste Intention von Arendts Denken als eine „politische Ethik“ zu charakterisieren. (shrink)