Results for 'Phenomenal quality'

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  1.  55
    The Vagueness Constraint and the Quality Space for Pain.Daniel Kostic - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):929-939.
    This paper is concerned with a quality space model as an account of the intelligibility of explanation. I argue that descriptions of causal or functional roles (Chalmers Levine, 2001) are not the only basis for intelligible explanations. If we accept that phenomenal concepts refer directly, not via descriptions of causal or functional roles, then it is difficult to find role fillers for the described causal roles. This constitutes a vagueness constraint on the intelligibility of explanation. Thus, I propose (...)
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  2. Phenomenal Character, Phenomenal Concepts, and Externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.
    A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible. Even if internally identical individuals could have different thoughts, it is said, if one of them has a headache, or a tingly sensation, so must the other. In this paper, I argue that recent work on phenomenal (...)
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  3. Content Externalism and Phenomenal Character: A New Worry About Privileged Access.Jonathan Ellis - 2007 - Synthese 159 (1):47 - 60.
    A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject.
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  4.  68
    Can Phenomenal Qualities Exist Unperceived?Edward Feser - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):405-14.
    Michael Lockwood has in recent years revived and defended a unique approach to the mind/body problem most famously associated with Bertrand Russell. This approach has a number of surprising and counterintuitive features, not the least of which is that it involves the claim that phenomenal qualities can exist independently of any mind, unperceived by any conscious subject. In this paper I first provide a summary of the Russell/Lockwood theory of mind so as to make evident the importance of this (...)
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  5. On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.
    Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept *Q* (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.
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  6. Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.
    One popular materialist response to the explanatory gap identifies phenomenal concepts with type-demonstrative concepts. This kind of response, however, faces a serious challenge: that our phenomenal concepts seem to provide a richer characterization of their referents than just the demonstrative characterization of 'that quality'. In this paper, I develop a materialist account that beefs up the contents of phenomenal concepts while retaining the idea that these contents contain demonstrative elements. I illustrate this account by focusing on (...)
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  7. Phenomenal and Objective Size.John Zeimbekis - 2009 - Noûs 43 (2):346-362.
    Definitions of phenomenal types (Nelson Goodman’s definition of qualia, Sydney Shoemaker’s phenomenal types, Austen Clark’s physicalist theory of qualia) imply that numerically distinct experiences can be type-identical in some sense. However, Goodman also argues that objects cannot be replicated in respect of continuous and densely ordered types. In that case, how can phenomenal types be defined for sizes, shapes and colours, which appear to be continuously ordered types? Concentrating on size, I will argue for the following points. (...)
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  8.  38
    A Physicalist Reinterpretion of 'Phenomenal' Spaces.Lieven Decock - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (2):197-225.
    This paper argues that phenomenal or internal metrical spaces are redundant posits. It is shown that we need not posit an internal space-time frame, as the physical space-time suffices to explain geometrical perception, memory and planning. More than the internal space-time frame, the idea of a phenomenal colour space has lent credibility to the idea of internal spaces. It is argued that there is no phenomenal colour space that underlies the various psychophysical colour spaces; it is parasitic (...)
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  9.  31
    Quantifying the Subjective: Psychophysics and the Geometry of Color.Alistair M. C. Isaac - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):207 - 233.
    Early psychophysical methods as codified by Fechner motivate the development of quantitative theories of subjective experience. The basic insight is that just noticeable differences between experiences can serve as units for measuring a sensory domain. However, the methods described by Fechner tacitly assume that the experiences being investigated can be linearly ordered. This assumption is not true for all sensory domains; for example, there is no trivial linear order over all possible color sensations. This paper discusses key developments in the (...)
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  10. Presentism, Eternalism, and Phenomenal Change.Michael Pelczar - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):275 - 290.
    Normally, when we notice a change taking place, our conscious experience has a corresponding quality of phenomenal change. Here it is argued that one's experience can have this quality at or during a time when there is no change in which phenomenal properties one instantiates. This undermines a number of otherwise forceful arguments against leading metaphysical theories of change, but also requires these theories to construe change as a secondary quality, akin to color.
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  11. Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character.Fiona Macpherson - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Stirling
    This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain (...)
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  12.  35
    Colour: Physical or Phenomenal?Russell Wahl & Jonathan Westphal - 1998 - Philosophy 73 (284):301-304.
    We wish to defend Jonathan Westphal's view that colour is complex against a recent ‘phenomenological’ criticism of Eric Rubenstein. There is often thought to be a conflict between two kinds of determinants of colour, physical and phenomenal. On the one hand there are the complex physical facts about colour, such as the determination of a surface colour by an absorption spectrum. There is also, however, the fact that the apparently simple phenomenological quality of what is seen is a (...)
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  13.  2
    On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):43-95.
    Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is the view that there is some concept Q that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.
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  14. Making Sense: The Problem of Phenomenal Qualities in Late Scholastic Aristotelianism and Descartes.Alison J. Simmons - 1994 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
    It is no surprise that the phenomenal qualities of our sensory experience pose recalcitrant philosophical problems for a physical materialist metaphysics. The colors of flowers as we experience them by sight, the taste of a ripe peach, and the smell of fresh-cut grass are undeniably part of the experienced world; yet in their phenomenal mode, they do not seem well-placed in the physicist's world of particles and energy fields. It seems, prima facie, that the metaphysical programs found in (...)
     
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  15. The Problem of Phenomenal Character.Abraham Witonsky - 1997 - Dissertation, Temple University
    I defend the view that the felt quality of experience is both an essential feature of certain inner mental states as well as a feature of the brain, but that at present we have no idea of how it is a feature of the brain because it is irreducibly subjective. I call this situation the "problem of phenomenal character". I argue that we cannot solve this problem with our present conceptual apparatus, but I explain why it is premature (...)
     
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  16.  16
    Unsensed Phenomenal Qualities: A Defence.Michael Lockwood - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):415-18.
    In Lockwood , I defended a conception of phenomenal qualities , according to which they can exist unsensed. Edward Feser points out that a key argument to which I appealed, in support of my claim that phenomenal qualities can ‘outrun awareness’, fails to show that there are phenomenal qualities of which we are unaware; rather, it shows only that phenomenal qualities have attributes of which we are unaware. This may be granted. But I argue that we (...)
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  17. Red and 'Red'.Galen Strawson - 1989 - Synthese 78 (February):193-232.
    THIS PAPER ARGUES FOR THE CLAIM THAT ALTHOUGH COLOUR WORDS LIKE 'RED' ARE, ESSENTIALLY, 'PHENOMENAL-QUALITY' WORDS—I.E., WORDS FOR PROPERTIES WHOSE WHOLE AND ESSENTIAL NATURE CAN BE AND IS FULLY REVEALED IN SENSORY EXPERIENCE, GIVEN ONLY THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTER THAT THAT EXPERIENCE HAS—STILL 'RED' CANNOT BE SUPPOSED TO BE A WORD THAT PICKS OUT OR DENOTES ANY PARTICULAR PHENOMENAL QUALITY. THE ARGUMENT RESTS ESSENTIALLY ON THE SUPPOSITION, OFTEN DISCUSSED UNDER THE HEADING OF THE 'COLOR-SPECTRUM INVERSION ARGUMENT', THAT (...)
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  18.  58
    Modeling, Localization and the Explanation of Phenomenal Properties: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences at the Beginning of the Millennium.Steven Horst - 2005 - Synthese 147 (3):477-513.
    Case studies in the psychophysics, modeling and localization of human vision are presented as an example of.
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  19.  56
    Phenomenal Qualities and the Nontransitivity of Matching.John A. Burgess - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):206-220.
  20.  16
    Phenomenal Qualities.P. S. Kitcher - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (April):123-9.
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  21. Visual Perception and Blindsight: The Role of the Phenomenal Qualities.Ralph Schumacher - 1998 - Acta Analytica 20 (20):71-82.
     
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  22. Panpsychism’s Combination Problem Is a Problem for Everyone.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. London, UK: Routledge.
    Panpsychism, the view that microphysical entities have phenomenal experiences that constitute the phenomenal experiences of macrophysical entities, seems to be committed to various sorts of mental combination: it seems that experiences, subjects, and phenomenal characters would have to mentally combine in order to yield experiences such as our own. The combination problem for panpsychism is that of explaining precisely how the required forms of mental combination occur. This paper argues that, given a few plausible assumptions, the panpsychist’s (...)
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  23. Quality and Content: Essays on Consciousness, Representation, and Modality.Joseph Levine - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Joseph Levine draws together a series of essays in which he has developed his distinctive approach to philosophy of mind. He defends a materialist view of the mind against various challenges, and offers illuminating studies of consciousness, phenomenal concepts, mental representation, demonstrative thought, and cognitive phenomenology.
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  24. Aristotle on Consciousness.Victor Caston - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):751-815.
    Aristotle's discussion of perceiving that we perceive has points of contact with two contemporary debates about consciousness: the first over whether consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states or a higher-order thought or perception; the second concerning the qualitative nature of experience. In both cases, Aristotle's views cut down the middle of an apparent dichotomy, in a way that does justice to each set of intuitions, while avoiding their attendant difficulties. With regard to the first issue?the primary focus of (...)
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  25.  80
    Emotional Experience in the Computational Belief-Desire Theory of Emotion.Rainer Reisenzein - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):214-222.
    Based on the belief that computational modeling (thinking in terms of representation and computations) can help to clarify controversial issues in emotion theory, this article examines emotional experience from the perspective of the Computational Belief–Desire Theory of Emotion (CBDTE), a computational explication of the belief–desire theory of emotion. It is argued that CBDTE provides plausible answers to central explanatory challenges posed by emotional experience, including: the phenomenal quality,intensity and object-directedness of emotional experience, the function of emotional experience and (...)
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  26. Pain, Dislike and Experience.Guy Kahane - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (3):327-336.
    It is widely held that it is only contingent that the sensation of pain is disliked, and that when pain is not disliked, it is not intrinsically bad. This conjunction of claims has often been taken to support a subjectivist view of pain’s badness on which pain is bad simply because it is the object of a negative attitude and not because of what it feels like. In this paper, I argue that accepting this conjunction of claims does not commit (...)
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  27. Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency.Carl Ginet - 1997 - The Journal of Ethics 1 (1):85-98.
    This paper first distinguishes three alternative views that adherents to both incompatibilism and PAP may take as to what constitutes an agent''s determining or controlling her action (if it''s not the action''s being deterministically caused by antecedent events): the indeterministic-causation view, the agent-causation view, and "simple indeterminism." The bulk of the paper focusses on the dispute between simple indeterminism - the view that the occurrence of a simple mental event is determined by its subject if it possesses the "actish" (...) quality and is undetermined by antecedent events - and Timothy O''Connor''s agent-causation view. It defends simple indeterminism against O''Connor''s objections to it and offers objections to O''Connor''s view. (shrink)
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  28.  85
    Beyond Transparency: The Spatial Argument for Experiential Externalism.Neil Mehta - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.
    I highlight a neglected but striking phenomenological fact about our experiences: they have a pervasively spatial character. Specifically, all (or almost all) phenomenal qualities – roughly, the introspectible, philosophically puzzling properties that constitute ‘what it’s like’ to have an experience – introspectively seem instantiated in some kind of space. So, assuming a very weak charity principle about introspection, some phenomenal qualities are instantiated in space. But there is only one kind of space – the ordinary space occupied by (...)
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  29.  87
    Hedonic Tone and the Heterogeneity of Pleasure.Ivar Labukt - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (2):172-199.
    Some philosophers have claimed that pleasures and pains are characterized by their particular or . Most contemporary writers reject this view: they hold that hedonic states have nothing in common except being liked or disliked (alternatively: pursued or avoided) for their own sake. In this article, I argue that the hedonic tone view has been dismissed too quickly: there is no clear introspective or scientific evidence that pleasures do not share a phenomenal quality. I also argue that analysing (...)
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  30.  69
    Locke, Kierkegaard and the Phenomenology of Personal Identity.Patrick Stokes - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):645 – 672.
    Personal Identity theorists as diverse as Derek Parfit, Marya Schechtman and Galen Strawson have noted that the experiencing subject (the locus of present psychological experience) and the person (a human being with a career/narrative extended across time) are not necessarily coextensive. Accordingly, we can become psychologically alienated from, and fail to experience a sense of identity with, the person we once were or will be. This presents serious problems for Locke's original account of “sameness of consciousness” constituting personal identity, given (...)
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  31. Machine Consciousness: Plausible Idea or Semantic Distortion?William Y. Adams - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):46-56.
    I found the JCS issue on Machine Consciousness, Volume 10, No. 4-5 , frustrating and alienating. There seems to be a consensus building that consciousness is accessible to scientific scrutiny, so much so that it is already understood well enough to be modeled and even synthesized. I'm not so sure. It could be instead that the vocabulary of consciousness is being subtly redefined to be amenable to scientific investigation and explicit modeling. Such semantic revisionism is confusing and often misleading. Whatever (...)
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  32. Sex.Jonathan Webber - 2009 - Philosophy 84 (2):233-250.
    The sexual domain is unified only by the phenomenal quality of the occurrence of the desires, activities, and pleasures classed as sexual. There is no conceptual restriction on the range of intentional objects those desires, activities, and pleasures can take. Neither is there good conceptual reason to privilege some sexual desires, activities, or pleasures as paradigmatic. Since the phenomenal quality unifying the sexual domain is not itself morally significant, the morality of sexuality is no different from (...)
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  33.  63
    Motion Blindness and the Knowledge Argument.Philip Pettit - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 105--142.
    In a now famous thought experiment, Frank jackson asked us t0 imagine an omniscient scientist, Mary, who is coniincd in a black-and-white room and then released into the world 0f color . Assuming that she is omniscicnt in respect of all physical facts—roughiy, all the facts available to physics and all the facts that they in turn Hx or determine-physicalism would suggest that there is no new fact Mary can discover after emancipation; physicalism holds that all facts are physical in (...)
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  34.  24
    The Embodied Self and the Feeling of Being Alive.Fiorella Battaglia - 2012 - In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter. pp. 201-222.
    This paper aims to render some aspects of the feeling of being alive more clearly comprehensible. My emphasis on the phenomenal quality of consciousness stems from the “embodied” approach to consciousness, according to which consciousness, since it is considered a phenomenon of life, includes both intentional and motivational aspects. In this view, its phenomenal quality is an inherent property of the embodied self, which relates both to the external world and to itself. The feeling of being (...)
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  35.  2
    Sex.Jonathan Webber - unknown
    The sexual domain is unified only by the phenomenal quality of the occurrence of the desires, activities, and pleasures it includes. There is no conceptual restriction on the range of intentional objects those desires, activities, and pleasures can take. Neither is there good conceptual reason to privilege any class of them as paradigmatic. Since the quality unifying the sexual is not morally significant, the morality of sexuality is no different from morality in general. The view that participant (...)
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  36.  2
    Sex.Jonathan Webber - unknown
    The sexual domain is unified only by the phenomenal quality of the occurrence of the desires, activities, and pleasures it includes. There is no conceptual restriction on the range of intentional objects those desires, activities, and pleasures can take. Neither is there good conceptual reason to privilege any class of them as paradigmatic. Since the quality unifying the sexual is not morally significant, the morality of sexuality is no different from morality in general. The view that participant (...)
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  37.  2
    Sex.Jonathan Webber - unknown
    The sexual domain is unified only by the phenomenal quality of the occurrence of the desires, activities, and pleasures it includes. There is no conceptual restriction on the range of intentional objects those desires, activities, and pleasures can take. Neither is there good conceptual reason to privilege any class of them as paradigmatic. Since the quality unifying the sexual is not morally significant, the morality of sexuality is no different from morality in general. The view that participant (...)
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  38.  4
    On Literary Works as Simulations That Run on Minds.Rainer Reisenzein - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (1):35-36.
    This commentary discusses Oatley's proposal that literary works considered as simulations that run on minds can fulfill similar epistemic functions as computer simulations of mental processes. Whereas in computer simulation, both the input data and the computations to be performed on these data are explicit, only the input is explicitly known in the case of mental simulation. For this reason, literary simulations cannot play exactly the same epistemic role as computer simulations. Still, literary simulations can provide knowledge (e.g., about the (...)
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  39. The Case for Intrinsic Theory: X. A Phenomenologist's Account of Inner Awareness.Thomas Natsoulas - 2004 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (2):97-121.
    This article is in large part an exposition and interpretation of the Woodruff Smith intrinsic-theoretical account of inner awareness. And, it is propaedeutic to considering, subsequently in the present series, the first of six theses regarding inner awareness that Kriegel defended in a recently published issue of this journal. Included here, as well, is some of the relevant background about intrinsic theory and other theories of inner awareness. Kriegel defended his first thesis with special critical reference to phenomenologist Woodruff Smith’s (...)
     
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  40. Sex.Jonathan Webber - unknown
    The sexual domain is unified only by the phenomenal quality of the occurrence of the desires, activities, and pleasures it includes. There is no conceptual restriction on the range of intentional objects those desires, activities, and pleasures can take. Neither is there good conceptual reason to privilege any class of them as paradigmatic. Since the quality unifying the sexual is not morally significant, the morality of sexuality is no different from morality in general. The view that participant (...)
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  41. Moral Phenomenology (2nd Edition).Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell.
    In the philosophy of mind, the study of mental life has tended to focus on three central aspects of mental states: their representational content, their functional role, and their phenomenal character. The representational content of a mental state is what the state represents, what it is about; its functional role is the role it plays within the functional organization of the subject’s overall psychology; its phenomenal character is the experiential or subjective quality that goes with what it (...)
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  42. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Perception/Cognition Divide.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York: Routledge.
    One of Brian Loar’s most central contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind is the notion of phenomenal intentionality: a kind of intentional directedness fully grounded in phenomenal character. Proponents of phenomenal intentionality typically also endorse the idea of cognitive phenomenology: a sui generis phenomenal character of cognitive states such as thoughts and judgments that grounds these states’ intentional directedness. This combination creates a challenge, though: namely, how to account for the manifest phenomenological difference between perception and (...)
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  43. The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons.Fabian Dorsch - forthcoming - In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press.
    Doxasticism about our awareness of normative (i.e. justifying) reasons – the view that we can recognise reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs – is incompatible with the following triad of claims: -/- (1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) requires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason. -/- (2) Infants are capable of being motivated. -/- (3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement or belief. -/- (...)
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  44. What Hard Problem?Massimo Pigliucci - 2013 - Philosophy Now (99).
    The philosophical study of consciousness is chock full of thought experiments: John Searle’s Chinese Room, David Chalmers’ Philosophical Zombies, Frank Jackson’s Mary’s Room, and Thomas Nagel’s ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ among others. Many of these experiments and the endless discussions that follow them are predicated on what Chalmers famously referred as the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness: for him, it is ‘easy’ to figure out how the brain is capable of perception, information integration, attention, reporting on mental (...)
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  45.  53
    Phenomenal Dispositions.Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
    In this paper, I argue against a dispositional account of the intentionality of belief states that has been endorsed by proponents of phenomenal intentionality. Specifically, I argue that the best characterization of a dispositional account of intentionality is one that takes beliefs to be dispositions to undergo occurrent judgments. I argue that there are cases where an agent believes that p, but fails to have a disposition to judge that p.
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  46. Herding QATs: Quality Assessment Tools for Evidence in Medicine.Jacob Stegenga - forthcoming - In Huneman, Silberstein & Lambert (eds.), Herding QATs: Quality Assessment Tools for Evidence in Medicine.
    Medical scientists employ ‘quality assessment tools’ (QATs) to measure the quality of evidence from clinical studies, especially randomized controlled trials (RCTs). These tools are designed to take into account various methodological details of clinical studies, including randomization, blinding, and other features of studies deemed relevant to minimizing bias and error. There are now dozens available. The various QATs on offer differ widely from each other, and second-order empirical studies show that QATs have low inter-rater reliability and low inter-tool (...)
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  47. Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
    I review recent work on Phenomenal Conservatism, the position introduced by Michael Huemer according to which if it seems that P to a subject S, in the absence of defeaters S has thereby some degree of justification for believing P.
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  48.  21
    An Introduction to Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2000 - In Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. pp. 1-15.
    (for online upload) The readings in Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness (2000) were developed from an International Symposium on Methodologies for the Study of Consciousness: A new Synthesis,” that I organised in April, 1996, funded and hosted by the Fetzer Institute, Wisconsin, USA, with the aim of fostering the development of first-person methods that could be used in conjunction with already well-developed third-person methods for investigating phenomenal consciousness. In this Introduction, we briefly survey the state of the art at that (...)
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  49. In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
    During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, (...)
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  50. The Quality of Life.Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen - 1993 - Clarendon Press.
    This book addresses issues of defining and measuring the quality of life. Leading philosophers and economists examine recent developments in the philosophical definition of well-being and link them to practical issues such as the delivery of health care and the assessment of women's quality of life. The volume reflects the growing need for interdisciplinary work as economists become more aware of fundamental philosophical questions and philosophers of the importance of linking theoretical enquiries to an understanding of complex practical (...)
     
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