A ‘Ulysses arrangement’ (UA) is an agreement where a patient may arrange for psychiatric treatment or non-treatment to occur at a later stage when she expects to change her mind. In this article, I focus on ‘competence-insensitive’ UAs, which raise the question of the permissibility of overriding the patient’s subsequent decisionally competent change of mind on the authority of the patient’s own prior agreement. In “The Ethical Justification for Ulysses Arrangements”, I consider sceptical and supportive arguments concerning competence-insensitive UAs, and (...) argue that there are compelling reasons to give such UAs serious consideration. In “Decisional Competence and Legal Capacity in UAs”, I examine the nature of decisional competence and legal capacity as they arise in UAs, an issue neglected by previous research. Using the distinctions which emerge, I then identify the legal structure of a competence-insensitive UA in terms of the types of legal capacity it embodies and go on to explain how types of legal capacity might be shared between the patient and a trusted other to offer support to the patient in the creation and implementation of a competence-insensitive UA. This is significant because it suggests possibilities for building patient support mechanisms into models of legal UAs, which has not addressed in the literature to date. Drawing on this, in “Using Insights from the Competence/Capacity Distinction to Enhance Patient Support in UAs”, I offer two possible models to operationalize competence-insensitive UAs in law that allow for varying degrees of patient support through the involvement of a trusted other. Finally, I outline some potential obstacles implementing these models would face and highlight areas for further research. (shrink)
Ethical and legal discourse pertaining to the ability to consent to treatment and research in England operates within a dualist framework of “competence” and “capacity”. This is confusing, as while there exists in England two possible senses of legal capacity – “first person” legal capacity and “delegable” legal capacity, currently neither is formulated to bear a necessary relationship with decision-making competence. Notwithstanding this, judges and academic commentators frequently invoke competence to consent in discussions involving the validity of offering or withholding (...) consent as a synonym for legal capacity to consent. I argue that this gives rise to a conflation, jeopardising clarity and consistency in law. This is somewhat less problematic in instances of “first-person” legal capacity that are heavily informed by criteria for decision-making competence than in the second sense of legal capacity, which is qualitatively different from decision-making competence, or with first-person legal capacity when defined in different terms from competence. The paper concludes by proposing that the soundest resolution to this problem is by making decision-making competence a necessary and sufficient condition of first-person legal capacity, affording a more scrupulous distinction between the two different forms of legal capacity that exist. (shrink)
I defend the conserved quantity theory of causation against two objections: firstly, that to tie the notion of "cause"to conservation laws is impossible, circular or metaphysically counterintuitive ; and secondly, that the conser quantity theory entails an undesired notion of identity through time. My defence makes use of an important meta-philosophical distinction between empirical analysis and conceptual analysis. My claim is that the conserved quantity theory of causation must be understood primarily as an empirical, not a conceptual, analysis of causation.
In this article, we examine the intimate significance of trees and woods through research on how people engage with and perform their bodies in different kinds of wooded environments in contemporary Britain. We argue that there are significant, contested and ambivalent affordances provided by woods and forests in contemporary Britain - as providing `live' contact with nature, as a source of tranquillity, and as providing a distinct `social' space in sharp contrast to the pressures of modern living. Second, there is (...) considerable variation in the bodily experiences that people gain from woods and forests, influenced by personal and family life-stage, socio-economic circumstance and geographical location. The values people appear to attach to woods and forests arise from the specific `affordances' that the latter could offer for bodily desires. There are, we might say, different `contested' natures of the forest. (shrink)
For several decades Rafael Capurro has been at the forefront of defining the relationship between information and modernity through both phenomenological and ethical formulations. In exploring both of these themes Capurro has re-vivified the transcultural and intercultural expressions of how we bring an understanding of information to bear on scientific knowledge production and intermediation. Capurro has long stressed the need to look deeply into how we contextualize the information problems that scientific society creates for us and to re-incorporate a pragmatic (...) dimension into our response that provides a balance to the cognitive turn in information science. -/- With contributions from 35 scholars from 15 countries, Information Cultures in the Digital Age focuses on the culture and philosophy of information, information ethics, the relationship of information to message, the historic and semiotic understanding of information, the relationship of information to power and the future of information education. This Festschrift seeks to celebrate Rafael Capurro’s important contribution to a global dialogue on how information conceptualisation, use and technology impact human culture and the ethical questions that arise from this dynamic relationship. (shrink)
Phil Gerrans comments on Proust's paper entitled 'Thinking of oneself as the same' raise two points; one has to do with the value of sceptical arguments about self-knowledge, the other with what a self can know of him/herself. These two comments are discussed. It is shown first that metacognition operates on content as well as on vehicles, which leaves every replica with her own numerical identity. Second, the homuncular fallacy is discussed as part of a response to the second (...) point. (shrink)
Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey world we (...) actually live in: can one theory of causation cover all instances of cause and effect?Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic Worldis a collection of specially written papers by world-class metaphysicians. Its focus is the problem facing the 'reductionist' approach to causation: the attempt to cover all types of causation, deterministic and indeterministic, with one basic theory.Contributors: Stephen Barker, Helen Beebee, Phil Dowe, Dorothy Edgington, Doug Ehring, Chris Hitchcock, Igal Kwart, Paul Noordhof, Murali Ramachandran and Michael Tooley. (shrink)
Course Outline: § Main Goals: 1. To construct a theory of meaning (a semantics) as Tarski does with a theory of truth. 2. To argue that the meaning of a sentence is nothing but its truth conditions. 3. To argue that a characterization of a truth predicate describes the required kind of structure, and provides a clear and testable criterion of an adequate semantics for a natural language.
A particular thing is nothing but a bundle (a collection) of all its properties. Other than these properties (including spatial, temporal properties), there is nothing. [Space and time, being physical properties, are among the things that have to be constructed as bundles of universals.].
Q. Sept. Florent. Tertulliani Opera ex recensione Aug. Reifferscheid et Georg Wissowa. Pars I. Vienna, Tempsky, 1890. Mk. 15.60. Patristische Studien I. II. III. IV. By Dr. Wilhelm von Hartel. Vienna, Tempsky, 1890. Mk. 5.80. Studia Ecclesiastica. Tertullianus. I. Critica et Interpretatoria scripsit DR. J. Van Der Vliet. Leyden, Brill, 1891. 2s. 6d. Gai Vetti Aquiliai Juvenci Evangeliorum Libri Quattuor. Ed. J. Huemer, Vienna, 1891. Mk. 7. 20. Ueber das Evangelienbuch des Juvencus in seinem Verhältniss zum Bibeltext. By K. Marold. (...) [Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliclie Theologie, 1890, pp. 329–341.] Geschichte der Christlich-lateinisehen Poesie. By M. Manitius. Stuttgart, 1891. 12 Mk. (shrink)
Write a short paper, approximately 6-8 pages, on one of the following topics. (Some of these topics could also be considered for the longer paper. Some might be better suited for a short paper and some might be better suited for a long paper, but most could be adapted (narrowed or expanded) to work for either purpose.) It is possible to write on another topic, if you prefer, but it is necessary to meet with me in advance and to agree (...) on the contours of an alternate topic. This paper is due in class on Wednesday, May 2. (Students wishing to write the longer paper first should consult with me to okay their topic and set up a different timetable.) Students are welcome to consult me on the topics and readings associated with their papers. (shrink)
The seminar is intended as an introduction to vagueness. We'll survey some prominent accounts of vagueness, so that people get a sense of what `accounting for vagueness' is all about, and why it's hard.
Professor JeeLoo Liu § Metaphysical Realism ___ The view that large stretches of reality do not depend on our conceptual and theoretical choices for existing and being what they are. Or: ___ The view that vast stretches of reality are what they are absolutely, not in any way relative to certain conceptual-theoretical choices that have equally viable alternatives. ___ It is sensible because it recognizes that some stretches of reality do conform to the account anti-realism gives of the whole of (...) reality. (shrink)