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Phil Dowe [66]Phill Dowe [1]
  1. Physical Causation.Phil Dowe - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book, published in 2000, is a clear account of causation based firmly in contemporary science. Dowe discusses in a systematic way, a positive account of causation: the conserved quantities account of causal processes which he has been developing over the last ten years. The book describes causal processes and interactions in terms of conserved quantities: a causal process is the worldline of an object which possesses a conserved quantity, and a causal interaction involves the exchange of conserved quantities. Further, (...)
     
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  2. Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory.Phil Dowe - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (2):195-216.
    This paper examines Wesley Salmon's "process" theory of causality, arguing in particular that there are four areas of inadequacy. These are that the theory is circular, that it is too vague at a crucial point, that statistical forks do not serve their intended purpose, and that Salmon has not adequately demonstrated that the theory avoids Hume's strictures about "hidden powers". A new theory is suggested, based on "conserved quantities", which fulfills Salmon's broad objectives, and which avoids the problems discussed.
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  3. Physical Causation.Phil Dowe - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):244-248.
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  4. Paradoxes of Multi-Location.Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe - 2003 - Analysis 63 (2):106–114.
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  5. Proportionality and Omissions.Phil Dowe - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):446-451.
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  6.  50
    Causes Are Physically Connected to Their Effects: Why Preventers and Omissions Are Not Causes.Phil Dowe - 2004 - In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. pp. 189--196.
  7.  1
    Physical Causation.Phil Dowe - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (2):258-263.
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  8. Endurance is Paradoxical.Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):69-74.
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  9.  55
    Causal Processes.Phil Dowe - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  10. Absences, Possible Causation, and the Problem of Non-Locality.Phil Dowe - 2009 - The Monist 92 (1):23-40.
    I argue that so-called ‘absence causation’must be treated in terms of counterfactuals about causation such as ‘had a occurred, a would have caused b’. First, I argue that some theories of causation that accept absence causation are unattractive because they undermine the idea of possible causation. And second, I argue that accepting absence causation violates a principle commonly associated with relativity.
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  11. Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World.Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.) - 2003 - Routledge.
    Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey world we (...)
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  12.  61
    Causality and Conserved Quantities: A Reply to Salmon.Phil Dowe - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):321-333.
    In a recent paper (1994) Wesley Salmon has replied to criticisms (e.g., Dowe 1992c, Kitcher 1989) of his (1984) theory of causality, and has offered a revised theory which, he argues, is not open to those criticisms. The key change concerns the characterization of causal processes, where Salmon has traded "the capacity for mark transmission" for "the transmission of an invariant quantity." Salmon argues against the view presented in Dowe (1992c), namely that the concept of "possession of a conserved quantity" (...)
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  13. The Case for Time Travel.Phil Dowe - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (3):441-451.
    This idea of time travel has long given philosophers difficulties. Most recently, in his paper ‘Troubles with Time Travel’ William Grey presents a number of objections to time travel, some well known in the philosophical literature, others quite novel. In particular Grey's ‘no destinations’ and ‘double occupation’ objections I take to be original, while what I will call the ‘times paradox’ and the ‘possibility restriction argument’ are versions of well known objections. I show how each of these can be answered, (...)
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  14.  95
    Backwards Causation and the Direction of Causal Processes.Phil Dowe - 1996 - Mind 105 (418):227-248.
  15. The Coincidences of Time Travel.Phil Dowe - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (3):574-589.
    In this paper I consider two objections raised by Nick Smith (1997) to an argument against the probability of time travel given by Paul Horwich (1995, 1987). Horwich argues that time travel leads to inexplicable and improbable coincidences. I argue that one of Smith's objections fails, but that another is correct. I also consider an instructive way to defend Horwich's argument against the second of Smith's objections, but show that it too fails. I conclude that unless there is something faulty (...)
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  16. Every Now and Then: A-Theory and Loops in Time.Phil Dowe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (12):641-665.
  17.  81
    The Conserved Quantity Theory Defended.Phil Dowe - 2000 - Theoria 15 (1):11-31.
    I defend the conserved quantity theory of causation against two objections: firstly, that to tie the notion of “cause” to conservation laws is impossible, circular or metaphysically counterintuitive; and secondly, that the conserved quantity theory entails an undesired notion of identity through time. My defence makes use of an important meta-philosophical distinction between empirical analysis and conceptual analysis. My claim is that the conserved quantity theory of causation must be understood primarily as an empirical, not a conceptual, analysis of causation.
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  18. A Defense of Backwards in Time Causation Models in Quantum Mechanics.Phil Dowe - 1997 - Synthese 112 (2):233-246.
    This paper offers a defense of backwards in time causation models in quantum mechanics. Particular attention is given to Cramer's transactional account, which is shown to have the threefold virtue of solving the Bell problem, explaining the complex conjugate aspect of the quantum mechanical formalism, and explaining various quantum mysteries such as Schrödinger's cat. The question is therefore asked, why has this model not received more attention from physicists and philosophers? One objection given by physicists in assessing Cramer's theory was (...)
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  19.  83
    Process Causality and Asymmetry.Phil Dowe - 1992 - Erkenntnis 37 (2):179-196.
    Process theories of causality seek to explicate causality as a property of individual causal processes. This paper examines the capacity of such theories to account for the asymmetry of causation. Three types of theories of asymmetry are discussed; the subjective, the temporal, and the physical, the third of these being the preferred approach. Asymmetric features of the world, namely the entropic and Kaon arrows, are considered as possible sources of causal asymmetry and a physical theory of asymmetry is subsequently developed (...)
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  20. Causality and Explanation.Phil Dowe - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):165-174.
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  21.  66
    The Conserved Quantity Theory of Causation and Chance Raising.Phil Dowe - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):501.
    In this paper I offer an 'integrating account' of singular causation, where the term 'integrating' refers to the following program for analysing causation. There are two intuitions about causation, both of which face serious counterexamples when used as the basis for an analysis of causation. The 'process' intuition, which says that causes and effects are linked by concrete processes, runs into trouble with cases of 'misconnections', where an event which serves to prevent another fails to do so on a particular (...)
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  22. Causal Process Theories.Phil Dowe - 2009 - In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press.
     
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  23.  33
    On the Reduction of Process Causality to Statistical Relations.Phil Dowe - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):325-327.
  24.  3
    Chance-Lowering Causes.Phil Dowe - 2004 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
    In this paper I reconsider a standard counterexample to the chance-raising theory of singular causation. Extant versions of this theory are so different that it is difficult to formulate the core thesis that they all share, despite the guiding idea that causes raise the chance of their effects. At one extreme, ‘Humean’ theories – which can be traced to Reichenbach – say that a particular event of type C is the cause of a particular event of type E only if (...)
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  25.  33
    Recent Work on Leibniz on Miracles.Phil Dowe - 1996 - The Leibniz Review 6:160-163.
  26.  28
    What's Right and What's Wrong with Transference Theories.Phil Dowe - 1995 - Erkenntnis 42 (3):363 - 374.
    This paper examines the Transference Theory of causation, developed originally by Aronson (1971) and Fair (1979). Three difficulties for that theory are presented: firstly, problems associated with the direction of transference and causal asymmetry; secondly, the case of persistence as causation, for example where a body's own inertia is the cause of its motion; and thirdly the problematic notion of identity through time of physical quantities such as energy or momentum. Finally, the theory is compared with the Conserved Quantity Theory (...)
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  27.  2
    Endurance is Paradoxical.Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):69-74.
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  28.  62
    Causal Loops and the Independence of Causal Facts.Phil Dowe - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S89-.
    According to Hugh Mellor in Real Time II (1998, Ch. 12), assuming the logical independence of causal facts and the 'law of large numbers', causal loops are impossible because if they were possible they would produce inconsistent sets of frequencies. I clarify the argument, and argue that it would be preferable to abandon the relevant independence assumption in the case of causal loops.
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  29.  53
    Causation and Misconnections.Phil Dowe - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):926-931.
    In this paper I show how the conserved quantity theory, or more generally the process theory of Wesley Salmon and myself, provides a sufficient condition in an analysis of causation. To do so I will show how it handles the problem of alleged 'misconnections'. I show what the conserved quantity theory says about such cases, and why intuitions are not to be taken as sacrosanct.
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  30.  88
    The Power of Possible Causation.Phil Dowe - unknown
    In this paper I consider possible causation, specifically, would-cause counterfactuals of the form ‘had an event of kind A occurred, it would have caused an event of kind B’. I outline some difficulties for the Lewis program for understanding would-cause counterfactuals, and canvass an alternative. I then spell out a view on their significance, in relation to (i) absence causation, where claims such as ‘A’s not occurring caused B’s not occurring’ seem to make sense when understood in terms of the (...)
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  31. Physical Causation.Phil Dowe - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):529-533.
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  32.  37
    What is Determinism?'.Phil Dowe - 2002 - In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. pp. 309--20.
  33.  20
    An Empiricist Defence of the Causal Account of Explanation.Phil Dowe - 1992 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (2):123 – 128.
    Abstract Kitcher (1989) and others have criticized Salmon's (1984) causal account of explanation on the grounds that it is epistemologically inadequate. The difficulty is that Salmon's principle of ?mark transmission? fails to achieve its intended purpose, namely to distinguish causal processes from other types of processes. This renders Salmon's account of causality epistemically inaccessible. In this paper that critique is reviewed and developed, and a modification to Salmon's theory, the ?conserved?quantity? theory (Dowe, 1992) is presented. This theory is shown to (...)
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  34. Retrocausación.Phil Dowe - 2005 - Enrahonar 37:101-111.
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  35.  28
    ‘The Universe As We Find It’, by Heil, John.Phil Dowe - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):614-614.
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  36. The Causal-Process-Model Theory of Mechanisms.Phil Dowe - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press.
  37. Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World.Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):728-733.
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  38.  43
    Constraints on Data in Worlds with Closed Timelike Curves.Phil Dowe - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):724–735.
    It is claimed that unacceptable constraints on initial data are imposed by certain responses to paradoxes that threaten time travel, closed timelike curves (CTCs) and other backwards causation hypotheses. In this paper I argue against the following claims: to say “contradictions are impossible so something must prevent the paradox” commits in general to constraints on initial data, that for fixed point dynamics so-called grey state solutions explain why contradictions do not arise, and the latter have been proved to avoid constraints (...)
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  39.  3
    Critical Notice:'The Facts of Causation'.Phil Dowe - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (1):162-170.
  40. Causal Loops and the Independence of Causal Facts.Phil Dowe - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (S3):S89-S97.
    According to Hugh Mellor in Real Time II, assuming the logical independence of causal facts and the 'law of large numbers', causal loops are impossible because if they were possible they would produce inconsistent sets of frequencies. I clarify the argument, and argue that it would be preferable to abandon the relevant independence assumption in the case of causal loops.
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  41.  36
    Would‐Cause Semantics.Phil Dowe - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):701-711.
    This article raises two difficulties that certain approaches to causation have with would‐cause counterfactuals. First, there is a problem with David Lewis’s semantics of counterfactuals when we ‘suppose in’ some positive event of a certain kind. And, second, there is a problem with embedded counterfactuals. I show that causal‐modeling approaches do not have these problems. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia; e‐mail: p.dowe@uq.edu.au.
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  42. Florida Institute for Human and Machine Cognition.Phil Dowe, Paul Noordhof & Clark Glymour - unknown
    For most of the contributions to this volume, the project is this: Fill out “Event X is a cause of event Y if and only if……” where the dots on the right are to be filled in by a claims formulated in terms using any of (1) descriptions of possible worlds and their relations; (2) a special predicate, “is a law;” (3) “chances;” and (4) anything else one thinks one needs. The form of analysis is roughly the same as that (...)
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  43.  18
    Moore's Account of Causation and Responsibility, and the Problem of Omissive Overdetermination.Phil Dowe - 2013 - Jurisprudence 4 (1):115-120.
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  44.  1
    What is Endurance?Phil Dowe & Steve Barker - 2008 - In Christian Kanzian (ed.), Persistence. Frankfurt, Germany: Ontos Verlag. pp. 5-18.
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  45.  1
    Introduction.Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof - 2004 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and chance : Causation in an indeterministic world. London, U.K.: Routledge. pp. 1-11.
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  46.  12
    Good Connections: Causation and Causal Processes.Phil Dowe - 1999 - In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 247--263.
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  47. Darwin, God, and Chance.Phil Dowe - 2011 - In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3. Oxford University Press.
     
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  48.  9
    David Boonin and Graham Oddie. What's Wrong? New York: Oxford Press, 2005, 746 Pp. ISBN 0-19-516761-9 (Pb). Stephen Boyden. The Biology of Civilisation. Sydney, Australia: University of New South Wales Press, 2004, 189 Pp (Indexed). ISBN 0-8840-766-6, $22.50 (Pb). [REVIEW]Harold Coward, Andrew J. Weaver, Alan Dershowitz, Jose van Dijck & Phil Dowe - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39:543-545.
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  49.  2
    A and B Theories of Closed Time.Phill Dowe - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (1):183-196.
    ABSTRACT Closed time is possible in several senses of ‘possible’. One might like to know, therefore, whether closed time is possible in the sense that it is compatible with standard metaphysical theories of time. In this paper I am concerned with whether closed time is compatible with A and/or B theories of time. A common enough view amongst philosophers is that B theories do but A theories do not allow closed time. However, I show that prima-facie neither approach allows closed (...)
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    A Miller's Tale.David Oldroyd, Phil Dowe, Adrian Mackenzie, Alison Bashford, Geoffrey C. Bowker, Alan Chalmers, I. J. Crozier, John Dargavel, Wendy Riemens & Andrew Dowling - 1997 - Metascience 6 (1):105-184.
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