Experiments in particle physics have hitherto failed to produce any significant evidence for the many explicit models of physics beyond the Standard Model (BSM) that had been proposed over the past decades. As a result, physicists have increasingly turned to model-independent strategies as tools in searching for a wide range of possible BSM effects. In this paper, we describe the Standard Model Effective Field Theory (SM-EFT) and analyse it in the context of the philosophical discussions about models, theories, and (bottom-up) (...) effective field theories. We find that while the SM-EFT is a quantum field theory, assisting experimentalists in searching for deviations from the SM, in its general form it lacks some of the characteristic features of models. Those features only come into play if put in by hand or prompted by empirical evidence for deviations. Employing different philosophical approaches to models, we argue that the case study suggests not to take a view on models that is overly permissive because it blurs the lines between the different stages of the SM-EFT research strategies and glosses over particle physicists' motivations for undertaking this bottom-up approach in the first place. Looking at EFTs from the perspective of modelling does not require taking a stance on some specific brand of realism or taking sides in the debate between reduction and emergence into which EFTs have recently been embedded. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Constitutive panpsychism is the doctrine that macro-level consciousness—that is, consciousness of the sort possessed by certain composite things such as humans—is built out of irreducibly mental features had by some or all of the basic physical constituents of reality. On constitutive panpsychism, changes in macro-level consciousness amount to changes in either the way that micro-conscious entities ‘bond’ or the way that micro-conscious qualities ‘blend’. I pose the ‘Selection Problem’ for constitutive panpsychism—the problem of explaining how high-level functional states of (...) the brain ‘select’ micro-conscious qualities for bonding or blending. I argue that there are no empirically plausible solutions to this problem. (shrink)

The idea that there should be no limits on freedom of discussion receives passionate defenses from some of the most thoughtful and eloquent writers in our language, for example, Milton's evidential transparence condition and Mill's condition of equal benefit. My interest lies in exposing the consequences of this view for the derivative value of free discussion. I'm going to be particularly concerned with those instances in which these conditions are problematic.

We define a weak iterability notion that is sufficient for a number of arguments concerning $\Sigma _{1}$ -definability at uncountable regular cardinals. In particular we give its exact consistency strength first in terms of the second uniform indiscernible for bounded subsets of $\kappa $ : $u_2$, and secondly to give the consistency strength of a property of Lücke’s.TheoremThe following are equiconsistent:There exists $\kappa $ which is stably measurable;for some cardinal $\kappa $, $u_2=\sigma $ ;The $\boldsymbol {\Sigma }_{1}$ -club property holds (...) at a cardinal $\kappa $.Here $\sigma $ is the height of the smallest $M \prec _{\Sigma _{1}} H $ containing $\kappa +1$ and all of $H $. Let $\Phi $ be the assertion: TheoremAssume $\kappa $ is stably measurable. Then $\Phi $.And a form of converse:TheoremSuppose there is no sharp for an inner model with a strong cardinal. Then in the core model K we have: $\mbox {``}\exists \kappa \Phi \mbox {''}$ is -generically absolute ${\,\longleftrightarrow \,}$ There are arbitrarily large stably measurable cardinals.When $u_2 < \sigma $ we give some results on inner model reflection. (shrink)

Peu d'oeuvres souffrent autant que celles de Rousseau et Sartre de la réputation qui leur est faite. Prix de leur accessibilité peut-être, de l'ampleur des controverses auxquelles elles ont donné lieu, elles sem-blent irrémédiablement marquées l'une et l'autre par quelques formules censées en résumer la substance: errant seul dans les bois, Rousseau serait le champion d'un homme sauvage et bon qu'il opposerait à toutes les manifestations de la vie sociale; assis seul dans les cafés, Sartre affirmerait, de son côté, l'échec (...) douloureux de tout rapport interpersonnel—et leurs oeuvres réspectives developperaient cette position centrale. Simplifications sans doute. Malgré tout, il n'est peut-être pas inutile d'interroger le fait qu'on ait surtout retenucelad'oeuvres si riches, particulièrement en regard de leurs nombreux textes politiques, en tentant d'envisager ces oeuvres moins à travers l'une ou l'autre de leurs théses que selon des lignes de force plus génerales sur ce problème de l'existence sociale. Ceci peut permettre, croyons-nous, quelques mises en rapport suggestives. (shrink)

This study seeks to examine Umberto Eco's views of the key ideas in John Dewey's Art as Experience. Eco's proferred suggestion of transactional psychology as a corrective to Dewey's views is criticized as a misreading of Dewey's position.

In The Evolution of biological complexity, Christoph Adami, Charles Ofria and Travis C. Collier analysed the relationship between evolution by natural selection and the entropy of the genome. There are some similarities between their paper and my own analysis of.

Functional versus Subjective Consciousness The Example of Pain Dieting and Free Will The Production/Judgement Model Judgement is not Reward Feelings are Judgements Low-Bandwidth Channels Candidate Neural Control Channels Timing of Intention and Action Conclusion References Abstract.

We set out a doctrine about truth for the statements of mathematics—a doctrine which we think is a worthy competitor to realist views in the philosophy of mathematics—and argue that this doctrine, which we shall call ‘mathematical relativism’, withstands objections better than do other non-realist accounts.