In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand homes in on a central problem of moral education and offers us a solution. Briefly put, the problem is this: There is often widespread disagreement about moral matters, even among those who have thought long and hard about them. So how is moral education possible without resorting to indoctrination? We are all aware of familiar strategies to avoid this problem, such as introducing various moral systems and conflicting beliefs without taking a stand (...) on them, encouraging students to reach their own conclusions about moral matters, or even keeping well clear of the whole subject in the first place. Unfortunately, these options are not available to anyone who sees the need for moral education and takes it that bringing about rational assent to moral standards is among its aims. Given this starting point, the fact of reasonable disagreement makes it difficult to see how to avoid the problem of indoctrination. Hand’s solution is to argue that, while disagreement about moral matters is a salient feature of social life, there is a significant core of moral values about which there is actually little contention, and for which an adequate justification is within reach. Among them are “prohibitions on killing and causing harm, stealing and extorting, lying and cheating, and requirements to treat others fairly, keep one’s promises and help those in need”. With well-known caveats, there is at least general assent to these prescriptions, but their rational justification is more problematic. The history of ethical theory is littered with arguments as to why such things are wrong, but the arguments are contentious—and that looks to compound the problem. Nevertheless, Hand believes that there is at least one sound argument that can be used to justify our core moral standards. (shrink)

How can school education best bring about moral improvement? Socrates believed that the unexamined life was not worth living and that the philosophical examination of life required a collaborative inquiry. Today, our society relegates responsibility for values to the personal sphere rather than the social one. I will argue that, overall, we need to give more emphasis to collaboration and inquiry rather than pitting students against each other and focusing too much attention on ‘teaching that’ instead of ‘teaching how’. I (...) will argue that we need to include philosophy in the curriculum throughout the school years, and teach it through a collaborative inquiry which enables children to participate in an open society subject to reason. Such collaborative inquiry integrates personal responsibility with social values more effectively than sectarian and didactic religious education. (shrink)

John Dewey wished to place development of the ability to think at the core of school education. The kind of thinking that Dewey had in mind was based on his conception of scientific inquiry. Matthew Lipman was likewise committed to an education centred on thinking, but he claimed that we should turn to philosophy rather than to science in order to secure this end. In his view, philosophy has a stronger claim to this mantle than does science, or any other (...) subject, when it is appropriately reconstructed and taught. He developed various arguments to that effect, but the one considered here is that philosophical thinking has a generic character that especially suits it for the role. I examine this argument to see how compelling a case it makes for the inclusion of philosophy in the school curriculum. (shrink)

Moral education needs to be distinguished from moral training and to find its way into the school curriculum. It should meet academic standards relating to knowledge and understanding of the moral domain in much the same way as do other areas of study. This paper briefly explores the aims, subject matter and methods of such an undertaking from a philosophical point of view. The approach helps to overcome the common dichotomy in which students are regarded as moral beings so far (...) as their general conduct is concerned and as amoral beings when it comes to the subject matter that they study. When integrated into the curriculum, it brings out the moral aspects of various areas of study and assists students to understand them. (shrink)

The influence of pragmatism—and of Dewey in particular—upon Lipman’s conception of the classroom Community of Inquiry is pervasive. The notion of the Community of Inquiry is directly attributable to Peirce, while Dewey maintained that inquiry should form the backbone of education in a democratic society, conceived of as an inquiring community. I explore the ways in which pragmatic conceptions of truth and meaning are embedded in the Community of Inquiry, as well as looking at its Deweyan moral and social commitments. (...) I show that Peirce’s and Dewey’s notions of truth are in perfect alignment with the philosophical Community of Inquiry, as is Dewey’s tie between meaning and ideas that bring our inquiries to a satisfactory conclusion. The Deweyan notion that moral values are justified by their utility in solving problems in social life is also to be found in the Community of Inquiry, as arguably is his view that moral values are to be regarded as working values that face the tribunal of experience in much the same way as hypotheses in science. Again, the focus in the classroom on open inquiry into issues and problems, the active participation of the students in building upon one another’s ideas, the sense of shared responsibility, and the growth and development of the intellectual and social powers of the individual, all mirror Dewey’s pragmatic conception of democracy. Given this allegiance, it may be argued that the Community of Inquiry faces a pragmatic problem of its own. While it aims to be a philosophically open encounter with all kinds of issues and ideas, pragmatic conceptions are so constitutive of it that they may skew the pitch philosophically. I also address this issue. (shrink)

Conceptualisation and reasoning involve intellectual operations that can and should be taught. This paper identifies pairs of basic operations in reasoning and conceptualisation that are comparable to the basic operations of arithmetic and just as important. Examples are provided to illustrate how these operations may be introduced in the classroom.

In Fact, value and philosophy education I tried to show how philosophy can help to overcome the fact-value divide that continues to plague education. In attempting this, I applied John Dewey’s suggestion that philosophy may help to integrate beliefs about matters of fact with values in society at large, to the curricular division between subjects that deal with knowledge of matters of fact and those that are largely devoted to subjective understanding and personal expression. The paper centres on the claim (...) that philosophical dialogue about what we should believe and value can help to effect a mutual adjustment between our reason and our sentiments and bring us to think as whole human beings. It argues the case by first looking at the use of reflective practical reason to effect a change in our desires and conduct when we deem them to be undesirable. The use of reason to provide us with courses of action and other practical remedies to deal with what we see as defects in our character suggests that our cognitive and affective powers are capable of working together through mutual adjustment. By extension, I argue that reason can help us to examine the moral dimension of problems and issues in various areas of study, while making our understanding of them responsive to our feelings. The introduction of an educational means to give effect to this mutual adjustment brings us back to the role of philosophy. Philosophy provides the opportunity for reasoned dialogue that brings the factual material that students encounter into connection with what they are learning to value. It brings a normative cast to the study of history, society, literature, art, science and technology and enables the knowledge that students gain through their studies to be applied to matters of value. In general, it brings moral sensitivity to all kinds of subject matter and enables students to apply their knowledge and intelligence to the formation of values. In the years since I wrote this piece, I had the privilege to assist with the initial draft of documents on ethical understanding as a general competence in the Australian national curriculum and of constructing and implementing a pilot program for ethical inquiry in New South Wales primary schools, which led to ethics becoming an option for students who do not attend religious instruction. In different ways, both experiences brought home to me the importance of incorporating considerations of value throughout the curriculum and the value of philosophical inquiry as a means of doing so. Reflection on these experiences resulted in my book Teaching Ethics in Schools. (shrink)

How can materialists begin to do justice to the experiencing subject? Some materialists, whom I call ?structuralists?, believe that the brain sciences offer at least the distant prospect of a materialist psychology with an experiencing subject. Others, and notably those materialists who are functionalists, believe that this faith is misplaced, and offer us instead a functional psychology. I argue, briefly, that functionalism cannot deliver the goods, and go on to elaborate and defend the structuralist claim that consciousness or experience is (...) the formation of content conceived as that laying down of traces commonly assumed to be involved in perception and cognition. (shrink)

Philip Cam argues that we need to rise above Smith's fixation on self-interest in economic affairs.

The norms associated with HP Grice’s cooperative principle focus on exchange of information and require considerable extension in order to capture the presiding features of discourse that attempts to inquire into a problem or an issue. These features are revealed by looking at the case of collaborative philosophical inquiry. Although it is a special case, the findings have widespread implications for education. When teachers venture beyond the kind of informative discourse that has traditionally monopolised verbal exchange in the classroom and (...) engage in collaborative inquiry-based teaching, they need to attend to the norms that govern such discourse. (shrink)

Given the obvious differences between telling a story and setting out a philosophical theory or a carefully reasoned argument, the philosophical narrative is, on the face of it, an unlikely genre. It is rendered even more problematic when we come to the philosophical narrative for children, with philosophy and children being, in the eyes of tradition, an equally dubious combination. The philosophical novels of Matthew Lipman and others constitute an existence proof that such a genre is possible, of course, but (...) the mere fact that the attempt has been made does not nullify the claim that the form is disfigured or misbegotten. Indeed, without further examination, who is to say that the philosophical narrative for children is not a mongrel as both philosophy and literature, or that it can be called philosophical only by courtesy? In what follows I remark briefly on what makes writing philosophical and then apply those remarks to the philosophical narrative for children in order to explore both the difficulties and allure of the genre. (shrink)

Over forty years ago, the American philosopher and educationalist began work on what was to become a series of philosophical novels for children. As time went on, he also constructed accompanying teacher resources together with colleagues. The most popular of these works were designed for primary education and constitute what came to be known as the IAPC Curriculum for the younger years. The influence of Lipman has been immense. He taught us that philosophy is not beyond the reach of primary (...) school children when appropriately presented; that the questions of philosophy are germane to all primary school subjects; and that philosophy can be used to encourage thinking across the curriculum. Influential and instructive as these materials have been, however, they do not constitute a curriculum in the sense in which that is generally understood in school education. This paper explores both the strengths and limitations of Lipman’s pioneering effort from the viewpoint of curriculum construction in order to see what lessons can be leaned. (shrink)