8 found
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  1. Letters to the Editor.Felicia Ackerman, Philip E. Devine, Philip Gossett, Howard Stein, Jaakko Hintikka & Raymond S. Pfeiffer - 1997 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 70 (5):167-177.
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  2. Against Superkitten Ethics.Philip E. Devine - 2011 - International Philosophical Quarterly 51 (4):429-436.
    I here criticize the use of science-fiction examples in ethics, chiefly, though not solely, by defenders of abortion. We have no reliable intuitions concerning such examples—certainly nothing strong enough to set against the strong intuition that infanticide is virtually always wrong.
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  3. Birth, Copulation, and Death.Philip E. Devine - 1985 - New Scholasticism 59 (3):276-295.
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  4. Comparable Worth.Philip E. Devine - 1987 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 3 (3):11-19.
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  5. "Exists" and St. Anselm's Argument.Philip E. Devine - 1977 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 3:59-70.
    This paper examines interpretations of the doctrine that "exists" is not a predicate. None, it is concluded, is both true and a refutation of St. Anselm's "ontological" argument for the existence of God.
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  6. Ideologues Or Scholars?Philip E. Devine - 1991 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 6 (2):69-78.
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  7. Relativism.Philip E. Devine - 1984 - The Monist 67 (3):405-418.
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  8. What’s Wrong with Torture?Philip E. Devine - 2009 - International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):317-332.
    Many of us want to say that there is an absolute—or at least a virtually absolute—prohibition on torturing people. But we live in a world in which firm moral restraints of all sorts are hard to defend. Neither contemporary conventional morality, nor any of the available moral theories, provides adequate support for the deliverances of the “wisdom of repugnance” in this area. Nor do they support casuistry capable of distinguishing torture from forms of rough treatment. I here make some suggestions (...)
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