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Profile: Philip Goff (Central European University)
  1. A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.
    Dualists say plausible things about our mental concepts: there is a way of thinking of pain, in terms of how it feels, which is independent of causal role. Physicalists make attractive ontological claims: the world is wholly physical. The attraction of a posteriori physicalism is that it has seemed to do both: to agree with the dualist about our mental concepts, whilst retaining a physicalist ontology. In this paper I argue that, in fact, a posteriori physicalism departs from the dualist's (...)
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  2. Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism, and the Grounding Relation.Philip Goff - forthcoming - In William Seager (ed.), Routledge Panpsychism Handbook. Routledge.
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  3.  23
    Grounding, Essence, and the Knowledge Argument.Philip Goff - forthcoming - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument: Then and Now. Cambridge University Press.
    Few these days dispute that the knowledge argument demonstrates an epistemic gap between the physical facts and the facts about experience. It is much more contentious whether that epistemic gap can be used to demonstrate a metaphysical gap of a kind that is inconsistent with physicalism. In this paper I will explore two attempts to block the inference from an epistemic gap to a metaphysical gap – the first from the phenomenal concept strategy, the second from Russellian monism – and (...)
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  4.  20
    Is It a Problem That Physics is Mathematical?Philip Goff - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
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  5. Is Realism About Consciousness Compatible with a Scientifically Respectable World View?Philip Goff - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
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  6. The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem.Philip Goff - forthcoming - In L. Jaskolla (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
  7. Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear From Ghosts Than Zombies.Philip Goff - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):119-139.
    Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious experience. Much of the consciousness literature focuses on considering how threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to physicalism. There is not much attention given to the converse possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is, creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a ghost.
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  8. Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.
    This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.
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  9. Against Constitutive Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - forthcoming - In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.
  10. Does Mary Know I Experience Plus Rather Than Quus? A New Hard Problem.Philip Goff - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):223-235.
    Realism about cognitive or semantic phenomenology, the view that certain conscious states are intrinsically such as to ground thought or understanding, is increasingly being taken seriously in analytic philosophy. The principle aim of this paper is to argue that it is extremely difficult to be a physicalist about cognitive phenomenology. The general trend in later 20th century/early 21st century philosophy of mind has been to account for the content of thought in terms of facts outside the head of the thinker (...)
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  11. What's Wrong with Strong Necessities?Philip Goff & David Papineau - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):749-762.
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  12. Experiences Don't Sum.Philip Goff - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):53-61.
  13. Orthodox Truthmaker Theory Cannot Be Defended by Cost/Benefit Analysis.Philip Goff - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):45-50.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  14.  49
    Spinoza on Monism.Philip Goff (ed.) - 2012 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  15.  64
    Fundamentality and the Mind-Body Problem.Philip Goff - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):881-898.
    In the recent metaphysics literature, a number of philosophers have independently endeavoured to marry sparse ontology to abundant truth. The aim is to keep ontological commitments minimal, whilst allowing true sentences to quantify over a vastly greater range of entities than those which they are ontologically committed to. For example, an ontological commitment only to concrete, microscopic simples might be conjoined with a commitment to truths such as ‘There are twenty people working in this building’ and ‘There are prime numbers (...)
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  16.  25
    A Priori Physicalism, Lonely Ghosts and Cartesian Doubt.Philip Goff - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):742-746.
    A zombie is a physical duplicates of a human being which lacks consciousness. A ghost is a phenomenal duplicate of a human being whose nature is exhausted by consciousness. Discussion of zombie arguments, that is anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of zombies, is familiar in the philosophy of mind literature, whilst ghostly arguments, that is, anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of ghosts, are somewhat neglected. In this paper I argue that ghostly arguments have a number of (...)
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  17.  83
    Real Acquaintance and Physicalism.Philip Goff - forthcoming - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
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  18.  40
    Kirk on Empirical Physicalism.Philip Goff - 2007 - Ratio 20 (1):122-129.
  19.  80
    A Non-Eliminative Understanding of Austere Nominalism.Philip Goff - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):43–54.
    How do we account for resemblance between concrete particular objects? What is it about reality which makes a sentence such as the following true? (1) x and y are both spherical Realists about properties claim that, at a fundamental level, this sentence is true because x and y both exemplify the property of sphericity. Michael Loux favours this account of resemblance. Nevertheless, Loux concedes that austere nominalism, which I understand to be the view that nothing exists over and above particular (...)
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  20.  66
    Real Materialism and Other Essays – Galen Strawson.Philip Goff - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):652-656.
  21.  36
    The Zombie Threat to a Science of Mind.Philip Goff - 2013 - Philosophy Now 96:6-7.
  22.  20
    Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain, by Dimitris Platchias: Durham: Acumen, 2011, Pp. 256,£ 17.99 (Paperback). [REVIEW]Philip Goff - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):1-3.
    (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain, by Dimitris Platchias. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 617-620. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.788529.
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  23. Mario Bunge, Emergence and Convergence. Qualitative Novelty and the Unity of Knowledge Reviewed By.Philip Goff - 2004 - Philosophy in Review 24 (6):389-391.
  24.  12
    Ghosts Are Still Scarier Than Zombies–Reply to Diaz-Leon's Reply to 'A Priori Physicalism, Lonely Ghosts and Cartesian Doubt'.Philip Goff - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):749-750.
  25.  24
    Review of Cynthia MacDonald, Graham MacDonald (Eds.), Emergence in Mind[REVIEW]Philip Goff - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).
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  26.  4
    Propertied Objects as Truth-Makers.Philip Goff - 2006 - In Paolo Valore (ed.), Topics on General and Formal Ontology. Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher. pp. 181-189.
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  27. Metaphysics: The Key Concepts.Nikk Effingham, Helen Beebee & Philip Goff - 2010 - Routledge.
    _‘Informative, accessible, and fun to read— this is an excellent reference guide for undergraduates and anyone wanting an introduction to the fundamental issues of metaphysics. I know of no other resource like it.’– __Meghan Griffith, Davidson College, USA_ _'Marvellous! This book provides the very best place to start for students wanting to take the first step into understanding metaphysics.Undergraduates would do well to buy it and consult it regularly. The quality and clarity of the material are consistently high.' – __Chris (...)
     
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  28.  36
    Metaphysics: The Key Concepts.Nikk Effingham, Helen Beebee & Philip Goff - 2011 - Routledge.
    _‘Informative, accessible, and fun to read— this is an excellent reference guide for undergraduates and anyone wanting an introduction to the fundamental issues of metaphysics. I know of no other resource like it.’– __Meghan Griffith, Davidson College, USA_ _'Marvellous! This book provides the very best place to start for students wanting to take the first step into understanding metaphysics.Undergraduates would do well to buy it and consult it regularly. The quality and clarity of the material are consistently high.' – __Chris (...)
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  29. Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - Oup Usa.
    The first half of this book argues that physicalism cannot account for consciousness, and hence cannot be true. The second half explores and defends Russellian monism, a radical alternative to both physicalism and dualism. The view that emerges combines panpsychism with the view that the universe as a whole is fundamental.
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  30. Can Science Explain Consciousness?Philip Goff - 2017 - Philosophy Now 121:4-4.
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  31. The Case for Panpsychism.Philip Goff - 2017 - Philosophy Now 121:6-8.
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  32. There is More Than One Thing.Philip Goff - 2012 - In Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 113-22.
     
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