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Philip Hugly [85]Philip Grandjean Hugly [1]
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Philip Hugly
University of California, Berkeley (PhD)
  1.  37
    Intensionality and Truth: An Essay on the Philosophy of A. N. Prior.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1996 - Dordrecht, Boston and London: kluwer.
    This book says Prior claims: (1) that a sentence never names; (2) what a sentence says cannot be otherwise signified; and (3) that a sentence says what it says whatever the type of its occurrence; (4) and that quantifications binding sentential variables are neither eliminable, substitutional, nor referential. The book develops and defends (1)-(3). It also defends (4) against the sorts of strictures on quantification of such philosophers as Quine and Davidson.
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  2.  93
    Expressions and Tokens.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1981 - Analysis 41 (4):181-187.
    The purpose of this paper is to uncover and correct several confusions about expressions, tokens and the relations between them that crop up in even highly sophisticated writing about language and logic.
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  3. A Problem About Conversational Implicature.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1979 - Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (1):19 - 25.
    Conversational implicatures are easy to grasp for the most part. But it is another matter to give a rational reconstruction of how they are grasped. We argue that Grice's attempt to do this fails. We distinguish two sorts of cases: (1) those in which we grasp the implicature by asking ourselves what would the speaker have to believe given that what he said is such as is required by the talk exchange; (2) those in which we grasp the implicature by (...)
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  4.  15
    Expressions and Tokens.Philip Hugly & Alonso Church - 1981 - Analysis 41 (4):181.
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  5. Intensionality and Truth: An Essay on the Philosophy of A. N. Prior.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1999 - Studia Logica 63 (2):287-290.
     
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  6.  44
    Is English Inconsistent?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1980 - Erkenntnis 15 (3):343 - 347.
    The significance of the semantical paradoxes for natural languages is examined. If Tarski’s reflections on the issue are correct, English is inconsistent. Paul Ziff responds to Tarskian reflections by arguing to the conclusion that no natural language is or can be inconsistent. The authors reject Ziff’s argument, but they defend something similar to its conclusion: no language, natural or otherwise, is or can be inconsistent in the way that Tarski holds languages capable of formulating the Epimenides are inconsistent.
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  7.  34
    Ineffability in Frege's Logic.Philip Hugly - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (4):227 - 244.
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  8. Quantifying Over the Reals.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1994 - Synthese 101 (1):53 - 64.
    Peter Geach proposed a substitutional construal of quantification over thirty years ago. It is not standardly substitutional since it is not tied to those substitution instances currently available to us; rather, it is pegged to possible substitution instances. We argue that (i) quantification over the real numbers can be construed substitutionally following Geach's idea; (ii) a price to be paid, if it is that, is intuitionism; (iii) quantification, thus conceived, does not in itself relieve us of ontological commitment to real (...)
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  9. Why Substitutional Quantification Does Not Express Existence.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1987 - Theory and Decision 50:67-75.
    Fundamental to Quine’s philosophy of logic is the thesis that substitutional quantification does not express existence. This paper considers the content of this claim and the reasons for thinking it is true.
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  10. The Internal/External Question.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1994 - Grazier Philosophishe Studien 47:31-41.
    For Rudolf Carnap the question ‘Do numbers exist?’ does not have just one sense. Asked from within mathematics, it has a trivial answer that could not possibly divide philosophers of mathematics. Asked from outside of mathematics, it lacks meaning. This paper discusses Carnap ’s distinction and defends much of what he has to say.
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  11. Are All Tautologies True?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1989 - Logique Et Analyse 125 (125-126):3-14.
    The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.
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  12.  67
    Frege on Identities.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2000 - History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (3):195-205.
    The idea underlying the Begriffsschrift account of identities was that the content of a sentence is a function of the things it is about. If so, then if an identity a=b is about the content of its contained terms and is true, then a=a and a=b have the same content. But they do not have the same content; so, Frege concluded, identities are not about the contents of their contained terms. The way Frege regarded the matter is that in an (...)
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  13. Is Moral Relativism Consistent?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1985 - Analysis 45 (1):40-44.
    Let C1 and C2 be distinct moral codes formulated in English. Let C1 contain a norm N and C2 its negation. The paper construes the moral relativist as saying that if both codes are consistent, then, in the strongest sense of correctness applicable to moral norms, they are also both correct in the sense that they contain only correct moral norms. If we believe that the physical statements of English are true (false) in English, we will reject an analogous statement (...)
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  14. Domains of Discourse.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1987 - Logique Et Analyse 117 (17):173-176.
    Suppose there is a domain of discourse of English, then everything of which any predicate is true is a member of that domain. If English has a domain of discourse, then, since ‘is a domain of discourse of English’ is itself a predicate of English and true of that domain, that domain is a member of itself. But nothing is a member of itself. Thus English has no domain of discourse. We defend this argument and go on to argue to (...)
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  15. Offices and God.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1990 - Sophia 29 (3):29-34.
    Pavel Tichy presents an interpretation of Anselm’s Proslogion III argument. Tichy presents an interpretation of this argument and raises doubts about one of the premises. The authors contend that Tichy’s interpretation of Anselm is wrong. The argument Tichy comes to raise doubts about is not Anselm’s.
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  16. Null Sentences.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1999 - Iyyun, The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly 48:23-36.
    In Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there are null sentences – prominently including logical truths and the truths of mathematics. He says that such sentences are without sense (sinnlos), that they say nothing; he also denies that they are nonsensical (unsinning). Surely it is what a sentence says which is true or false. So if a sentence says nothing, how can it be true or false? The paper discusses the issue.
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  17. Tarski and Proper Classes.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1980 - Analysis 40 (4):6-11.
    In this paper the authors argue that if Tarski’s definition of truth for the calculus of classes is correct, then set theories which assert the existence of proper classes (classes which are not the member of anything) are incorrect.
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  18. Prior’s Theory of Propositions.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1977 - Analysis 37 (3):104-112.
    Prior propounded a theory that, if correct, explains how it is possible for a statement about propositions to be true even if there are no propositions. The major feature of his theory is his treatment of sentence letters as bindable variables in non-referential positions. His theory, however, does not include a semantical account of the resulting quantification. The paper tries to fill that gap.
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  19.  97
    Quine’s Way Out.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1975 - Analysis 36 (1):28-37.
    As a way of dealing with the semantical paradoxes Quine has suggested: that semantical expressions such as ‘true’ and ‘true of’ be used with numerical subscripts; that when a truth locution T is applied to a sentence S, the subscript on T is greater than any within S; otherwise, the result of applying T to S is ill formed. A problem is that this introduces infinitely many semantical primitives. The paper suggests a way around the problem. The paper raises a (...)
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  20. Moral Relativism and Deontic Logic.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1990 - Synthese 85 (1):139 - 152.
    If a native of India asserts "Killing cattle is wrong" and a Nebraskan asserts "Killing cattle is not wrong", and both judgments agree with their respective moralities and both moralities are internally consistent, then the moral relativist says both judgments are fully correct. At this point relativism bifurcates. One branch which we call content relativism denies that the two people are contradicting each other. The idea is that the content of a moral judgment is a function of the overall moral (...)
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  21. Bound Variables and Schematic Letters.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1981 - Logique Et Analyse 95 (95):425-429.
    The paper purports to show, against Quine, that one can construct a language , which results from the extension of the theory of truth functions by introducing sentence letter quantification. Next a semantics is provided for this language. It is argued that the quantification is neither substitutional nor requires one to consider the sentence letters as taking entities as values.
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  22. What’s So Special About Sentences?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1995 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 28 (4):409-25.
    This paper is a discussion of Frege's maxim that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has a meaning. Quine reads the maxim as saying that the sentence is the fundamental unit of significance. Dummett rejects this as a truism. But it is not a truism since it stands in opposition to a conception of meaning held by John Locke and others. The maxim denies that a word has a sense independently of any sentence in (...)
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  23.  85
    The Lessons of the Liar.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1979 - Theory and Decision 11 (1):55-70.
    The paper argues that the liar paradox teaches us these lessons about English. First, the paradox-yielding sentence is a sentence of English that is neither true nor false in English. Second, there is no English name for any such thing as a set of all and only true sentences of English. Third, ‘is true in English’ does not satisfy the axiom of comprehension.
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  24.  98
    Theories of Truth and Truth-Value Gaps.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (6):551 - 559.
    The fact that a group of axioms use the word 'true' does not guarantee that that group of axioms yields a theory of truth. For Davidson the derivability of certain biconditionals from the axioms is what guarantees this. We argue that the test does not work. In particular, we argue that if the object language has truth-value gaps, the result of applying Davidson''s definition of a theory of truth is that no correct theory of truth for the language is possible.
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  25.  81
    Do We Need Quantification?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1984 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 25 (4):289-302.
    The standard response is illustrated by E, J. Lemmon's claim that if all objects in a given universe had names and there were only finitely many of them, then we could always replace a universal proposition about that universe by a complex proposition. It is because these two requirements are not always met that we need universal quantification. This paper is partly in agreement with Lemmon and partly in disagreement. From the point of view of syntax and semantics we can (...)
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  26.  90
    Did the Greeks Discover the Irrationals?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1999 - Philosophy 74 (2):169-176.
    A popular view is that the great discovery of Pythagoras was that there are irrational numbers, e.g., the positive square root of two. Against this it is argued that mathematics and geometry, together with their applications, do not show that there are irrational numbers or compel assent to that proposition.
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  27.  79
    Relativism and Ontology.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148):278-290.
    This paper deals with the question of whether there is objectivist truth about set-theoretic matters. The dogmatist and skeptic agree that there is such truth. They disagree about whether this truth is knowable. In contrast, the relativist says there is no objective truth to be known. Two versions of relativism are distinguished in the paper. One of these versions is defended.
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  28.  60
    More on Propositional Identity.Charles Sayward & Philip Hugly - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):129-132.
    We give a semantical account of propositional identity which is stronger than mutual entailment. That is, according to our account: (1) if A = B is true in a model, so are A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A. (2) There exist models m such that A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A are true in m but A = B is not true in m. According to our account the following rule is sound: (3) from (.. A..) = (.. (...)
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  29.  65
    Paradox and Semantical Correctness.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1979 - Analysis 39 (4):166-169.
    In a series of papers R. L. Martin propounds a theory for dealing with the semantical paradoxes. This paper is a criticism of that theory.
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  30.  50
    More on Propositional Identity.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):129-132.
    We give a semantical account of propositional identity which is stronger than mutual entailment. That is, according to our account: (1) if A = B is true in a model, so are A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A. (2) There exist models m such that A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A are true in m but A = B is not true in m. According to our account the following rule is sound: (3) from (.. A..) = (.. (...)
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  31.  45
    Offices and God.Philip Hugly & Charles Saywood - 1990 - Sophia 29 (3):29-34.
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  32.  72
    The Disquotational Theory of Truth is False.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (3-4):331-339.
    It is argued that if there are truth-value gaps then the disquotational theory of truth is false. Secondly, it is argued that the same conclusion can be reached even without the assumption that there are truth-value gaps.
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  33.  63
    Quine's Relativism.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1990 - Ratio 3 (2):142-149.
    A doctrine that occurs intermittently in Quine’s work is that there is no extra-theoretic truth. This paper explores this doctrine, and argues that on its best interpretation it is inconsistent with three views Quine also accepts: bivalence, mathematical Platonism, and the disquotational account of truth.
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  34. Kripke on Necessity and Identity.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (3):151-159.
    It may be that all that matters for the modalities, possibility and necessity, is the object named by the proper name, not which proper name names it. An influential defender of this view is Saul Kripke. Kripke’s defense is criticized in the paper.
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  35.  31
    The Private Language Problem: A Philosophical Dialogue.Philip Hugly - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (2):288.
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  36.  61
    Tractatus 6.2–6.22.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1990 - Philosophical Investigations 13 (2):126-136.
    It is argued that Wittgenstein’s remarks 6.2-6.22 Tractatus fare well when one focuses on non-quantificational arithmetic, but they are problematic when one moves to quantificational arithmetic.
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  37.  60
    Classical Logic and Truth-Value Gaps.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1992 - Philosophical Papers 21 (2):141-150.
    An account of the logic of bivalent languages with truth-value gaps is given. This account is keyed to the use of tables introduced by S. C. Kleene. The account has two guiding ideas. First, that the bivalence property insures that the language satisfies classical logic. Second, that the general concepts of a valid sentence and an inconsistent sentence are, respectively, as sentences which are not false in any model and sentences which are not true in any model. What recommends this (...)
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  38.  41
    Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Amsterdam, Netherlands: rodopi.
    In this book a non-realist philosophy of mathematics is presented. Two ideas are essential to its conception. These ideas are (i) that pure mathematics--taken in isolation from the use of mathematical signs in empirical judgement--is an activity for which a formalist account is roughly correct, and (ii) that mathematical signs nonetheless have a sense, but only in and through belonging to a system of signs with empirical application. This conception is argued by the two authors and is critically discussed by (...)
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  39. Are all Tautologies True?Philip Hugly - 1989 - Logique Et Analyse 32 (25):3.
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  40. Analytical Table of Contents.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:31-33.
  41. Chapter 6: Arithmetic and Necessity.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:159-182.
  42. Chapter 7: Arithmetic and Rules.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:183-211.
  43. Chapter 5: Existence, Number, and Realism.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:129-155.
  44. Chapter 1: Introduction.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:35-42.
  45. Chapter 2: Notes to Grundlagen.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:45-72.
  46. Chapter 3: Objectivism and Realism in Frege's Philosophy of Arithmetic.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:73-101.
  47. Chapter 10: Thesis Three.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:254-283.
     
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  48. Chapter 8: Thesis One.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:215-240.
     
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  49. Chapter 4: The Peano Axioms.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:105-128.
  50. Chapter 9: Thesis Two.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:241-253.
     
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