85 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Philip Hugly [85]Philip Grandjean Hugly [1]
See also
Philip Hugly
University of California, Berkeley (PhD)
  1.  36
    Intensionality and Truth: An Essay on the Philosophy of A. N. Prior.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1996 - kluwer.
    This book says Prior claims: (1) that a sentence never names; (2) what a sentence says cannot be otherwise signified; and (3) that a sentence says what it says whatever the type of its occurrence; (4) and that quantifications binding sentential variables are neither eliminable, substitutional, nor referential. The book develops and defends (1)-(3). It also defends (4) against the sorts of strictures on quantification of such philosophers as Quine and Davidson.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  2.  92
    Expressions and Tokens.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1981 - Analysis 41 (4):181-187.
    The purpose of this paper is to uncover and correct several confusions about expressions, tokens and the relations between them that crop up in even highly sophisticated writing about language and logic.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  3. A Problem About Conversational Implicature.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1979 - Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (1):19 - 25.
    Conversational implicatures are easy to grasp for the most part. But it is another matter to give a rational reconstruction of how they are grasped. We argue that Grice's attempt to do this fails. We distinguish two sorts of cases: (1) those in which we grasp the implicature by asking ourselves what would the speaker have to believe given that what he said is such as is required by the talk exchange; (2) those in which we grasp the implicature by (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  4.  14
    Expressions and Tokens.Philip Hugly & Alonso Church - 1981 - Analysis 41 (4):181.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  5.  32
    Ineffability in Frege's Logic.Philip Hugly - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (4):227 - 244.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6.  60
    Frege on Identities.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2000 - History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (3):195-205.
    The idea underlying the Begriffsschrift account of identities was that the content of a sentence is a function of the things it is about. If so, then if an identity a=b is about the content of its contained terms and is true, then a=a and a=b have the same content. But they do not have the same content; so, Frege concluded, identities are not about the contents of their contained terms. The way Frege regarded the matter is that in an (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. Null Sentences.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1999 - Iyyun, The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly 48:23-36.
    In Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there are null sentences – prominently including logical truths and the truths of mathematics. He says that such sentences are without sense (sinnlos), that they say nothing; he also denies that they are nonsensical (unsinning). Surely it is what a sentence says which is true or false. So if a sentence says nothing, how can it be true or false? The paper discusses the issue.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Bound Variables and Schematic Letters.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1981 - Logique Et Analyse 95 (95):425-429.
    The paper purports to show, against Quine, that one can construct a language , which results from the extension of the theory of truth functions by introducing sentence letter quantification. Next a semantics is provided for this language. It is argued that the quantification is neither substitutional nor requires one to consider the sentence letters as taking entities as values.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. What’s So Special About Sentences?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1995 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 28 (4):409-25.
    This paper is a discussion of Frege's maxim that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has a meaning. Quine reads the maxim as saying that the sentence is the fundamental unit of significance. Dummett rejects this as a truism. But it is not a truism since it stands in opposition to a conception of meaning held by John Locke and others. The maxim denies that a word has a sense independently of any sentence in (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Kripke on Necessity and Identity.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (3):151-159.
    It may be that all that matters for the modalities, possibility and necessity, is the object named by the proper name, not which proper name names it. An influential defender of this view is Saul Kripke. Kripke’s defense is criticized in the paper.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. There Is A Problem with Substitutional Quantification.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2002 - Theoria 68 (1):4-12.
    Whereas arithmetical quantification is substitutional in the sense that a some-quantification is true only if some instance of it is true, it does not follow (and, in fact, is not true) that an account of the truth-conditions of the sentences of the language of arithmetic can be given by a substitutional semantics. A substitutional semantics fails in a most fundamental fashion: it fails to articulate the truth-conditions of the quantifications with which it is concerned. This is what is defended in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Quantifying Over the Reals.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1994 - Synthese 101 (1):53 - 64.
    Peter Geach proposed a substitutional construal of quantification over thirty years ago. It is not standardly substitutional since it is not tied to those substitution instances currently available to us; rather, it is pegged to possible substitution instances. We argue that (i) quantification over the real numbers can be construed substitutionally following Geach's idea; (ii) a price to be paid, if it is that, is intuitionism; (iii) quantification, thus conceived, does not in itself relieve us of ontological commitment to real (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13.  42
    Is English Inconsistent?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1980 - Erkenntnis 15 (3):343 - 347.
    The significance of the semantical paradoxes for natural languages is examined. If Tarski’s reflections on the issue are correct, English is inconsistent. Paul Ziff responds to Tarskian reflections by arguing to the conclusion that no natural language is or can be inconsistent. The authors reject Ziff’s argument, but they defend something similar to its conclusion: no language, natural or otherwise, is or can be inconsistent in the way that Tarski holds languages capable of formulating the Epimenides are inconsistent.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14.  39
    Theories of Truth and Semantical Primitives.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1977 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):349 - 354.
    Robert cummins has recently attacked this line of argument: if p is a semantically primitive predicate of a first order language l, then p requires its own clause in the definition of satisfaction integral to a definition of truth of l. thus if l has infinitely many such p, the satisfaction clause cannot be completed and truth for l will remain undefined. against this cummins argues that a single clause in a general base theory for l can specify satisfaction conditions (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15.  39
    Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - rodopi.
    In this book a non-realist philosophy of mathematics is presented. Two ideas are essential to its conception. These ideas are (i) that pure mathematics--taken in isolation from the use of mathematical signs in empirical judgement--is an activity for which a formalist account is roughly correct, and (ii) that mathematical signs nonetheless have a sense, but only in and through belonging to a system of signs with empirical application. This conception is argued by the two authors and is critically discussed by (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Are All Tautologies True?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1989 - Logique Et Analyse 125 (125-126):3-14.
    The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Are all Tautologies True?Philip Hugly - 1989 - Logique Et Analyse 32 (25):3.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  26
    A Fregean Principle.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1998 - History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (3):125-135.
    Frege held that the result of applying a predicate to names lacks reference if any of the names lack reference. We defend the principle against a number of plausible objections. We put forth an account of consequence for a first-order language with identity in which the principle holds.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Analytical Table of Contents.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:31-33.
  20. Chapter 6: Arithmetic and Necessity.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:159-182.
  21. Chapter 7: Arithmetic and Rules.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:183-211.
  22. Chapter 5: Existence, Number, and Realism.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:129-155.
  23. Chapter 1: Introduction.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:35-42.
  24. Chapter 2: Notes to Grundlagen.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:45-72.
  25. Chapter 3: Objectivism and Realism in Frege's Philosophy of Arithmetic.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:73-101.
  26.  21
    Crowell on Nietzsche on Truth.Philip Hugly - 1987 - International Studies in Philosophy 19 (2):19-28.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Chapter 10: Thesis Three.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:254-283.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Chapter 8: Thesis One.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:215-240.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Chapter 4: The Peano Axioms.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:105-128.
  30. Chapter 9: Thesis Two.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:241-253.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  34
    Can There Be a Proof That an Unprovable Sentence of Arithmetic is True?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (43):289-292.
    Various authors of logic texts are cited who either suggest or explicitly state that the Gödel incompleteness result shows that some unprovable sentence of arithmetic is true. Against this, the paper argues that the matter is one of philosophical controversy, that it is not a mathematical or logical issue.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  5
    Can There Be A Proof That Some Unprovable Arithmetic Sentence Is True?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (3):289-292.
  33. Domains of Discourse.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1987 - Logique Et Analyse 117 (17):173-176.
    Suppose there is a domain of discourse of English, then everything of which any predicate is true is a member of that domain. If English has a domain of discourse, then, since ‘is a domain of discourse of English’ is itself a predicate of English and true of that domain, that domain is a member of itself. But nothing is a member of itself. Thus English has no domain of discourse. We defend this argument and go on to argue to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  86
    Did the Greeks Discover the Irrationals?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1999 - Philosophy 74 (2):169-176.
    A popular view is that the great discovery of Pythagoras was that there are irrational numbers, e.g., the positive square root of two. Against this it is argued that mathematics and geometry, together with their applications, do not show that there are irrational numbers or compel assent to that proposition.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Editor's Introduction.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:11-21.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Intensionality and Truth: An Essay on the Philosophy of A. N. Prior.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1999 - Studia Logica 63 (2):287-290.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  37.  3
    Is English Consistent?Philip Hugly - 1980 - Erkenntnis 15 (3):343.
    No categories
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Is Moral Relativism Consistent?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1985 - Analysis 45 (1):40-44.
    Let C1 and C2 be distinct moral codes formulated in English. Let C1 contain a norm N and C2 its negation. The paper construes the moral relativist as saying that if both codes are consistent, then, in the strongest sense of correctness applicable to moral norms, they are also both correct in the sense that they contain only correct moral norms. If we believe that the physical statements of English are true (false) in English, we will reject an analogous statement (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39.  2
    Is Moral Relativism Consistent?Philip Hugly & Alonso Church - 1985 - Analysis 45 (1):40.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  49
    More on Propositional Identity.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):129-132.
    We give a semantical account of propositional identity which is stronger than mutual entailment. That is, according to our account: (1) if A = B is true in a model, so are A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A. (2) There exist models m such that A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A are true in m but A = B is not true in m. According to our account the following rule is sound: (3) from (.. A..) = (.. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  1
    More on Propositional Identity.Philip Hugly & Alonso Church - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):129.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Moral Relativism and Deontic Logic.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1990 - Synthese 85 (1):139 - 152.
    If a native of India asserts "Killing cattle is wrong" and a Nebraskan asserts "Killing cattle is not wrong", and both judgments agree with their respective moralities and both moralities are internally consistent, then the moral relativist says both judgments are fully correct. At this point relativism bifurcates. One branch which we call content relativism denies that the two people are contradicting each other. The idea is that the content of a moral judgment is a function of the overall moral (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Offices and God.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1990 - Sophia 29 (3):29-34.
    Pavel Tichy presents an interpretation of Anselm’s Proslogion III argument. Tichy presents an interpretation of this argument and raises doubts about one of the premises. The authors contend that Tichy’s interpretation of Anselm is wrong. The argument Tichy comes to raise doubts about is not Anselm’s.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  44
    Offices and God.Philip Hugly & Charles Saywood - 1990 - Sophia 29 (3):29-34.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Preface.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:27-29.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  32
    Prior and Lorenzen on Quantification.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1991 - Grazer Philosophishe Studien 41:150-173.
    A case against Prior’s theory of propositions goes thus: (1) everyday propositional generalizations are not substitutional; (2) Priorean quantifications are not objectual; (3) quantifications are substitutional if not objectual; (4) thus, Priorean quantifications are substitutional; (5) thus that Priorean quantifications are not ontologically committed to propositions provides no basis for a similar claim about our everyday propositional generalizations. Prior agrees with (1) and (2). He rejects (3), but fails to support that rejection with an account of quantification on which there (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  7
    Prior and Lorenzen on Quantification.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 41 (1):151-173.
  48.  6
    Prior and Lorenzen on Quantification.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 41 (1):151-173.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  65
    Paradox and Semantical Correctness.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1979 - Analysis 39 (4):166-169.
    In a series of papers R. L. Martin propounds a theory for dealing with the semantical paradoxes. This paper is a criticism of that theory.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Paradox and Semantical Correctness.Philip Hugly & Alonso Church - 1979 - Analysis 39 (4):166.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 85