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Philip Reed [7]Philip A. Reed [6]
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Philip Reed
Canisius College
  1. How Not to Defend the Unborn.David B. Hershenov & Philip Reed - forthcoming - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    It is sometimes proposed that killing or harming abortion providers is the only logically consistent position available to opponents of abortion. Since lethal violence against morally responsible attackers is normally viewed as justified in order to defend innocent parties, pro-lifers should also think so in the case of the abortion doctor and so they should act to defend the unborn. In our paper, we defend the mainstream pro-life view against killing abortion doctors. We argue that the pro-life view can, in (...)
     
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  2.  41
    Empirical Adequacy and Virtue Ethics.Philip Reed - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):343-357.
    Situationists contend that virtue ethics is empirically inadequate. However, it is my contention that there is much confusion over what “empirical adequacy” or “empirical inadequacy” actually means in this context. My aim in this paper is to clarify the meanings of empirical adequacy in order to see to what extent virtue ethics might fail to meet this standard. I argue that the situationists frequently misconstrue the empirical commitments of virtue ethics. More importantly, depending on what we mean by empirical adequacy, (...)
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  3.  3
    Is “Aid in Dying” Suicide?Philip Reed - forthcoming - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics:1-17.
    The practice whereby terminally ill patients choose to end their own lives painlessly by ingesting a drug prescribed by a physician has commonly been referred to as physician-assisted suicide. There is, however, a strong trend forming that seeks to deny that this act should properly be termed suicide. The purpose of this paper is to examine and reject the view that the term suicide should be abandoned in reference to what has been called physician-assisted suicide. I argue that there are (...)
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  4. What's Wrong with Monkish Virtues? Hume on the Standard of Virtue.Philip A. Reed - 2012 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (1).
     
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  5.  17
    Artifacts, Intentions, and Contraceptives: The Problem with Having a Plan B for Plan B.Philip A. Reed - 2013 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 38 (6):jht051.
    Next SectionIt is commonly proposed that artifacts cannot be understood without reference to human intentions. This fact, I contend, has relevance to the use of artifacts in intentional action. I argue that because artifacts have intentions embedded into them antecedently, when we use artifacts we are sometimes compelled to intend descriptions of our actions that we might, for various reasons, be inclined to believe that we do not intend. I focus this argument to a specific set of artifacts, namely, medical (...)
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  6.  24
    The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory.Philip Reed - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):595-614.
    In this article I argue that vanity, the desire for and delight in the favorable opinion of others, plays a fundamental role in Hume's account of moral motivation. Hume says that vanity and virtue are inseparable, though he does not explicitly say how or why this should be. I argue that Hume's account of sympathy can explain this alliance. In resting moral sentiment on sympathy, Hume gives a fundamental role to vanity as it becomes either a mediating motive to virtue (...)
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  7.  24
    Hume on the Cultivation of Moral Character.Philip Reed - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):299-315.
    This paper attempts to give a complete and coherent account of how Hume’s moral psychology can explain the cultivation of moral character. I argue that the outcome of a fully formed moral character is an agent who strengthens her calm moral sentiments into settled principles of action. I then take up the question of how the process of strengthening moral sentiments might occur, rejecting the possibilities of sympathy, “reflection,” and “resolution” because either they are too weak or else they make (...)
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  8.  20
    Motivating Hume's Natural Virtues.Philip A. Reed - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):134-147.
    Many commentators propose that Hume thinks that we are not or should not be motivated to perform naturally virtuous actions from moral sentiments if we want our actions to be genuinely virtuous. It is this proposal with which I take issue in this article, arguing that Hume fully incorporates the moral sentiments into his understanding of how human beings act when it comes to the natural virtues and that he does not see the moral sentiments as a problematic kind of (...)
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  9.  3
    Pleasing People.Philip A. Reed - 2016 - Philosophia Christi 18 (1):79-96.
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  10.  12
    Hume on Sympathy and Agreeable Qualities.Philip A. Reed - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (6):1136-1156.
    Hume says that sympathy is the source of our moral feeling of approval for useful qualities. But does Hume give the same psychological explanation of our approval of immediately agreeable qualities as he does to our approval of useful qualities? Does he trace our moral approbation of immediately agreeable qualities to sympathy? Some commentators, including Rachel Cohon and Don Garrett, argue that he does not. Let us call this view the ‘narrow view’ of sympathy in contrast to the ‘wide view’ (...)
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  11.  12
    How to Gerrymander Intention.Philip A. Reed - 2015 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):441-460.
    Essential to the doctrine of double effect is the idea that agents are prohibited from intending evil as a means to a good end. I argue in this paper that some recent accounts of intention from proponents of double effect cannot sustain this prohibition on harmful means. I outline two ways to gerrymander intention that mark these accounts. First, intention is construed in such a way that an agent intends only those states of affairs that she cares about or finds (...)
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  12. Hume’s Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology.Philip Reed & Rico Vitz - 2018 - London, UK: Routledge.
    Recent work at the intersection of moral philosophy and the philosophy of psychology has dealt mostly with Aristotelian virtue ethics. The dearth of scholarship that engages with Hume’s moral philosophy, however, is both noticeable and peculiar. Hume's Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology demonstrates how Hume’s moral philosophy comports with recent work from the empirical sciences and moral psychology. It shows how contemporary work in virtue ethics has much stronger similarities to the metaphysically thin conception of human nature that Hume developed, (...)
     
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  13. Opioids, Double Effect, and the Prospects of Hastening Death.Philip Reed - forthcoming - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.
    The relevance of double effect for end of life decision-making has been challenged recently by a number of scholars. The principal reason is that opioids such as morphine do not usually hasten death when administered to relieve pain at the end of life; therefore no secondary “double” effect is brought about. In my paper I argue against this view, showing how the doctrine of double effect is relevant to the administration of opioids at the end of life. I contend that (...)
     
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