A great mathematician and teacher, and a physicist and philosopher in his own right, bridges the gap between science and the humanities in this exposition of the philosophy of science. He traces the history of science from Aristotle to Einstein to illustrate philosophy's ongoing role in the scientific process. In this volume he explains modern technology's gradual erosion of the rapport between physical theories and philosophical systems, and offers suggestions for restoring the link between these related areas. This book is (...) suitable for undergraduate students and other readers. 1962 ed. Index. 36 figures. (shrink)

The Law of Causality and its Limits was the principal philosophical work of the physicist turned philosopher, Philipp Frank. Born in Vienna on March 20, 1884, Frank died in Cambridge, Massachusetts on July 21, 1966. He received his doctorate in 1907 at the University of Vienna in theoretical physics, having studied under Ludwig Boltzmann; his sub sequent research in physics and mathematics was represented by more than 60 scientific papers. Moreover his great success as teacher and expositor was recognized throughout (...) the scientific world with publication of his collaborative Die Differentialgleichungen der Mechanik und Physik, with Richard von Mises, in 1925-27. Frank was responsible for the second volume, on physics, and especially noted for his authoritative article on classical Hamiltonian mechanics and optics. Among his earliest papers were those, beginning in 1908, devoted to special relativity, which together with general relativity and physical cosmology occupied him throughout his life. Already in 1907, Frank published his seminal paper 'Kausalgesetz und Erfahrung', much later collected with a splendid selection of his essays on philosophy of science, in English. Joining the first 'Vienna Circle' in the first decade of the 20th century, with Hans Hahn, mathematician, and Otto Neurath, sociologist and economist, and deeply influenced by studies of Ernst Mach's critical conceptual histories of science and by the striking challenge of Poincare and Duhem, Frank continued his epistemological investigations. (shrink)

Introduction: Historical background.--The law of causality and experience (1908)--The importance of Ernst Mach's philosophy of science for our times (1917)--Physical theories of the twentieth century and school philosophy (1929)--Is there a trend today toward idealism in physics? (1934)--The positivistic and the metaphysical conception of physics (1935)--Logical empiricism and the philosophy of the Soviet Union (1935)--Philosophical misinterpretations of the quantum theory (1936)--What "length" means to the physicist (1937)--Determinism and indeterminism in modern physics (1938)--Ernst Mach and the unity of science (1938).

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The issue “realism vs. phenomenalism” or “realism vs. positivism” has been widely discussed during the last fifty years. The issue has even become a political and social one in Lenin's Materialism and Empiriocricism, which is built entirely around this topic. He calls “positivism” bluntly a “reactionary philosophy” because it supposedly denies the reality of the world which is described by science. M. Schlick devoted to this issue the paper “Realism and Positivism” which was published recently with an introduction by D. (...) Rynin. It should, therefore, be welcomed, that Professor Feigl attacked this problem by the methods of modern semantics. This is an attempt to solve a question by precise logical argument which has been frequently treated in a way that provided more heat than light. It is certainly very desirable to scrutinize Feigl's argument carefully and to find out exactly its contribution to our conception of scientific method. (shrink)

When science of the 20th century is spoken of in opposition to that of the 19th century, a particularly characteristic attribute is often cited: namely, that since the time of Galileo and Newton the task of science has been to explain everything mechanistically. By analogy the world was to be conceived as a great machine. But the theories of the 20th century, above all the relativity and quantum theories, caused a revolution in science. It is seen today that nature can (...) be described and understood not ‘mechanistically’ but only through abstract mathematical formulas. The world is no longer a machine but a mathematical formula. (shrink)

Introduction, by G. Holton.--Three eighteenth-century social philosophers: scientific influences on their thought, by H. Guerlac.--Science and the human comedy: Voltaire, by H. Brown.--The seventeenth-century legacy: our mirror of being, by G. de Santillana.--Contemporary science and the contemporary world view, by P. Frank.--The growth of science and the structure of culture, by R. Oppenheimer.--The Freudian conception of man and the continuity of nature, by J. S. Bruner.--Quo vadis, by P. W. Bridgman.--Prospects for a new synthesis: science and the humanities as complementary (...) activities, by C. Morris.--A humanist looks at science, by H. M. Jones. (shrink)

Diese Ausgabe enthält eine repräsentative Auswahl von Originaltexten des Wiener Kreises. Sie umfaßt nicht nur Texte zu den klassischen Themen wie der Protokollsatzdebatte oder der Metaphysikkritik, sondern auch Frühschriften der Gründer und solche zu den Grundlagen der Einzelwissenschaften.

L’opinion professée par beaucoup de philosophes et de physiciens, que la physique moderne a modifié la délimitation entre le sujet qui observe et l’objet physique soumis à l’observation, repose sur un malentendu. Dans la physique moderne, c’est-à-dire dans toutes les expériences montéеэ pour contrôler la théorie de la relativité et celle des quanta, ce qui est de règle n’est pas différent du cas de la physique classique : c’est le déplacement d’une aiguille devant une échelle qui fait l’objet d’observation. Cette (...) observation est la seule interaction effective entre objet et sujet ; rien de nouveau ne s’y est introduit. Ce qui s’est modifié, c’est plutôt la façon de considérer l’interaction entre l’objet observé, un électron par exemple, et l’instrument de mesure. Mais il s’agit là de l’interaction entre deux objets physiques. C’est sur eile que la physique atomique moderne a établi en effet des theories nouvelles. (shrink)