Contents \t\t\t\t\t \tTRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION \t\t1 \t \tNOTE ON THE TRANSLATION \t\t39 \t OBSERVATIONS ON THE FEELING OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME \t\t\t\t\t \tSECTION ONE: \t\t\t\t \t\tOf the Distinct Objects of the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime \t\t45 \tSECTION TWO: \t\t\t\t \t\tOf the Attributes of the Beautiful and Sublime.

La question de ce petit livre est simple : peut-on aller au-delà du constat de crise et d'impuissance dont le philosophe se fait le prophète depuis plus d'un siècle? Peut-on parler de la science sans complexe d'infériorité, de Dieu sans obscurantisme, d'existence sans tomber dans la banalité du café du commerce, de politique sans consacrer le cynisme, de morale sans faire dans le sermon? Bref, la philosophie peut-elle aider à faire comprendre et à dépasser les apories du temps présent qu'elle (...) a fait siennes, comme un malade ressasse sa propre maladie pour se donner le sentiment qu'ainsi il peut la mettre à distance à défaut de la vaincre? Toutes ces questions sont aujourd'hui les nôtres, et il ne faut pas avoir peur de parler des grands problèmes qui agitent les hommes depuis l'aube des temps, car si la philosophie a un sens, c'est bien en ce qu'elle envisage les questions ultimes dans une plus ou moins grande systématicité selon les époques. (shrink)

In this book Taylor brings together some of his best essays, including "Overcoming Epistemology," "The Validity of Transcendental Argument," "Irreducibly Social ...

According to the A-theory of time some instant of time is absolutely present. Many reject the A-theory on the grounds that it is inconsistent with current spacetime physics, which appears to leave no room for absolute presentness. However, some reject the A-theory on purely philosophical grounds. In this article I describe three purely philosophical arguments against the A-theory and show that there are plausible A-theoretic responses to each of them. I conclude that, whatever else is wrong with the (...) A-theory, it is not obviously a philosophically suspect theory. (shrink)

A common argument in support of a beginning of the universe used by advocates of the kalām cosmological argument (KCA) is the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite, or the “Infinity Argument”. However, it turns out that the Infinity Argument loses some of its force when compared with the achievements of set theory and it brings into question the view that God predetermined an endless future. We therefore defend a new formal argument, based on the nature of time (...) (just as geometrical reasoning is based on the nature of space), which addresses more directly the question of beginningless time. (shrink)

Becker argued Confucianism lacked of argumentation, dialogue and debate. However, Becker is wrong. First, the purpose of philosophical argumentation is to justify an arguer’s philosophical standpoints. Second, both Confucius’ Analects and Mencius’ Mencius were written in forms of dialogues. Third, the content of each book is the recorded utterance and the purpose of dialogue is to persuade its audience. Finally, after Confucius, Confucians’ works have either argued for those unjustified standpoints or re-argued about some justified viewpoints (...) in the Analects. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Can philosophers come up with persuasive reasons to allow or to ban human reproductive cloning? Yes. Can philosophers agree, locally and temporarily, which practices related to cloning should be condoned and which should be rejected? Some of them can. Can philosophers produce universally convincing arguments for or against different kinds of human cloning? No. This paper analyses some of the main arguments presented by philosophers in the cloning debate, and some of the most important objections against them. The clashes (...) between the schools of thought suggest that philosophers cannot be trusted to provide the public authorities, or the general public, a unified, universally applicable view of the morality of human reproductive cloning. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Can philosophers come up with persuasive reasons to allow or to ban human reproductive cloning? Yes. Can philosophers agree, locally and temporarily, which practices related to cloning should be condoned and which should be rejected? Some of them can. Can philosophers produce universally convincing arguments for or against different kinds of human cloning? No. This paper analyses some of the main arguments presented by philosophers in the cloning debate, and some of the most important objections against them. The clashes (...) between the schools of thought suggest that philosophers cannot be trusted to provide the public authorities, or the general public, a unified, universally applicable view of the morality of human reproductive cloning. (shrink)

In this article, a new, idealizing-hermeneutic methodological approach to developing a theory of philosophical arguments is presented and carried out. The basis for this is a theory of ideal philosophical theory types developed from the analysis of historical examples. According to this theory, the following ideal types of theory exist in philosophy: 1. descriptive-nomological, 2. idealizing-hermeneutic, 3. technical-constructive, 4. ontic-practical. These types of theories are characterized in particular by what their basic types of theses are. The main task (...) of this article is then to determine the types of arguments that are suitable for justifying these types of theses. Surprisingly, practical arguments play a key role here. (shrink)

This paper argues that many philosophical arguments within the education discourse are too little embedded in their own historical contexts. Starting out from the obvious fact that philosophers of education use sources from the past, the paper asks how we can deal with the arguments that these sources contain. The general attitude within philosophy of education, which views arguments as timeless, is being challenged by the insight that arguments always depend upon their own contexts. For this reason, citing past (...) authors, heroes, or enemies without respecting the context says more about our interest at the present time than it does about the times of the authors examined. Conversely, the contextual approach helps us to avoid believing that ‘timeless truths’ are to be found in different texts of different ages. However, the present contribution in no way advocates a total relativization of statements. Quite the contrary; it claims that the contextual approach helps us to understand the traditions and contexts within which we ourselves, as researchers, are positioned. And this self‐awareness is believed to be the proper starting position for theoretical statements about education. (shrink)

This paper argues that many philosophical arguments within the education discourse are too little embedded in their own historical contexts. Starting out from the obvious fact that philosophers of education use sources from the past, the paper asks how we can deal with the arguments that these sources contain. The general attitude within philosophy of education, which views arguments as timeless, is being challenged by the insight that arguments always depend upon their own contexts. For this reason, citing past (...) authors, heroes, or enemies without respecting the context says more about our interest at the present time than it does about the times of the authors examined. Conversely, the contextual approach helps us to avoid believing that ‘timeless truths’ are to be found in different texts of different ages. However, the present contribution in no way advocates a total relativization of statements. Quite the contrary; it claims that the contextual approach helps us to understand the traditions and contexts within which we ourselves, as researchers, are positioned. And this self‐awareness is believed to be the proper starting position for theoretical statements about education. (shrink)

Philosophical investigations, reasons, subject-matter https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Ulrich+verster+&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5 https://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Arguments-Philosophy-Objectives-Methodology/dp/187444000X/ref=asap_bc?ie=UTF8.

According to Peter van Inwagen, there are no successful philosophical arguments for substantive conclusions. He argues for this thesis in two steps. First, he puts forward and defends a “criterion of philosophical success,” according to which a philosophical argument is a success just in case it has the power to convert any ideally rational agnostic to its conclusion. He then argues that, given the kind of disagreement we find among philosophers, we have good reason to think that (...) no philosophical arguments for substantive conclusions satisfy that criterion. This paper contests van Inwagen’s case at both steps: first, it offers objections to his proposed criterion of philosophical success; second, it argues that even if we are wrong and his criterion is correct, the kind of disagreement that we find among actual philosophers does not provide a good reason to think that no philosophical arguments meet the relevant standard. (shrink)

The regulation of drugs presents a challenge for liberalism: how can punishing a person for an action that harms only himself or herself be justified? For public policy a related difficulty is to justify the differential treatment of drugs and alcohol. Philosophical arguments suggest that current regulations are unjustified, and that some currently illegal drugs should be treated no more harshly than alcohol. However, such arguments make little or no impact in public policy discussions. This generates a further problem: (...) to understand the different perspectives of philosophical reasoning and public policy so that philosophical arguments can have a greater role in public policy debates. (shrink)

The purpose of this text is to introduce students to great philosophy and great philosophers through an intense focus on argument. Like other topically organized introductory philosophy readers, this book is organized around the existence of God, knowledge and skepticism, mind and body, free will and determinism, ethics, and contemporary ethical debates, including abortion, euthanasia, and global hunger and poverty. 78 selections are grouped into six topical chapters-and the selections within those chapters are organized by argument. Vaughn's approach focuses students' (...) attention on argumentation, where much of the philosophical work gets done. (shrink)

Craig's second philosophical argument for a beginning of the universe presupposes a dynamic theory of time, a limitation which makes the argument unacceptable for those who do not hold this theory. I argue that the argument can be modified thus: If time is beginning -less, then it would be the case that a person existing and counting as long as time exists would count an actual infinite by counting one element after another successively, but the consequent is metaphysically impossible, (...) hence the antecedent is metaphysically impossible. I defend the premises and show that this argument does not presuppose the dynamic theory. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas asserts, in the Preface to Knowledge and Human Interests, that a radical critique of knowledge, that is a metacritique of epistemology, is only possible as a social theory. In this essay, Garbin Kortian discusses the implications and philosophical import of this thesis, which is central to Habermas's work, through a critical account of the German philosophical tradition in which it stands. He relates the 'metacritical dimension' of Haberbas's thought to Hegel's critique of Kant, Marx's critique of (...) Hegel, and the Frankfurt school's critique of positivism. Kortian presents his perspective on the philosophical problems Habermas's argument faces: the primacy of practice, this philosophy of understanding and the hermeneutic concept of understanding. This book, which was originally published in French, will interest students of philosophy and of the social and political sciences. (shrink)

Two types of philosophical arguments are employed by the defenders and critics of the Copenhagen Interpretation. One type of argument is a confrontation of an opponent's interpretation with criteria of demarcation and criteria of acceptability. The purpose of such arguments is either to exclude an opponent's interpretation from the range of permissible discourse in quantum physics, or to establish the inadequacy of an opponent's interpretation. A second type of argument is a justification of the value, or utility, of the (...) criteria selected. (shrink)

Tracing the interplay between theory and practice in the dynamics of philosophical argument, This paper represents philosophy as an open, Critical discipline, Which keeps asking the same fundamental questions about knowledge, Reality, Justice, Freedom, Harmony and truth under changing historical conditions. In the light of this, The present impasse of human thought which manifests itself in the confrontation between totalitarian functionalism in the west on the one hand and totalitarian ideologism in the east on the other, The need for (...) a reversal of thinking becomes evident. The present deadlock of human thought and the confrontation between west and east resulting from it can be broken only if one-Sided functional practice is replaced by fully-Fledged human practice. This requires moving beyond popper's one-Dimensional 'critical' rationalism and marxism-Leninism's 'scientific' dialectical materialism to a critical humanism, Based on man's contingent experience of reality. (shrink)

This book’s four main theses: -/- (1) Interpersonal liberty requires an explicit, pre-propertarian, purely factual, theory. -/- (2) Liberty is—and need only be—morally desirable in systematic practice, not in every logically possible case. In practice, there is no clash between the two main moral contenders: rights and consequences. -/- (3) Nothing can ever justify, support, or ground any theory of liberty or its applications, because it is logically impossible to transcend assumptions. Theories can only be explained, criticised, and defended within (...) conjectural frameworks. -/- (4) The state is inherently authoritarian and also negative-sum. It reduces welfare overall, with the losses compounding over time. Libertarian anarchic order is the positive-sum solution to illiberal political chaos. -/- J C Lester is a philosopher whose solution to the crucial philosophical problem of interpersonal liberty provides an explicit theory of liberty, explains how its application entails self-ownership and external property, and relates to all other interpersonal matters. (shrink)

Abstract: Critics of Havi Carel's 2008 book, Illness: The Cry of the Flesh, have contended that Carel's deployment of phenomenological philosophy adds little to commonsense views about illness and that Carel relies too heavily on emotion-laden autobiographical anecdotes. Against these contentions this article argues: first, that a perfectly respectable task of philosophy is to find reasons to support pre-existing beliefs; and secondly, that Carel's use of anecdotes, while certainly appealing to readers' emotions, constitutes part of a legitimate argumentative strategy. The (...) article links these proposals with broader debates concerning the proper task of philosophy and the role of emotionality and imagination in philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

This comment on Frodeman and Briggle’s Socrates Tenured raises questions about the project of applying philosophy or philosophical skills to wicked problems such as terrorism. By definition, these problems cannot be solved by appeal to principles, but involve conflicting values and goals. The societal problems to which the book refers are of this kind. The argument of the book vacillates between recognizing this and asserting some sort of special disciplinary authority for philosophy in the face of these problems. Examples (...) illustrate the dilemma. (shrink)

My aim is to highlight four philosophical presuppositional issues that underliethe questions associated with God-arguments precisely as such.Apresuppositional issue is some matter that systematically precedes a question onwhich one is focusing, and one‟s stance on the presuppositional issue provides afundamental component of one‟s stance on that focalquestion. Moreover, differences between stances on presuppositional issuesfrequently constitute a basic part of disputes overstances on focal questions. Finally, philosophical presuppositional issues areespecially crucial, since they regard one‟s fundamental horizon – one‟s basiccategories (...) of meaning and criteria of verification. For example, yourdisagreement with your friend about whether capital punishment could ever bemorally good may well arise at least partly from an underlying disagreement between the two of you about just what “moralgoodness” means and how its presence in a concrete situation can be confirmedor disconfirmed.The first of the philosophical presuppositional issues I have in mind isepistemological: Do I ever genuinely know anything at all? The remaining issuesare metaphysical. One is general: What are the characteristics of reality preciselyas such? And two are particular: Is utter badness real? Is direct divine selfdisclosurereal?In the first of my paper‟s three parts, I will recount four common stanceson these issues that short-circuit the enterprise of attempting to arguephilosophically in favor of God before it even gets started. To maintain any ofthem is to maintain a philosophical presupposition that excludes in advance thepotential rational success of any particular argument for God, thus leaving everysuch argument as at most the symbolic expression of individual or collectivefeelings, experiences, memories, hopes, expectations, and so forth, or perhaps asjust a matter of historical interest. In the second part of my paper, I will review two other common stancesthat serve to undercut the potential religious relevance of any philosophical Godargument,evenifithappenstoberationallysuccessful.Thesestancesconstitutephilosophicalpresuppositio nsthatexclude in advance the possibility that what aphilosophical argument might establish has any connection at all with what thereligious believer means by “God.”Finally, in my paper‟s third part I will spell out a further set ofphilosophical presuppositions, all of which, in my view, must be in place if anyparticular argument in favor of God is to have hope of being rationally successfuland religiously relevant. Although maintaining these latter presuppositions doesnot guarantee the success and relevance of any particular God-argument, it leavessuch matters open to being determined argument by argument, rather than havingtheir very possibility dismissed before any particular argument has actually beenstudied.I must add three important prefatory notes. First, in this paper what Inormally mean by “God” is what is meant by that word in the philosophicaltradition typified by the views of Augustine and Aquinas. More exactly, forpresent purposes let me say that by “God” I mean at least this: a reality that isessentially spiritual, world-transcending, all-knowing, all-powerful, and allloving.Second, my primary purpose in this paper is elucidation, not evaluation.While you will not be surprised to learn that I think the presuppositions discussedin the third part are notably more defensible than those discussed in parts one andtwo, I am mainly concerned not to justify any specific set of presuppositions butrather to illuminate the role that presuppositions play, whether explicitly or justimplicitly, and therefore the importance of taking them into account in order toproperly situate particular arguments for God.Third, my interest in this topic grows out of my own experience in theclassroom. An important part of my pedagogical responsibility is to help studentsunderstand and assess some of the traditional philosophical arguments for God –cosmological, ontological, moral, and so forth. The propensity of many studentsto remain unmoved by those arguments stems not from their study of specificfeatures of the arguments themselves but rather from their antecedentassumptions about knowing and reality. That is to say, for many students thecrucial philosophical factor in their rejection of this or that particular Godargumentis their stance, whether patent or just latent, on some issue that isproper not to philosophy of religion but rather to general epistemology ormetaphysics.2. (shrink)

This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind–body problem that have been taking place at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. In it I focus on phenomenal consciousness or “qualia”, which I distinguish from various related issues (sections 1-2). I then discuss various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument from multiple realizability and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found (...) entirely convincing (section 3). It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety (section 4). (shrink)