106 found
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  1. Ways of Seeing: The Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition.Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Ways of Seeing is a unique collaboration between an eminent philosopher and a world famous neuroscientist. It focuses on one of the most basic human functions - vision. What does it mean to 'see'. It brings together electrophysiological studies, neuropsychology, psychophysics, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of mind. The first truly interdisciplinary book devoted to the topic of vision, it will make a valuable contribution to the field of cognitive science.
     
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  2. The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: A Critique. [REVIEW]Pierre Jacob - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):519-540.
    This paper assesses the so-called “direct-perception” model of empathy. This model draws much of its inspiration from the Phenomenological tradition: it is offered as an account free from the assumption that most, if not all, of another’s psychological states and experiences are unobservable and that one’s understanding of another’s psychological states and experiences are based on inferential processes. Advocates of this model also reject the simulation-based approach to empathy. I first argue that most of their criticisms miss their target because (...)
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  3. What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human Social Cognition?Pierre Jacob - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (2):190–223.
    According to an influential view, one function of mirror neurons (MNs), first discovered in the brain of monkeys, is to underlie third-person mindreading. This view relies on two assumptions: the activity of MNs in an observer’s brain matches (simulates or resonates with) that of MNs in an agent’s brain and this resonance process retrodictively generates a representation of the agent’s intention from a perception of her movement. In this paper, I criticize both assumptions and I argue instead that the activity (...)
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  4. What Is It Like to Feel Another’s Pain?Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Jacob - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (2):295-316.
    We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascription. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neuroscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective component. According to our account, contagious pain consists in imagining the former, whereas empathetic pain consists in imagining the latter. We further (...)
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  5. The Motor Theory of Social Cognition: A Critique.Pierre Jacob & Marc Jeannerod - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):21-25.
    Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of the mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-human primates, provides an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospects of a motor theory of social cognition. Since human social cognition includes the ability to mindread, many motor theorists of social (...)
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  6.  66
    Making Sense of Early False-Belief Understanding.Katharina A. Helming, Brent Strickland & Pierre Jacob - 2014 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18 (4):167-170.
  7.  43
    What Do False-Belief Tests Show?Pierre Jacob - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):1-20.
    In a paper published in Psychological Review, Tyler Burge has offered a unified non-mentalistic account of a wide range of social cognitive developmental findings. His proposal is that far from attributing mental states, young children attribute to humans the same kind of internal generic states of sensory registration that biologists attribute to e.g. snails and ticks. Burge’s proposal deserves close attention: it is especially challenging because it departs from both the mentalistic and all the non-mentalistic accounts of the data so (...)
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  8. Intentionality.Pierre Jacob - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. The puzzles of intentionality lie at the interface between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. The word itself, which is of medieval Scholastic origin, was rehabilitated by the philosopher Franz Brentano towards the end of the nineteenth century. ‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher's word. It derives from the Latin word intentio, which in turn derives from the verb (...)
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  9.  35
    Solving the Puzzle About Early Belief‐Ascription.Katharina A. Helming, Brent Strickland & Pierre Jacob - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (4):438-469.
    Developmental psychology currently faces a deep puzzle: most children before 4 years of age fail elicited-response false-belief tasks, but preverbal infants demonstrate spontaneous false-belief understanding. Two main strategies are available: cultural constructivism and early-belief understanding. The latter view assumes that failure at elicited-response false-belief tasks need not reflect the inability to understand false beliefs. The burden of early-belief understanding is to explain why elicited-response false-belief tasks are so challenging for most children under 4 years of age. The goal of this (...)
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  10.  53
    What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World.Pierre Jacob - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
    Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behaviour. In the process, this 1997 book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest (...)
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  11. On Doing Things Intentionally.Pierre Jacob, Cova Florian & Dupoux Emmanuel - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409.
    Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb 'intentionally'. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb 'intentionally' has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end by discussing the implications (...)
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  12.  75
    How From Action-Mirroring to Intention-Ascription?Pierre Jacob - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):1132-1141.
  13. Universal Moral Grammar: A Critical Appraisal.Pierre Jacob & Emmanuel Dupoux - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (9):373-378.
    A new framework for the study of the human moral faculty is currently receiving much attention: the so-called ‘universal moral grammar' framework. It is based on an intriguing analogy, first pointed out by Rawls, between the study of the human moral sense and Chomsky's research program into the human language faculty. In order to assess UMG, we ask: is moral competence modular? Does it have an underlying hierarchical grammatical structure? Does moral diversity rest on culture-dependent parameters? We review evidence that (...)
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  14. The Tuning-Fork Model of Human Social Cognition: A Critique☆.Pierre Jacob - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):229-243.
    The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified by the activity of MNs, constitute instances of third-person mindreading, whereby an observer represents the agent's intention. (4) Non-motor mirroring processes enable humans to represent others' emotions. After questioning all (...)
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  15. What Minds Can Do. Intentionality in a Non-Intentional World.Pierre Jacob - 1997 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2):379-379.
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  16.  4
    'Mirror Neurons' Or'concept Neurons'?Pierre Jacob - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (2):190-223.
  17. Visual Cognition: A New Look at the Two-Visual Systems Model.Marc Jeannerod & Pierre Jacob - unknown
    According to the two visual systems model, the visual processing of objects divides into semantic and pragmatic processing. We provide various criteria for this distinction. Further, we argue that both the semantic and pragmatic processing of visual information about objects should be divided into low-level processing and high-level processing. Finally, we re-evaluate the contribution of the human parietal lobe to the concious visual perception of spatial relations among objects.
     
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  18.  56
    A Non-Mentalistic Cause-Based Heuristic in Human Social Evaluations.Marine Buon, Pierre Jacob, Elsa Loissel & Emmanuel Dupoux - 2013 - Cognition 126 (2):149-155.
  19. Why Visual Experience is Likely to Resist Being Enacted.Pierre Jacob - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and (...)
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  20.  19
    Mental Content.Pierre Jacob - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):723-728.
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  21.  47
    Emotional Contagion: Its Scope and Limits.Guillaume Dezecache, Pierre Jacob & Julie Grèzes - 2015 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (6):297-299.
  22. A Philosopher’s Reflections on the Discovery of Mirror Neurons.Pierre Jacob - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (3):570-595.
    Mirror neurons fire both when a primate executes a transitive action directed toward a target (e.g., grasping) and when he observes the same action performed by another. According to the prevalent interpretation, action-mirroring is a process of interpersonal neural similarity whereby an observer maps the agent's perceived movements onto her own motor repertoire. Furthermore, ever since Gallese and Goldman's (1998) influential paper, action-mirroring has been linked to third-person mindreading on the grounds that it enables an observer to represent the agent's (...)
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  23.  62
    Sharing and Ascribing Goals.Pierre Jacob - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):200-227.
    This paper assesses the scope and limits of a widely influential model of goal-ascription by human infants: the shared-intentionality model. It derives much of its appeal from its ability to integrate behavioral evidence from developmental psychology with cognitive neuroscientific evidence about the role of mirror neuron activity in non-human primates. The central question raised by this model is whether sharing a goal with an agent is necessary and sufficient for ascribing it to that agent. I argue that advocates of the (...)
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  24.  32
    Spatial Coordinates and Phenomenology in the Two-Visual Systems Model.Pierre Jacob & Frédérique de Vignemont - 2010 - In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
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  25.  86
    Some Problems for Reductive Physicalism. [REVIEW]Pierre Jacob - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):648-654.
    I examine and discuss Jaegwon Kim's arguments against non-reductive physicalism in his book, Mind in a Physical World. I first examine the supervenience argument and then the multiple realization argument. Finally, I raise some questions about Kim's overall attitude towards mental realism, i.e., realism about mental properties.
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  26. What is the Phenomenology of Thought? [REVIEW]Pierre Jacob - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):443-448.
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  27.  6
    Is Mindreading a Gadget?Pierre Jacob & Thom Scott-Phillips - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1-27.
    Non-cognitive gadgets are fancy tools shaped to meet specific, local needs. Cecilia Heyes defines cognitive gadgets as dedicated psychological mechanisms created through social interactions and culturally, not genetically, inherited by humans. She has boldly proposed that many human cognitive mechanisms are gadgets. If true, these claims would have far-reaching implications for our scientific understanding of human social cognition. Here we assess Heyes’s cognitive gadget approach as it applies to mindreading. We do not think that the evidence supports Heyes’s thought-provoking thesis (...)
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  28.  57
    Thoughts and Belief Ascriptions.Pierre Jacob - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (4):301-325.
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  29. Embodying the Mind by Extending It.Pierre Jacob - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):33-51.
    To subscribe to the embodied mind (or embodiment) framework is to reject the view that an individual’s mind is realized by her brain alone. As Clark ( 2008a ) has argued, there are two ways to subscribe to embodiment: bodycentrism (BC) and the extended mind (EM) thesis. According to BC, an embodied mind is a two-place relation between an individual’s brain and her non-neural bodily anatomy. According to EM, an embodied mind is a threeplace relation between an individual’s brain, her (...)
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  30.  26
    Beyond Empathy for Pain.Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Jacob - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (3):434-445.
    Here we address four objections raised by Julien Deonna, John Michael, and Francesca Fardo against a recent account of empathy for pain. First, to what extent must the empathizer share her target’s affective state? Second, how can one interpret neuroscientific findings on vicarious pain in light of recent results challenging the notion of a pain matrix? Third, can one offer a simpler account of how empathy makes one aware of another’s emotion? Finally, to what extent can this account of empathy (...)
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  31.  44
    What Is the Phenomenology of Thought?Pierre Jacob - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):443-448.
  32. Moral Evaluation Shapes Linguistic Reports of Others' Psychological States, Not Theory-of-Mind Judgments.Florian Cova, Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre Jacob - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):334-335.
    We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the way we think about, others' psychological states.
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  33. Grasping and Perceiving Objects.Pierre Jacob - 2005 - In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 241--283.
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  34. De Vienne à Cambridge. L'héritage du positivisme logique de 1950 à nos jours.Pierre Jacob - 1984 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (2):374-375.
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  35. The Scope and Limits of Enactive Approaches to Visual Experience.Pierre Jacob - unknown
    I pursue here three related aims. First, I criticise some of the metaphysical claims made on behalf of the so-called `enactive' approach to visual experience. Secondly, I explain why the enactive view of visual experience is hard to square with the evidence in favour of the two-visual-systems model of human vision. Finally, I explore one possible way to develop the `pre-emptive perception' framework and explain why, contrary to first appearances, some of the fundamental discoveries of brain mechanisms, whose function might (...)
     
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  36. Is Meaning Intrinsically Normative?Pierre Jacob - unknown
    As a naturalistically inclined philosopher, I reject the thesis that meaning is intrinsically normative. I consider the deflationary proposal that meaning is not normative at all and I find it unacceptable. I argue from the difficulties met by the deflationary proposal in favor of the teleosemantic view that the normativity of meaning arises from biological functions.
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  37.  51
    The Scope and Limit of Mental Simulation.Pierre Jacob - 2002 - In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.
  38. Action-Oriented Understanding of Consciousness and the Structure of Experience.Anil Seth, Richard Menary, Paul Verschure, Jamie Turnbull, Martina Martina Martina Al, Judith Ford, Chris Frith, Pierre Jacob, Miriam Kyselo, Marek McGann, Ezequiel Di Paolo & Kevin Andrew Kevin - 2016 - In Karl Friston, Andreas Andreas & Danika Kragic (eds.), Pragmatism and the Pragmatic Turn in Cognitive Science. Cambridge MA: M.I.T. Press. pp. 261-281.
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  39.  92
    Can Selection Explain Content?Pierre Jacob - 1998 - In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosophy Doc Ctr. pp. 91-102.
    There are presently three broad approaches the project of naturalizing intentionality: a purely informational approach (Dretske and Fodor), a purely teleological approach (Millikan and Papineau), and a mixed informationally-based teleological approach (Dretske again). I will argue that the last teleosemantic theory offers the most promising approach. I also think, however, that the most explicit version of a pure teleosemantic theory of content, namely Millikan’s admirable theory, faces a pair of objections. My goal in this paper is to spell out Millikan’s (...)
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  40.  87
    Externalism Revisited: Is There Such a Thing as Narrow Content?Pierre Jacob - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 60 (November):143-176.
    First, I argue that the narrow content of a thought cannot be identical with the linguistic meaning of the sentence used to express it. Secondly, I argue that the distinction between narrow content and linguistic meaning is not fatal to content-dualism. Thirdly I argue for the view that the proposition contributed by the clause prefixed by "that" is an interpretation of the believer's thought. Finally, I use this insight to provide an individualist account of Burge's thought-experiments such that recognition that (...)
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  41. Pourquoi les choses ont-elles un sens ?Pierre Jacob - 1999 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 189 (3):387-388.
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  42. La logique des noms propres.Pierre Jacob & Francois Recanati - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 172 (3):542-545.
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  43.  82
    Externalism and Mental Causation.Pierre Jacob - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1):203-219.
    Argues that externalist content is not causally efficacious, but is relevant to causal explanations of behavior indirectly, via the cognitive activities of others external to the system.
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  44. Précis de "E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory Of Phenomenal Consciousness" (Spanish version).Reinaldo Bernal, Pierre Jacob, Maximilian Kistler, David Papineau, Jérôme Dokic, Juan Diego Morales Otero & Jaime Ramos - 2013 - Ideas Y Valores 62 (152):267-297.
    El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of PhenomenalConsciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de laconciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experienciasubjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real,y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
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  45. First-Person and Third-Person Mindreading.Pierre Jacob - 2005 - In P. Gampieri-Deutsch (ed.), Psychoanalysis as an Empirical, Interdisciplinary Science. Austrian Academy of Sciences.
  46. Externalism and the Explanatory Relevance of Broad Content.Pierre Jacob - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (1):131-156.
  47. L'empirisme logique, ses antécédents, ses critiques.Pierre Jacob - 1980 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 170 (4):484-484.
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  48. Précis of "E-physicalism-a physicalist theory of phenomenal consciousness".Reinaldo Bernal Velasquez, Pierre Jacob, Maximilian Kistler, David Papineau & Jérôme Dokic - 2013 - Ideas Y Valores 62 (152):268-297.
    El libro "E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness" presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de la conciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experiencia subjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real, y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
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  49. Do We Know How We Know Our Own Minds Yet?Pierre Jacob - 2003 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
    In traditional epistemology, psychological self-knowledge is taken to be the paradigm of privleged a priori knowledge. According to an influential incompatibilist line of thought, traditional epistemic features attributed to psychological self-knowledge are supposed to be inconsistent with content externalism. In this paper, I examine one prominent compatibilist response by an advocate of content externalism, i.e., Fred Dretske's answer tot he incompatibilist argument, based on the model of displaced perceptual knowledge. I discuss the costs and benefits of his answer.
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  50.  47
    What Can the Semantic Properties of Innate Representations Explain?Pierre Jacob - 1997 - In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 175--197.
    Dretske has argued that, unlike the content of beliefs and desires, the contents of innate representations cannot in principle play a role in the causal explanation of an individual's behavior. I examine this "asymmetry" and against it, I argue that the content of innate mental representations too can play a causal role in the explanation of behavior.
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