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Pierre Le Morvan [29]Pierre Georges Le Morvan [1]
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  1.  62
    Knowledge Before Gettier.Pierre Le Morvan - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (6):1216-1238.
    According to a historical claim oft-repeated by contemporary epistemologists, the ‘traditional’ conception of knowledge prevailed in Western philosophy prior to the publication in 1963 of Edmund’s Gettier’s famous three-page article ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’. On this conception, knowledge consists of justified true belief. In this article, I critically consider evidence for and against this historical claim, and conclude with a puzzle concerning its widespread acceptance.
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  2.  54
    On Ignorance: A Vindication of the Standard View.Pierre Le Morvan - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (2):379-393.
    Rik Peels has once again forcefully argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he endeavors to refute the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and to advance what he calls the “New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. I defend the Standard View against his new attempted refutation.
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  3. Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them.Pierre le Morvan - 2004 - American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3):221-234.
    Since the demise of the Sense-Datum independent objects or events to be objects Theory and Phenomenalism in the last cenof perception; however, unlike Direct Retury, Direct Realism in the philosophy of alists, Indirect Realists take this percepperception has enjoyed a resurgence of tion to be indirect by involving a prior popularity.1 Curiously, however, although awareness of some tertium quid between there have been attempts in the literature the mind and external objects or events.3 to refute some of the arguments against (...)
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  4.  22
    When Ignorance Excuses.Pierre Le Morvan - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):22-31.
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  5.  47
    Why the Standard View of Ignorance Prevails.Pierre Le Morvan - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):239-256.
    Rik Peels has forcefully argued that, contrary to what is widely held, ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he has argued against the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and argued for what he calls “the New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. In this paper, I defend the Standard View against Peels’s latest case for the New View.
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  6. Knowledge, Ignorance and True Belief.Pierre le Morvan - 2011 - Theoria 77 (1):32-41.
    Suppose that knowledge and ignorance are complements in the sense of being mutually exclusive: for person S and fact p, either S knows that p or is ignorant that p. Understood in this way, ignorance amounts to a lack or absence of knowledge: S is ignorant that p if and only if it is not the case that S knows that p. Let us call the thesis that knowledge and ignorance are opposites the “Complement Thesis”. In this article, I discuss (...)
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  7. Is Mere True Belief Knowledge?Pierre Le Morvan - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (2):151-168.
    Crispin Sartwell ingeniously defends the provocative thesis that mere true belief suffices for knowledge. In doing so, he challenges one of the most deeply entrenched epistemological tenets, namely that knowledge must be more than mere true belief. Particularly interesting is the way he defends his thesis by appealing to considerations adduced by such prominent epistemologists as William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Alvin Goldman and Paul Moser, each of whom denies that knowledge is merely true belief. In this paper, I argue that (...)
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  8.  73
    On the Ignorance, Knowledge, and Nature of Propositions.Pierre Le Morvan - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3647-3662.
    Deploying distinctions between ignorance of \ and ignorance that \ , and between knowledge of \ and knowledge that \ , I address a question that has hitherto received little attention, namely: what is it to have knowledge of propositions? I then provide a taxonomy of ontological conceptions of the nature of propositions, and explore several of their interesting epistemological implications.
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  9.  23
    Propositional Learning: From Ignorance to Knowledge.Pierre Le Morvan - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):162-177.
    ABSTRACTIn this paper, I offer an account of propositional learning: namely, learning that p. I argue for what I call the “Three Transitions Thesis” or “TTT” according to which four states and three transitions between them characterize such learning. I later supplement the TTT to account for learning why p. In making my case, I discuss mathematical propositions such as Fermat's Last Theorem and the ABC Conjecture, and then generalize to other mathematical propositions and to non-mathematical propositions. I also discuss (...)
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  10.  3
    Knowledge and Security.Pierre Le Morvan - 2016 - Philosophy 91 (3):411-430.
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  11.  58
    Ramsey on Truth and Truth on Ramsey.Pierre Le Morvan - 2004 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):705 – 718.
    It is widely held, to the point of being the received interpretation, that Frank Ramsey was the first to defend the so-called Redundancy Theory of Truth in his landmark article ‘Facts and Propositions’ (hereafter ‘FP’) of 1927.1 For instance, A.J. Ayer2 cited this article in the context of arguing that saying that p is true is simply a way of asserting p and that truth is not a real quality or relation. Other holders of the received interpretation, such as George (...)
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  12.  13
    Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them.Pierre Le Morvan - 2004 - American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3):221 - 234.
  13.  22
    Medical Learning Curves and the Kantian Ideal.Pierre le Morvan - 2005 - Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (9):513-518.
    A hitherto unexamined problem for the ‘‘Kantian ideal’’ that one should always treat patients as ends in themselves, and never only as a means to other ends, is explored in this paper. The problem consists of a prima facie conflict between this Kantian ideal and the reality of medical practice. This conflict arises because, at least presently, medical practitioners can only acquire certain skills and abilities by practising on live, human patients, and given the inevitability and ubiquity of learning curves, (...)
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  14.  37
    The Converse Consequence Condition and Hempelian Qualitative Confirmation.Pierre Le Morvan - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):448-.
    In this paper, I offer a proof that a disastrous conclusion (namely, that any observation report confirms any hypothesis) may be derived directly from two principles of qualitative confirmation which Carl Hempel called the "Converse Consequence Condition" and the "Entailment Condition." I then discuss three strategies which a defender of the Converse Consequence Condition may deploy to save this principle.
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  15. Epistemic Means and Ends: A Reply to Hofmann.Pierre Le Morvan - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):251-264.
    How is epistemic justification related to knowledge? Is it, as widely thought, constitutive of knowledge? Is it merely a means to knowledge, or merely a means to something else, such as truth? In a recent article in this journal, Hofmann (2005, Synthese, 146(3), 357–369) addresses these questions in attempting to defend an important argument articulated by Sartwell (1992, The Journal of Philosophy, 89(4), 167–180) and reconstructed and criticized by Le Morvan (2002, Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 56(2), 151–168). (...)
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  16.  85
    Sensory Experience and Intentionalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.
    Increasingly prominent in the recent literature on the philosophy of perception, Intentionalism holds that sensory experience is inherently intentional, where to be intentional is to be about, or directed on, something. This article explores Intentionalism's prospects as a viable ontological and epistemological alternative to the traditional trinity of theories of sensory experience: the Sense-Datum Theory, the Adverbial Theory, and the Theory of Appearing.
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  17. Intentionality: Transparent, Translucent, and Opaque.Pierre Le Morvan - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:283-302.
    Exploring intentionality from an externalist perspective, I distinguish three kinds of intentionality in the case of seeing, which I call transparent, translucent, and opaque respectively. I then extend the distinction from seeing to knowing, and then to believing. Having explicated the three-fold distinction, I then critically explore some important consequences that follow from granting that there are transparent and translucent intentional states and these intentional states are mental states. These consequences include: first, that existential opacity is neither the mark of (...)
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  18.  34
    Intentionality: Transparent, Translucent, and Opaque.Pierre Le Morvan - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:283-302.
    Exploring intentionality from an externalist perspective, I distinguish three kinds of intentionality in the case of seeing, which I call transparent, translucent, and opaque respectively. I then extend the distinction from seeing to knowing, and then to believing. Having explicated the three-fold distinction, I then critically explore some important consequences that follow from granting that there are transparent and translucent intentional states and these intentional states are mental states. These consequences include: first, that existential opacity is neither the mark of (...)
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  19.  12
    Healthy Skepticism and Practical Wisdom.Pierre Le Morvan - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (1):87-102.
    This paper explores and articulates an alternative to the two main approaches that have come to predominate in contemporary philosophical discussionsof skepticism. These we may call the ‘Foil Approach’ and the ‘Bypass Approach’ respectively. On the Foil Approach, skepticism is treated as a problem to be solved, or challenge to be met, or threat to be parried; skepticism’s value, insofar as it is deemed to have one, accrues from its role as a foil contrastively illuminating what is required for knowledge (...)
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  20.  8
    Ignorance, Knowledge, and Two Epistemic Intuitions.Pierre Le Morvan - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-10.
    One of the most venerable and enduring intuitions in epistemology concerns the relationship between true belief and knowledge. Famously articulated by Socrates, it holds that true belief does not suffice for knowledge. I discuss a matching intuition about ignorance according to which true belief does not suffice for the absence of ignorance. I argue that the latter intuition undercuts the New View of Ignorance and supports the Standard View of Ignorance.
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  21. Information, Privacy, and False Light.Pierre Le Morvan - 2018 - In Mark Navin & Ann Cudd (eds.), Core Concepts and Contemporary Issues in Privacy. Springer Verlag.
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  22.  41
    Notes and Comments. Plantinga on Warranted Christian Belief.Pierre Le Morvan & Dana Radcliffe - 2003 - Heythrop Journal 44 (3):345-351.
  23.  19
    Perspectives on Ignorance From Moral and Social Philosophy, Edited by Rik Peels.Pierre Le Morvan - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (4):536-539.
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  24.  32
    Privacy, Secrecy, Fact, and Falsehood.Pierre Le Morvan - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:313-336.
    Deploying distinctions between ignorance of a proposition and ignorance that it is true, and between knowledge of a proposition and knowledge that it is true, I distinguish between propositional privacy and factive privacy. While the latter is limited to personal facts, the former encompasses personal falsehoods as well. I argue that propositional privacy is both broader and deeper than factive privacy, and accordingly that conceiving of the nature of privacy in terms of propositional privacy has important advantages over conceiving of (...)
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  25.  67
    Selfishness, Altruism, and Our Future Selves.Pierre Le Morvan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):409 – 424.
    In this article, I defend the thesis that selfishness and altruism can be intrapersonal . In doing so, I argue that the notions of intrapersonal altruism and selfishness usefully pick out behavioural patterns and have predictive value. I also argue that my thesis helps enrich our understanding of the prudential, and can subsume some interesting work in economic and psychological theory.
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  26.  18
    Skepticism as Vice and Virtue.Pierre Le Morvan - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3):238-260.
    I articulate and defend a conception of skepticism inspired by Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. On it, skepticism is vicious when deficient and when excessive. Virtuous skepticism lies as a mean between these two extremes.
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  27.  65
    Searle on the Biology of Seeing.Pierre Le Morvan - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 71:26-31.
    Searle offers an account of seeing as a conscious state not constituted by the object(s) seen. I focus in this article on his biological case for this thesis, and argue that the biological considerations he adduces neither establish his own position nor defeat a rival object-inclusive view. I show (among other things) that taking seeing to be a biological state is compatible with its being (partially) constituted by the object(s) seen.
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  28.  58
    Uncorrected Proof.Pierre Le Morvan - manuscript
    In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it’s implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief.
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  29.  30
    A Metaphilosophical Dilemma for Epistemic Externalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (5):688-707.