We propose that the isomorphism generally observed between the representations composing our momentary phenomenal experience and the structure of the world is the end-product of a progressive organization that emerges thanks to elementary associative processes that take our conscious representations themselves as the stuff on which they operate, a thesis that we summarize in the concept of Self-Organizing Consciousness (SOC). Key Words: Associative learning; automatism; consciousness; development; implicit learning; incubation; language; mental representation; perception; phenomenal experience.

In a prior review, Perrruchet and Pacton (2006) noted that the literature on implicit learning and the more recent studies on statistical learning focused on the same phenomena, namely the domain-general learning mechanisms acting in incidental, unsupervised learning situations. However, they also noted that implicit learning and statistical learning research favored different interpretations, focusing on the selection of chunks and the computation of transitional probabilities aimed at discovering chunk boundaries, respectively. This paper examines the state of the debate 12 years (...) later. The link between contrasting theories and their historical roots has disappeared, but a number of studies were aimed at contrasting the predictions of these two approaches. Overall, these studies strongly question the still prevalent account based on the statistical computation of pairwise associations. Various chunk-based models provide much better predictions in a number of experimental situations. However, these models rely on very different conceptual frameworks, as illustrated by a comparison between Bayesian models of word segmentation, PARSER, and a connectionist model (TRACX). (shrink)

Through the concept of self-organizing consciousness (SOC), we posit that the dynamic of the mind stems from the recurrent interplay between the properties of conscious experiences and the properties of the world, hence making it unnecessary to postulate the existence of an unconscious mental level. In contrast, arguments are provided by commentators for the need for a functional level of organization located between the neural and the conscious. Other commentaries challenge us concerning the ability of our model to account for (...) specific phenomena in the domains of language, reasoning, incubation, and creativity. The possibility of unconscious semantic access and other alleged instances of adapted performance in the absence of any conscious counterpart are also put forth as evidence against our view. Our response emphasizes the fact that opponents to our model often present as factual, theory-free evidence which is in fact nothing more than the postulates underlying the classical computational framework. (shrink)

Though we fully agree that unconscious processing produces explicit representations that form the conscious phenomenal experience of the subject, identifying phenomenal experience with stable patterns of activation in a PDP network seriously limits O'Brien & Opie's thesis. They fail to recognize the constructive role of consciousness during the learning episode itself, reducing consciousness to a resulting outcome of the learning episode. We illustrate how consciousness can guide and shape the formation of increasingly structured representations of the world by presenting a (...) brief outline of a model for speech segmentation. (shrink)

Attributing the creation of new features to categorization requirements implies that the exemplars displayed are correctly assigned to their category. This constraint limits the scope of Schyns et al.'s proposal to supervised learning. We present data suggesting that this constraint is unwarranted and we argue that feature creation is better thought of as a byproduct of the attentional, on-line processing of incoming information.