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Pierre Poirier
Université du Québec à Montréal
  1.  38
    On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts. [REVIEW]Robert Cummins, Alexa Lee, Martin Roth, David Byrd & Pierre Poirier - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):102-108.
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  2. A Framework for Thinking About Distributed Cognition.Pierre Poirier & Guillaume Chicoisne - 2006 - Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (2):215-234.
    As is often the case when scientific or engineering fields emerge, new concepts are forged or old ones are adapted. When this happens, various arguments rage over what ultimately turns out to be conceptual misunderstandings. At that critical time, there is a need for an explicit reflection on the meaning of the concepts that define the field. In this position paper, we aim to provide a reasoned framework in which to think about various issues in the field of distributed cognition. (...)
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  3. Systematicity and the Cognition of Structured Domains.Robert Cummins, James Blackmon, David Byrd, Pierre Poirier, Martin Roth & Georg Schwarz - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):167 - 185.
    The current debate over systematicity concerns the formal conditions a scheme of mental representation must satisfy in order to explain the systematicity of thought.1 The systematicity of thought is assumed to be a pervasive property of minds, and can be characterized (roughly) as follows: anyone who can think T can think systematic variants of T, where the systematic variants of T are found by permuting T’s constituents. So, for example, it is an alleged fact that anyone who can think the (...)
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  4.  8
    Cultural Blankets: Epistemological Pluralism in the Evolutionary Epistemology of Mechanisms.Pierre Poirier, Luc Faucher & Jean-Nicolas Bourdon - forthcoming - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-16.
    In a recently published paper, we argued that theories of cultural evolution can gain explanatory power by being more pluralistic. In his reply to it, Dennett agreed that more pluralism is needed. Our paper’s main point was to urge cultural evolutionists to get their hands dirty by describing the fine details of cultural products and by striving to offer detailed and, when explanatory, varied algorithms or mechanisms to account for them. While Dennett’s latest work on cultural evolution does marvelously well (...)
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  5.  88
    Representation and Indication.Robert C. Cummins & Pierre Poirier - 2004 - In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. pp. 21--40.
    This paper is about two kinds of mental content and how they are related. We are going to call them representation and indication. We will begin with a rough characterization of each. The differences, and why they matter, will, hopefully, become clearer as the paper proceeds.
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  6. Atomistic Learning in Non-Modular Systems.Pierre Poirier - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):313-325.
    We argue that atomistic learning?learning that requires training only on a novel item to be learned?is problematic for networks in which every weight is available for change in every learning situation. This is potentially significant because atomistic learning appears to be commonplace in humans and most non-human animals. We briefly review various proposed fixes, concluding that the most promising strategy to date involves training on pseudo-patterns along with novel items, a form of learning that is not strictly atomistic, but which (...)
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  7. Epistemological Strata and the Rules of Right Reason.Robert C. Cummins, Pierre Poirier & Martin Roth - 2004 - Synthese 141 (3):287 - 331.
    It has been commonplace in epistemology since its inception to idealize away from computational resource constraints, i.e., from the constraints of time and memory. One thought is that a kind of ideal rationality can be specified that ignores the constraints imposed by limited time and memory, and that actual cognitive performance can be seen as an interaction between the norms of ideal rationality and the practicalities of time and memory limitations. But a cornerstone of naturalistic epistemology is that normative assessment (...)
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  8.  13
    A Framework For Thinking About Distributed Cognition.Pierre Poirier & Guillaume Chicoisne - 2006 - Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (2):215-234.
    As is often the case when scientific or engineering fields emerge, new concepts are forged or old ones are adapted. When this happens, various arguments rage over what ultimately turns out to be conceptual misunderstandings. At that critical time, there is a need for an explicit reflection on the meaning of the concepts that define the field. In this position paper, we aim to provide a reasoned framework in which to think about various issues in the field of distributed cognition. (...)
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  9.  3
    A New Hope: A better ICM to understand human cognitive architectural variability.Pierre Poirier & Luc Faucher - forthcoming - Synthese:1-33.
    How can we best understand human cognitive architectural variability? We believe that the relationships between theories in neurobiology, cognitive science and evolutionary biology posited by evolutionary psychology’s Integrated Causal Model has unduly supported various essentialist conceptions of the human cognitive architecture, monomorphic minds, that mask HCA variability, and we propose a different set of relationships between theories in the same domains to support a different, non-essentialist, understanding of HCA variability. To set our case against essentialist theories of HCA variability, we (...)
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  10.  36
    Philosophie de l’esprit. État des lieux.Denis Fisette & Pierre Poirier - 2000 - Paris: Vrin.
    Cet ouvrage vise à délimiter le champ d'investigation de la philosophie de l'esprit. Il comprend huit chapitres. Le premier, le plus général, se veut une première délimitation du champ d'investigation de la philosophie de l'esprit à l'aide de ses trois concepts clés: l'intentionnalité, la rationalité et la conscience. Le chapitre suivant se veut une réflexion plus générale sur les motivations philosophiques qui commandent des jugements si opposés sur le statut ontologique et épistémologique de la psychologie du sens commun. Le chapitre (...)
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  11.  45
    Le véritable retour des définitions.Pierre Poirier & Guillaume Beaulac - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (1):153-164.
    In our critical review of Doing without Concepts, we argue that although the heterogeneity hypothesis (according to which exemplars, prototypes and theories are natural kinds that should replace ‘concept’) may end fruitless debates in the psychology of concepts, Edouard Machery did not anticipate one consequence of his suggestion: Definitions now acquire a new status as another one of the bodies of information replacing ‘concept’. In order to support our hypothesis, we invoke dual-process models to suggest that prototypes, exemplars and theories (...)
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  12.  26
    L'empire contre-attaque : le retour de la réduction psychophysique.Pierre Poirier - 2000 - Philosophiques 27 (1):39-62.
    En refusant à la psychologie la latitude accordée aux autres sciences, l’argument concluant à l’irréductibilité des propriétés psychologiques à partir de leur réalisation multiple manifeste une attitude antinaturaliste à l’égard de cette science. En science, il est possible de relativiser les réductions à des domaines bien définis, c’est-à-dire des domaines qui découpent la nature d’une manière non ad hoc , et de corriger en conséquence l’appareil conceptuel des théories. Et en science, il est possible de construire des niveaux abstraits et (...)
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  13. Structured Thoughts: The Spatial-Motor View.Benoit Hardy-Vallée & Pierre Poirier - 2005 - In Gerhard Schurz, Edouard Machery & Markus Werning (eds.), Applications to Linguistics, Psychology and Neuroscience. De Gruyter. pp. 229-250.
    Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we think with words, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous na- ture of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have tradition- ally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could not (...)
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  14. Pascal Engel, La Dispute: Une Introduction À la Philosophie Analytique. [REVIEW]Pierre Poirier - 1998 - Philosophy in Review 18 (5):324-326.
     
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  15.  14
    Les gardiens du bon usage : Étude critique de « Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience », de P. M. R. Hacker et M. R. Bennett. [REVIEW]Pierre Poirier & Nicolas Payette - 2007 - Philosophiques 34 (1):183-200.
  16. Embodied Categorization.Pierre Poirier - unknown
  17.  12
    La théorie des systèmes développementaux et la construction sociale des maladies mentales.Luc Faucher, Pierre Poirier & Jean Lachapelle - 2006 - Philosophiques 33 (1):147-182.
    Dans ce texte, nous proposons un cadre, qui vise à intégrer les contributions des approches constructionnistes et biologiques dans un domaine précis, celui des maladies mentales. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons quelques propositions récentes faites par des philosophes de la biologie — plus spécifiquement les idées avancées par les tenants de la « théorie des systèmes développementaux » ainsi que la notion d’« enracinement génératif » .In this paper, we are proposing a framework to integrate the core insights of the (...)
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  18.  35
    Convolution and Modal Representations in Thagard and Stewart’s Neural Theory of Creativity: A Critical Analysis.Jean-Frédéric de Pasquale & Pierre Poirier - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5):1535-1560.
    According to Thagard and Stewart :1–33, 2011), creativity results from the combination of neural representations, and combination results from convolution, an operation on vectors defined in the holographic reduced representation framework. They use these ideas to understand creativity as it occurs in many domains, and in particular in science. We argue that, because of its algebraic properties, convolution alone is ill-suited to the role proposed by Thagard and Stewart. The semantic pointer concept allows us to see how we can apply (...)
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  19.  72
    Va Savoir! De la Connaissance En Général -- Pascal Engel. [REVIEW]Guillaume Beaulac & Pierre Poirier - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):217-221.
  20.  40
    Embodied Thoughts. Concepts and Compositionality Without Language.B. Hardy-Vallee & Pierre Poirier - 2006 - Theoria Et Historia Scientarum 1:53-72.
    Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we _think with words_, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous nature of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have traditionally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could not be but (...)
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  21.  22
    Et Pourquoi Pas Une Explication Non Représentationnelle de L’Action Motrice?Pierre Poirier - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (2):353-360.
  22.  65
    Cognitive Evolutionary Psychology Without Representational Nativism.Denise D. Cummins, Robert C. Cummins & Pierre Poirier - 2003 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 15 (2):143-159.
    A viable evolutionary cognitive psychology requires that specific cognitive capacities be (a) heritable and (b) ‘quasi-independent’ from other heritable traits. They must be heritable because there can be no selection for traits that are not. They must be quasi-independent from other heritable traits, since adaptive variations in a specific cognitive capacity could have no distinctive consequences for fitness if effecting those variations required widespread changes in other unrelated traits and capacities as well. These requirements would be satisfied by innate cognitive (...)
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  23. Be There, or Be Square! On the Importance of Being There.Pierre Poirier - unknown
    By using the name of one of his first papers (See Clark 1987) for his latest book, Andy Clark proves how consistent his view of the mind has been over his career. Indeed Being There becomes the latest in a ten year effort, laid out over a series of books, to flesh out one of the few comprehensive proposals in philosophy of mind since Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind (RTM). Each book in the series accentuates one aspect of Clark’s view. (...)
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  24. I. Background.Robert C. Cummins, James Blackmon, David Byrd, Pierre Poirier & Martin Roth - unknown
    The current debate over systematicity concerns the formal conditions a scheme of mental representation must satisfy in order to explain the systematicity of thought.1 The systematicity of thought is assumed to be a pervasive property of minds, and can be characterized (roughly) as follows: anyone who can think T can think systematic variants of T, where the systematic variants of T are found by permuting T’s constituents. So, for example, it is an alleged fact that anyone who can think the (...)
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  25.  42
    Finding a Place for Elimination in Inter-Level Reductionist Activities: Reply to Wimsatt.Pierre Poirier - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):477 - 483.
    According to Wimsatt, a proper treatment of reduction must distinguish between two types of reductionist activities scientists engage in. One of the benefits of better understanding the nature of reduction, he believes, is that it shows that eliminativism, that is, the elimination of concepts and theories from science, is a rather circumscribed and limited affair, especially in the case of inter-level reductionist activities. While I agree with Wimsatt that it is important to distinguish the two types of reductionisms, I show (...)
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  26. André De Tienne, L'analytique de La Représentation Chez Peirce Reviewed By.Pierre Poirier - 1996 - Philosophy in Review 16 (4):251-253.
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  27.  35
    Psychologie Évolutionniste Et Théories Interdomaines.Luc Faucher & Pierre Poirier - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (3):453-.
    Evolutionary psychology presupposes relations between theories of different domains that the two traditional models, reduction and autonomy, cannot properly account for. We aim to construct a model of relations between theories that succeeds where traditional models fail. We show that the multiple realizability argument, on which the autonomist model is thought to rest, is compatible with reductionism and, following Kim, that an autonomist reading of the argument deprives psychology of its scientific status. We therefore opt for a reductionist model compatible (...)
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  28.  34
    The Electric Meme: A New Theory of How We Think Robert Aunger New York: Free Press, 2002, 392 Pp., $41.00. [REVIEW]Jean LaChapelle, Luc Faucher & Pierre Poirier - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (2):410.
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  29.  5
    Convolution and Modal Representations in Thagard and Stewart’s Neural Theory of Creativity: A Critical Analysis.Pierre Poirier & Jean-Frédéric Pasquale - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5):1535-1560.
    According to Thagard and Stewart :1–33, 2011), creativity results from the combination of neural representations, and combination results from convolution, an operation on vectors defined in the holographic reduced representation framework. They use these ideas to understand creativity as it occurs in many domains, and in particular in science. We argue that, because of its algebraic properties, convolution alone is ill-suited to the role proposed by Thagard and Stewart. The semantic pointer concept allows us to see how we can apply (...)
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  30. Du Stimulus À la Science, Neurocomputationnellement.Pierre Poirier - unknown
    À Harvard durant l’année académique 1940-41, les philosophes-mathématiciens Quine, Tarski et Carnap débattaient de la possibilité d’établir une distinction entre les énoncés analytiques et synthétiques qui soit suffisamment mordante pour dégager un statut spécial à l’épistémologie. Quine et Tarski s’objectaient à la distinction et l’objection de Quine verra notamment le jour sous le titre fameux « Les deux dogmes de l’empirisme ». Carnap, dans son autobiographie intellectuelle, se souvient avoir alors craint : « are we now back to John Stuart (...)
     
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  31.  17
    Paul Thagard, The Cognitive Science of Science, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA)/Londres, 2012, 365 P. Paul Thagard, The Cognitive Science of Science, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA)/Londres, 2012, 365 P. [REVIEW]Jean-Frédéric de Pasquale & Pierre Poirier - 2013 - Philosophiques 40 (1):238-243.
    Jean-Frédéric de Pasquale ,Pierre Poirier.
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  32.  17
    Réponse à Don Ross.Denis Fisette & Pierre Poirier - 2003 - Philosophiques 30 (1):256-262.
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  33.  17
    Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, John Searle, Neuroscience and Philosophy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, 215p.Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, John Searle, Neuroscience and Philosophy, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, 215p. [REVIEW]Nicolas Payette & Pierre Poirier - 2009 - Philosophiques 36 (1):260-265.
  34.  8
    The Electric Meme. [REVIEW]Jean LaChapelle, Luc Faucher & Pierre Poirier - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (2):410-412.
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  35. Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths, and Russell D. Gray, Eds., Cycles of Contingency Reviewed By.Jean Lachapelle, Luc Faucher & Pierre Poirier - 2003 - Philosophy in Review 23 (3):201-204.
     
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  36. Judith Genova, Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing Reviewed By.Pierre Poirier - 1996 - Philosophy in Review 16 (4):257-259.
     
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  37.  9
    Un Défi Pour La Psychologie Évolutionniste.Pierre Poirier, Luc Faucher & Jean Lachapelle - 2005 - Philosophia Scientiae 2:1-35.
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  38. Peter K. Machamer, Rick Grush and Peter McLaughlin, Eds., Theory and Method in the Neurosciences Reviewed By.Pierre Poirier & Luc Faucher - 2002 - Philosophy in Review 22 (6):422-424.
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  39. Martin Montminy, Les Fondements Empiriques de la Signification Reviewed By.Pierre Poirier - 1999 - Philosophy in Review 19 (2):130-132.
     
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  40. André De Tienne, L'analytique de La Représentation Chez Peirce. [REVIEW]Pierre Poirier - 1996 - Philosophy in Review 16:251-253.
     
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  41. Des Neurones a La Philosophie: Neurophilosophie Et Philosophie Des Neurosciences.Pierre Poirier & Luc Faucher (eds.) - 2008 - Éditions Syllepse.
  42. Des Neurones A La Conscience: Neurophilosophie Et Philosophie Des Neurosciences.Pierre Poirier, Luc Faucher, Eric Racine & E. Ennan (eds.) - 2005 - Bruxelles: De Boeck Universite.
  43. Et pourquoi pas une explication non représentationnelle de l’action motrice?: Considérations neurophénoménologiques.Pierre Poirier & Martin Ratte - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (2):353-360.
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  44. Judith Genova, Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing. [REVIEW]Pierre Poirier - 1996 - Philosophy in Review 16:257-259.
     
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  45. Martin Montminy, Les Fondements Empiriques de la Signification. [REVIEW]Pierre Poirier - 1999 - Philosophy in Review 19:130-132.
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  46. The Concept of Innateness and the Destiny of Evolutionary Psychology.Pierre Poirier, Luc Faucher & Jean Lachapelle - 2008 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (1-2):17-47.
    According to a popular version of the current evolutionary attitude in cognitive science, the mind is a massive aggregate of autonomous innate computational devices, each addressing specific adaptive problems. Our aim in this paper is to show that although this version of the attitude, which we call GOFEP , does not suffer from fatal flaws that would make it incoherent or otherwise conceptually inadequate, it will nevertheless prove unacceptable to most cognitive scientists today. To show this, we raise a common (...)
     
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