45 found
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  1. From autonomy to heteronomy (and back): The enaction of social life.Pierre Steiner & John Stewart - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):527-550.
    The term “social cognition” can be construed in different ways. On the one hand, it can refer to the cognitive faculties involved in social activities, defined simply as situations where two or more individuals interact. On this view, social systems would consist of interactions between autonomous individuals; these interactions form higher-level autonomous domains not reducible to individual actions. A contrasting, alternative view is based on a much stronger theoretical definition of a truly social domain, which is always defined by a (...)
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  2.  62
    The structure of intentionality. Insights and challenges for enactivism.Pierre Steiner - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The purpose of the paper is twofold. It first aims at clarifying and developing an important tension within enactivism concerning the relations between intentionality and content, once representationalism has been abandoned. In which sense(s) do enactivists (still) say that intentionality is contentful and not contentful? Secondly, it puts this tension in perspective with two paradigmatic ways of defining the relations between intentional states and their objects: Husserl’s theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations, and Charles Sanders Peirce’s triadic semiotics.
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  3. Enacting anti-representationalism. The scope and the limits of enactive critiques of representationalism.Pierre Steiner - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):43-86.
    I propose a systematic survey of the various attitudes proponents of enaction (or enactivism) entertained or are entertaining towards representationalism and towards the use of the concept “mental representation” in cognitive science. For the sake of clarity, a set of distinctions between different varieties of representationalism and anti-representationalism are presented. I also recapitulate and discuss some anti-representationalist trends and strategies one can find the enactive literature, before focusing on some possible limitations of eliminativist versions of enactive anti-representationalism. These limitations are (...)
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  4. The delocalized mind. Judgements, vehicles, and persons.Pierre Steiner - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):1-24.
    Drawing on various resources and requirements (as expressed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom), this paper proposes an externalist view of conceptual mental episodes that does not equate them, even partially, with vehicles of any sort, whether the vehicles be located in the environment or in the head. The social and pragmatic nature of the use of concepts and conceptual content makes it unnecessary and indeed impossible to locate the entities that realize conceptual mental episodes in non-personal or subpersonal contentful (...)
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  5.  87
    Beyond the internalism/externalism debate: The constitution of the space of perception.Charles Lenay & Pierre Steiner - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):938-952.
    This paper tackles the problem of the nature of the space of perception. Based both on philosophical arguments and on results obtained from original experimental situations, it attempts to show how space is constituted concretely, before any distinction between the “inner” and the “outer” can be made. It thus sheds light on the presuppositions of the well-known debate between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind; it argues in favor of the latter position, but with arguments that are foundationally (...)
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  6.  39
    Radical views on cognition and the dynamics of scientific change.Pierre Steiner - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):547-569.
    Radical views on cognition are generally defined by a cluster of features including non-representationalism and vehicle-externalism. In this paper, I concentrate on the way radical views on cognition define themselves as revolutionary theories in cognitive science. These theories often use the Kuhnian concepts of “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” for describing their ambitions and the current situation in cognitive science. I examine whether the use of Kuhn’s theory of science is appropriate here. There might be good reasons to think that cognitive (...)
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  7. Habits, Meaning, and Intentionality. A Deweyan Reading.Pierre Steiner - 2020 - In Fausto Caruana & Italo Testa (eds.), Habits: Pragmatist Approaches From Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory. Cambridge University Press. pp. 223-244.
  8.  42
    Not thinking about the same thing. Enactivism, pragmatism and intentionality.Pierre Steiner - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    Enactivism does not have its primary philosophical roots in pragmatism: phenomenology (from Husserl to Jonas) is its first source of inspiration (with the exception of Hutto & Myin’s radical enactivism). That does not exclude the benefits of pragmatist readings of enactivism, and of enactivist readings of pragmatism. After having sketched those readings, this paper focuses on the philosophical concept of intentionality. I show that whereas enactivists endorse the idea that intentionality is a base-level property of cognition, pragmatism offer(ed) us some (...)
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  9.  87
    Boundless thought. The case of conceptual mental episodes.Pierre Steiner - 2012 - Manuscrito 35 (2):269-309.
    I present and defend here a thesis named vehicleless externalism for conceptual mental episodes. According to it, the constitutive relations there are between the production of conceptual mental episodes by an individual and the inclusion of this individual in social discursive practices make it non-necessary to equate, even partially, conceptual mental episodes with the occurrence of physical events inside of that individual. Conceptual mental episodes do not have subpersonal vehicles; they have owners: persons in interpretational practices. That thesis is grounded (...)
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  10.  43
    Content, Mental Representation and Intentionality.Pierre Steiner - 2019 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):153-174.
    Criticisms and rejections of representationalism are increasingly popular in 4E cognitive science, and especially in radical enactivism. But by overfocusing our attention on the debate between radical enactivism and classical representationalism, we might miss the woods for the trees, in at least two respects: first, by neglecting the relevance of other theoretical alternatives about representationalism in cognitive science; and second by not seeing how much REC and classical representationalism are in agreement concerning basic and problematic issues dealing with mental content (...)
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  11.  87
    The bounds of representation: A non-representationalist use of the resources of the model of extended cognition.Pierre Steiner - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (2):235-272.
    Based on an endorsement of the hypothesis of extended cognition , this paper proposes a criticism of the representationalist assumptions that still pertain to these contemporary models of cognition. I first rehearse some basic problems akin to any representationalist model of cognition, before proposing some more specific arguments directed against the necessity, the plausibility, and the coherence of the marriage between extended cognition and contemporary representationalism . Extended and distributed models of cognition have the resources to get rid of representationalism, (...)
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  12. Philosophie, technologie, cognition. Etat des lieux et perspectives.Pierre Steiner - 2010 - Intellectica 53:7-40.
  13. Pragmatism in cognitive science: from the pragmatic turn to Deweyan adverbialism.Pierre Steiner - 2017 - Pragmatism Today 8 (1):9-27.
  14.  37
    The bounds of representation: A non-representationalist use of the resources of the model of extended cognition.Pierre Steiner - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (2):235-272.
    Based on an endorsement of the hypothesis of extended cognition, this paper proposes a criticism of the representationalist assumptions that still pertain to these contemporary models of cognition. I first rehearse some basic problems akin to any representationalist model of cognition, before proposing some more specific arguments directed against the necessity, the plausibility, and the coherence of the marriage between extended cognition and contemporary representationalism. Extended and distributed models of cognition have the resources to get rid of representationalism, and they (...)
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  15.  11
    Désaturer l'esprit. Usages du pragmatisme.Pierre Steiner - 2018 - Paris: Questions théoriques.
  16.  20
    Délocaliser les phénomènes mentaux: la philosophie de l'esprit de Dewey.Pierre Steiner - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 245 (3):273-292.
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  17. Reading and understanding: on some differences between Wittgenstein and 4E cognitive science.Pierre Steiner - 2018 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 12 (2).
  18.  10
    Normativity and the Methodology of 4E Cognition: Taking Stock and Going Forward.Pierre Steiner - 2023 - In Mark-Oliver Casper & Giuseppe Flavio Artese (eds.), Situated Cognition Research: Methodological Foundations. Springer Verlag. pp. 103-126.
    In this chapter, I pursue two aims. Firstly, I propose an original survey and analysis of the way proponents of 4E cognition have until now defined the relations between normativity and cognitive science. A first distinction is made between making normativity an explanandum of 4E cognitive science, and turning normativity into a property or part of the explanantia of 4E cognitive science. Inside of the latter option, one must distinguish between methodological, ontological and semantic claims on the value of normativity (...)
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  19.  91
    A problem for representationalist versions of extended cognition.Pierre Steiner - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):184-202.
    In order to account for how organisms can apprehend the contents of the external representations they manipulate in cognizing, the endorsement of representationalism fosters a situation of what I call cognitive overdetermination. I argue that this situation is problematic for the inclusion of these external representations in cognitive processing, as the hypothesis of extended cognition would like to have it. Since that situation arises from a commitment to representationalism (even minimal), it only affects the viability of representationalist versions of extended (...)
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  20.  9
    Jean-Marie C hevalier, Peirce ou l’invention de l’épistémologie, Paris, Vrin, 2022, 313 p.Pierre Steiner - 2023 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 118 (2):279-281.
  21.  63
    The nature of the modern mind. Some remarks on Dewey's "Unmodern philosophy and modern philosophy".Pierre Steiner - 2013 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 5 (1).
    In Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, Dewey develops a comprehensive account of mindedness and a genealogical picture of the modern concept of ‘mind.’ Chapter X, “Mind and Body”, is the longest chapter of the book. Its three sections correspond to three different folders, yet all written in 1942. The title of the chapter – Dewey’s own title – might sound surprising to the readers of chapter VII of Experience and Nature, where Dewey explicitly coined the term ‘body-min...
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  22. An aftertaste of Cartesian salad? Pre-reflective self-consciousness, Peirce, and the study of cognition in the wild.Pierre Steiner - 2023 - Adaptive Behavior 31 (2):169-173.
    I situate the originality and the ambiguities of the target paper in the context of post-cognitivist cognitive science and in relation with some aspects of Charles Sanders Peirce’s anti-Cartesianism. I then focus on what the authors call « pre-reflective self-consciousness », highlighting some ambiguities of the characterizations they propose of this variety of consciousness. These ambiguities can become difficulties once one grants a crucial methodological role to this consciousness in the study of cognitive activities.
     
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  23.  83
    C.S. Peirce and artificial intelligence: historical heritage and (new) theoretical stakes.Pierre Steiner - 2013 - SAPERE - Special Issue on Philosophy and Theory of AI 5:265-276.
  24.  19
    Embodied Cognitive Science, Pragmatism, and the Fate of Mental Representation.Pierre Steiner - 2016 - In Matthias Jung & Roman Madzia (eds.), Pragmatism and Embodied Cognitive Science: From Bodily Intersubjectivity to Symbolic Articulation. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 73-98.
  25.  26
    Interaction et transaction.Pierre Steiner - 2010 - Chromatikon 6:203-213.
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  26.  16
    Interaction et transaction.Pierre Steiner - 2010 - Chromatikon 6:203-213.
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  27.  5
    Le dopage sans duperie. Essai sur le sport augmenté.Pierre Steiner - 2016 - Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
    Se doper, dans le sport, c'est avoir recours à des produits dont l'usage est interdit par un règlement. Mais en deçà de ces règlements, existe-t-il des principes ou des valeurs en vertu desquels l'usage de ces produits constituerait nécessairement un crime moral, une forme de tricherie, ou un danger sanitaire? Cet essai développe une réponse négative à cette question, et propose ainsi une déconstruction des principes hygiénistes, égalitaristes et naturalistes qui sont presque toujours invoqués pour justifier le caractère nécessaire de (...)
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  28.  37
    La fabrique des pensées.Pierre Steiner - 2022 - Paris: Editions du Cerf.
    Un citron, La Joconde et le Père Noël. Aucun de ces trois objets ne se trouve dans notre esprit, pourtant, nous parvenons à les concevoir. Comment ? Mobilisant les ressources du pragmatisme et de la philosophie des techniques, Pierre Steiner développe l’idée que nos pensées ne visent pas le monde mais y sont inscrites. -/- Les principales traditions philosophiques ont en commun le présupposé que l’esprit serait comme un archer qui aurait le pouvoir, par la pensée, de « viser le (...)
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  29.  11
    Life, Knowledge and Values: A Tribute to John Stewart.Pierre Steiner - 2021 - Constructivist Foundations 16 (3):381-384.
    : John Stewart passed away earlier this year. In this tribute, I present some elements of his biography and of his main intellectual engagements. Keywords: Autopoiesis, cognitive science, ….
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  30. La représentation et le sens des réalités.Pierre Steiner - 2023 - Klesis 56.
    Claudine Tiercelin has shared with Hilary Putnam a criticism of various attempts to naturalize intentionality and a criticism of radical forms of anti-representationalism. Nevertheless, this agreement is accompanied by an important divergence concerning the value of the couple “representation/reality” for defining mind and knowledge after one has rejected reductive naturalism and anti-representationalism. In order to analyse this divergence, I resort to Peirce and to Aristotle.
     
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  31. Mental Explicitness.Pierre Steiner - 2006 - Abstracta 3 (1):2-22.
    This paper aims at answering the question “When is informational content explicitly represented in a cognitive system?”. I first distinguish the explicitness this question is about from other kinds of explicitness that are currently investigated in philosophy of mind, and situate the components of the question within the various conceptual frameworks that are used to study mental representations. I then present and criticize, on conceptual and empirical grounds, two basic ways of answering the question, the first one coming from the (...)
     
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  32. Mental Explicitness: The Case of Representational Contents.Pierre Steiner - 2005 - Abstracta 2 (1):3-23.
    This paper aims at answering the question “When is informational content explicitly represented in a cognitive system?”. I first distinguish the explicitness this question is about from other kinds of explicitness that are currently investigated in philosophy of mind, and situate the components of the question within the various conceptual frameworks that are used to study mental representations. I then present and criticize, on conceptual and empirical grounds, two basic ways of answering the question, the first one coming from the (...)
     
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  33.  12
    Présentation.Pierre Steiner - 2012 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 260 (2):153-154.
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  34.  45
    Quel Arrière-plan pour l'esprit?Pierre Steiner - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (3):419-444.
    This article analyzes the notion of background capacities as developed by John Searle during the last twenty years in philosophy of mind. Broadly construed, this notion designates non-representational mental capacities as the means by which mental representations are given a precise semantic content and thus are able to be expressed. Though novel and relevant, I intend to show that, according to Searle's description, this notion proves inadequate to attain its descriptive and explicative goals. I go on to regard background capacities (...)
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  35.  20
    Qu'est-ce que la pensée ?Pierre Steiner - 2017 - Paris: Vrin.
    Qu'est-ce que la pensée? La pensée est-elle une activité? La pensée a-t-elle un lieu qui lui est propre? Pense-t-on en mots ou en images? Peut-on penser sans langage? Existe-t-il des normes de la pensée? Commentaire : "La pensée et la représentation" - Antoine Arnauld - Des vraies et des fausses idées. chapitre VI. "Rationalité et pensée" -Gilbert Ryle - "A rational animal n. Collected Papers II.
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  36. Rorty avant Rorty. A propos de la distinction entre corps et esprit.Pierre Steiner - 2019 - Archives de Philosophie 82 (3):489-504.
  37.  19
    Réponses à Marta Caravà, Jean-Marie Chevalier et Roberta Dreon.Pierre Steiner - 2020 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 12 (1).
    Marta Caravà synthétise de manière très juste et claire les ambitions de la lecture que je propose de Wittgenstein dans le troisième chapitre de l’ouvrage: il s’agit de penser d’une manière critique renouvelée le projet des sciences cognitives, en particulier dans leurs versions énactives ou énactivistes. Avant de répondre aux questions légitimes qu’elle m’adresse, je voudrais dissiper un malentendu concernant le statut de ce que j’appelle, à la suite de Wittgenstein, les “concepts psychologi...
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  38. Relocating mental phenomena: the philosophy of the spirit of Dewey.Pierre Steiner - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (245):273-292.
     
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  39. Steering a middle course between intentionality and representation: some remarks about John Stewart’s enactive stance.Pierre Steiner - 2021 - Adaptive Behavior 29 (5):471-483.
    John Stewart commits himself to the defence of a demanding version of enaction. Among its many original features, John’s version of enaction includes a questionable form of anti-representationalism, and leaves room for the Varelian idea that intentionality is a biological property. This stance anticipates contemporary endorsements in 4E cognition of intentionality as a non-representational and non-contentful property. Once it is deprived of its representational tinsels, intentionality appears to us again as a property of object-directedness. Nevertheless, is the autopoietic model of (...)
     
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  40.  13
    Sciences cognitives, tournant pragmatique et horizons pragmatistes.Pierre Steiner - 2008 - Tracés 15:85-105.
  41.  61
    Survenance, émergence et immersion. Le problème de la conscience d'un point de vue externaliste.Pierre Steiner - 2013 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 111 (1):69-108.
  42.  24
    Une question de point de vue. James, Husserl, Wittgenstein et l'erreur du psychologue.Pierre Steiner - 2012 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 260 (2):251-281.
    Ce texte se propose de revenir sur la manière dont les Principles of Psychology ont été compris et discutés par Husserl et par Wittgenstein. Pour ce faire, on se focalisera ici sur le sens et l’importance stratégique de la dénonciation effectuée par James de l’ erreur du psychologue dans le chapitre VII de l’ouvrage, antérieur au chapitre « The Stream of Thought » qui a retenu toute l’attention de Husserl et de Wittgenstein. Il est suggéré qu’une des sources permettant de (...)
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  43.  27
    Untangling the Knot of Intentionality: Between Directedness, Reference, and Content.Pierre Steiner - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):83-104.
    The notion of “intentionality” is much invoked in various foundational theories of meaning, being very often equated with “meaning”, “content” and “reference”. In this paper, I propose and develop a basic distinction between two concepts and, more fundamentally, properties of intentionality: intentionality-T and intentionality-C. Representationalism is then defined as the position according to which intentionality-T can be reduced to intentionality-C, in the form of representational states. Nonrepresentationalism is rejecting this reduction, and argues that intentionality-T is more fundamental than intentionality-C. Non-representationalism (...)
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  44.  33
    Who's on first? Living situations and lived experience.Pierre Steiner - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):27.
    This paper is a discussion of Claire Petitmengin and Michel Bitbol's article 'The validity of first-person descriptions as authenticity and coherence' . In section I, I present what I take as being the main points they defend in that article, and put them in relation with the global purpose of the special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies in which their article is included. In section II, I start discussing the paper by comparing the conception of description they defend (...)
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  45.  31
    William M. Ramsey, Representation Reconsidered, Cambridge (GB)/New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 268 pagesWilliam M. Ramsey, Representation Reconsidered, Cambridge (GB)/New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 268 pages. [REVIEW]Pierre Steiner - 2008 - Philosophiques 35 (2):616-620.
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