Man's rational capacities rest on education and this makes the form of human sapience interpersonal. As persons, however, we do not take part in the tradition of sapience only passively. That is, mere rationality in Kant's sense, i.e. the faculty of following implicit norms or explicit rules, is not enough for personhood. It requires also reason in Hegel's sense, i.e. free active participation in developing 'the idea' (eventually of good human life), as well as 'the concept', i.e. joint generic knowledge (...) that defines the inferential content of our words and sentences. In making reasonable proposals for developing these persons are themselves the free 'spirit' of the human world. (shrink)
Addresses various crucial approaches to the history of philosophy - narrative, philological, hermeneutic, and systematic. This book elaborates the principles of each approach and puts focus on their capacity to properly comprehend problems.
The following account of a Kantian theory of action, in which I do not proceed in accordance with just one text of Kant’s, has as its main aim a critical assessment of Kant’s ‘solution’ of the third antinomy, i.e., of the dilemma between the principle of causality in the domain of understanding nature and the cardinal proposition of free will in the domain of understanding action. According to the first horn of the dilemma, we assume that at least in principle (...) every event in the world can be considered as the necessary result of preceding conditions and some efficient causal laws. According to the second horn, preceding events outside or inside our body cannot cause our deeds. They must be understood as consequences of free choices between different possibilities of action. (shrink)
The project of developing a pragmatic theory of meaning aims at an anti-metaphysical, therefore anti-representationalist and anti-subjectivist, analysis of truth and reference. In order to understand this project we have to remember the turns or twists given to Frege's and Wittgenstein's original idea of inferential semantics in later developments like formal axiomatic theories, regularist behaviorism, mental regulism and interpretationism, social behaviorism, intentionalism, conventionalism, justificational theories and, finally, Brandom's normative pragmatics.
In order to understand Hegel's gnomic oracle according to which the ‘I’ is a ‘We’, the notion of a personal subject is explained by its competence to perform personal roles in a pre-given partition of roles. Explicit divisions of labour by contractual promises are special cases that presuppose the general case of an already established social practice. On the other hand, methodological individualism is right to stress that we actualize joint intentions only via corresponding instantiations. In performing our parts, we (...) form a plural subject, a we-group. The result of what each of us does is what we do, and the generic ‘We’ turns into the generic ‘I’. (shrink)
Filozofia analityczna po logicyzmie Fregego i atomizmie logicznym Russella odziedziczyła szereg założeń związanych z istnieniem rodzajowej dziedziny bytów indywidualnych, których tożsamość i elementarne określenia już mamy zdefiniowane. Te „indywidua” istnieją tylko w idealnych „światach możliwych” i nie są niczym innym jak zbiorami posiadającymi strukturę bądź czystymi zbiorami matematycznymi. W przeciwieństwie do takich czysto abstrakcyjnych modeli, Hegel analizuje rolę pojęciowych rozróżnień i odpowiednich brakujących inferencji w rzeczywistym świecie. Tutaj wszystkie obiekty są przestrzennie i czasowo skończone. Nawet jeśli rzeczywiste rzeczy poruszają się (...) zgodnie z pewnymi formami, są tylko momentami w całościowym procesie. Wszelako, formy te nie są przedmiotami bezpośredniej, empirycznej obserwacji, lecz zakładają udane i powtarzalne działania i akty mowy. W rezultacie żadna semantyka odnoszącej się do świata referencji nie może obyć się bez kategorii Heglowskich, które wykraczają daleko poza narzędzia opartej wyłącznie na relacjach logiki matematycznej. (shrink)
The problem of evaluating philosophical texts is not only an institutional problem for philosophers. It transcends our own discipline. In a globalized word, English seems to be the lingua franca of all the sciences, much more than Latin ever was. But if we do not appreciate the systematic differences between articulating the ‚results‘ in the ‚natural‘ sciences on the one hand and normative and philosophical disputes about reasonable developments of forms of articulation and understanding in the ‚Geisteswissenschaften‘ on the other, (...) there is a great danger of transnational regionalism — especially if we limit philosophical thinking and research to one language. Instead, we should treasure the diverse traditions and experiences as they are manifested in different languages. In consequence, the policy of evaluating international visibility of philosophic journals, as proposed by the European Science Foundation , must be changed. (shrink)
In order to understand Hegel’s form of philosophical reflection in general, we must read his ‘speculative’ sentences about spirit and nature, rationality and reason, the mind and its embodiment as general remarks about conceptual topics in topographical overviews about our ways of talking about ourselves in the world. The resulting attitude to traditional metaphysics gets ambivalent in view of the insight that Aristotle’s prima philosophia is knowledge of human knowledge, developed in meta-scientific reflections on notions like ‘nature’ and ‘essence’, ‘reality’ (...) and ‘truth’, about ‘powers’ and ‘faculties’ – and does not lead by itself to an object-level theory about spiritual things like the soul. We therefore cannot just replace critical metaphysics of the human mind by empirical investigation of human behaviour as empiricist approaches to human cognition in naturalized epistemologies do and neuro-physiological explanations propose. Making transcendental forms and material presuppositions of conceptually informed perception and experience explicit needs some understanding of figurative forms of speech in our logical reflections and leads to other forms of knowledge than empirical observation and theory formation. (shrink)