Judicial review by constitutional courts is often presented as a necessary supplement to democracy. This book questions its effectiveness and legitimacy. Drawing on the republican tradition, Richard Bellamy argues that the democratic mechanisms of open elections between competing parties and decision-making by majority rule offer superior and sufficient methods for upholding rights and the rule of law. The absence of popular accountability renders judicial review a form of arbitrary rule which lacks the incentive structure democracy provides to ensure rulers treat (...) the ruled with equal concern and respect. Rights based judicial review undermines the constitutionality of democracy. Its counter-majoritarian bias promotes privileged against unprivileged minorities, while its legalism and focus on individual cases distort public debate. Rather than constraining democracy with written constitutions and greater judicial oversight, attention should be paid to improving democratic processes through such measures as reformed electoral systems and enhanced parliamentary scrutiny. (shrink)

The debate on political constitutionalism has entirely neglected the constitution-making dimension. This is probably due to the fact that constitution-making usually brings with it undesirable outcomes such as the entrenchment of rights or structures. These outcomes do not respect reasonable disagreement among citizens because they violate the only fair system for settling disagreement: majority rule and equal voting rights. This article argues that political constitutionalists may regret the absence of any claim about constitution-making. Either they are overlooking (...) certain problems inherent to the electoral process that is supposed to tackle disagreement or, even worse, they are downplaying the entrenching effect of ordinary political processes by ignoring the redemptive properties of constituent power. In both cases, their claims undermine the political dimension of constitutionalism. (shrink)

The paper is focused on the criticisms that theorists of political constitutionalism raise against legal constitutionalism, especially with regard to the idea of representation and political sovereignty. At the same time, the intention is to reconstruct the debate between legal and political constitutionalism in contemporary liberalism, starting from the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty. This debate concerns two different approaches: the political one rejects the idea of judicial review by the Supreme Court because it may (...) establish a possible rule of the judges (Michelman; Dworkin). It defends the role of Parliament in constitutional matters, in contrast with the role of the Supreme Court, inasmuch as – according to them – it is not open to political participation. Parliament is considered the only place in which we can exercise our constitutional power and in which our rights could be adequately protected (Bellamy; Waldron; Tushnet; Goldoni). On the other hand, legal constitutionalism upholds the idea of judicial review, defending the role of the Supreme Court as “exemplar of public reason” (Rawls 1993). This article tries to answer to three fundamental questions about constitutional democracy under the banner of political liberalism: 1. What do we mean by counter-majoritarian difficulty? 2. What is the answer that legal and political model of constitutionalism give to this question? 3. What is the role of constitutional courts in democratic regimes and what is their authority within the State? (shrink)

This article looks at Bernard Williams’s relevance to particular debates in constitutional theory about the legitimacy of two competing models of institutional design: political constitutionalism which endorses giving the final say on the meaning of constitutional rights to legislatures; and legal constitutionalism which endorses giving the final say on the meaning of rights to courts. Recent defences of political constitutionalism have made claims about the realism of their accounts when compared with legal constitutionalism and (...) have co-opted Bernard Williams’s realism to support their case. This article examines these claims, concluding that these accounts of political constitutionalism rely on a distinctly non-Williamsian form of political moralism in that they assume a legitimacy for political constitutionalism which is prior to politics and political disagreement. It offers an alternative defence of political constitutionalism, a partial defence, which, it argues, is closer to the realism of Bernard Williams than these accounts. (shrink)

Drawing upon Hannah Arendt's and Carl Schmitt's theories on the relationship between nomos and boundary, this paper revisits how constitutionalism and political power are reconciled as constitutional ordering. It first analyzes constitutionalism in the light of political modernity. Indicating that political power grounded by constitutions is omnipotent, complementing and completing constitutionalism, the paper contends that an omnipotent constitutional ordering is anything but an unleashed Leviathan. It is argued that constitutional omnipotence is framed and thus (...) constrained by a constitutional nomos, the matrix of which is a dual delimitation of boundaries, generational, and jurisdictional. (shrink)

This article analogises political representation to legal interpretation. It then applies the analogy to the hitherto neglected question of what political representation means for deliberative constitutionalism. The upshot is a conception of deliberative constitutionalism that, while uncompromisingly grounded in the reasoned expression of the preferences of a polity's constituents through deliberative democratic institutional innovations, mandates representatives to translate those preferences into general and abstract constitutional law. It thus enhances the deliberative contribution of citizens in the determination (...) of constitutional meaning, while preserving the value of representative institutions. (shrink)

Drawing upon Hannah Arendt's and Carl Schmitt's theories on the relationship between nomos and boundary, this paper revisits how constitutionalism and political power are reconciled as constitutional ordering. It first analyzes constitutionalism in the light of political modernity. Indicating that political power grounded by constitutions is omnipotent, complementing and completing constitutionalism, the paper contends that an omnipotent constitutional ordering is anything but an unleashed Leviathan. It is argued that constitutional omnipotence is framed and thus (...) constrained by a constitutional nomos, the matrix of which is a dual delimitation of boundaries, generational, and jurisdictional. (shrink)

Reasonable disagreement is one of the most critical issues in contemporary political philosophy, especially within liberal-democratic constitutionalism. In emphasising the role of disagreement in the relationship between discourse and politics, many scholars such as Jeremy Waldron and Richard Bellamy – against the background of the Rawlsian idea of “reasonable pluralism” – defend the thesis of moral disagreement as the core of political deliberation. By refusing the idea of neutrality, these authors maintain that political discourse cannot be (...) established by simply removing our moral disagree- ment on political values. This essay engages the issue of “discourse and politics” by focusing on some relevant topics: the deliberative conception of democracy; the Rawlsian idea of public reason as a forum for deliberation and discourse; the fact of disagreement and its inuence on the deliberative process. In order to investigate such issues, the paper follows three ways. First, it aims at examining John Rawls’ idea of public reason, by presenting it as a tool to resolve reasonable disagreement in the context of constitutional essentials. The second section deals with reasonable disagreement from a liberal point of view, by trying to focus on some critical remarks which Bellamy raises against Rawlsian political lib- eralism. The third section briefly analyses Waldron’s arguments in defence of reasonable disagreement, as a critique of the deliberative model of democracy. From this perspective, Waldron presents deliberative democracy’s failure in considering political dissent and moral disagreement as two problematic aspects of democracy. (shrink)

In this paper I take issue with and argue against a certain subordination of the political to the legal that, I argue, is advanced under theories or ‘republican constitutionalism’ and undertake a defense of the political as ‘reflexive’. In republican constitutionalism one discerns an ‘imperialistic’ legal move to set the terms of political discourse, as political conflicts in order to be legally resolved are forced to meet criteria of legal relevance: in the process much (...) that is vital to political action, its understanding and undertaking, is suppressed, elided or appropriated. I argue against the purported ‘containment’ of politics in law and for a ‘reflexivity’ that is constitutive of politics, re-introducing contingency and selfreference (‘what is political can only be a political question’) at the heart of what it means to act politically. (shrink)

This article problematizes the recent comeback of the exceptionalist jargon as it is conjured by both critics and sympathizers. While in the last decades governments across the globe had recourse to emergency measures to cope with far-reaching emergencies, from terrorism to the COVID-19 pandemic, the received view has it that political power takes advantage of states of emergency as they put themselves in the position to circumvent constitutional limitations. Carl Schmitt is claimed to be the major advocate of this (...) conception of emergency politics in that he elaborated on the concept of the state of exception as the heart of the state political power. This article contends that the received view is doubly wrong. First, soon after his espousal of exceptionalism, Schmitt realized that emergency legislation is an ineffective and costly governmental device that should be transitory and is as unstable as the crisis it is meant to overcome. Second, the received view neglects how Schmitt came to his model of ultraconservative substantive constitutionalism as he maintained that the main task of politics is to protect the normative life of a limited set of state-sponsored institutions as well as the substantive contents they produce. (shrink)

Written by one of Italy's leading historians, this book analyses the Neapolitan nobleman Gaetano Filangieri and his seven-volume 'Science of Legislation' in their historical context, expounding on his legacy for the histories of ...

ABSTRACT This article examines the prominent Japanese postwar thinker Maruyama Masao’s critical engagement with his contemporary German legal theorist Carl Schmitt. Maruyama engaged with Schmitt’s decisionistic notion of “the political” and sovereignty since he found it useful in addressing the pathological elements of Japanese political culture, namely, the widespread political passivity and fatalistic ethos of the Japanese public. In his view, such a “decision-avoiding” political culture, which had contributed to the rise of fascism in interwar and (...) wartime Japan, posed a fundamental threat to the viability of Japan’s postwar democracy. Although Maruyama objected to Schmitt’s authoritarian theory of political leadership, he nevertheless believed Schmitt provided important insights into the key concepts of modern politics, such as political agency and the constituent power of the people. In his efforts to foster political subjectivity and liberal individuality in postwar Japan, Maruyama attempted to strike a balance between two extremes: Schmittian normless decisionism, on the one hand, and a politically naïve liberal constitutionalism, on the other. I conclude by suggesting that the hitherto overlooked intellectual affinity between Maruyama and one of the leading Weimar-era constitutional theorists—Hermann Heller—can enrich our understanding of Maruyama’s unceasing effort to formulate and insist on the imperative role of political subjectivity and liberal individuality in consolidating liberal democracy in postwar Japan. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article examines the prominent Japanese postwar thinker Maruyama Masao’s critical engagement with his contemporary German legal theorist Carl Schmitt. Maruyama engaged with Schmitt’s decisionistic notion of “the political” and sovereignty since he found it useful in addressing the pathological elements of Japanese political culture, namely, the widespread political passivity and fatalistic ethos of the Japanese public. In his view, such a “decision-avoiding” political culture, which had contributed to the rise of fascism in interwar and (...) wartime Japan, posed a fundamental threat to the viability of Japan’s postwar democracy. Although Maruyama objected to Schmitt’s authoritarian theory of political leadership, he nevertheless believed Schmitt provided important insights into the key concepts of modern politics, such as political agency and the constituent power of the people. In his efforts to foster political subjectivity and liberal individuality in postwar Japan, Maruyama attempted to strike a balance between two extremes: Schmittian normless decisionism, on the one hand, and a politically naïve liberal constitutionalism, on the other. I conclude by suggesting that the hitherto overlooked intellectual affinity between Maruyama and one of the leading Weimar-era constitutional theorists—Hermann Heller—can enrich our understanding of Maruyama’s unceasing effort to formulate and insist on the imperative role of political subjectivity and liberal individuality in consolidating liberal democracy in postwar Japan. (shrink)

Exploring the connection between Bentham and Byron forged by the Greek struggle for independence, this book focuses on the activities of the London Greek Committee, supposedly founded by disciples of Jeremy Bentham, which mounted the expedition on which Lord Byron ultimately met his death in Greece. Rosen's penetrating study provides a new assessment of British philhellenism and examines for the first time the relationship between Bentham's theory of constitutional government and the emerging liberalism of the 1820s. Breaking new ground in (...) the history of political ideas and culture in the early nineteenth century, Rosen advances striking new interpretations based on recently published texts and manuscript sources of the development of constitutional theory from Locke and Montesquieu, the conflicting strands of liberalism in the 1820s, and the response in Britain to strong claims for national self-determination in the Mediterranean basin. He sets out to distinguish between Bentham's theory and the ideological context against which it is usually interpreted. (shrink)

In _The New Constitutionalism_, seven distinguished scholars develop an innovative perspective on the power of institutions to shape politics and political life. Believing that constitutionalism needs to go beyond the classical goal of limiting the arbitrary exercise of political power, the contributors argue that it should—and can—be designed to achieve economic efficiency, informed democratic control, and other valued political ends. More broadly, they believe that political and social theory needs to turn away from the negativism (...) of critical theory to consider how a good society should be "constituted" and to direct the work of designing institutions that can constitute a "good polity," in both the economic and civic senses. Stephen L. Elkin and Karol Edward Soltan begin with an overview of constitutionalist theory and a discussion of the new constitutionalism within the broader intellectual and historical context of political and social thought. Charles Anderson, James Ceaser, and the editors then offer different interpretations of the central issues regarding institutional design in a constitutionalist social science, consider various ways of performing the task, and discuss the inadequacy of recent political science to the job it ought to be doing. The book concludes with essays by Ted Lowi, Cass Sunstein and Edwin Haefele which apply these themes to the American regime. (shrink)

In _Sociocybernetics and Political Theory in a Complex World_, Roberto Mancilla offers new takes on known ideas of political and constitutional theory; the advent of information technology and globalization puts them in crisis, as many stem from centuries past.

The threat of terrorism once again raises some of the classic questions about constitutionalism: is it possible for constitutions to do what they aim to do—channel and control political power in such a way as to make it safe and beneficent for those under its rule but also competent to govern? Does not terrorism reraise the Schmittian problem of “the exception”, i.e., the situation of emergency that necessarily escapes all constitutional limitations? Although they did not face the problem (...) of terrorism as we know it, the American founders developed three different models of constitutionalism, embodying three different ways of responding to emergent circumstances and yet remaining bound to the constitutionalist aspiration. We develop the main outlines of the three models both conceptually and historically and show how they continue to be relevant to current discussions of constitutionalism in the age of terror. Finally, we make a tentative effort to judge which of the three models is most able to do what constitutions should do in difficult times. (shrink)

This essay explores the ways in which a broadly pluralist outlook can help illuminate longstanding issues of constitutional theory and practice. It begins with a common-sense understanding of pluralism as the diversity of observed practices within a general category (section 2). It turns out that many assumptions Americans and others often make about constitutional essentials are valid only locally but not generically. The essay then turns to pluralism in a more technical and philosophical sense—specifically, the account of value pluralism adumbrated (...) by Isaiah Berlin and developed by his followers. Section 3 sketches this version of pluralism, and section 4 brings it to bear on a range of familiar constitutional issues. In the process, a distinction emerges between, on the one hand, areas of variation among constitutions and, on the other, some general truths about political life that define core constitutional functions. The essay concludes (section 5) with some brief reflections on the normative thrust of pluralist constitutional theory—in particular, a presumption in favor of the maximum accommodation of individual and group differences consistent with the maintenance of constitutional unity and civic order. (shrink)

The historical roots of despotism in Russia are long, the tradition of arbitrariness seems to be unbreakable. But this status quo can't persist endless: Growing mass protests indicate that the time nears when Russia will unhorse the self-constituted disposers and will demonstrate again its re-invention potential. -/- This expected and hoped egression from despotism into a new phase of Russian history needs to be carefully elaborated and arranged. Starting with the writing and publishing of my essays following mass political (...) protests in the former Soviet Union, namely, in the Russian Federation in fall and winter of the year 2012, I work permanently on redesigning political system. One year later, i.e. 2013, I released a book dedicated those events, and in the same year I wrote the draft of a new constitution, now revised and adopted by the community Rus’ whose member I am since 12.12.2018. -/- 2017 I registered an internet domain reserved for the Foundation intended to promote the constitutional order in Russia. Since that time, I designed the site of the Foundation, fashioned the identity card, and published several documents related to promotion and establishing of the constitutional order (CO). -/- All skilled designers and creative thinkers are invited to take part in this process as co-workers and creators of a new political system. (shrink)

The central argument of this book is that liberalism, constitutionalism, and democracy, as well as, specifically, liberal constitutional democracy all work, when they do, because they serve the mutual advantage of the politically effective groups in the society through coordination of those groups on a political and, perhaps, economic order. These arguments are applied both to the early history of constitutional developments in the United States and to contemporary transitions from autocratic regimes to market democracies. A subsidiary claim (...) is that constitutional political institutions and democratic procedures generally require not so much active support as merely acquiescence in order to survive and work. These are explanatory theses, not normative claims, but they have relevance for normative claims if one takes seriously some relative of Kant's dictum that ought implies can. If we are to insist that some form of government is normatively right for a particular society, we must be able to say that it would or could work for that society. It is commonly argued that what makes democracy right is that it works by consent. If so, it is such a distressingly minimal form of consent—acquiescence—as to be normatively disqualified. If we rule out mere acquiescence as adequate for consent, it seems likely that no credible argument can be adduced to defend liberal constitutional democracy in any detail on grounds of consent or contractarianism. Hence, concern for workability, which should be central to any moral assessment of principles of social order, undercuts the entire consent school of political theory. (shrink)

This illuminating book is a republican critique of the current system of global governance and its failure to address key global problems. With a republican account of international political theory which transcends prevailing forms of global governance, it develops republican forms of leadership and citizenship to inform the creation of a stronger system of formal international organisations. Republican Global Constitutionalism focuses on the current challenges facing formal international organisations such as the UN, the growing reliance on opaque informal (...) international organisations like the G20, and the inconsistent nature of transnational civil society. As a unique contribution to the field of global constitutionalism, the book provides an account of republican international political theory that emphasises the importance of extending the activity of citizens and constitutionalism beyond the state, in order to support the operation of transnational civil society and create a formal system of international organisations. Providing a concise intervention into the field of global governance, this book will appeal to scholars and students in the disciplines of international relations, political theory, transnational activism studies, international law, and public policy. It will also benefit policymakers and activists looking for alternative forms of global cooperation. (shrink)

This essay analyzes neo-liberal economic agreements and legal and political frameworks or what has been called the “new constitutionalism,” a governance framework that empowers market forces to reshape economic and social development worldwide. The article highlights some consequences of new constitutionalism for caring institutions specifically, and for what feminists call social reproduction more generally: the biological reproduction of the species; the reproduction of labor power; and the reproduction of social institutions and processes associated with the creation and (...) maintenance of communities. New constitutional governance frameworks fundamentally reshape conditions under which the care of human beings takes place. Caring institutions once governed by enabling professions geared to universal care are now determined increasingly by market values and private forces, and driven directly by the profit motive. This is one of the reasons why neo-liberalism is increasingly contested in both the North and the global South. (shrink)

The article presents a plebeian strand of republican constitutional thought that recognises the influence of inequality on political power, embraces conflict as the effective cause of free government, and channels its anti-oligarchic energy through the constitutional structure. First it engages with two modern plebeian thinkers – Niccolò Machiavelli and Nicolas de Condorcet - focusing on the institutional role of the common people to resist oppression through ordinary and extraordinary political action. Then it discusses the work of two contemporary (...) republican thinkers – Philip Pettit and John McCormick – and contrasts their models of ‘contestatory’ and ‘tribunician’ democracy. Finally, I incorporate a political economy lens and propose as part of republican constitutionalism not only contestatory and tribunician institutions but also anti-oligarchic basic rules to keep inequality and corruption under control. (shrink)

Carl J. Friedrich (1901?1984) defined constitutionalism as something more than can be expressed by the dominant behavioralist paradigm of modern political science and the typical academic focus on law and courts. A leading but now neglected post-WWII authority on constitutionalism, Friedrich argued that it should be understood as an institutionally-based, interactive system for deliberating the meaning and legal application of the norms of a political community. His approach shares much with the contemporary ?historical institutionalist? call to (...) situate law and courts within a broader, more normative, and more interactive conception of constitutionalism. Accordingly, a reconsideration of Friedrich's work may help current efforts to better articulate the full richness and complexity of constitutionalism as a distinctive way of ordering political life. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Weakest Meaning of “Constitutionalism” Constitutionalism as a Theory Particular and General Constitutionalism Explicit and Implicit Constitutions Constitutionalism and Written Constitutions Constitutionalism and Constraint Empowerment and Authority Democracy: Constraint or Empowerment? Constitutionalism versus Democracy Popular Sovereignty Judicial Review of Legislation Concluding Remark Notes.

This paper has several aims. Its main interpretive task is to argue that the democratic aspirations of contemporary critical theory are informed and haunted by an essentially Hegelian conception of constitutional order that I describe in part 1, according to which the modern state represents an institutional structure that integrates society through rational activity by mediating between the different interests of various social strata, connecting them in a common enterprise—haunted, because this Hegelian vision of making individuals free and “at home” (...) in the modern world, reconciled to it by virtue of being able to comprehend their social order as the work of their own shared reasons, remains a griping one, but one that critical theorists starting with the Left Hegelians view as increasingly implausible under modern social conditions. In section 2, I trace the decline of confidence in the prospects for the rational/mediational integration of society Hegel envisioned through Horkheimer and Adorno, and discuss some relevant aspects of Habermas’s initial reception of their views. Section 3 argues that the conceptions of democratic constitutional politics offered by Habermas and Benhabib should be read as attempts to recover, in a critical manner and under changed conditions, Hegel’s idea of social order as the product of rational activity. Along the way, I will make three interpretive and critical points: first, the existence of this link to Hegelian conceptions of constitutionalism demonstrates that interpretations of Habermas’s later work that read him as having broken with the tradition of Left Hegelianism are overstated—my reading of Habermas highlights his essentially Hegelian proceduralism and the social theoretic dimension of his work, and should challenge people who think of him as a neo-Kantian moralist. Second, this Left Hegelian social theoretic backdrop provides a stronger normative justification for the practice of democratically rearticulating constitutional norms—along with its apparent demotion of the stabilizing virtues of the rule of law—than the contextual one that some legal theorists have so far offered. Thirdly, I will comment on the shortcomings of Habermas’s conception of democratic constitutionalism, as well as Benhabib’s modified concept of “democratic iterations,” along with some brief suggestions on how this set of ideas should be developed. (shrink)

Globalization is a topic of some anxiety among international lawyers. On the one hand, its fluid dynamics — fragmentation, deformalization and empire — undermine traditional diplomatic rules and institutions. On the other hand, the effort to reimagine international law in purely managerial terms appears intellectually shallow and politically objectionable. To avoid marginalization and instrumentalization, many lawyers have begun to think about international problems through a constitutional vocabulary and have often cited Kant in that connection. This Article argues that, while it (...) is always possible to grasp the world through a constitutional vocabulary, this does not provide determinate answers to international problems. Instead of an institutional architecture or a set of legal rules, constitutionalism is best seen as a mindset — a tradition and a sensibility about how to act in a political world. Contrary to a widespread assumption, Kant’s political writings may also be read in this fashion and, if so, a meaningful international transformation might necessitate not only legislative or institutional intervention but a professional and perhaps spiritual regeneration. (shrink)

The very idea of the draft European Union (EU) Constitutional Treaty was reexamined after the failed French and Dutch referendums and the Treaty of Lisbon (also known as the Reform Treaty) was drafted and entered into force on 1 December 2009 after it’s ratification by all 27 member states. The traditional notion of a Constitution as a national legal document establishing the social contract and a moral minimum for a particular socially unified group still prevails in legal and political (...) thinking. Indeed, the European Union has some constitutional elements, but absence of the so called ‘European demos’ prevents us from recognizing the founding treaties as a real ‘European constitution’ in the proper sense of the word. The author agrees with the decision to exclude the term ‘Constitution’ from the title and contents of the new Reform Treaty. The author also suggests that softer terms, like ‘European constitutional order’ and ‘European Constitutionalism’ might better reflect the scope of contemporary European integration than the term of ‘a Constitution for Europe’. A rethinking of the ‘constitutional core’ of the Lisbon Treaty was inspired following the so-called Lisbon judgments of Czech, Latvian and German constitutional courts. (shrink)

The article examines the compatibility of agonistic democracy and populism as well as their relationship to the idea of constitutionalism. The first part shows that Chantal Mouffe’s recent attempts to reconcile her normative approach of an agonistic pluralism with a populist style of politics are not fully convincing. Although there are undeniable commonalities between an agonistic and a populist understanding of politics – the appreciation of conflict, the rejection of moralistic and juridical modes of conflict resolution etc. – the (...) populist mode of the construction of the people (and the denunciation of political opponents as enemies of the people) risks impeding the transformation of antagonistic into agonistic modes of political contest. The tensions between agonism and populism are especially evident in matters of constitutionalism. This topic is examined in the second part of the article, which provides some ideas for reducing the normative and institutional blind spots of contemporary theories of agonistic democracy. It focuses on elementary principles for an agonistic concept of democratic constitutionalism that differs from the populist view of the relationship between politics and law, especially in respect of its interpretation of the concept of ‘resistibility’ of legal norms. (shrink)

This essay introduces a collection of articles gathered under the theme of “law, science, and constitutions of life.” Together, they explore how revolutions in notions of what biological life is are eliciting correspondingly revolutionary imaginations of how life should be governed. The central theoretical contribution of the collection is to further elaborate the concept of bioconstitutionalism, which draws attention to especially consequential forms of coproduction at the law–life nexus. This introduction offers a theoretical discussion of bioconstitutionalism. It explores the constitutional (...) significance of interplay between scientific and technological power over life and a given political community’s shared imaginary of what modes of reasoning, judgment, and rule are proper and legitimate in a well-ordered state. It argues that knowing what life is for purposes of governance does not follow from scientific knowledge alone. Rather, such knowledge is refracted through culturally distinctive imaginaries that commit societies to particular understandings of what life means and what should be done to encourage its flourishing. (shrink)

This is the second volume in a sub-series of specially commissioned collaborative volumes on key topics at the heart of contemporary philosophy of law that will be appearing regularly within Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law. A distinguished international team of legal theorists examine the issue of constitutionalism and pose such foundational questions as: why have a constitution? How do we know what the constitution of a country really is? How should a constitution be interpreted? Why should one generation (...) feel bound by the constitution of an earlier one? The volume will be of particular importance to those in philosophy, law, political science and international relations interested in what kinds of constitutions should be adopted in countries without them, and involved in debates about constitutional interpretation. (shrink)

Is there evidence of constitutionalism in classical Confucian political thought? In Sungmoon Kim's book on Confucian virtue politics, he argues that that Mencius (Mengzi, fourth century BCE) and Xunzi (third century BCE) are constitutionalists in the following sense: they expressed a commitment to creating durable institutions, one of whose primary aims is to constrain the exercise of legitimate political authority and facilitate good and proper uses of political authority. But for many political thinkers, the sort (...) of constitutionalism that really matters is the sort that entails a commitment to "constitutional remedies." Roughly, a constitutional remedy is some sanctioned means of enforcing the constraints or correcting political authorities who fail to abide by them. Moreover, it is often thought that the remedies should be entrenched – that is, widely recognized and regarded as beyond the legitimate power of the political authorities to change easily. Most decent political thinkers are constitutionalists in the the weak sense that they think there should be durable institutions that constrain abuses of power and facilitate good uses of power. Fewer go so far as to say that there should be entrenched checks and balances on that power, so that people's well-founded objections have something more than just rhetorical force against abuses of power. -/- In this paper, I examine whether Mencius and Xunzi would qualify as constitutionalists in the robust sense that presupposes entrenched remedies. I find that Mencius has some political commitments that might make him friendlier to aristocratic remedies than to democratic ones, but that his reluctance to divide political authority among non-ideal agents makes it difficult to know whether he would accept constitutional remedies of any sort. And my findings with respect to Xunzi are similar, but a modicum more hopeful: at best, Xunzi could be stretched to underwrite some aristocratic constitutional remedies, and he seems somewhat more open to dividing power among non-ideal agents. Neither Mencius nor Xunzi were robust constitutionalists, but it is historically and philosophically informative to ask how near they came to robust constitutionalism, and in which respects they fell short of it. -/- In the course of developing and justifying my interpretation, I call attention to two considerations in assessing an historical thinker's commitment to robust constitutionalism: first, whether the thinker invokes the threat of rebellion as a way of countenancing it or merely as a descriptive claim about likely consequences of bad governance; second, whether non-ideal political agents are empowered to check abuses of power. Only when the thinker actually countenances rebellion and allows that non-ideal political agents can check abuses can the thinker be plausibly described as a robust constitutionalist. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to propose and consider a new constitutional provision that can contribute to the protection of the vital needs of future generations. The proposal I wish to elaborate can be termed the posterity provision, and it has both substantive and procedural elements. The aim of this constitutional provision is twofold. The first is to encourage state authorities to make more future‐oriented deliberations and decisions. The second is to create more public awareness and improve the process (...) of public deliberation about issues affecting near and remote future generations. It is argued that a good case can be made for the proposed reforms compared with alternative substantive constitutional environmental provisions found in existing constitutions and in the literature on legal and political theory. The main reason for this is that the proposed law constitutes a better and more adequate basis for judicial enforcement than the alternatives, which tend to be very vague or unclear. In this connection, I contend that there are both epistemological and moral reasons for introducing constitutional provisions that focus on the protection of critical natural resources essential for meeting the basic physiological needs of future people. It is also argued that the posterity provision can be defended on the basis of central ideas and ideals in recent theory of deliberative democracy. (shrink)