ABSTRACT “Lockdown!” has articulated our collective and individual fear response to the novel coronavirus. Two regnant specialized discourses fostered by the academy—science and ideology critique—could not redirect this inadequate response nor generate their own adequately broad and focused social responses. This suggests the desirability of the academy adding phronesis as a goal for its pedagogical practices.

I argue that taking the Practical Conditionals Thesis seriously demands a new understanding of the semantics of such conditionals. Practical Conditionals Thesis: A practical conditional [if A][ought] expresses B’s conditional preferability given A Paul Weirich has argued that the conditional utility of a state of affairs B on A is to be identified as the degree to which it is desired under indicative supposition that A. Similarly, exploiting the PCT, I will argue that the (...) proper analysis of indicative practical conditionals is in terms of what is planned, desired, or preferred, given suppositional changes to an agent’s information. Implementing such a conception of conditional preference in a semantic analysis of indicative practical conditionals turns out to be incompatible with any approach which treats the indicative conditional as expressing non-vacuous universal quantification over some domain of relevant antecedent-possibilities. Such analyses, I argue, encode a fundamental misunderstanding of what it is to be best, given some condition. The analysis that does the best vis-à-vis the PCT is, instead, one that blends a Context-Shifty account of indicative antecedents with an Expressivistic, or non-propositional, treatment of their practical consequents. (shrink)

In this lecture, given on 17 June 2004, the author describes the conditions for proper disclosure of the wisdom of Kabbalah. He explains that today everyone is entitled and indeed is required to know about its true meaning. Expounding on the three past bans - "no need to disclose," "impossible to disclose," and "the Creator's personal secret" - Makaron demonstrates why today they have been (at least partially) lifted.

This chapter discusses three puzzles about practical conditionals and inferences and shows how the flexible, contextualist semantic framework for “ought”. The chapter develops elsewhere resolves all three puzzles more satisfactorily than any of its three most prominent rivals, the relativist account of Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane, the wide-scoping account of John Broome, and the “trying on” account of James Dreier. The chapter first introduces the puzzle cases and six desiderata for their solutions, and then shows how only (...) flexible contextualism about “ought” is able to resolve each while satisfying all six desiderata. (shrink)

This paper brings together two recent developments in the theory of epistemic justification: practical conditions on justification, and infinitism (the view thatjustification is a matter of having an infinite series of non-repeating reasons). Pragmatic principles can be used to argue that, if we’re looking for an ‘objective’ theory of the structure of justification – a theory that applies to all subjects independently of their practical context – infinitism stands the only chance at being the correct theory.

BackgroundThere is numerous literature on mechanisms underlying variability of practice advantages. Literature includes both behavioral and neuroimaging studies. Unfortunately, no studies are focusing on practice in constant conditions to the best of our knowledge. Hence it is essential to assess possible differences in mechanisms of neuroplasticity between constant vs. variable practice conditions. The primary objectives of the study described in this protocol will be: to determine the brain’s structural and functional changes following constant and variable practice conditions in motor learning (...) ; to determine the EEG activation and connectivity between cognitive, sensory, and motor cerebral cortex areas in constant and variable practice conditions and as a function of practice time.MethodsThe study will follow the interventional design with two arms. Fifty participants will be randomly assigned to two groups practicing in constant and variable conditions. CG will be practicing only one pattern of step isometric contractions during unimanual index finger abduction, i.e., 90 trials in all training sessions, whereas VG will practice three different patterns. Each will be practiced 30 times per session in variable conditions. Resting-state fMRI, EEG, and motor task proficiency will be examined before and after practice.DiscussionFindings will enhance our understanding of structural and functional neural changes following practice in constant and variable conditions. Therefore, the study can be considered pure research.Clinical Trial RegistrationStudy registered at clinicaltrials.gov on 9 June 2021. Last version update: 21 December 2021.The protocol has been prepared according to the complete SPIRIT checklist, although the item order has been modified in order to comply with the manuscript structure. (shrink)

This article is about conditionalized modal statements whose antecedents concern a preferential attitude of an agent. The focus is on anankastic conditionals or, as they are known in the philosophical literature, hypothetical imperatives. We present a linguistically-motivated analysis of anankastic and related conditionals and use it to address challenges for semantic theories of natural language conditionals motivated by certain philosophical concerns about practical reasoning and the requirements of rationality.

This chapter contains sections titled: A prima facie case for teaching as a practice MacIntyre's objection Schools as surroundings.

The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of religious ignorance promotes responsible acts of assertion, epistemic humility, and non–dogmatic doxastic attitudes towards the content of one’s own faith. Such conformity also facilitates the formation of the religious personality in a healthy direction in other ways. I explore these ideas in relation to the Christian faith tradition, (...) but my reflections generalize. (shrink)

Habermas: a closet Kantian -- Kant -- Vattimo: a closet Kantian -- Gadamer and Lyotard on aesthetic judgment (I): some problems -- Gadamer and Lyotard on aesthetic judgment (II): the story of where they go wrong.

Multi-point Temperature Measurement has always been very important aspect of physical instrumentation mainly in environmental and Industrial application. A multi-point temperature measurement system has been developed to measure temperature at different points simultaneously. This multi-channel system is designed specifically for measuring snow temperature at 28 different points In snow layers and this multi-point data is used in modeling of snow cover. The interfacing of such multi-channel system to Data acquisition system is one of the most critical design aspects, which affect (...) the overall performance of the system. The temperature sensor system and Data Acquisition System may be working satisfactorily when operated independently but total system integrity is absolutely important when these two sub-systems are interfaced together. Further operating conditions in snow causes many performance and reliability issues to be tackled through proper design. This paper discusses the design aspects involved in the interfacing of the multi-channel temperature measurement system with the Data Acquisition System specifically for Snow hydrological applications. (shrink)

Normative reasons for action are considerations that count in favor of actions. They are the considerations that determine what an agent should do in a given situation. If the agent acts on these considerations, they justify her action. This paper concerns accounts of normative reasons that separate the explanation of why a particular reason counts in favor of an agent’s performing some action from the content of that reason. Elements of this explanation of why the reason is a reason are (...) “background conditions” on that reason, rather than part of the reason itself. (shrink)

To qualify the truth of a proposition probabilistically is to place it within the scope of a special type of alethic modality. We expect that, as in other modal contexts, the merely probabilistic truth of an assumption in a valid inference must carry over to whatever conclusions are derived from the assumption. That expectation, however, is not always fulfilled in ordinary reasoning about conditional probabilities. There are simpler ways of illustrating what I shall call the paradoxes of conditional probabilistic reasoning (...) in ordinary language, but the following argument is a colorful example. Consider an apparently deductively valid inference, by an imaginary inmate of a penal institution supervised by a bitterly hated warden who is surrounded by dangerous criminals, including the argument’s author. (shrink)

The use of high hypothetical payoffs has been justified by the realism and relevance of large monetary consequences and by the impracticality of making high cash payments. We argue that subjects may not be able to imagine how they would behave in high payoff situations.

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to provide a response to Christiansen's paper, Ellen Christiansen “From ‘ethics of the eye’ to ‘ethics of the hand’ by collaborative prototyping”,Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, Vol. 12 No. 1.Design/methodology/approach– Reflection and critique of Christiansen's position.Findings– The paper raises questions about the conceptual basis, the realisation of participation and the conditions required for participative practice to be more broadly employed.Originality/value– It is an original response.

Abstract: I argue that practically all vague language is context-sensitive in a covert and unfamiliar way. I first outline a novel puzzle concerning the interaction of conditionals and vagueness. I then argue that the best way of resolving the puzzle is through positing context-sensitive penumbral connections between sundry parts of language. I argue that these penumbral connections shift through a distinct form of Lewisian accommodation. The upshot is that meaning is a far shiftier thing than has typically been thought.

According to a rich tradition in philosophy of action, intentional action requires practical knowledge: someone who acts intentionally knows what they are doing while they are doing it. Piñeros Glasscock argues that an anti-luminosity argument, of the sort developed in Williamson, can be readily adapted to provide a reductio of an epistemic condition on intentional action. This paper undertakes a rescue mission on behalf of an epistemic condition on intentional action. We formulate and defend a version of an epistemic (...) condition that is free from any luminosity commitments. While this version of an epistemic condition escapes reductio, it comes with substantive commitments of its own. In particular, we will see that it forces us to deny the existence of any essentially intentional actions. We go on to argue that this consequence should be embraced. On the resulting picture, intentional action is not luminous. But it still entails practical knowledge. (shrink)

It is generally accepted today that the biomedical model's exclusive focus on the patient's somatic condition is too narrow. The biomedical model, however, has additional shortcomings. In the first place, resources are left out of the diagnostic perspective. Secondly, the automatic interpretation of symptoms and deviations from normal as present or potential threats to the individual's health. In this paper it is claimed that these characteristics of the biomedical model can lead to medicalization. To elucidate these claims, an alternative approach (...) to antenatal care, is presented in which the psychosocial conditions of pregnant women are integrated. Some practical problems that follow from this approach are discussed. (shrink)

Research suggests that psychological characteristics and social behaviors contribute to the development of coaching effectiveness and as such should not be neglected by strength and conditioning coaches. This review examines the current literature on the influence of psychosocial characteristics and behaviors of the S&C coach on elite athlete development. Additionally, this review provides practical suggestions and guidelines to coach developers and coach practitioners to develop such psychosocial behaviors using constructivist learning theories in relation to reflection, stories, mentorships, and internships.

This paper analyses a situation where a patient's suffering provoked feelings of compassion in a student nurse, and distress at her patient's circumstances. The reported behaviour of qualified nurses within the situation suggests that they lacked compassion, had inadequate knowledge, and that they failed to understand their patient's plight. An account of the situation is followed by an exploration of the nature of moral agency, and understanding in nursing. Nurses' capacity for moral imagination is shown to be of crucial importance (...) to the care that patients receive. The extent of nurses' responsibility for their behaviour is considered, and in particular, the extent of nurses' responsibility during times when they experience strain. Argument leads to the conclusion that we are justified in holding nurses responsible for their behaviour in situations of patient care, although we must not judge a nurse's behaviour too hastily. Attention is drawn to the need for a moral climate to sustain those nurses who struggle to give good patient care, despite the strain that is ever present within today's world of health care. (shrink)

A political philosophy that no longer wants to be a philosophy inevitably runs into contradictions. The productive transparency of Arendt's philosophical experiment becomes visible, however, if we avoid simple mappings to Aristotle, Kant and Heidegger in order to emphasize the point and counterpoint of Arendt's message. The connections she draws, unusual in the world of philosophical thinking, have an obvious and a hidden side. The hidden side can be frequently found in the nuances, and these will be pursued inasmuch as (...) they allow an entirely new reading of Arendt's relationship to practical philosophy. (shrink)

Definition: A condition A is said to be sufficient for a condition B, if (and only if) the truth (/existence /occurrence) [as the case may be] of A guarantees (or brings about) the truth (/existence /occurrence) of B.

Living together peacefully in a world of differences asks for a practice of respecting the irreducible difference of the other. Acknowledging this `not-me' of the other subject generates an in-between: a space/time between subjects that cannot be transgressed other than by violence. Following Irigaray, I argue that this `in-between' comes about through the passion of wonder, a being touched in the flesh in the encounter with the other, which opens the subject to him/herself and to the other. To perceive this (...) touch asks for a life-style directed at keeping open and sensitizing the sensibilities of the senses, so that the subject's aesthesis or awareness for the perceptions of the sensible flesh and of its reactions to the other is heightened. Key-element in this aesthetics is the practice of breathing. It enables the subject to remain rooted in him/or herself and open to the other: generating and respecting the in-between between them. (shrink)

Es frecuente buscar en Freud a un crítico de la Ilustración y, en particular, del modo de pensar la moral heredero del planteamiento kantiano. Sin embargo, Freud se limita a descubrir en la naturaleza humana un importante obstáculo del que el proyecto ilustrado no se podrá ya desentender. Este obstáculo, que afecta de un modo decisivo al modo como entender el paso a la mayoría de edad, remite a la existencia de un determinado reino de la heteronomía cuyo rasgo más (...) característico es su capacidad para suplantar la voz de la autonomía moral: al igual que la ley moral en Kant, el superyóuna vez ha interiorizado en la infancia y asumido como propios determinados contenidos de cultura. (shrink)

Superior motor task success has been correlated with participants’ self-reports of a larger-than-actual size of a sport-related target. In the present study, we examined whether a putting practice condition with greater success would differentially impact participants’ self-reported perceptions of the size of the putting hole during acquisition and retention. We randomly assigned participants to one of three different practice conditions and had them self-report their perceived size of the putting hole upon completion of each required putting distance. Although there were (...) no statistically significant differences between motor task success in the acquisition or retention period for the practice conditions, self-reported perceptions of target size were impacted by practice condition. During the acquisition period, participants in the self-controlled success and success-late conditions self-reported that the putting hole was larger than did participants in the success-early condition. In the retention period, participants in the self-controlled success condition perceived the target as larger than those in the success-early condition. These findings are the first to show that practice condition, independent of task success, differentially impacted self-reported perception of a target size. (shrink)

Shared agency is a distinctive kind of sociality that involves interdependent planning, practical reasoning, and action between participants. Philosophical reflection suggests that agents engage in this form of sociality when a special structure of interrelated psychological attitudes exists between them, a set of attitudes that constitutes a collective intention. I defend a new way to understand collective intention as a combination of individual conditional intentions. Revising an initial statement of the conditional intention account in response to several challenges leads (...) to a specification of the properties these intentions need to have in order to be genuine commitments. I then show how a structure of conditional intentions with these properties settles a collection of agents on engaging in social interactions that display all the features typically associated with shared agency. (shrink)

The practice of medicine frequently involves the unconsented restriction of liberty. The reasons for unilateral liberty restrictions are typically that being confined, strapped down, or sedated are necessary to prevent the person from harming themselves or others. In this paper, we target the ethics of chemical restraints, which are medications that are used to intentionally restrict the mental states associated with the unwanted behaviors, and are typically not specifically indicated for the condition for which the patient is being treated. Specifically, (...) we aim to identify the conditions under which chemical restraints are ethically permissible. It is wrong to assume that what is morally true of physical restraints is also true of chemical restraints. Our aim is thus to identify the conditions under which chemical restraints are permissible while distinguishing these conditions from those of the application of physical restraints. (shrink)

In the Freedom essay, Schelling charges that (1) idealism fails to grasp human freedom’s distinctiveness and that (2) this failure undermines idealism's attempt to refute pantheism, as exemplified by Spinoza. This raises two questions, which I will answer in turn: what, for Schelling, is distinctive of human freedom; and how does the idealists’ failure to grasp it render them unable to refute pantheism? To answer these questions, I will reconstruct Schelling’s argument that freedom has the distinctness of being the unconditioned (...) condition of the world’s intelligibility. My reconstruction will illustrate how Schelling’s notion of freedom as primal will grounds the alleged primacy of practical reason as Kant and Fichte conceive it. I will then consider three objections to Schelling’s argument. Throughout, I will develop the Schellingian idea that freedom is enacted in an unprethinkable decision that cannot be anticipated by any law or principle. (shrink)

According to ‘orthodox’ representationalism, perceptual states possess constitutive veridicality (truth, accuracy, or satisfaction) conditions. Typically, philosophers who deny orthodox representationalism endorse some variety of anti-representationalism. But we argue that these haven’t always been, and needn’t continue to be, the only options. Philosophers including Descartes, Malebranche and Helmholtz appear to have rejected orthodox representationalism while nonetheless endorsing perceptual representations of a fundamentally practical kind not captured by orthodox representationalism. Moreover, we argue that the perceptual science called on by contemporary philosophers (...) to defend orthodox representationalism instead motivates a return to this older view, and we suggest that contemporary philosophers may conceptualize fundamentally practical perceptual representations as _‘de agendo’_ representations, a species of representation that has constitutive appropriateness rather than veridicality conditions. (shrink)

In “The Standing to Blame: A Critique” (2013), Macalester Bell challenges theories that claim that ‘standing’ plays a central role in blaming practices. These standard accounts posit that it is not enough for the target of blame to be blameworthy; the blamer also must have the proper standing to blame the wrongdoer. Bell identifies and criticizes four different standing conditions, (1) the Business Condition, (2) the Contemporary Condition, (3) the Nonhypocricy Condition, and (4) the Noncomplicity Condition. According to standard accounts, (...) these conditions must be met in order for a would-be blamer to properly blame a wrongdoer. In this paper, I defend the Business Condition against Bell’s critique. My argument, then, is that some version of the standard account survives and ‘standing’ should be part of our theory of properly-wielded blame. I conclude by raising two additional concerns regarding the agency of blamers and the possibility that, without proper standing, a blamer could make things worse. (shrink)