This chapter is a survey of the ethics of belief. It begins with the debate as it first emerges in the foundational dispute between W. K. Clifford and William James. Then it surveys how the disagreements between Clifford and James have shaped the work of contemporary theorists, touching on topics such as pragmatism, whether we should believe against the evidence, pragmatic and moral encroachment, doxastic partiality, and doxastic wronging.

A challenge we face in a world that has been shaped by, and continues to be shaped by, racist attitudes and institutions is that the evidence is often stacked in favor of racist beliefs. As a result, we may find ourselves facing the following conflict: what if the evidence we have supports something we morally shouldn’t believe? For example, it is morally wrong to assume, solely on the basis of someone’s skin color, that they’re a staff member. But, what if (...) you’re in a context where, because of historical patterns of discrimination, someone’s skin color is a very good indicator that they’re a staff member? When this sort of normative conflict looms, a conflict between moral considerations on the one hand and what you epistemically ought to believe given the evidence on the other, what should we do? It might be unfair to assume that they’re a staff member, but to ignore the evidence would mean risking inaccurate beliefs. Some, notably Tamar Gendler (2011), have suggested that we simply face a tragic irresolvable dilemma. In this chapter, I consider how these cases of conflict arise and I canvass the viability of suggested resolutions of the conflict. In the end, I argue that there’s actually no conflict here. Moral considerations can change how we epistemically should respond to the evidence. (shrink)

On Jaina, Bauddha, Nyaya, Vaiśeṣika, Sankhya, Yoga, Purva-Mimamsa and Vedānta systems of Indic philosophy.

This paper attempts to argue for the theory-ladenness of evidence. It does so by employing and analysing an episode from the history of eighteenth century chemistry. It delineates attempts by Joseph Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier to construct entirely different kinds of evidence for and against a particular hypothesis from a set of agreed upon observations or data. Based on an augmented version of a distinction, drawn by J. Bogen and J. Woodward, between data and phenomena it is shown that the (...) role of theoretical auxiliary assumptions is very important in constructing evidence for a theory from observation or data. In revolutionary situations, rival groups hold radically different theories and theoretical auxiliary assumptions. These are employed to construct very different evidence from the agreed upon set of observations or data. Hence, theory resolution becomes difficult. It is argued that evidence construction is a multi-layered exercise and can be disputed at any level. What counts as unproblematic observation or data at one level may become problematic at another level. The contingency of these constructions and the problematic nature of evidence are shown to be partially dependent upon the scientific knowledge that the scientific community possesses.Author Keywords: Theory-ladenness of evidence; Eighteenth century chemical philosophy; Construction of evidence; Observation/data; Theory resolution. (shrink)

Articles on political and philosophical thoughts of Michel Foucault, French philosopher, in the last decade of his career.

We care not only about how people treat us, but also what they believe of us. If I believe that you’re a bad tipper given your race, I’ve wronged you. But, what if you are a bad tipper? It is commonly argued that the way racist beliefs wrong is that the racist believer either misrepresents reality, organizes facts in a misleading way that distorts the truth, or engages in fallacious reasoning. In this paper, I present a case that challenges this (...) orthodoxy: the case of the supposedly rational racist. We live in a world that has been, and continues to be, structured by racist attitudes and institutions. As a result, the evidence might be stacked in favour of racist beliefs. But, if there are racist beliefs that reflect reality and are rationally justified, what could be wrong with them? Moreover, how do I wrong you by believing what I epistemically ought believe given the evidence? To address this challenge, we must recognize that there are not only epistemic norms governing belief, but moral ones as well. This view, however, is at odds with the assumption that moral obligation requires a kind of voluntary control that we lack with regard to our beliefs. This background assumption motivates many philosophers to try to explain away the appearance that beliefs can wrong by locating the wrong elsewhere, e.g., in an agent’s actions. Further, even accounts that accept the thesis that racist beliefs can wrong restrict the class of beliefs that wrong to beliefs that are either false or the result of hot irrationality, e.g., the racist belief is a result of ill-will. In this paper I argue that although the these accounts will capture many of the wrongs associated with racist beliefs, they will be only partial explanations because they cannot explain the wrong committed by the supposedly rational racist. The challenge posed by the supposedly rational racist concerns our epistemic practices in a non-ideal world. The world is an unjust place, and there may be many morally objectionable beliefs it justifies. To address this challenge, we must seriously consider the thesis people wrong others in virtue of what they believe about them, and not just in virtue of what they do. (shrink)

In the Book of Common Prayer’s Rite II version of the Eucharist, the congregation confesses, “we have sinned against you in thought, word, and deed”. According to this confession we wrong God not just by what we do and what we say, but also by what we think. The idea that we can wrong someone not just by what we do, but by what think or what we believe, is a natural one. It is the kind of wrong we feel (...) when those we love believe the worst about us. And it is one of the salient wrongs of racism and sexism. Yet it is puzzling to many philosophers how we could wrong one another by virtue of what we believe about them. This paper defends the idea that we can morally wrong one another by what we believe about them from two such puzzles. The first puzzle concerns whether we have the right sort of control over our beliefs for them to be subject to moral evaluation. And the second concerns whether moral wrongs would come into conflict with the distinctively epistemic standards that govern belief. Our answer to both puzzles is that the distinctively epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. This account of moral encroachment explains how epistemic norms governing belief are sensitive to the moral requirements governing belief. (shrink)

This comprehensive analysis dives deep into the intricate interplay between artificial intelligence (AI) and human agency, examining the remarkable capabilities and inherent limitations of large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-3 and ChatGPT. The paper traces the complex trajectory of AI's evolution, highlighting its operation based on statistical pattern recognition, devoid of self-consciousness or innate comprehension. As AI permeates multiple spheres of human life, it raises substantial ethical, legal, and societal concerns that demand immediate attention and deliberation. The metaphorical illustration (...) of humans as “shepherds” of AI, coupled with a thought-provoking examination of “agency without intelligence,” engenders deep reflections on the future of human-AI interplay and the associated philosophical, ethical, and practical ramifications. The paper further elucidates critical challenges associated with AI, such as ethical dilemmas, “agency without intelligence,” the role of human oversight, and the environmental impact of AI technologies. In the pursuit of solutions, the paper maps prospective directions, emphasizing the need for robust AI policies, improved AI literacy, sustainable AI practices, and a continued dialogue on the multifaceted issues surrounding AI. Through a holistic exploration of AI, this paper underlines the necessity for a multidisciplinary, collaborative approach to chart an ethical, beneficial, and sustainable AI future, enabling society to harness the potential of AI responsibly while mitigating the associated risks. (shrink)

Papers presented at two national seminars on Language science and cognition and Epistemology and cognition held at Hyderabad.

But to infer is not to be trained in Logic. The primitive persons inferred ; the common layman infers. But they do not know any bit of what is known as ...

Contributed papers presented during the national seminar held at Visva- Bharati, from August 20-21, 1993.

Past decades have witnessed the growing success of branding as a corporate activity as well as a rise in anti-brand activism. While appearing to be contradictory, both trends have emerged from common sources – the transition from industrial to post-industrial society, and the advent of globalization – the examination of which might lead to a socially grounded understanding of why brand success in the future is likely to demand more than superior product performance, placing increasing demand on corporations with regard (...) to a broader envelop of socially responsible behavior. Directions for strategic and managerial options are suggested. (shrink)

We care what people think of us. The thesis that beliefs wrong, although compelling, can sound ridiculous. The norms that properly govern belief are plausibly epistemic norms such as truth, accuracy, and evidence. Moral and prudential norms seem to play no role in settling the question of whether to believe p, and they are irrelevant to answering the question of what you should believe. This leaves us with the question: can we wrong one another by virtue of what we believe (...) about each other? Can beliefs wrong? In this introduction, I present a brief summary of the articles that make up this special issue. The aim is to direct readers to open avenues for future research by highlighting questions and challenges that are far from being settled. These papers shouldn’t be taken as the last word on the subject. Rather, they mark the beginning of a serious exploration into a set of questions that concern the morality of belief, i.e., doxastic morality. (shrink)

This paper is about an overlooked aspect—the cognitive or epistemic aspect—of the moral demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not only how people act towards us and what they say of us, but also what they believe of us. That we can feel hurt by what others believe of us suggests both that beliefs can wrong and that there is something we epistemically owe to each other. This proposal, however, surprises many theorists who claim (...) it lacks both intuitive and theoretical support. This paper argues that the proposal has intuitive support and is not at odds with much contemporary theorizing about what we owe to each other. (shrink)

Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified can shift according to the moral stakes. On this account, believing a paradigmatically racist (...) belief reflects a failure to not only attend to the epistemic risk of being wrong, but also a failure to attend to the distinctively moral risk of wronging others given what we believe. (shrink)

In this paper, we study some classes of logical structures from the universal logic standpoint, viz., those of the Tarski- and the Lindenbaum-types. The characterization theorems for the Tarski- and two of the four different Lindenbaum-type logical structures have been proved as well. The separations between the five classes of logical structures, viz., the four Lindenbaum-types and the Tarski-type have been established via examples. Finally, we study the logical structures that are of both Tarski- and a Lindenbaum-type, show their separations, (...) and end with characterization, adequacy, minimality, and representation theorems for one of the Tarski–Lindenbaum-type logical structures. (shrink)

This chapter asks two questions about the ethics of expectations: one about the nature of expectations, and one about the wrongs of expectations. On the first question, expectations involve a rich constellation of attitudes ranging from beliefs to also include imaginings, hopes, fears, and dreams. As a result, sometimes expectations act like predictions, like your expectation of rain tomorrow, sometimes prescriptions, like the expectation that your students will do the reading, sometimes like proleptic reasons like the hope that your mentee (...) will flourish, and sometimes expectations are peremptory in that they carry the force of moral law. Turning to the second question, given the multiple roles played by expectations it shouldn’t be surprising that there are also multiple ways expectations can be wrong to hold. Sometimes they wrong as beliefs do, e.g., doxastic wronging, and sometimes they result in alienation because of who holds that expectation of us. The upshot of this chapter is that getting clear on these potential ways expectations can wrong not only delivers an ethics of expectations that mirrors familiar discussions of the ethics of belief, but an ethics of expectations further opens the door for taking seriously an ethics of mental attitudes more generally. (shrink)

It is no surprise that we should be careful when it comes to what we believe. Believing false things can be costly. The morality of belief, also known as doxastic wronging, takes things a step further by suggesting that certain beliefs can not only be costly, they can also wrong. This article surveys some accounts of how this could be so. That is, how beliefs wrong.

Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, Indian philosopher; contributed articles.

Morality bears on what we should forget. Some aspects of our identity are meant to be forgotten and there is a distinctive harm that accompanies the permanence of some content about us, content that prompts a duty to forget. To make the case that forgetting is an integral part of our moral duties to others, the paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I make the case that forgetting is morally evaluable and I survey three kinds of forgetting: no-trace forgetting, archival (...) forgetting, and siloing. In §2, I turn to how we practice these forms of forgetting in our everyday lives and the goods these practices facilitate by drawing on examples ranging from the expunging of juvenile arrest records to the right to privacy. In §3, I turn to how my account can help us both recognize and address a heretofore neglected source of harm caused by technology and big data. In §4, I end by addressing the concern that we lack control over forgetting and thus can't be required to forget. I argue this challenge can be answered, but there’s a harder challenge that can’t. Forgetting is under threat. To address this challenge and preserve forgetting, we must change the world. (shrink)

In this paper I explore three challenges to the morality of belief. First, whether we have the necessary control over our beliefs to be held responsible for them, i.e., the challenge of doxastic involuntarism. Second, the question of whether belief is really the attitude that we care about in the cases used to motivate the morality of belief. Third, whether attitudes weaker than belief, such as credence, can wrong, I then end by turning to how answers to the previous challenges (...) suggest a way of extending the morality of belief to encompass a way of thinking of the moral mind more generally. (shrink)

This paper is a comprehensive survey of the alarming deterioration in the morals, values and mental health of individuals and societies right across the globe. In fact this decline is really the true globalization of the day, not so much equitable distribution, meeting of minds and so on. The author explores numerous reports and writings of researchers, poets, thinkers, policy-makers, journalists and intellectuals, and uses all that to deliver a shattering knock to the complacent and smug modern citizen—Western or Eastern. (...) For remedies against the modern consumerist-materialist global epidemic, Bhattacharya falls back upon classical Eastern and Indian thought. This corpus offers timeless wisdom, the seers having accurately forecasted today's human predicament and having laid down the blueprint for sane living. (shrink)

The doctrine of karma is a vexed philosophical question and karmic law has often been confused with fatal ism. This article seeks to put forward the author's understanding of this complex concept. It is a cosmic law of action with its inevitable consequence and reaction. Narration of parables—metaphors pregnant with rich meaning—supplemented with instances from real life show a path out of the labyrinth, even the much- debated issue of determinism and free will. The thesis is that karmic law can (...) provide the discerning intelli gence, cultivated through chitta-shuddhi, adequate guidance for making the choice that may help one—if one chooses to—in avoiding decisions for short-term gains that breed long-term misery. (shrink)

At times we come across traditional sayings that pose enigmas. Often, striving to resolve the puzzle turns into a quest, a search for meaning that, quite unexpectedly, throws light on problems facing us today. Such an enigmatic Sanskrit couplet exhorts invoking five females regularly to redeem us of failings, howsoever grievous. Ahalya draupadi kunti tara mandodari tatha/ Panchakanya smarenityam mahapataka nashinim// The choice of the five is itself intriguing, all being epic heroines: Ahalya, Tara and Mandodari from the Ramayana; Kunti (...) and Draupadi from the Mahabharata. Even more so is the celebration of each as kanya, not as nari or sati. If kanya connotes ‘virgin’, the matter becomes more puzzling since each had intimate relationships with more than one man. In analysing what is known about them, we are surprised, for these heroines of ancient myth turn out to be, quite unexpectedly, guides for us in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

At times we come across traditional sayings that pose enigmas. Often, striving to resolve the puzzle turns into a quest, a search for meaning that, quite unexpectedly, throws light on problems facing us today. Such an enigmatic Sanskrit couplet exhorts invoking five females regularly to redeem us of failings, howsoever grievous: Ahalya draupadi kunti tara mandodari tatha\ Panchakanya smarenityam mahapataka nashinim\\ The choice of the five is itself intriguing, all being epic heroines: Ahalya, Tara and Mandodari from the Ramayana; Kunti (...) and Draupadi from the Mahabharata. Even more so is the celeberation of each as kanya, not as nari or sati. If kanya connotes ‘virgin’, the matter becomes more puzzling since each had intimate relationships with more than one man. In analysing what is known about them, we are surprised, fore these heroines of ancient myth turn out to be, quite unexpectedly, guides for us in the twenty-first century. In the previous issue the exploration had dealt with four of the five kanyas. This concluding part examines the persona of Draupadi, heroine of the world's longest epic, the Mahabharata.1. (shrink)

At times we come across traditional sayings that pose enigmas. Often, striving to resolve the puzzle turns into a quest, a search for meaning that, quite unexpectedly, throws light on problems facing us today. Such an enigmatic Sanskrit couplet exhorts invoking five females regularly to redeem us of failings, howsoever grievous. Ahalya draupadi kunti tara mandodari tatha/ Panchakanya smarenityam mahapataka nashinim// The choice of the five is itself intriguing, all being epic heroines: Ahalya, Tara and Mandodari from the Ramayana; Kunti (...) and Draupadi from the Mahabharata. Even more so is the celebration of each as kanya, not as nari or sati. If kanya connotes ‘virgin’, the matter becomes more puzzling since each had intimate relationships with more than one man. In analysing what is known about them, we are surprised, for these heroines of ancient myth turn out to be, quite unexpectedly, guides for us in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

At times we come across traditional sayings that pose enigmas. Often, striving to resolve the puzzle turns into a quest, a search for meaning that, quite unexpectedly, throws light on problems facing us today. Such an enigmatic Sanskrit couplet exhorts invoking five females regularly to redeem us of failings, howsoever grievous: Ahalya draupadi kunti tara mandodari tatha\ Panchakanya smarenityam mahapataka nashinim\\ The choice of the five is itself intriguing, all being epic heroines: Ahalya, Tara and Mandodari from the Ramayana; Kunti (...) and Draupadi from the Mahabharata. Even more so is the celeberation of each as kanya, not as nari or sati. If kanya connotes ‘virgin’, the matter becomes more puzzling since each had intimate relationships with more than one man. In analysing what is known about them, we are surprised, fore these heroines of ancient myth turn out to be, quite unexpectedly, guides for us in the twenty-first century. In the previous issue the exploration had dealt with four of the five kanyas. This concluding part examines the persona of Draupadi, heroine of the world's longest epic, the Mahabharata.1. (shrink)

This new Bangla book discusses Michel Foucault's political and philosophical thoughts in the last decade of his career. The author argues that this decade was one of his most restless, creative, and fascinating. He discusses and analyses Foucauldian theories, such as sexuality, governmentality, bio-politics, and bio-power, as also his concern with the politics of truth, which includes his thoughts on modernity and critique.

You shouldn’t have done it. But you did. Against your better judgment you scrolled to the end of an article concerning the state of race relations in America and you are now reading the comments. Amongst the slurs, the get-rich-quick schemes, and the threats of physical violence, there is one comment that catches your eye. Spencer argues that although it might be “unpopular” or “politically incorrect” to say this, the evidence supports believing that the black diner in his section will (...) tip poorly. He insists that the facts don’t lie. The facts aren’t racist. In denying his claim and in believing otherwise, it is you who engages in wishful thinking. It is you who believes against the evidence. You, not Spencer, are epistemically irrational. -/- My dissertation gives an account of the moral-epistemic norms governing belief that will help us answer Spencer and the challenge he poses. We live in a society that has been shaped by racist attitudes and institutions. Given the effects of structural racism, Spencer’s belief could have considerable evidential support. Spencer notes that it might make him unpopular, but he cares about the truth and he is willing to believe the unpopular thing. But, Spencer’s belief seems racist. Spencer asks, however, how could his belief be racist if his beliefs reflect reality and are rationally justified? Moreover, how could he wrong anyone by believing what he epistemically ought to believe given the evidence? In answer, I argue that beliefs can wrong. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that morality might bear on belief in at least two conceptually distinct ways. The first is that morality might bear on belief by bearing on questions of justification. The claim that it does is the doctrine of moral encroachment. The second, is that morality might bear on belief given the central role belief plays in mediating and thereby constituting our relationships with one another. The claim that it does is the doctrine of doxastic wronging. Though (...) conceptually distinct, the two doctrines overlap in important ways. This paper provides clarification on the relationship between the two, providing reasons throughout that we should accept both. (shrink)