20 found
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  1. The curve fitting problem: A bayesian rejoinder.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Robert J. Boik - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):402.
    In the curve fitting problem two conflicting desiderata, simplicity and goodness-of-fit pull in opposite directions. To solve this problem, two proposals, the first one based on Bayes's theorem criterion (BTC) and the second one advocated by Forster and Sober based on Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) are discussed. We show that AIC, which is frequentist in spirit, is logically equivalent to BTC, provided that a suitable choice of priors is made. We evaluate the charges against Bayesianism and contend that AIC approach (...)
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  2. Simpson's Paradox and Causality.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Mark Greenwood, Don Dcruz & Venkata Raghavan - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):13-25.
    There are three questions associated with Simpson’s Paradox (SP): (i) Why is SP paradoxical? (ii) What conditions generate SP?, and (iii) What should be done about SP? By developing a logic-based account of SP, it is argued that (i) and (ii) must be divorced from (iii). This account shows that (i) and (ii) have nothing to do with causality, which plays a role only in addressing (iii). A counterexample is also presented against the causal account. Finally, the causal and logic-based (...)
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  3.  61
    Acceptibility, Evidence, and Severity.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon G. Brittan - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):259-293.
    The notion of a severe test has played an important methodological role in the history of science. But it has not until recently been analyzed in any detail. We develop a generally Bayesian analysis of the notion, compare it with Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical approach by way of sample diagnostic tests in the medical sciences, and consider various objections to both. At the core of our analysis is a distinction between evidence and confirmation or belief. These notions must be kept separate (...)
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  4. Two dogmas of strong objective bayesianism.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon Brittan - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):45 – 65.
    We introduce a distinction, unnoticed in the literature, between four varieties of objective Bayesianism. What we call ' strong objective Bayesianism' is characterized by two claims, that all scientific inference is 'logical' and that, given the same background information two agents will ascribe a unique probability to their priors. We think that neither of these claims can be sustained; in this sense, they are 'dogmatic'. The first fails to recognize that some scientific inference, in particular that concerning evidential relations, is (...)
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  5. How to Undermine Underdetermination?Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, John G. Bennett & Megan D. Higgs - 2015 - Foundations of Science 20 (2):107-127.
    The underdetermination thesis poses a threat to rational choice of scientific theories. We discuss two arguments for the thesis. One draws its strength from deductivism together with the existence thesis, and the other is defended on the basis of the failure of a reliable inductive method. We adopt a partially subjective/objective pragmatic Bayesian epistemology of science framework, and reject both arguments for the thesis. Thus, in science we are able to reinstate rational choice called into question by the underdetermination thesis.
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  6.  45
    Non-Bayesian Accounts of Evidence: Howson’s Counterexample Countered.Gordon Brittan, Mark L. Taper & Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):291-298.
    There is a debate in Bayesian confirmation theory between subjective and non-subjective accounts of evidence. Colin Howson has provided a counterexample to our non-subjective account of evidence: the counterexample refers to a case in which there is strong evidence for a hypothesis, but the hypothesis is highly implausible. In this article, we contend that, by supposing that strong evidence for a hypothesis makes the hypothesis more believable, Howson conflates the distinction between confirmation and evidence. We demonstrate that Howson’s counterexample fails (...)
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    The Epistemology of a Positive SARS-CoV-2 Test.Rainer Johannes Klement & Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - 2020 - Acta Biotheoretica 69 (3):359-375.
    We investigate the epistemological consequences of a positive polymerase chain reaction SARS-CoV test for two relevant hypotheses: V is the hypothesis that an individual has been infected with SARS-CoV-2; C is the hypothesis that SARS-CoV-2 is the cause of flu-like symptoms in a given patient. We ask two fundamental epistemological questions regarding each hypothesis: First, how much confirmation does a positive test lend to each hypothesis? Second, how much evidence does a positive test provide for each hypothesis against its negation? (...)
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  8.  31
    Emergence and Evidence: A Close Look at Bunge’s Philosophy of Medicine.Rainer J. Klement & Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - 2019 - Philosophies 4 (3):50.
    In his book “Medical Philosophy: Conceptual issues in Medicine”, Mario Bunge provides a unique account of medical philosophy that is deeply rooted in a realist ontology he calls “systemism”. According to systemism, the world consists of systems and their parts, and systems possess emergent properties that their parts lack. Events within systems may form causes and effects that are constantly conjoined via particular mechanisms. Bunge supports the views of the evidence-based medicine movement that randomized controlled trials (RCTs) provide the best (...)
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  9. Are Scientific Models of life Testable? A lesson from Simpson's Paradox.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Don Dcruz, Nolan Grunska & Mark Greenwood - 2020 - Sci 1 (3).
    We address the need for a model by considering two competing theories regarding the origin of life: (i) the Metabolism First theory, and (ii) the RNA World theory. We discuss two interrelated points, namely: (i) Models are valuable tools for understanding both the processes and intricacies of origin-of-life issues, and (ii) Insights from models also help us to evaluate the core objection to origin-of-life theories, called “the inefficiency objection”, which is commonly raised by proponents of both the Metabolism First theory (...)
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  10. Truths about Simpson's Paradox - Saving the Paradox from Falsity.Don Dcruz, Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Venkata Raghavan & Gordon Brittain Jr - 2015 - In M. Banerjee & S. N. Krishna (eds.), LNCS 8923. pp. 58-75.
    There are three questions associated with Simpson’s paradox (SP): (i) Why is SP paradoxical? (ii) What conditions generate SP? and (iii) How to proceed when confronted with SP? An adequate analysis of the paradox starts by distinguishing these three questions. Then, by developing a formal account of SP, and substantiating it with a counterexample to causal accounts, we argue that there are no causal factors at play in answering questions (i) and (ii). Causality enters only in connection with action.
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  11. Statistical Inference and the Plethora of Probability Paradigms: A Principled Pluralism.Mark L. Taper, Gordon Brittan Jr & Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - manuscript
    The major competing statistical paradigms share a common remarkable but unremarked thread: in many of their inferential applications, different probability interpretations are combined. How this plays out in different theories of inference depends on the type of question asked. We distinguish four question types: confirmation, evidence, decision, and prediction. We show that Bayesian confirmation theory mixes what are intuitively “subjective” and “objective” interpretations of probability, whereas the likelihood-based account of evidence melds three conceptions of what constitutes an “objective” probability.
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  12. Lost in Translation? The Upaniṣadic Story about “Da” and Interpretational Issues in Analytic Philosophy.Don Dcruz, Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Venkata Raghavan - 2015 - Apa Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies 2 (14):15-18.
    In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, one of the principal Upaniṣads, we find a venerable and famous story where the god Prajāpati separately instructs three groups of people (gods, humans, and demons) simply by uttering the syllable “Da.” In this paper, our concern is not with ethics but theories of meaning and interpretation: How can all divergent interpretations of a single expression be correct, and, indeed, endorsed by the speaker? As an exercise in cross-cultural philosophical reflection, we consider some of the leading (...)
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  13. On an inconsistency in constructive empiricism.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (3):511-514.
    I show that van Fraassen's empiricism leads to mutually incompatible claims with regard to empirical theories. He is committed to the claim that reasons for accepting a theory and believing it are always identical, insofar as the theory in question is an empirical theory. He also makes a general claim that reasons for accepting a theory are not always reasons for believing it irrespective of whether the theory is an empirical theory.
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  14. Empiricism and/or Instrumentalism?Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Mark Greenwood, Gordon Brittan & Ken A. Aho - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1019-1041.
    Elliott Sober is both an empiricist and an instrumentalist. His empiricism rests on a principle called actualism, whereas his instrumentalism violates this. This violation generates a tension in his work. We argue that Sober is committed to a conflicting methodological imperative because of this tension. Our argument illuminates the contemporary debate between realism and empiricism which is increasingly focused on the application of scientific inference to testing scientific theories. Sober’s position illustrates how the principle of actualism drives a wedge between (...)
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  15. Constructive Empiricism: From a Theory of Empirical Adequacy to a Theory of Acceptance.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - 1995 - Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    I begin chapter I by discussing two key distinctions that constitute the core of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism: a distinction between observables and unobservables and a distinction between acceptance and belief with regard to a theory. To support constructive empiricism, van Fraassen also deploys two epistemological principles: only actual observations are to be taken as evidence and possible evidence is all that can be rationally inferred from the actual evidence. I reject both principle and van Fraassen's construal of observation. As (...)
     
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  16. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.) - 2011 - Elsevier B.V..
  17.  23
    Incongruent Counterparts and the Nature of Space: Demystifying their Reappearance in Kant's Writings.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - 2001 - In Ralph Schumacher, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Volker Gerhardt (eds.), Kant Und Die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des Ix. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Bd. I: Hauptvorträge. Bd. Ii: Sektionen I-V. Bd. Iii: Sektionen Vi-X: Bd. Iv: Sektionen Xi-Xiv. Bd. V: Sektionen Xv-Xviii. New York: De Gruyter. pp. 110-121.
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  18.  40
    The Modernist Turn in Indian Philosophy.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - 2019 - Sophia 58 (1):1-5.
  19. Confirmation and Evidence Distinguished.Mark Taper, Gordon Brittan, Prasanta Bandyopadhyay, Mark L. Taper, Gordon Brittan Jr & Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - 2016 - In Mark Taper, Gordon Brittan & Prasanta Bandyopadhyay (eds.), Belief, Evidence, and Uncertainty: Problems of Epistemic Inference. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
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  20. Concluding Reflections.Mark Taper, Gordon Brittan, Prasanta Bandyopadhyay, Mark L. Taper, Gordon Brittan Jr & Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - 2016 - In Mark Taper, Gordon Brittan & Prasanta Bandyopadhyay (eds.), Belief, Evidence, and Uncertainty: Problems of Epistemic Inference. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
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