El problema de la cotidianidad no es estudiado en muchos autores marxistas, y menos en los años 1960, cuando Sánchez Vázquez analiza esta temática en su tesis doctoral Sobre la praxis. Predomina entonces en teorías marxistas, la concentración en los aspectos económicos y políticos. La conciencia cot..
Existen en el campo de las ciencias sociales numerosas investigaciones que abordan la problemática de la praxis, sin embargo, menos común es encontrar estudios que vinculen esta categoría al estudio del movimiento obrero. A lo largo de estas notas se busca construir un marco de análisis desde el cua..
Istnieją przynajmniej dwa powody zajęcia się liberalizmem w pracy poświęconej zależnościom pomiędzy myślą a rzeczywistością. Centralnym problemem filozofii polityki jest najlepszy ustrój, który stanowi owoc spotkania ludzkiego umysłu z życiem społeczno-politycznym. To po pierwsze. Po drugie, liberalne ujecie związków teoria – praktyka stanowi jeden z wyznaczników doktryny liberalnej w ogóle. Liberalizm był i jest filozofią, która wywiera potężny wpływ na charakter nowoczesnych społeczeństw i nowożytnej myśli społecznej. Liczne hasła, które stanowiły kiedyś o jego odrębności, weszły na stałe do abecadła zachodniej (...) kultury (np. prawa człowieka, konstytucjonalizm, trójpodział władzy, społeczeństwo obywatelskie, tolerancja, rozdział Kościoła od państwa). Zarazem został on uznany za wroga przez wszystkie inne nurty filozofii polityki (konserwatystów, socjalistów, marksistów, anarchistów, feministki, komunitarystów, libertarian), można wręcz powiedzieć, że uzyskały one swą tożsamość przez opozycję wobec liberalizmu. Sytuacja ta jest szczególnie widoczna w Polsce, gdzie w wiedzy potocznej i dyskursie medialnym (a nierzadko i naukowym) głęboko zakorzeniła się definicja liberalizmu wywodząca się z propagandy antyliberalnej uprawianej przez środowiska ideowo zainteresowane krytyką tej filozofii . Nad Wisłą oznaczanie liberalizmu koncentrowało się na pomówieniach, wadach odmian skrajnych przy jednoczesnym lekceważeniu zalet podstawowych idei. Konsekwentnie liberalizm kojarzono z koncepcjami Thomasa Hobbesa, Jean Jacques Rousseau i prorynkowych myślicieli (neoliberałów, a nawet libertarian). Kładziono nacisk na skrajny leseferyzm i indywidualizm. Natomiast przemilczano wspólnotowe i socjalne wątki myśli liberalnej, utajano liberalne wysiłki prowadzące do minimalizacji napięcia między dobrem wspólnym i wolnością jednostki, wolnością indywidualną i wolnością polityczną, wolnością ekonomiczną a równością i sprawiedliwością. W ustach Polaka słowo „liberalizm” to wciąż obelga bądź straszak. Parafrazując powiedzenie Ludwiga von Misesa można powiedzieć, że nienawiść do liberalizmu jest jedyna rzeczą, co do której Polacy zgodzili się. Zanim zatem przejdziemy do prezentacji relacji między praxis a logos w myśli liberalnej rozwikłajmy problemy semantyczne narosłe wokół liberalizmu. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to examine the central role of praxis in Arendt’s conception of the human world and the structure of political life as a site of subjective interaction and narrative discourse. First, Arendt’s use of Aristotle will be presented in terms of the meaning of action as a unique philosophical category. Second, Arendt’s encounter with the work of Martin Heidegger will be shown to involve a critical response to his reading of Aristotle. Finally, the revised (...) conception of praxis that derives from her philosophical reflections will be related to the experience of narrative as a necessary complement to human plurality. (shrink)
The article re-examines the Aristotelian backdrop of Arendt’s notion of action. On the one hand, Backman takes up Arendt’s critique of the hierarchy of human activities in Aristotle, according to which Aristotle subordinates action (praxis) to production (poiesis) and contemplation (theoria). Backman argues that this is not the case since Aristotle conceives theoria as the most perfect form of praxis. On the other hand, Backman stresses that Arendt’s notion of action is in fact very different from Aristotle’s (...) class='Hi'>praxis, to the extent that Arendt thinks of action as an external to the means-ends scheme, whereas Aristotle ultimately remains caught in this scheme proper to poiesis in thinking of praxis as its own end. According to Backman, Arendt’s concept of action can therefore be understood as a critique, rather than as a rehabilitation, of Aristotelian praxis. (shrink)
Every metaphysic, according to Reiner Schürmann, involves the positing of a first principle for thinking and doing whereby the world becomes intelligible and masterable. What happens when such rules or norms no longer have the power they previously had? According to Cornelius Castoriadis, the world makes sense through institutions of imaginary significations. What happens when we discover that these significations and institutions truly are imaginary, without ground? Both thinkers begin their ontologies by acknowledging a radical finitude that threatens to destroy (...) meaning or order. For Schürmann it is the ontological anarchy revealed between epochs when principles governing modes of thinking and doing are foundering but new principles to take their place have not yet emerged. For Castoriadis it is chaos that names the indeterminationdetermination that governs the unfolding of the socio-historical with contingency and unpredictability. And yet for both thinkers their respective ontologies have political or ethical implications. On the basis of the anarchy of being, Schürmann unfolds an anarchic praxis or ethos of “living without why.” And on the basis of his notion of being as chaos, Castoriadis develops his political praxis of autonomy. The challenge for both is this move from ontology to practical philosophy, how to bridge theory and practice. The key for both seems to be a certain ontologically derived sense of freedom. In this paper, I analyze and compare their respective thoughts, and pursue the question of how anarchy or chaos and the implied sense of an ontological freedom might be made viable and sensible for human praxis, how radical finitude in the face of ontological groundlessness might nevertheless serve to situate a viable political praxis. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to present the theoretical and philosophical assumptions of the Nursing Manifesto , written by three activist scholars whose objective was to promote emancipatory nursing research, practice, and education within the dialogue and praxis of social justice. Inspired by discussions with a number of nurse philosophers at the 2008 Knowledge Conference in Boston, two of the original Manifesto authors and two colleagues discussed the need to explicate emancipatory knowing as it emerged from the Manifesto (...) . Our analysis yielded an epistemological framework based on liberation principles to advance praxis in the discipline of nursing. This paper adds to what is already known on this topic, as there is not an explicit contribution to the literature of this specific Manifesto , its significance, and utility for the discipline. While each of us have written on emancipatory knowing and social justice in a variety of works, it is in this article that we identify, as a unit of knowledge production and as a direction towards praxis, a set of critical values that arose from the emancipatory conscience-ness and intention seen in the framework of the Nursing Manifesto. (shrink)
The empirical basis for this article is threeyears of experience with ethical rounds atUppsala University Hospital. Three standardapproaches of ethical reasoning are examined aspotential explanations of what actually occursduring the ethical rounds. For reasons given,these are not found to be satisfyingexplanations. An approach called ``imaginativeethics'', is suggested as a more satisfactoryaccount of this kind of ethical reasoning. Theparticipants in the ethical rounds seem to drawon a kind of moral competence based on personallife experience and professional competence andexperience. By listening to (...) other perspectivesand other experiences related to one particularpatient story, the participants imaginealternative horizons of moral experience andexplore a multitude of values related toclinical practice that might be at stake. Inhis systematic treatment of aesthetics in theCritique of Judgement, Kant made use ofan operation of thought that, if applied toethics, will enable us to be more sensitive tothe particulars of each moral situation. Basedon this reading of Kant, an account ofimaginative ethics is developed in order tobring the ethical praxis of doctors and nursesinto sharper relief. The Hebraic and theHellenic traditions of imagination are used inorder to illuminate some of the experiences ofethical rounds. In conclusion, it is arguedthat imaginative ethics and principle-basedethics should be seen as complementary in orderto endow a moral discourse with ethicalauthority. Kantian ethics will do the job if itis remembered that Kant suggested only amodest, negative role of principle-baseddeliberation. (shrink)
A kind of ‘neo‐Aristotelianism’ that connects educational reasoning and reflection to phronesis, and education itself to praxis, has gained considerable following in recent educational discourse. The author identifies four cardinal claims of this phronesis‐praxis perspective: that a) Aristotle's epistemology and methodology imply a stance that is essentially, with regard to practical philosophy, anti‐method and anti‐theory; b) ‘producing’, under the rubric of techné, as opposed to ‘acting’ under the rubric of phronesis, is an unproblematically codifiable process; c) phronesis must (...) be given a particularist interpretation; and d) teaching is best understood as praxis in the Aristotelian sense, guided by phronesis. The author argues that these claims have insufficient grounding in Aristotle's own writings, and that none of them stands up to scrutiny. (shrink)
Critical Management Studies (CMS) has become an accepted part of mainstream management research. Yet, as CMS research advances, it is our position that CMS's ethical potential is not being realized. Drawing on one of CMS's theoretical sources, Critical Theory (CT), we suggest that CMS has well embraced the CT element of critique, but it has not adequately achieved the element of praxis, thereby truncating CMS's emancipation project. This paper seeks to address this trend and recover the ethical promise of (...) CMS by proposing that CMS expand its conception of praxis beyond its current focus on critical pedagogy and participatory research. To do so we elaborate on a process model that utilizes both critique and praxis to bring about the practical change of existing structures of domination. (shrink)
In this paper, we reflect on current notions of engineering practice by examining some of the motives for engineered solutions to the problem of climate change. We draw on fields such as science and technology studies, the philosophy of technology, and environmental ethics to highlight how dominant notions of apoliticism and ahistoricity are ingrained in contemporary engineering practice. We argue that a solely technological response to climate change does not question the social, political, and cultural tenet of infinite material growth, (...) one of the root causes of climate change. In response to the contemporary engineering practice, we define an activist engineer as someone who not only can provide specific engineered solutions, but who also steps back from their work and tackles the question, What is the real problem and does this problem “require” an engineering intervention? Solving complex problems like climate change requires radical cultural change, and a significant obstacle is educating engineers about how to conceive of and create “authentic alternatives,” that is, solutions that differ from the paradigm of “technologically improving” our way out of problems. As a means to realize radically new solutions, we investigate how engineers might deploy the concept of praxis, which raises awareness in engineers of the inherent politics of technological design. Praxis empowers engineers with a more comprehensive understanding of problems, and thus transforms technologies, when appropriate, into more socially just and ecologically sensitive interventions. Most importantly, praxis also raises a radical alternative rarely considered—not “engineering a solution.” Activist engineering offers a contrasting method to contemporary engineering practice and leads toward social justice and ecological protection through problem solving by asking not, How will we technologize our way out of the problems we face? but instead, What really needs to be done? (shrink)
Science is praxis relevant to the extent that it guides goal-directed action by telling us how to act in order to achieve the goals. Investigations aiming at high praxis relevance are performed in various disciplines under names such as clinical trials, evaluation research, intervention research and social experiments. In this contribution, the notion of (direct) praxis relevance is delineated, and it is distinguished from related properties of science such as those of being applied and being practically useful (...) in a wider sense. Recommendations for the achievement of praxis relevance are offered in the form of five principles: the prerogative of direct experiments, minimized theory-induced uncertainty, multiple approximations, causal chain decomposition and successive improvements. (shrink)
This exposition focuses on purposeful behavioursaseffortstoward self-actualization. I introducehabit as a set of value-based behaviours that is different than the typical habit of physical movements. Each of those praxis is controlled by cognition drivenby values –both personal and societal, and their following habitsare the result of complex learning. I will then elaborate on three important topics: (1) awareness and efficacy with respect tohabit, (2) collective habit, and (3) implications of existential habit on the individual’s as well as the society’s (...) wellbeing. (shrink)
This paper re-assesses the place of theology in Leibniz’s thought focusing on the relationship between theory and praxis. It takes as its point of departure a general conclusion established in previous work, namely that Leibniz’s key formulations of his overarching plan for the reform and advancement of all the sciences, are devoted to a set of objectives which is both shaped by broadly theological concerns and ultimately practical. Against this backdrop, the discussion will then turn to an exploration of (...) how Leibniz thought of theology as such. I argue that Leibniz was committed to the elaboration of a robust Christian dogmatic which was rationally defensible, and that this commitment resulted in a genuine engagement with Christian theology which took very seriously its theoretical content. The key additional thesis argued for in this paper is that this theoretical engagement was in the service of a science which he conceived as ultimately practical. For Leibniz, the ultimate aim of theology was to lead to the love of God above all things and, in so doing, to salvation and eternal happiness. It is in the light of this practical end that his theological pragmatism should be evaluated. When this is done, it becomes apparent that, beneath Leibniz’s efforts at theological reconciliation in the context of his Kirchenpolitik, there lies a deeper, fundamental and properly theological emphasis on praxis, grounded in Leibniz’s epistemology and driven by his conception of salvation as ultimately dependent on a practical attitude – the love of God above all things. Leibniz’s theological pragmatism was remarkably -- perhaps even surprisingly -- close to the family of prudential approaches to religious belief proposed by Pascal and later authors such as William James. The paper concludes that Leibniz’s conception of theology as ultimately practical is very much in line with the whole thrust of Leibniz’s intellectual programme as expressed in the over-arching plans discussed in the first section. These plans too were driven by a practical end: the promotion of the common good and of human happiness as the celebration of the glory of God in his creation. At the same time, the end of happiness – whether worldly or eternal -- should not be regarded as competing with Leibniz’s theoretical endeavours – whether in the sciences or in theology -- but as directly supported by them. (shrink)
En este trabajo se pretende mostrar el sentido político que adquirió la defensa de la teoría por parte de Adorno en los últimos años de su vida. él empleó esta defensa como una respuesta a los imperativos de los estudiantes de izquierda de plegar la teoría crítica a la intervención práctica inmediata. Para justificar esta tesis se atiende no sólo a lo que decía, sino también, en un nivel discursivo diferente, a lo que estaba haciendo cuando empleaba concentraciones de términos (...) y enunciados densos y eruditos para manifestarse. Esto lleva a incluir las reflexiones y valoraciones de Adorno referentes a la actitud teorética y a la praxis, principalmente aquellas esbozadas en Dialéctica negativa, en un contexto más amplio. This work pretends to show the political sense that the defense of the theory by Adorno acquired in the last years of his life. He used this defense as an answer to the students's imperatives of applying the critical theory to the immediate practical intervention. In order to justify this thesis will be considered not only what Adorno said, but also, in a different discursive level, what he was doing on having used concentrations of terms and dense and erudite declarations. This entails, then, to relate Adorno's reflections and assessments concerning to the theoretical and practical approach -specially those outlined in Negative Dialectic- to a broader contextual framework. (shrink)
The events of 1968/69 initiated a dispute between Adorno and Marcuse over the separation of theory and praxis. While Marcuse “stood at the barricades” Adorno sought recluse in the “ivory tower”. Marcuse and German students perceived Adorno’s move as departure from fundamental postulates of critical theory as laid down in Horkheimer’s 1937 essay. Adorno died amidst the process of clarifying his differences with Marcuse and thus the “unlimited discussions” between the two remain unfinished. This paper sets to examine how (...) both Marcuse and Adorno remained dedicated to the unity of theory and praxis, albeit in different ways. I argue that Adorno did not separate theory and praxis; instead, he perceived the gap between critical theory and concrete historical situation. Adorno rejected simple and unreflective translation of theory into praxis. Hence his attempt to recalibrate critical theory. Marcuse’s and Adorno’s differences lie in their different evaluation of the student movement and this evaluation was context related. My second argument is that Marcuse/Adorno disagreement is partly caused by the absence of the two from the concrete historical context. (shrink)
This article is an attempt to give arguments for bringing aesthetics back into praxis. Often aesthetics is understood as something coming out of individual designers' or architects' creative talents. We challenge such a view by introducing an understanding of aesthetics as an aspect of praxis. The article builds on observations of a design project for a community centre in a Danish village. We argue that aesthetics is a result of struggles by participants in praxis, where aesthetic, material, (...) functional, ethical, political, and economic aspects are formed by each other in a dialectic process. The struggles are found in the client's reasons for starting the process, in the design and construction process and the use of the results. This means that descriptions of the aesthetics of buildings should incorporate relevant discussions and struggles of the design, construction and use of the building. It also means that the key to a fruitful ongoing collaborative process producing good aesthetic comes from managing together the many aspects of praxis in an open way. (shrink)
This essay attempts to elaborate a first thorough comparative analysis of August Cieszkowski and Nikolaj Berdjaev. Although the latter is well known as one of the most important Russian philosophers, the former is hardly known beyond the Polish borders. This general lack of recognition contrasts with the fact that Cieszkowski played a significant role in nineteenth century philosophy in Germany, France, Poland and Russia. A comparative analysis of Cieszkowski and Berdjaev will undergird the idea that Cieszkowski was not merely a (...) ‘marginal’ figure in the history of philosophy. This essay has sought the reasons why Berdjaev considered himself to a large extent as a disciple of Cieszkowski. The stress is put on the central aspects of both philosophers’ thinking: freedom, praxis and the way they relate to morality in general. (shrink)
For a long time, under the influence of traditional Western philosophy, Orthodox interpreters have distorted Marx’s philosophy as the ontology of matter, thereby concealing the essence of Marx’s philosophy, and eliminating the fundamental difference between Marx’s philosophy and traditional philosophy. This paper proposes that Marx’s philosophy is not the ontology of matter, but on the contrary, by examining the ontology of matter, Marx put forward his own ontological theory, i.e., the ontology of the praxis-relations of social production, by which (...) Marx linked the realms of phenomenon and essence, revealing the content and essence of his philosophy. (shrink)
La defensa gadameriana del carácter extra-metódico de la verdad de las ciencias humanas, teorizada en Verdad y método, no es el simple rechazo del método; ella nace de la conciencia de que hay verdades que no pueden ser reducibles a las condiciones del método, porque se refieren a una dimensión ontológica que no se refiere a la repetitividad y a la conmensurabilidad. Tales aspectos de lo real son los acontecimientos contingentes, accidentales, aquellos que definimos como propiamente históricos. En este texto (...) me propongo poner a la luz esta dimensión ontológica, que en Aristóteles está en particular en aquella de la praxis, de la acción humana, buscando mostrar que la necesidad de su tematización está estrechamente ligada a las discusiones lógicas y ontológicas que atravesaron el pensamiento griego después del descubrimiento de las grandezas inconmensurables. La ontología de la praxis es una ontología que toma en consideración aquella “irracionalidad” constituida a partir de lo contingente y lo accidental, a la que corresponde una forma de racionalidad que no es más conmensuradora sino mediadora, representada por la phrónesis Gadamer’s vindication of the extra-methodical feature of truth in the human sciences put forward in Truth and Method does not mean a mere refusal of method: rather, it arises from the awareness that there are truths which are not reducible to the conditions of repeatability and commensurability set up by methodical thinking. In fact, the truths of the human sciences refer to the ontological dimension of the contingent and the accidental, i.e. to the dimension of the historical. In this essay I aim at highlighting this ontological dimension, which for Aristotle is eminently that of the praxis and of human action. I will show that such an ontology is a consequence of the logical and ontological discussions which crisscrossed Greek thought after the discovery of the incommensurable magnitudes. The ontology of praxis is an ontology which takes into account the “irrationality” represented by the contingent, the accidental, to which a new form of rationality corresponds: that of phrónesis. Phrónesis is in fact not a commensurative but a mediative rationality. (shrink)
Esta pesquisa se propõe a ser uma forma de análise da práxis cristã, tendo como ponto de partida a experiência místico-religiosa. A resposta de Friedrich Schleiermacher ao Iluminismo tem muito a nos beneficiar, principalmente se levarmos em consideração as críticas de Rudolf Otto. A compreensão do “sentimento de dependência” em Schleiermacher, que se torna em Otto “sentimento de criatura”, e a realidade da experiência de Deus que se conecta à práxis, nos fornecem um excelente ponto de partida para compreensão daquilo (...) que move as pessoas a uma vida de renúncia, servidão e comprometimento com valores e princípios do Evangelho de Jesus Cristo. Com base em uma pesquisa de campo, foi possível perceber que existe uma conexão entre a práxis cristã e a experiência religiosa. Quando há experiência religiosa, há ações cristãs executadas com naturalidade, com maior incidência do que quando não existe tal experiência. Podemos ter muito a perder se acaso deixarmos de considerar o aspecto experiencial da fé cristã com o sagrado. Em primeiro lugar, em nossas formulações teológicas, as quais podem, em maior ou menor grau, enfatizar em demasia aspectos antropocêntricos, deixando de lado o aspecto numinoso. Em segundo lugar, perderemos a oportunidade de influenciar a igreja a vivenciar uma prática espiritual real, que considere, com toda a relevância devida, a experiência de fé e não somente aspectos catequéticos. Por fim, perderemos a possibilidade de analisar a vida de fé, tendo como ponto de partida a experiência de Deus, que pode ter sido agente influenciador número um para uma vida de exemplo de práxis cristã genuína. (shrink)
Reconciliation is a theologically-charged word with politically-charged implications. The work of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) raised questions about reconciliation in a political context including the parts or partners of reconciliation: truth-telling, repentance, amnesty, reparations, and ultimately forgiveness and justice. This paper explores two questions. First, are theologians ready to give up an exclusive claim on reconciliation as a theological term or, at the very least, be agreeable to the fact that reconciliation might have political as well (...) as theological meanings? Second, if reconciliation is granted unhindered access across the borders of theology and politics, what wisdom from the theological tradition has informed the political praxis of reconciliation, and has political praxis in any way challenged our theological understanding of reconciliation? As responses to these questions, the paper looks at the theological development of reconciliation, with particular attention to the New Testament and subsequent historical praxis. It then discusses points of connection where the theological development has informed political praxis. (shrink)
In a Guest Lecture delivered by Professor Thaddeus Metz at a Colloquium organized in honour of my 50th birthday, he critically interrogated various aspects of my African philosophical scholarship with a particular focus on what I consider as the task of an African philosopher in the twenty-first century. Drawing on the existential and social problems in contemporary Africa, I have argued that African philosophy should be tailored towards ameliorating these problems as a way of making life meaningful. Metz’s striking criticism (...) is that doing philosophy that does not necessary address existential and socio-political problems in Africa is worth taking seriously in African philosophy. He adds that the very idea of “meaningfulness constitutes a strong, competing reason,” to do philosophy for its own sake. In this article, I reply Metz, contending that his critique only differs in degree from the position I earlier defended but not in kind regarding the connection between theory and praxis. While we both agree on the imperativeness of theorizing in African philosophy, I argue further that African philosophy should go beyond this to solve the practical issues relevant to the advancement of humanity and the society. Keywords: African Philosophy, theory, Praxis, Thaddeus Metz. (shrink)
The managerial form of university governance has changed the conditions of academic work in many countries. While some academics consider this a welcome development, others experience it as a threat to their autonomy and to the meaningfulness of their work. This essay suggests a stance in response to the current conditions that should serve especially the latter group of academics. The claim is that by approaching academic work as a potential praxis in emergence, it is possible to appreciate local, (...) autonomous activity in renewing academic work. Even if such efforts remain difficult, dispersed in space, discontinuous in time, and incomplete, they may provide a sense of direction and keep up hope. The conception of praxis is a way of articulating the mission of such efforts; simultaneously, it is also a way of defining an epistemic object for research on academic work. (shrink)
Luigi Pareyson’s concept of formativity is one of his most relevant and original concepts. In this paper I will give a short exposition of this concept in Pareyson’s Estetica and try to show how it can account, better as other object-, subject-, target- oriented theories, even of some features of contemporary art. The very relevant innovation that we can find in this concept is the shift from a concept of art as poiesis—as it is in Aristotle, namely, as a production (...) of an object—to the concept of art as praxis, that is, as an activity which involves the entire doing of the artist. As a doing that invents the form of doing, formativity appears as a kind of schematism that operates, not only without concept, as it is in Kant’s Critique of Judgement, but even without object. The thesis here suggested is that formativity can be understood as a transcendentalism of invention. (shrink)
O artigo pretende sublinhar a incompatibilidade que a hermenêutica filosófica de Gadamer apresenta com relação ao projeto filosófico de Heidegger. O objetivo é, desta forma, problematizar a ideia segundo a qual a hermenêutica filosófica constitui um desdobramento representativo do pensamento heideggeriano. A hermenêutica de Gadamer é percebida aqui como estando comprometida com uma tarefa de refundação, e a práxis, entendida como imanência da vida histórica, se mostra precisamente como um novo fundamento. O encontro de Gadamer com a práxis revela-se, assim, (...) à luz de uma não identificação, ainda que pouco explícita, da hermenêutica filosófica em relação ao projeto heideggeriano. (shrink)
In this article the author analyzes the positions of the intellectuals from the former Yugoslavia, gathered around Praxis journal, toward nationalism, as well as nationalists? critiques of them, mainly from Croatia and Serbia. The analysis covers up the period from the beginning of Praxis to the first decade of this century. Autor analizira stavove intelektualaca s podrucja bivse Jugoslavije, okupljenih oko casopisa Praxis, prema nacionalizmu, kao i kritike koje su im upucivali nacionalisti, pre svega iz Hrvatske i (...) Srbije. Analiza obuhvata period od pojave Praxisa do prve decenije dvadeset prvog veka. (shrink)
The author?s approach is based on three premises: 1. that Gajo Petrovic?s Praxis was an outstanding phenomenon in Croatian, Yugoslav and European culture, a challenge of freedom in a repressive society; 2. that there has never been such a thing as "Praxis group", "philosophers of practice" or "Praxis philosophers" with a unified philosophical and socio-theoretical orientation; and 3. that political and ideological attacks on Praxis were part of the repressive system that targeted every instance of cultural (...) and scientific dissent. The political leadership of Tito?s regime, its ideological and propaganda apparatus systematically disseminated allegations, denunciations and accusations against Praxis and Gajo Petrovic. The same style has survived through radical historical changes from the appearance of Praxis until today. The attackers have often been the same persons, with the difference that in earlier times they denounced Praxis and Gajo Petrovic as enemies of "socialism" and the "socialist self-management system", and in the changed political fashion as "servants" of Tito?s authoritarian rule. The fate of Praxis in the former regime has been triumphantly interpreted as a "family quarrel". This paper attempts a sociological analysis of the political destiny of Praxis. The analysis is essentially determined not by old and new political and ideological questionings of Praxis, but by Gajo Petrovic?s fundamental belief that there is no freedom without the human or humanity without freedom.. Osnovu autorovog pristupa cine tri stava: 1. da je Praxis Gaje Petrovica bio izuzetna pojava u hrvatskoj, jugoslovenskoj i evropskoj kulturi, izazov slobode u drustvu represije; 2. da ne postoji tako nesto kao "praxis-grupa", "filozofi prakse" ili "praxis filozofi" koji bi imali jedinstvenu filozofsku ili drustveno-teorijsku orijentaciju; 3. da su politicka i ideoloska osporavanja Praxisa bila deo represivnog sistema kojem je bilo podvrgnuto svako neistomisljenistvo u kulturi i nauci. Politicki vrh Titovog rezima, njegov ideoloski i propagandni aparat sistematski su sirili insinuacije, denuncijacije i optuzbe o Praxisu i Gaji Petrovicu, da bi taj manir u bitno promenjenim istorijskim okolnostima, trajao od pojave Praxisa do danasnjeg dana. Cesto su i akteri napada bile iste osobe, samo sto su nekada osporavali Praxis i Gaju Petrovica kao neprijatelje "socijalizma" i "sistema socijalistickog samoupravljanja", a u promenjenoj politickoj modi kao "sluge" Titove autoritarne vladavine. Sudbinu Praxisa u prethodnom rezimu slavodobitno su tumacili kao "obracun u obitelji". Rad je pokusaj socioloske analize politicke sudbine Praxisa, koju ce bitno odrediti temeljno uverenje Gaje Petrovica da nema slobode bez coveka ni ljudskosti bez slobode, a ne stara i nova politicka i ideoloska osporavanja Praxisa.. (shrink)
Using the categories of the epistemic and epistemological field of theory the author is trying to show on the basis of Bled presentations of Mihailo Markovic and Milan Kangrga that their conceptions belong to two separated theoretical fields, which are incompatible with each other. Therefore even in that period we could not speak about a common praxis-philosophy nor a common vision of Marxism. Koristeci kategorije epistemickog i epistemoloskog polja teorije autorica na osnovu bledskih referata Mihaila Markovica i Milana Kangrgi (...) pokusava pokazati da njihove koncepcije pripadaju dvema razlicitim filozofskim poljima koje se ne mogu sloziti, tako da ni u to vreme se nije moglo govoriti o nikakvoj zajednickoj praxis-filozofiji ni zajednickoj viziji marksizma. (shrink)
O artigo procura responder a um dos grandes desafios teológicos da atualidade: o diálogo inter-religioso. Trabalha a dimensão da práxis do diálogo, especialmente, no pensamento de Leonardo Boff, identificado a partir de 1992 em um novo paradigma - o paradigma ecológico. A dialogação (como práxis dialogal) é pensada num grande encontro teoantropocósmico, articulando Deus, Ser humano e Natureza. Três momentos compõem essa práxis dialógica: dialogação mística ou espiritual; dialogação fraterna; e a ética da vida. Não são três momentos separados. Articulam-se (...) e estão interconectados. Começam e terminam com a mística, expressam-se no estarcom-o-outro, na fraternidade e nos critérios de pensar e agir eticamente. Palavras-chave: Diálogo inter-religioso; Práxis; Mística; Fraternidade; Ecologia; Ética. ABSTRACT This paper aims at responding to one of the great theological challenges at present: inter-religions dialogue. It focuses on the dimension of the praxis of dialogue, especially on Leonardo Boff´s thought, identified as of 1992 according to a new paradigm - the ecological one. Dialogue as praxis is taken into account within the scope of a wide Theo-anthropo-cosmic encounter, articulating God, the Human Being and Nature. Such dialogical praxis comprises three moments: mystical or spiritual dialogue; fraternal dialogue; and the ethics of life. Those are not three separate moments: they are articulated and interconnected. They start and end with mystics, and they express themselves in being-with-the-other in fraternity and in the criteria for ethical thought and action. Key words: Inter-religions dialogue; Praxis; Mystics; raternity; Ecology; Ethics. (shrink)
El presente trabajo hace un acercamiento al concepto de praxis en Ignacio Ellacuría, relacionando la praxis con los principales conceptos que Ellacuría presenta en su obra. La praxis, ejercicio fundamental a la hora de abordar el tema de la realidad histórica, objeto último y absoluto de la filosofía, requiere ser sustentada en una serie de elementos que se rescatan en el presente ensayo. Por ello, haremos referencia a algunos componentes propios de la praxis, las condiciones y (...) el lugar para ella. (shrink)
Praktische Gründe dienen uns Menschen dazu, unser Handeln verständlich zu machen. Philosophen sind fasziniert vom Wesen praktischer Gründe. Auf was für einen Gegenstand beziehen wir uns, wenn wir unser Handeln erklären? Sind praktische Gründe als psychologische Zustände der handelnden Person aufzufassen, etwa als deren Wünsche oder Überzeugungen? Oder sind sie identisch mit den sich in der Welt befindenden Tatsachen, also unabhängig vom Geist der Akteure? Verursachen Gründe unser Handeln? Diese und andere Fragen sind aktueller Gegenstand einer vielschichtigen Diskussion in der (...) analytisch geprägten Handlungstheorie. Dieses Buch bietet eine einschneidende Veränderung in der Sicht auf diese Fragen an. Überlegungen Wittgensteins folgend, werden praktische Gründe nicht als ontologischer Gegenstand, sondern als sprachliche Instrumente aufgefasst, die mit Funktionen und Zwecken verbunden sind. Auf diese Weise gelingt es, einen frischen Blick auf die normativen Bedingungen des Gebrauchs von Gründen, ihre Rolle in praktischen Überlegungsprozessen und ihre Bedeutung für die Motivation und Moral menschlichen Handelns in einer gemeinsam geteilten Praxis zu gewinnen. (shrink)
Se muestra la necesidad de replantear la unidad teórico-práctica de la concepción aristotélica, desde la "crisis" actual del sentido de la existencia humana, atestiguada por el pensamiento posmoderno. Concepción especulativa hegeliana: éste es un hito que permite diferenciar entre modernidad y contemporaneidad, limitando el alcance de la crítica posmoderna. La realización especulativa de la libertad del espíritu en su autonomos y en su autos-arché es planteada como la nueva formulación de la "vida virtuosa" y de la unidad intrínseca entre theoria (...) y praxis en el pensamiento aristotélico. (shrink)
Not only did Paracelsus (1493-1541) censure the logic of the Aristotelians, but also their "Godless" approach to questioning nature. He declared that Aristotle was “a heathen whose work had rightly been condemned repeatedly in church councils." In this essay I elucidate some of the more salient features of Paracelsus’s "epistemology," and draw parallels between his notion of experientia (Erfahrung) and that of Hans-Georg Gadamer. I also discuss Paracelsus’s educational metaphor, his creation myth, and the mysterious doctrine of signatures en route (...) to uncovering his peculiar understanding of the relationship between theory, practice, and experience. (shrink)
The present article reviews the concepts of enunciation in Greimas’s and other semioticians’ works; it examines the way in which these latter revisit Benveniste, the reorientations they propose or the aspects they leave aside, such as the distinction between speaker and enunciator (as the source of a point of view in a propositional content composed of a.
The ‘music appreciation as contemplation’ paradigm of traditional aesthetics and music education assumes that music exists to be contemplated for itself. The resulting distantiation of music and music education from life creates a legitimation crisis for music education. Failing to make a noteworthy musical difference for society, a politics of advocacy attempts to justify music education. Praxial theories of music, instead, see music as pragmatically social in origin, meaning, and value. A praxial approach to music education stresses that appreciation is (...) seen in use; thus, it seeks to ‘make a difference’ that students and society find musically noteworthy. (shrink)
This analysis comments on Bernstein’s lack of clear understanding of subjectivity, based on his book, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis. Bernstein limits his interpretation of subjectivity to thinkers such as Gadamer and Habermas. The authors analyze the ideas of classic scholars such as Edmund Husserl and Friedrich Nietzsche. Husserl put forward his notion of transcendental subjectivity and phenomenological ramifications of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. Nietzsche referred to subjectivity as perspectivism, the inescapable fact that any (...) and all consciousnesses exist in space and time. Consciousness is fundamentally constituted of cultural, linguistic, and historical dimensions. (shrink)
A constructive dialogue between Henry’s phenomenology and Rorty’s pragmatism does not seem very likely: each would probably consider that the other has not been faithful to his claim of breaking with philosophical tradition and thus ultimately reproduces its limits. Nevertheless, one can also note that Henry and Rorty are not at the same level of analysis: while Henry focuses on giving coherent grounds for any philosophical critique of representation, Rorty is occupied with the consequences of such critique on philosophy itself. (...) If one considers this difference, there emerge new results: Henry’s phenomenology is fundamental for the recognition of what Rorty calls the “human being’s sense of self-identity”, while it falls to Rorty’s pragmatism to ensure that, as hoped by Henry, there is “a mode of philosophy that does not harm essence”.  . (shrink)
O presente trabalho visa refletir sobre a experiência vivenciada durante os Estágios Supervisionados em Filosofia III e IV, as dificuldades encontradas, as descobertas no contato direto com a sala de aula e os aprendizados proporcionados ao graduando, de fundamental importancia para a constituição de sua identidade profissional.
Reflecting biomedical, technological and environmental issues of our modern society. The recent “Forum” section in Poiesis & Praxis Content Type Journal Article Category Editorial Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s10202-011-0097-7 Authors Stephan Lingner, Europäische Akademie zur Erforschung von Folgen wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler GmbH, Wilhelmstr. 56, 53474 Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler, Germany Journal Poiesis & Praxis: International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science Online ISSN 1615-6617 Print ISSN 1615-6609 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 1.
In common language, education is mostly understood as teaching. In this article, I would like to employ the hermeneutical philosophy of Merleau-Ponty to draw attention on that other etymological background of education: educere. Education as educere is about liberating or displacing our view instead of achieving a liberated view. In this sense, education does not refer to an immaterial relation of knowing or mastering , but to a relation of being . I hope to demonstrate Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body (...) can make us attentive to the importance of this hermeneutical and praxical character of education. After all, his thinking very aptly describes our relation to the world in terms of a corporeal being rather than in terms of a cognitive or abstract knowing. His conception of corporeality and of our being to the world deconstructs a mere formal and all too immaterial account of education. (shrink)
The purpose of this article is to investigate the meaning of politics as a practical science in Spinoza’s Political Treatise. First, we shall indicate how Spinoza recasts classical division between theoretical sciences, practical sciences and poietical sciences. The focus is on modern dissolution of abstract oppositions between theory and practice. Then we come to the question of poiesis to check how the arts of production are reconsidered by Spinoza from the new concept that stands in the unity between theory and (...) practices. Finally, we hope to contribute for further investigations about Spinoza’s politics as a “practical science”. (shrink)
The article discusses Sartres the o retical conversion towards Marxism and historical ma t e r ialism. It emphasizes, however, that this conversion has ne v e r implied abandoning certain existentialist conc e p t s. In the Critique of dialectical reason Sartre aimed at defining a new dialectics, in which the subjective and ex i stential dimension is part of the process of economic, political and social transformation.
Proponents of empirically supported treatment have argued that psychotherapists have an ethical obligation to make an EST the first choice in clinical practice. This paper challenges this idea. The EST program assumes a model of therapy as technology or applied science that poorly fits the reality of psychotherapeutic practice. The problems brought to therapy implicate fundamental questions regarding what constitutes a good life. A therapeutic response to such problems is not a technical means to change a circumscribed disorder, but an (...) engagement with the client that has relevance to broader moral concerns. Further, the picture of therapy as technology of change implicitly proposes views of a good life, while not acknowledging that it is doing so. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)
The language of science goes from description ton explanation; the first one is concerned in telling how phenomena happen and the second one to tell why they happen. This article explores two postures within science: the descriptive and the explanatory.
Wie beeinflussen sich Recht und Technik? Im ersten Teil dieses Bandes hinterfragen die Autorinnen und Autoren, ob es tatsächlich die rechtliche Entwicklung sein kann, die die Rahmenbedingungen für den technologischen und den damit möglicherweise einhergehenden gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt setzt – oder ob vielmehr das Recht nicht antizipiert, sondern nur reagiert. Damit und mit der globalen Dimension des Themas einher geht die Erkenntnis, dass es vielleicht an der Zeit ist, in einer weltweiten Informationsgesellschaft an neue, auch außerhalb des Rechts liegende Regulierungsansätze zu (...) denken. Im zweiten Teil des Bandes fragen die Autorinnen und Autoren nach der Relevanz des „practice turn“ für Recht und Moral. In ihren Beiträgen zeigen sie unter Rückgriff auf verschiedene philosophische Ansätze, was es für das Verständnis von Normen, Pflichten und Rechten bedeutet, wenn man diese als Teil sozialer Praktiken betrachtet: Wird so ein differenzierteres Bild gewonnen, das neue Möglichkeiten für die Kritik an bestehenden Normen eröffnet? Liegt hier theoretisches Potential für Völker- und Menschenrechtsdebatten? Oder wird die Möglichkeit normativer Begründungen dabei provinzialisiert und am Ende gar zugunsten von sozialtheoretischen Beschreibungen aufgegeben? (shrink)