This paper tries to extricate philosophical education from the restrictions of social and school systems and to commend some independent and subversive views. This is to be accomplished through a conceptual dissection of the term ‘education’. On the one hand, there is education seen as transmitter of the tradition, where to be educated is seen as being able to fit into an established community. There is also another education to which the authority of tradition is a permanent target of resistance, (...) always trying to undermine any educational uniformity. This second history of education, genuinely philosophical, is radically opposed to the history of institutionalized mass-education. However, intention of this paper is not to proclaim this as an "alternative" model, or to build it up as a new mythology. On the contrary, it is being written as a history of continuous subversion. Viewed from this vantage point, autonomous philosophical education is not a subsystem of a social system. This education has itself as a measurement, and always resists the wider community that has accidentally befallen it. Its honor is exactly in this attitude of resistance, in being watchful against any conscription and integration. Understood in this manner, philosophical education is not a useful "implemented" function of society, but is rather its dysfunction. (shrink)

In this paper the author is attempting to establish the relationship - or the lack of it - of the Critical Theory to the "Jewish question" and justification of perceiving signs of Jewish religious heritage in the thought of the representatives of this movement. The holocaust marked out by the name of "Auschwitz", is here tested as a point where the nature of this relationship has been decided. In this encounter with the cardinal challenge for the contemporary social theory, the (...) particularity of the Frankfurt School reaction is here revealed through Adorno installing Auschwitz as unexpected but lawful emblem of the ending of the course that modern history has assumed. The critique of this "fascination" with Auschwitz, as well as certain theoretical pacification and measured positioning of the holocaust into discontinued plane of "unfinished" and continuation and closure of the valued project, are given through communicative-theoretical pre-orientation of J?rgen Habermas?s Critical Theory and of his followers. Finally, through the work of Detlev Claussen, it is suggested that in the youngest generation of Adorno?s students there are signs of revision to once already revised Critical Theory and a kind of defractured and differentiated return to the initial understanding of the decisiveness of the holocaust experience. This shift in the attitude of the Critical Theory thinkers to the provocation of holocaust is not, however, particularly reflected towards the status of Jews and their tradition, but more to the age old questioning and explanatory patterns for which they served as a "model". The question of validity of the enlightenment project, the nature of occidental rationalism, existence of historical theology and understanding of the identity and emancipation - describe the circle of problems around which the disagreement is concentrated in the social critical theory. U ovoj studiji autor nastoji da ustanovi odnos - ili manjak odnosa - Kriticke teorije drustva prema "jevrejskom pitanju", te opravdanost uvidjanja eventualnih tragova jevrejskog religijskog nasledja u misljenju njenih predstavnika. Pritom se holokaust, amblematicki naznacen u imenu "Ausvic" iskusava kao tacka na kojoj se odlucivalo o karakteru tog odnosa. U tom susretu sa kardinalnim izazovom za savremenu drustvenu teoriju, posebnost reakcije Frankfurtske skole izlaze se preko Adornovog instaliranja Ausvica u neoCekivano ali zakonito znamenje kraja onog toka koji je moderna istorija poprimila. Kritike ove "opcinjenosti" Ausvicom, kao i izvesna teorijska pacifikacija i odmereno smestanje holokausta u diskontinuiranu ravan jednog "nedovrsenog" i nastavljanja i dovrsenja vrednog projekta, date su kroz komunikativno teorijsku preorijentaciju Kriticke teorije Jirgena Habermasa i nastavljaca. Najzad se preko dela Detlefa Klausena sugerise da u najmladjoj generaciji Adornovih ucenika postoje signali revizije jednom vec revidirane Kriticke teorije i jednog prelomljenog i diferenciranog povratka izvornim uvidima u odlucnost iskustva holokausta. Ova mena u stavovima Kritickih teoreticara drustva prema provokaciji holokausta se, medjutim, ne ogledu u nekakvoj partikularnoj usmerenosti na status Jevreja i njihove tradicije, vec radije u onim vec dugovekim nedoumenjima i eksplanatornim matricama za koja su posluzili kao "model". Pitanja validnosti projekta prosvetiteljstva prirode okcidentalne racionalnosti, postojanja istorijske teleologije i razumevanja koncepcija identiteta i emancipacije - opisuju onaj problemski krug oko kojega se, i kada je o holokaustu rec, koncentrisu nesaglasja Kriticke teorije drustva. (shrink)

This text gives a critical account of various, often conflicting interpretations of slash fiction - stories based on characters from popular TV show, The Star Trek, written by fans. What makes slash fiction, a subgenre of fan fiction, specific is a homoeroticization of characters that in the original narratives are either explicitly or implicitly heterosexual. Whether such?homoerotic pairing? has any foundation in the original Star Trek narrative, remains an open question. Answers to this question vary greatly. An affirmative answer, however, (...) begs a further question: whether these narratives are?homosexual representations? in a strict gay/lesbian sense? The authors propose that slash represents a non-hegemonic narrative which transgresses borders set up in the original narrative - queering, reexamining thus both sex and gender. (shrink)

The author is here seeking to expose his book Philosophical Animal zoographical persuasion to philosophy, to his own remorseless analysis - and that way defend the book from potential criticism by the others. On the other hand, the author believes that this will open up the space for discussion about the book and themes that book provokes. This discussion is not going to be mere neatly registered response and/or appropriate praise but a contribution inspired by the book, resonating back to (...) it. U ovom radu autor nastoji da svoju knjigu Filozofska zivotinja: zoografski nagovor na filozofiju izlozi vlastitoj bespostednoj analizi ne bi li je preventivno odbranio od potencijalnih kritika drugih. Na taj nacin, s druge strane, on veruje da upravo otvara prostor za takav govor o knjizi i temama koje ona provocira koji ne bi bio tek nakanadno uredno registrovanje i/ili prigodna pohvala, vec njome inspirisan samosvojni prilog koji joj nazad odjekuje. (shrink)

The author, first of all, undertakes to perceive and analyze the role that the metaphor of 'root' plays, as well as the discourse connected with it - 'rooted', 'root out' and so on - in order to examine the functioning of botanical metaphors in modern political theory. Ideological duality is here shown as, in equal measure but in different ways, fixed to the idea of the root of human existence or of the well ordered society - and an image of (...) a tree in blossom, if it has grown out of this condition - in which it is a privileged possession, giving the right to 'radical' actions. The difference is found where one group advocates unconditional nurturing of the given root and the other one urgent necessity of replacing it with new one. As a conclusion, it is suggested that the abandoning of the floral metaphor could not only open up space for reasonable dispute about the questions that it was believed to answer, but also that this kind of retreat from the fascination with root could really be - radical. U ovom prilogu autor sagledava i analizira kakvu ulogu igra metafora 'korena', kao i citav onaj diskurzivni sklop koji se za nju veze - 'ukorenjenost', 'iskorenjenost' i tako dalje - te kako funkcionisu botanicke analogije uopste u modernoj politickoj teoriji. Ideoloska podvajanja se iz ovog aspekta prikazuju kao u jednakoj meri, samo na razlicite nacine, fiksirana za predstavu korena ljudske egzistencije ili dobro uredjenog drustva - i odgovarajucu sliku rascvetalog drveta ukoliko je izniklo na tim osnovama - u cijem su povlascenom posedu i iz kojeg crpu pravo i na 'radikalno' postupanje. Razlika, pak, pocinje tek tamo gde jedni zagovaraju bezuslovno negovanje datog korena a drugi preku neophodnost njegovog zamenjivanja novim. U zakljucku rada se sugerise da bi napustanje floralnih metafora moglo ne samo da otvori prostor za razlozan disput o pitanjima na koja se mislilo da one pruzaju odgovore, nego i da bi tek takvo odstupanje od fascinacije korenom u savremenosti bilo zaista - korenito. (shrink)

Rad nastoji integrirati zapažanja Theodora W. Adorna o odgoju i obrazovanju, koja su rasuta gotovo po čitavome njegovom opusu. Namjera međutim nije doktrinarna: izdala bi se lojalnost autoru i podbacilo ispod njegove kritike kada bi takva integracija nastojala rekonstruirati neku neokupljenu ili neizrečenu Adornovu »prosvjetnu doktrinu«. Kod zakletog antisistematičara ni vizije prosvjetne teorije i prakse ne smiju prerasti u sistem. Riječ je prije o stavu ili držanju koje insistira na pokušaju da se antinomija obrazovanja – neslobodnim sredstvima do cilja slobode, (...) manipulacijom do nemogućnosti da se bude izmanipuliran – unese u školske, i ne samo školske, zadatke, kao cilj koji će onemogućiti ponavljanje Auschwitza, omogućiti autonomiju i osposobiti za autorefleksiju. The paper seeks to integrate Theodor W. Adorno’s observations about upbringing and education, scattered throughout his almost entire opus. The intention, however, is not doctrinal: loyalty to the author would be betrayed and it would fall short of his criticism if such integration would sought to reconstruct some uncollected or unspoken Adorno’s “educational doctrine”. With a sworn antisystematist, even visions of educational theory and practice must not grow into a system. It is rather about an attitude that insists on trying to bring the antinomy of education – by non-free means to the goal of freedom, by manipulation to the point of impossibility to be manipulated – into school and not only school tasks, as a goal that will prevent Auschwitz’s repetition, enable autonomy and empower for self-reflection. (shrink)

This expose deals, first of all, with suppositions, structure and range of human thinking that has been undertaken, very ambitiously, by "philosophical anthropology" at the beginning of the twentieth century. And then, through philosophical critique and self-critique of its status and limitations of this "discipline", it is indicating the orientation of recent controversy regarding the possibilities and characters of radical dismissal and/or reaffirmation of philosopheme "man". U prvom delu ovog clanka je rec o pretpostavkama, strukturi i dometima onog misljenja coveka (...) koje je vrlo ambiciozno preduzela "filozofska antropologija" s pocetka dvadesetog veka. Potom se izlazu razlicite varijante filozofske kritike, kao i antropoloske samokritike statusa i ogranicenja ove "discipline". Najzad, u zavrsnom delu rada se signaliziraju glavni orijentiri recentnih kontroverzi oko mogucnosti i karaktera radikalnog odbacivanja i/ili svojevrsne reafirmacije filozofeme "covek". (shrink)

This paper tries to extricate philosophical education from the restrictions of social and school systems and to commend some independent and subversive views. This is to be accomplished through a conceptual dissection of the term?education?. On the one hand, there is education seen as transmitter of the tradition, where to be educated is seen as being able to fit into an established community. There is also another education to which the authority of tradition is a permanent target of resistance, always (...) trying to undermine any educational uniformity. This second history of education, genuinely philosophical, is radically opposed to the history of institutionalized mass-education. However, intention of this paper is not to proclaim this as an "alternative" model, or to build it up as a new mythology. On the contrary, it is being written as a history of continuous subversion. Viewed from this vantage point, autonomous philosophical education is not a subsystem of a social system. This education has itself as a measurement, and always resists the wider community that has accidentally befallen it. Its honor is exactly in this attitude of resistance, in being watchful against any conscription and integration. Understood in this manner, philosophical education is not a useful "implemented" function of society, but is rather its dysfunction. Rad nastoji da izdvoji filozofsko obrazovanje iz ogranicenja drustvenog i skolskog sistema i da sugerise mogucnost njegovog nezavisnog i "subverzivnog" sagledavanja. Potonje se postize pojmovnim razlaganjem termina "obrazovanje". S jedne strane, postoji obrazovanje kao transmisija tradicije, u kom slucaju se obrazovanost vidi kao sposobnost da se uklopi u ustanovljenu zajednicu. Postoji, medjutim, takodje i jedno drugacije obrazovanje, u cijem registru je autoritet tradicije permanentna tacka otpora. Ono istrajno pokusava da potkopa svaku obrazovnu jednoobraznost. Ova druga istorija obrazovanja, radikalno je suprotstavljena istoriji institucionalizovanog masovnog obrazovanja. Namera ovog rada nije, medjutim, da nju proglasi "alternativnim" modelom ili da je uspostavi kao novu mitologiju. Naprotiv, ona je pisana kao istorija neprestanih diverzija. Sa ovog stanovista sagledana, autonomna filozofska obrazovanost nije podsistem drustvenog sistema. Ovo obrazovanje ima svoju meru u samom sebi i uvek se odupire zajednici koja ga okruzuje i koja ga slucajem dopada. Njegova cast je upravo u ovom stavu otpora, u budnosti prema svakom podvodjenju i integraciji. Na ovaj nacin shvaceno, filozofsko obrazovanje nije tek na jedan odredjeni nacin "implementirana" funkcija drustva, vec pre njegova disfunkcija. (shrink)

This paper presents the two competing models of Enlightenment tolerance and testing their status and scope. In the first part of the paper the author points out the limits of moderate Enlightenment?s?religious tolerance? as represented by Locke and Voltaire. That notion of tolerance to this day dominates in public and academic discourse. The second part of the paper, through figures of Spinoza, Bayle and Diderot, presents the radical Enlightenment?s concept of?universal? or?philosophical? tolerance. The conclusion is that, despite its theoretical superiority, (...) the prospects of social implementation of the latter, fortunately or not, are still no bigger than they were in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. U ovom prilogu izlazu se dva konkurentska prosvetiteljska modela tolerancije i iskusava njihov status i domet. U prvom delu rada se ukazuje na granice one?religijske tolerancije? umerenog toka prosvetiteljstva koju reprezentuju Lok i Volter i koja do danas dominira u javnom i akademskom diskursu. Drugi deo kroz likove Spinoze, Bejla i Didroa, izlaze koncepciju?univerzalne? ili?filozofske? tolerancije radikalnih prosvetitelja. Zakljucuje se da, uprkos njenoj teorijskoj nadmoci, izgledi drustvene implementacije potonje, srecom ili ne, i dalje nisu veci nego sto su bili u sedamnaestom i osamnaestom veku. (shrink)

The inspiration or provocation for this paper came from the animal welfare theorists and environmental philosophers who have questioned the justification of our - real and symbolic - practice of eating meat, and from there challenged our meat-eating and generally devouring culture. The author is attempting to examine this motif - a motif of eating, swallowing devouring - its manifestation, display, findings or far-reaching thematisation that have been taking place more or less in passing in the texts of some pivotal (...) thinkers of modern and contemporary philosophical tradition. It is suggested that grasping the procedure of devouring, perceived from the perspective of its imperceptible and in time almost ceremonial outgrowing into self-understandable gesture of a theory - and not only theory - is at least instructive and inspirational actual moment of consciousness for the entire thought, in other words, an aspect of its critical reconstruction and deconstruction. Inspiracija ili provokacija za ovaj clanak dosla je od onih teoreticara dobrobiti zivotinja i envajarmentalistickih filozofa koji su doveli u pitanje opravdanost nase - stvarne ali i simbolicke - prakse jedenja mesa i, odatle stavili na kusnju celokupnu nasu mesozdresku i, uopste, prozdrljivu kulturu. Autor priloga taj motiv - motiv jedenja, gutanja, zdranja - nastoji da propita na tragu onih njegovih manifestovanja, izlaganja, nalaza ili dalekoseznijih tematizacija koji su se vise ili manje usputno odigravali u nekim tekstovima pojedinih stozernih mislilaca moderne i savremene filozofske tradicije. Sugerise se da je pronicanje figure prozdiranja, sagledane iz perspektive njenog neprimetnog i vremenom gotovo obrednog prerastanja u samorazumljivi gest teorije - i niukoliko ne samo teorije - jedan u najmanju ruku instruktivan i inspirativan aktuelni momenat samosvesti celokupnog misljenja, odnosno vid njegove kriticke rekonstrukcije i dekonstrukcije. (shrink)

Using the representations of science, fiction and science fiction, this article attempts to sketch out a certain line of development in the history of representation of the enhanced human. First it was thought that chemicals could temporarily or permanently improve his natural abilities, then artificial substitutes, inserts and accessories dominated the vision of his improvement. The most recent possibility announced is the fundamental morphological transformation of his biological composition into a completely unrecognizable, amorphous?entity? capable of taking any form. This trajectory (...) of?improvement? of human capacities could be regarded as a gradual advancement in the realization of the pledge of traditional humanism: that man is special precisely for being able to become anything he chooses. (shrink)

Led by Adorno and Horkheimer’s understanding of the three conceptual orienteers - subject, reason and emancipation - this work attempts to sketch a status that they have attributed to the Enlightenment. Ulysses and Oedipus are here used not only in the way those two authors have done, not only to illustrate dialectical contradictions that this "project" falls into and is marked by, but also in a way that signalize possibilities of different interpretations that have relied upon them. Adorno and Horkheimer’s (...) "to enlighten the enlightenment about itself" is thus displayed, extended and examined also in the fields of contemporary thought where they have, in different ways, inspired and provoked new generation of Critical theory, and on the other hand, the postmodern authors. (shrink)

The first part of the article notes the sudden and conspicuous interest for the problem of identity at the turn of the 21st century. It presents Modern and postmodern conceptualizations of collective identity of social theorists. In the second part, the text draws on the legacy of philosophical speculation of the same period. The article aims to show that many of the dilemmas faced by latter-day humanities in their efforts to articulate their thinking of identity as well as difference still (...) have a relevant?pre-game? in the structural and dialectical interrelatedness thematized by philosophers of classical German idealism and the?philosophers of difference.? The text concludes that such?metaphysical? reflection comprises an unavoidable element, which can only be ignored by social theory at its own peril, even if it is not bound by the reflection?s findings. nema. (shrink)

This paper aims to question anew the popular and supposedly self-evident affirmation of education, in its modern incarnation as in its historical notion. The “naive” questions suggest that we have recently taken for granted that education ought to be for the masses, that it ought to be upbringing, and that it is better than ignorance. Drawing on the tradition that calls such an understanding of education into question, the author shows that the hidden costs of disregarding such reflection end up, (...) camouflaged and smuggled, taxing the current debates regarding generally accepted education strategies. The characteristic feeling of the currently accepted model of education being in chronic crisis is less a testament to an absence of alternative approaches than to a lack of thorough self-reflection. (shrink)

Over the Romantic reception of Kant, the author attempts to show a relationship between the Romanticism and the Enlightenment. First part of the paper reconstructs the social conditions that created the strange path of transformation of parts of Kant?s teachings in the romantic motifs. The second part follows the theoretical precomposition of Kant?s thought in Fichte and expressly deviation from it in Novalis and Schlegel. Third section presents the key moments of the Romantic critique of the Enlightenment mind, and fourth (...) its ambiguous pracital-political effects. In conclusion, it is suggested that Romanticism tested and testified the transcending of limits of the very freedom for which Kant believed that man becomes worthy of only if it is used in a lawful and purposeful manner. nema. (shrink)

This paper is attempting to mark dilemmas, de-montage and pre-composition of philosophy that have been noticeable in its self-understanding, for the past few decades. As an answer to the cardinal question, three different and competing strands have been singled out - suggested and represented by Adorno, Habermas and Rorty - where the philosophy believes it could continue to appear. It has been detected, however, that the problem of survival and legitimisation of critique in modern philosophy has been, at first, identified (...) with the question of survival of philosophy itself. Philosophy that has found itself on defense, but without loosing all illusions regarding its mission, it seems to see its last retreat and safe resort in the critical function of philosophy, traditionally understood as continual search for the truth. Nevertheless, politically situated, des-invested, even renouncing that enlightenment figure it seems that for the philosophical theory - more or less transformed - there is still place for autonomous action that is not without direct social consequences.. Ovaj clanak pokusava da oznaci one dileme, demontaze i prekompozicije filozofije, koje su primetne u njenom samorazumevanju u poslednjih nekoliko decenija. Kao odgovor na kardinalno postavljeno pitanje svoje vlastite dalje odrzivosti i opravdanosti, izdvajaju se tri njena razlicita i konkurentska lika - koje sugerisu i reprezentuju Adorno, Habermas i Rorti - pod kojima ona veruje da bi dalje mogla nastupati. Posebna se paznja posvecuje u tom kontekstu pojmu kritike. Detektuje se da je problem prezivljavanja i legitimacije kritike u modernoj filozofiji isprva identifikovan sa pitanjem opstanka same filozofije. Filozofija koja se nasla u defanzivi, a da jos uvek nije izgubila sve iluzije o svojoj misiji, cini se da je u svojoj kritickoj funkciji, tradicionalno shvacenoj kao neprekidna i bespostedna potraga za istinom, videla poslednju odstupnicu i sigurno pribeziste. Sa politickim situiranjem, depatetizacijom, pa cak i abdikacijom te prosvetiteljske figure, izgleda medjutim da se filozofskoj teoriji - doduse, u manjoj ili vecoj meri preobrazenoj - i dalje otvara prostor autonomnog kritickog delovanja, koji ne bi bio lisen i neposrednih drustvenih konsekvenci.. (shrink)

The intention of this paper is to revisit, once again the question asked by Adorno and Habermas and other contemporary thinkers under different headings few decades ago. The author is suggesting that nowadays philosophy requires a final departure from the idea of having single and perennial face, and that this would not only allow, but also enable philosophy to test its various faces freely, that is, without norm or limit set in advance. At the same time, by creating such?liberal? climate (...) philosophy would no longer be frightened by the possible answer, and hence would no longer dramatize the very question of?why still??. Even if philosophy turns out to be far less than the mission it once bestowed upon itself. Namera ovog rada je da jos jedanput iznova propita samo ono pitanje statusa filozofije koje su unazad nekoliko decenija postavili Adorno i Habermas, kao i drugi savremeni mislioci u drugacijim formulacijama. Autor sugerise da filozofija danas potrebuje konacni raskid sa idejom posedovanja jednog i perenijskog lika - sto bi joj ne samo dozvolilo, nego upravo i omogucilo da bez norme i granice postavljene unapred, slobodno iskusa svoje razlicite likove. U isto vreme, stvaranjem ovakve "liberalne" atmosfere u pogledu vlastitog odredjenja i samorazumevanja, ona vise ne bi bila zastrasena mogucim odgovorom, pa stoga vise ne bi ni dramatizovala samo pitanje "cemu jos?". Cak i ukoliko se posle vlastitog dovodjenja u pitanje ispostavi da je njeno znacenje mnogo manje nego ona misija koju je jednom sebi namenila. (shrink)