Preference is a basic notion in human behaviour, underlying such varied phenomena as individual rationality in the philosophy of action and game theory, obligations in deontic logic (we should aim for the best of all possible worlds), or collective decisions in social choice theory. Also, in a more abstract sense, preference orderings are used in conditional logic or non-monotonic reasoning as a way of arranging worlds into more or less plausible ones. The field of preference (...) logic (cf. Hansson [10]) studies formal systems that can express and analyze notions of preference between various sorts of entities: worlds, actions, or propositions. The art is of course to design a language that combines perspicuity and low complexity with reasonable expressive power. In this paper, we take a particularly simple approach. As preferences are binary relations between worlds, they naturally support standard unary modalities. In particular, our key modality ♦ϕ will just say that is ϕ true in some world which is at least as good as the current one. Of course, this notion can also be indexed to separate agents. The essence of this language is already in [4], but our semantics is more general, and so are our applications and later language extensions. Our modal language can express a variety of preference notions between propositions. Moreover, as already suggested in [9], it can “deconstruct” standard conditionals, providing an embedding of conditional logic into more standard modal logics. Next, we take the language to the analysis of games, where some sort of preference logic is evidently needed ([23] has a binary modal analysis different from ours). We show how a qualitative unary preference modality suffices for defining Nash Equilibrium in strategic games, and also the Backward Induction solution for finite extensive games. Finally, from a technical perspective, our treatment adds a new twist. Each application considered in this paper suggests the need for some additional access to worlds before the preference modality can unfold its true power.. (shrink)

This paper traces the intellectual effects of an encounter between Stig Kanger and Donald Davidson -two very different philosophers working in two seemingly unconnected areas. Their meeting in Oslo 1979 led the latter to improve his influential theory of radical interpretation and gave the former an inspiration for a rather striking paradox in preference logic. But, as we show, the paradox can be dis-solved and the radical interpretation continues to confront serious difficulties. Simultaneous elicitation of a speaker’s meaning, (...) beliefs and desires merely from his attitudes to sentences in the language he uses is a very ambitious project, but its theoretic viability is strongly questionable. (shrink)

Statements not only update our current knowledge, but also have other dynamic effects. In particular, suggestions or commands ?upgrade' our preferences by changing the current order among worlds. We present a complete logic of knowledge update plus preference upgrade that works with dynamic-epistemic-style reduction axioms. This system can model changing obligations, conflicting commands, or ?regret'. We then show how to derive reduction axioms from arbitrary definable relation changes. This style of analysis also has a product update version with (...) preferences between actions, as well as worlds. Some illustrations are presented involving defaults and obligations. We conclude that our dynamic framework is viable, while admitting a further extension to more numerical ?utility update'. (shrink)

In this paper, illocutionary acts of commanding will be differentiated from perlocutionary acts that affect preferences of addressees in a new dynamic logic which combines the preference upgrade introduced in DEUL (dynamic epistemic upgrade logic) by van Benthem and Liu with the deontic update introduced in ECL II (eliminative command logic II) by Yamada. The resulting logic will incorporate J. L. Austin’s distinction between illocutionary acts as acts having mere conventional effects and perlocutionary acts as (...) acts having real effects upon attitudes and actions of agents, and help us understand why saying so can make it so in explicit performative utterances. We will also discuss how acts of commanding give rise to so-called “deontic dilemmas” and how we can accommodate most deontic dilemmas without triggering so-called “deontic explosion”. (shrink)

A new possible world semantics for deontic logic is proposed. Its intuitive basis is that prohibitive predicates (such as "wrong" and "prohibited") have the property of negativity, i.e. that what is worse than something wrong is itself wrong. The logic of prohibitive predicates is built on this property and on preference logic. Prescriptive predicates are defined in terms of prohibitive predicates, according to the wellknown formula "ought" = "wrong that not". In this preference-based deontic (...) class='Hi'>logic (PDL), those theorems that give rise to the paradoxes of standard deontic logic (SDL) are not obtained. (E.g., O(p & q) → Op & Oq and Op → O(p v q)) are theorems of SDL but not of PDL.) The more plausible theorems of SDL, however, can be derived in PDL. (shrink)

The Barth–Krabbe–Hintikka–Hintikka Problem, independently raised by Barth and Krabbe and Hintikka and Hintikka Sherlock Holmes confronts modern logic: Toward a theory of information-seeking through questioning. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983), is the problem of characterizing the strategic reasoning of the players of dialogical logic and game-theoretic semantics games from rational preferences rather than rules. We solve the problem by providing a set of preferences for players with bounded rationality and specifying strategic inferences from those preferences, for a variant (...) of logical dialogues. This solution is generalized to both game-theoretic semantics and orthodox dialogical logic. (shrink)

In this paper I generalize the new approach to nonmonotonicreasoning that was presented in [6]. This generalization results in the inconsistency-adaptive logic PRL . I give proof theory, semantics, mention interesting properties,and comment on the reconstruction and amelioration of other nonmonotoniclogics and mechanisms.

SOCREAL 2013 : 3rd International Workshop on Philosophy and Ethics of Social Reality 2013. Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan, 25-27 October 2013. Session 3 : Logic, Norms, and Preferences.

Preference is a key area where analytic philosophy meets philosophical logic. I start with two related issues: reasons for preference, and changes in preference, first mentioned in von Wright’s book The Logic of Preference but not thoroughly explored there. I show how these two issues can be handled together in one dynamic logical framework, working with structured two-level models, and I investigate the resulting dynamics of reason-based preference in some detail. Next, I study (...) the foundational issue of entanglement between preference and beliefs, and relate the resulting richer logics to belief revision theory and decision theory. (shrink)

Preference is a key area where analytic philosophy meets philosophical logic. I start with two related issues: reasons for preference, and changes in preference, first mentioned in von Wright’s book The Logic of Preference but not thoroughly explored there. I show how these two issues can be handled together in one dynamic logical framework, working with structured two-level models, and I investigate the resulting dynamics of reason-based preference in some detail. Next, I study (...) the foundational issue of entanglement between preference and beliefs, and relate the resulting richer logics to belief revision theory and decision theory. (shrink)

In preference aggregation a set of individuals express preferences over a set of alternatives, and these preferences have to be aggregated into a collective preference. When preferences are represented as orders, aggregation procedures are called social welfare functions. Classical results in social choice theory state that it is impossible to aggregate the preferences of a set of individuals under different natural sets of axiomatic conditions. We define a first-order language for social welfare functions and we give a complete (...) axiomatisation for this class, without having the number of individuals or alternatives specified in the language. We are able to express classical axiomatic requirements in our first-order language, giving formal axioms for three classical theorems of preference aggregation by Arrow, by Sen, and by Kirman and Sondermann. We explore to what extent such theorems can be formally derived from our axiomatisations, obtaining positive results for Sen’s Theorem and the Kirman-Sondermann Theorem. For the case of Arrow’s Theorem, which does not apply in the case of infinite societies, we have to resort to fixing the number of individuals with an additional axiom. In the long run, we hope that our approach to formalisation can serve as the basis for a fully automated proof of classical and new theorems in social choice theory. (shrink)

How may we best understand the motivational structure that stands behind individuals' acts of voting? In “The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington” we suggested that expressive concerns swamp narrowly consequential motivations, in contradistinction to normal market transactions in which the priority is reversed. A striking consequence of this fact is that individuals will be led to vote for outcomes that they would reject were they in a position to act decisively. In this regard we found the moral psychology Adam Smith (...) develops in The Theory of Moral Sentiments remarkably fecund in suggesting alternatives to what we call the standard theory of electoral behavior. (shrink)

The article studies preferences of agents in a setting with imperfect information. For such a setting, the authors propose a new class of preferences. It is said that an agent prefers one statement over another if, among all indistinguishable worlds, the agent prefers the worlds where the first statement is true to those where the second one is true. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system describing the interplay between a binary modality capturing preferences and the (...) knowledge modality. The proof of completeness is using a newly proposed “tumbled pairs” technique. (shrink)

We contrast Bonanno’s ‘Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework’ [15] with preference change and belief revision from the perspective of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). For that, we extend the logic of communication and change of [11] with relational substitutions [8] for preference change, and show that this does not alter its properties. Next we move to a more constrained context where belief and knowledge can be defined from preferences [29; 14; 5; 7], prove completeness of a (...) very expressive logic of belief revision, and define a mechanism for updating belief revision models using a combination of action priority update [7] and preference substitution [8]. (shrink)

An explication of preference and equivalence with regard to the evaluation of states of affairs. The logical system developed consists of the ordinary propositional calculus together with connectives standing for the notions above. In the course of this study a number of useful distinctions and definitions can be found. The author indicates that his logic of preference may be of use in connection with utility and decision theory, but does not develop this point.--R. H. T.

History based models suggest a process-based approach to epistemic and temporal reasoning. In this work, we introduce preferences to history based models. Motivated by game theoretical observations, we discuss how preferences can dynamically be updated in history based models. Following, we consider arrow update logic and event calculus, and give history based models for these logics. This allows us to relate dynamic logics of history based models to a broader framework.

This article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in order to recover first-order logical consequence from a fragment of natural language argumentation are also forthcoming from preference profiles of boundedly rational players, provided that these players instantiate a specific player type and compute partial strategies. We present two structural rules, which are formulated similarly to closure rules for tableaux proofs that restrict players' strategies to a mapping between games in extensive forms and proof trees. (...) Both rules are motivated from players' preferences and limitations; they can therefore be viewed as being player-self-imposable. First-order logical consequence is thus shown to result from playing a specific type of argumentation game. The alignment of such games with the normative model of the Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is positively evaluated. But explicit rules to guarantee that the argumentation game instantiates first-order logical consequence have now become gratuitous, since their normative content arises directly from players' preferences and limitations. A similar naturalization for non-classical logics is discussed. (shrink)

We investigate in intuitionistic first-order logic various principles of preference relations alternative to the standard ones based on the transitivity and completeness of weak preference. In particular, we suggest two ways in which completeness can be formulated while remaining faithful to the spirit of constructive reasoning, and we prove that the cotransitivity of the strict preference relation is a valid intuitionistic alternative to the transitivity of weak preference. Along the way, we also show that the (...) acyclicity axiom is not finitely axiomatizable in first-order logic. (shrink)

Without introducing quantifiers, minimal axiomatic systems have already been constructed for Peirce's triadic logics. The present paper constructs a dual pair of axiomatic systems which can be used to introduce quantifiers into Peirce's preferred system of triadic logic. It is assumed (on the basis of textual evidence) that Peirce would prefer a system which rejects the absurd but tolerates the absolutely undecidable. The systems which are introduced are shown to be absolutely consistent, deductively complete, and minimal. These dual axiomatic (...) systems reveal an interesting elegance, independent of their historical motivation. (shrink)