Results for 'Premises, background assumptions, non-rational disputes, deep disagreements'

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  1.  21
    Arguing, Arguments, and Deep Disagreements.Peter Davson-Galle - 1992 - Informal Logic 14 (2).
    In response to earlier papers in Informal Logic by Robert Fogelin and Andrew Lugg, this paper explores the issue of whether disagreement could ever be so deep that it defied rational resolution. Contra Lugg, I agree with Fogelin that such unresolvable disagreement is possible and, contra Fogelin, I suggest that the focus of such disagreement can be quite Iimited-a single proposition rather than a whole system of beliefs. I also suggest that emphasising arguing as a human practice rather than (...)
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  2.  56
    Knowing When Disagreements Are Deep.David M. Adams - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):65-77.
    Reasoned disagreement is a pervasive feature of public life, and the persistence of disagreement is sometimes troublesome, reflecting the need to make difficult decisions. Fogelin suggests that parties to a deep disagreement should abandon reason and switch to non-rational persuasion. But how are the parties to know when to make such a switch? I argue that Fogelin's analysis doesn't clearly address this question, and that disputes arising in areas like medical decision making are such that the parties to (...)
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  3.  14
    The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements.Kirk Lougheed - 2018 - Informal Logic 38 (2):263-292.
    In the epistemology of disagreement literature an underdeveloped argument defending the claim that an agent need not conciliate when she becomes aware of epistemic peer disagreement is based on the idea that there are epistemic benefits to be gained from disagreement. Such benefits are unobtainable if an agent conciliates in the face of peer disagreement. I argue that there are good reasons to embrace this line of argument at least in inquiry-related contexts. In argumentation theory a deep disagreement occurs (...)
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  4.  36
    Deep Disagreements and Rational Resolution.Jonathan Matheson - forthcoming - Topoi:1-13.
    The purpose of this paper is to bring together work on disagreement in both epistemology and argumentation theory in a way that will advance the relevant debates. While these literatures can intersect in many ways, I will explore how some of views pertaining to deep disagreements in argumentation theory can act as an objection to a prominent view of the epistemology of disagreement—the Equal Weight View. To do so, I will explain the Equal Weight View of peer disagreement (...)
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  5.  16
    Hinges, Disagreements, and Arguments: Believing Hinge Propositions and Arguing Across Deep Disagreements.Harvey Siegel - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
    Wittgenstein famously introduced the notion of ‘hinge propositions’: propositions that are assumptions or presuppositions of our languages, conceptual schemes, and language games, presuppositions that cannot themselves be rationally established, defended, or challenged. This idea has given rise to an epistemological approach, ‘hinge epistemology’, which itself has important implications for argumentation. In particular, it develops and provides support for Robert Fogelin’s case for deep disagreements: disagreements that cannot be rationally resolved by processes of rational argumentation. In this paper, (...)
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  6.  15
    John Locke's Two Treatises of Government: New Interpretations.John P. Hittinger - 1994 - Review of Metaphysics 47 (3):615-617.
    The last thirty years has witnessed an explosion of scholarly books and articles on Locke which, claims Harpham, has "recast our most basic understanding of Locke as a historical actor and political theorist, the Two Treatises as a document, and liberalism as a coherent tradition of political discourse". The seven articles in this volume attempt to assess this "new scholarship," which is described as revisionist and historicist. This volume is now probably the best introduction to the "new scholarship." The introduction (...)
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  7.  58
    Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - Synthese:1-33.
    This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about (...)
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  8.  69
    Disagreement Over Vaccination Programmes: Deep Or Merely Complex and Why Does It Matter? [REVIEW]Tim Dare - 2014 - HEC Forum 26 (1):43-57.
    This paper argues that significant aspects of the vaccination debate are ‘deep’ in a sense described by Robert Fogelin and others. Some commentators have suggested that such disagreements warrant rather threatening responses. I argue that appreciating that a disagreement is deep might have positive implications, changing our moral assessment of individuals and their decisions, shedding light on the limits of the obligation to give and respond to arguments in cases of moral disagreement, and providing an incentive to (...)
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  9. Rational Choice on Non-Finite Sets by Means of Expansion-Contraction Axioms.M. Carmen Sánchez - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (1):1-17.
    The rationalization of a choice function, in terms of assumptions that involve expansion or contraction properties of the feasible set, over non-finite sets is analyzed. Schwartz's results, stated in the finite case, are extended to this more general framework. Moreover, a characterization result when continuity conditions are imposed on the choice function, as well as on the binary relation that rationalizes it, is presented.
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  10.  10
    Beyond Argument: A Hegelian Approach to Deep Disagreements.Connie Wang - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.
    Connie Wang ABSTRACT: Accounts of deep disagreements can generally be categorized as optimistic or pessimistic. Pessimistic interpretations insist that the depth of deep disagreements precludes the possibility of rational resolution altogether, while optimistic variations maintain the contrary. Despite both approaches’ respective positions, they nevertheless often, either explicitly or implicitly, agree on the underlying assumption that...
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  11.  36
    Settling Rational Disputes -- A Dead End?Erdinç Sayan - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:3-12.
    Many wonder at the abundance of disputes, opposing views and schools in philosophy. This abundance is surprising in view of the fact that philosophers are known for their striving and high regard for rationality. (There are, of course, philosophers who attempt to oppose, mostly by rational argumentation, the view that philosophy should be a rational discipline.) Why are all these admirably smart and rational people in so much disagreement with each other? Suvar Köseraif argues that the explanation of this phenomenon (...)
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  12.  6
    Settling Rational Disputes -- A Dead End?Erdinç Sayan - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:3-12.
    Many wonder at the abundance of disputes, opposing views and schools in philosophy. This abundance is surprising in view of the fact that philosophers are known for their striving and high regard for rationality. Why are all these admirably smart and rational people in so much disagreement with each other? Suvar Köseraif argues that the explanation of this phenomenon may lie in the fact that when two perfectly rational agents A 1 and A 2 disagree about matters of truth, there (...)
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  13.  51
    Deep Disagreement, Rational Resolutions, and Critical Thinking.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):12-23.
    According to Robert Fogelin, deep disagreements are disagreements about fundamental principles. He argues that deep disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. In this paper I argue against this thesis. A key part of the response depends upon the claim that disagreements can be rationally resolved not only by one participant rationally coming around to the other's point of view, but also by both of them rationally suspending judgment about the disputed proposition. I also claim that (...)
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  14.  18
    Revisiting Deep Disagreement.Dale Turner & Larry Wright - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):25-35.
    Argument-giving reasons for a view-is our model of rational dispute resolution. Fogelin suggests that certain "deep" disagreements cannot be resolved in this way because features of their context "undercut the conditions essential to arguing" . In this paper we add some detail to Fogelin's treatment of intractable disagreements. In doing so we distinguish between his relatively modest claim that some disputes cannot be resolved through argument and his more radical claim that such disputes are beyond rational resolution. (...)
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  15.  41
    Beyond the Best Interests of Children: Four Views of the Family and of Foundational Disagreements Regarding Pediatric Decision Making.H. T. Engelhardt - 2010 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (5):499-517.
    This paper presents four different understandings of the family and their concomitant views of the authority of the family in pediatric medical decision making. These different views are grounded in robustly developed, and conflicting, worldviews supported by disparate basic premises about the nature of morality. The traditional worldviews are often found within religious communities that embrace foundational metaphysical premises at odds with the commitments of the liberal account of the family dominant in the secular culture of the West. These disputes (...)
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  16.  8
    Searching for Deep Disagreement in Logic: The Case of Dialetheism.Benjamin Joseph Lewis Martin - 2019 - Topoi:1-12.
    According to Fogelin’s account of deep disagreements, disputes caused by a clash in framework propositions are necessarily rationally irresolvable. Fogelin’s thesis is a claim about real-life, and not purely hypothetical, arguments: there are such disagreements, and they are incapable of rational resolution. Surprisingly then, few attempts have been made to find such disputes in order to test Fogelin’s thesis. This paper aims to rectify that failure. Firstly, it clarifies Fogelin’s concept of deep disagreement and shows there (...)
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  17.  30
    Fact-Dependent Policy Disagreements and Political Legitimacy.Klemens Kappel - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):313-331.
    Suppose we have a persistent disagreement about a particular set of policy options, not because of an underlying moral disagreement, or a mere conflict of interest, but rather because we disagree about a crucial non-normative factual assumption underlying the justification of the policy choices. The main question in the paper is what political legitimacy requires in such cases, or indeed whether there are defensible answers to that question. The problem of political legitimacy in fact-dependent policy disagreements has received almost (...)
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  18.  50
    The Limits of Critical Thinking.Don S. Levi - 1992 - Informal Logic 14 (2).
    This paper examines Robert Fogelin's suggestion that there may be deep disagreements, where no argument can address what is at issue. A number of possible bases for Fogelin's position are considered and rejected: people sometimes do not have enough in common for reasons to count as reasons; doubt is possible only against the background of framework propositions; key premises may be inarguable; argument must occur within a conceptual framework. The paper concludes by reflecting on why it is (...)
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  19.  48
    Tradizioni religiose e diversità.Daniele Bertini - 2016 - Edizioni Fondazione Centro Studi Campostrini.
    Most literature on religious beliefs and disagreements among traditions focuses on a bit of mainstream assumptions: religions should be construed in substantive terms; religions are to be individuated by their core belief systems; adherents to a single tradition assent to the same belief system; religious beliefs have factual content; incompatible religious beliefs cannot be both true; and so on. In my work I question all these claims in order to defend a non kantian approach to deep pluralism. In (...)
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  20.  96
    Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons.Theo Van Willigenburg - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1):45-62.
    Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of practical reasoning (...)
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  21.  16
    Do Deep Disagreements Motivate Relativism?Victoria Lavorerio - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
    In his 2014 article “Motivations for Relativism as a Solution to Disagreements”, Steven Hales argues that relativism is a plausible disagreement resolution strategy for epistemically irresolvable disagreements. I argue that his relativistic strategy is not adequate for disagreements of this kind, because it demands an impossible doxastic state for disputants to resolve the disagreement. Contrarily, Fogelin’s :1–8, 1985) theory of deep disagreement does not run into the same problems. Deep disagreements, according to Fogelin, cannot (...)
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  22. Wittgenstein and the Logic of Deep Disagreement.David Godden & William H. Brenner - 2010 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 2:41-80.
    In “The logic of deep disagreements” (Informal Logic, 1985), Robert Fogelin claimed that there is a kind of disagreement – deep disagreement – which is, by its very nature, impervious to rational resolution. He further claimed that these two views are attributable to Wittgenstein. Following an exposition and discussion of that claim, we review and draw some lessons from existing responses in the literature to Fogelin’s claims. In the final two sections (6 and 7) we explore the (...)
     
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  23. Religious Disagreements and Epistemic Rationality.David M. Holley - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):33-48.
    Richard Feldman has argued that in cases of religious disagreement between epistemic peers who have shared all relevant evidence, epistemic rationality requires suspense of judgment. I argue that Feldman’s postulation of completely shared evidence is unrealistic for the kinds of disputes he is considering, since different starting points will typically produce different assessments of what the evidence is and how it should be weighed. Feldman argues that there cannot be equally reasonable starting points, but his extension of the postulate of (...)
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  24. Conciliationism and Moral Spinelessness.James Fritz - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):101-118.
    This paper presents a challenge to conciliationist views of disagreement. I argue that conciliationists cannot satisfactorily explain why we need not revise our beliefs in response to certain moral disagreements. Conciliationists can attempt to meet this challenge in one of two ways. First, they can individuate disputes narrowly. This allows them to argue that we have dispute-independent reason to distrust our opponents’ moral judgment. This approach threatens to license objectionable dogmatism. It also inappropriately gives deep epistemic significance to (...)
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  25.  12
    Searching for Common Ground on Hamas Through Logical Argument Mapping.Michael H. G. Hoffmann - unknown
    Robert Fogelin formulated the thesis “that deep disagreements cannot be resolved through the use of argument, for they undercut the conditions essential to arguing.” The possibility of arguing presupposes “a shared background of beliefs and preferences,” and if such a background is not given, there is no way of “rational” dispute resolution. By contrast to this pessimistic view, I will propose a method that has been developed to overcome difficulties as described by Fogelin.
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  26.  11
    The Significance of Behaviour-Related Criteria for Textual Exegesis—and Their Neglect in Indian Studies.Claus Oetke - 2013 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 41 (4):359-437.
    Against the background of the fact that speakers not seldom intend to convey imports which deviate from the linguistically expressed meanings of linguistic items, the present article addresses some consequences of this phenomenon which appear to still be neglected in textual studies. It is suggested that understanding behaviour is in some respect a primary objective of exegesis and that due attention must be attributed to the high diversity of behaviour-related criteria by which interpretations of linguistic items are to be (...)
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  27. Moral Intuitions, Moral Facts, and Justification in Ethics.Stefan S. Sencerz - 1992 - Dissertation, The University of Rochester
    A central and fundamental problem in moral philosophy is that of understanding how moral principles and theories can be justified. It involves finding rational solutions to both theoretical problems and to substantial moral questions . According to Moral Intuitionism, some normative judgments, usually called moral intuitions, justify moral principles and theories. Typically, moral intuitionists promise a method that is supposed to yield progress toward finding the answers to ethical disputes and controversies. ;I argue, first, that all versions of moral intuitionism (...)
     
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  28.  19
    Modality and its Conversational Backgrounds in the Reconstruction of Argumentation.Andrea Rocci - 2008 - Argumentation 22 (2):165-189.
    The paper considers the role of modality in the rational reconstruction of standpoints and arguments. The paper examines in what conditions modal markers can act as argumentative indicators and what kind of cues they provide for the reconstruction of argument. The paper critically re-examines Toulmin’s hypothesis that the meaning of the modals can be analyzed in terms of a field-invariant argumentative force and field-dependent criteria in the light of the Theory of Relative Modality developed within linguistic semantics, showing how this (...)
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  29.  44
    Argumentation Without Arguments Proper.Gábor Forrai - 2014 - In Gizella Horváth, Rozália Klára Bakos & Éva Bíró-Kaszás (eds.), Ten Years of Facebook, The Third Argumentor Conference. Partium Press, Debrecen University Press. pp. 219-238..
    The purpose of the paper is to draw attention to a kind of rational persuasion which has received little attention in argument studies even though its existence is acknowledged in other fields. I start with a brief analysis of the debates conducted in the comments on a philosophical blog. The posts are addressed to a non-academic audience, always end with a problem, and the reader is invited to offer a solution. In the comments we hardly ever find arguments in the (...)
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  30. Swinburne’s Modal Argument for the Existence of a Soul.Rafal Urbaniak & Agnieszka Rostalska - 2009 - Philo 12 (1):73-88.
    Richard Swinburne (Swinburne and Shoemaker 1984; Swinburne 1986) argues that human beings currently alive have non{bodily immaterial parts called souls. In his main argument in support of this conclusion (modal argument), roughly speaking, from the assumption that it is logically possible that a human being survives the destruction of their body and a few additional premises, he infers the actual existence of souls. After a brief presentation of the argument we describe the main known objection to it, called the substitution (...)
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  31.  9
    Modus Vivendi Liberalism, Practice-Dependence and Political Legitimacy.Valentina Gentile - 2018 - Biblioteca Della Libertà (222):1-21.
    Contemporary political theory is characterised by a realistic critique of liberalism. Realist theorising is seen as avoiding foundational disagreements about justice mutating into second-order disputes concerning the justifiability of legitimate political institutions. In this sense, the realist critique challenges a key aspect of Rawls’ liberal project – that is, its justificatory constituency. McCabe’s Modus Vivendi Liberalism presents an interesting case of such a critique. Given the condition of deep pluralism that characterizes contemporary democracies, the liberal Justificatory Requirement (JR) (...)
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  32.  88
    Object-Oriented France: The Philosophy of Tristan Garcia.Graham Harman - 2012 - Continent 2 (1):6-21.
    continent. 2.1 (2012): 6–21. The French philosopher and novelist Tristan Garcia was born in Toulouse in 1981. This makes him rather young to have written such an imaginative work of systematic philosophy as Forme et objet , 1 the latest entry in the MétaphysiqueS series at Presses universitaires de France. But this reference to Garcia’s youthfulness is not a form of condescension: by publishing a complete system of philosophy in the grand style, he has already done what none of us (...)
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  33.  28
    Political Poetry: A Few Notes. Poetics for N30.Jeroen Mettes - 2012 - Continent 2 (1):29-35.
    continent. 2.1 (2012): 29–35. Translated by Vincent W.J. van Gerven Oei from Jeroen Mettes. "Politieke Poëzie: Enige aantekeningen, Poëtica bij N30 (versie 2006)." In Weerstandbeleid: Nieuwe kritiek . Amsterdam: De wereldbibliotheek, 2011. Published with permission of Uitgeverij Wereldbibliotheek, Amsterdam. L’égalité veut d’autres lois . —Eugène Pottier The modern poem does not have form but consistency (that is sensed), no content but a problem (that is developed). Consistency + problem = composition. The problem of modern poetry is capitalism. Capitalism—which has no (...)
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  34.  9
    Life's Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions Of The Soul. [REVIEW]James Lennox - 2002 - Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 93:104-105.
    Life's Form is that rarest of books: an important contribution to advanced scholarship on its subject that is thoroughly accessible to nonspecialists. It immerses its readers in the world of the sixteenth‐ to seventeenth‐century scientia de anima, within which, and out of which, emerges Descartes's decidedly non‐Aristotelian conception of the body‐soul relation that has haunted us ever since. We are treated to lengthy, elegant translations of the Latin texts of the leading Jesuit philosophers of the period, principally Toletus, Sudrez, Fonseca, (...)
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  35.  17
    Newman’s Standing as a Philosopher.Ian Ker - 2004 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:71-81.
    Newman’s English empiricist background had alienated him from neoscholastic and analytic philosophers. His theological concerns separated him fromother empiricists, while his empiricism separated him from idealist philosophers who gave serious consideration to religious ideas. It is only recently that Newman has begun to be taken seriously as a philosopher as well as a theologian. We can now see that Newman identifies epistemological problems and offers solutions that are philosophically relevant today. In the words of Basil Mitchell, Newman was original (...)
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  36.  19
    The New Rhetoric, Practical Reason, and Justification: The Communicative Relativism of Chaim Perelman. [REVIEW]Joseph Beatty - 1983 - Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (4):325-334.
    In following what I take to be the central theme in these volumes I have not discussed several topics which are important and deserve mention: a careful, lengthy section on ‘justice’ and the disambiguation of various of its senses, a fecund account of the difference between classical and romantic modes in argumentation, a brief but incisive critique of Skinner's behaviorism, a treatment of the function of various sorts of “commonplaces” and “confused notions” in argument, and a consideration of the relation (...)
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  37.  3
    Newman’s Standing as a Philosopher.Ian Ker - 2004 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:71-81.
    Newman’s English empiricist background had alienated him from neoscholastic and analytic philosophers. His theological concerns separated him fromother empiricists, while his empiricism separated him from idealist philosophers who gave serious consideration to religious ideas. It is only recently that Newman has begun to be taken seriously as a philosopher as well as a theologian. We can now see that Newman identifies epistemological problems and offers solutions that are philosophically relevant today. In the words of Basil Mitchell, Newman was original (...)
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  38.  1
    Deep Disagreements on Social and Political Justice: Their Meta-Ethical Relevance and the Need for a New Research Perspective.Manuel Knoll - 2018 - In Nurdane Şimsek, Stephen Snyder & Manuel Knoll (eds.), New Perspectives on Distributive Justice: Deep Disagreements, Pluralism, and the Problem of Consensus. De Gruyter. pp. 23-52.
    This article starts off with a historical section showing that deep disagreements among notions of social and political justice are a characteristic feature of the history of political thought. Since no agreement or consensus on distributive justice is possible, the article argues that political philosophers should – instead of continuously proposing new normative theories of justice – focus on analyzing the reasons, significance, and consequences of such kinds of disagreements. The next two sections are analytical. The first (...)
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  39.  8
    Effect of Non-Rational Factors on Inductive Reasoning.J. J. B. Morgan - 1944 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 34 (2):159.
  40.  40
    Investigating the Shared Background Required for Argument: A Critique of Fogelin's Thesis on Deep Disagreement.Dana Phillips - 2008 - Informal Logic 28 (2):86-101.
    Robert Fogelin claims that interlocutors must share a framework of background beliefs and commitments in order to fruitfully pursue argument. I refute Fogelin’s claim by investigating more thoroughly the shared background required for productive argument. I find that this background consists not in any common beliefs regarding the topic at hand, but rather in certain shared pro-cedural commitments and competencies. I suggest that Fogelin and his supporters mistakenly view shared beliefs as part of the required background (...)
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  41.  17
    Suffering Strangers: An Historical, Metaphysical, and Epistemological Non-Ecumenical Interchange.M. J. Cherry - 1996 - Christian Bioethics 2 (2):253-266.
    To comprehend pain, disease, death and suffering as being meaningful - beyond the firing of synapses, the collapse of human abilities, and the mere end of life - requires a context in which to evaluate essential connotations, as well as to place and integrate understandings. If pain and suffering are to have enduring significance, they must be situated within a nest of ontological background assumptions, standards of inquiry, and epistemological foundations. Where secular bioethics fails to give deep meaning (...)
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  42.  41
    Belief Revision, Non-Monotonic Reasoning, and the Ramsey Test.Charles B. Cross - 1990 - In Kyburg Henry E., Loui Ronald P. & Carlson Greg N. (eds.), Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 223--244.
    Peter Gärdenfors has proved (Philosophical Review, 1986) that the Ramsey rule and the methodologically conservative Preservation principle are incompatible given innocuous-looking background assumptions about belief revision. Gärdenfors gives up the Ramsey rule; I argue for preserving the Ramsey rule and interpret Gärdenfors's theorem as showing that no rational belief-reviser can avoid reasoning nonmonotonically. I argue against the Preservation principle and show that counterexamples to it always involve nonmonotonic reasoning. I then construct a new formal model of belief revision that (...)
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  43.  46
    Non-Rational Action in the Face of Disagreement: An Argument Against Non-Conformism.Nikolaj Pedersen - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2935-2966.
    Recently there has been a surge of interest in the intersection between epistemology and action theory, especially in principles linking rationality in thought and rationality in action. Recently there has also been a surge of interest in the epistemic significance of perceived peer disagreement: what, epistemically speaking, is the rational response in light of disagreement with someone whom one regards as an epistemic peer? The objective of this paper is to explore these two issues—separately, but also in connection with one (...)
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  44.  47
    Social Epistemic Liberalism and the Problem of Deep Epistemic Disagreements.Klemens Kappel & Karin Jønch-Clausen - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):371-384.
    Recently Robert B. Talisse has put forth a socio-epistemic justification of liberal democracy that he believes qualifies as a public justification in that it purportedly can be endorsed by all reasonable individuals. In avoiding narrow restraints on reasonableness, Talisse argues that he has in fact proposed a justification that crosses the boundaries of a wide range of religious, philosophical and moral worldviews and in this way the justification is sufficiently pluralistic to overcome the challenges of reasonable pluralism familiar from Rawls. (...)
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  45. Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.
    Non-cognitivism might seem to offer a plausible account of evaluative judgments, at least on the assumption that there is a satisfactory solution to the Frege-Geach problem. However, Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivism remains implausible even assuming that the Frege-Geach problem can be solved, on the grounds that non-cognitivism still has to classify some paradigmatically rational inferences as irrational. Dorr's argument is ingenious and at first glance seems decisive. However, in this paper I will show that Dorr's argument equivocates between (...)
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  46.  16
    How Do Board Size and Occupational Background of Directors Influence Social Performance in For-Profit and Non-Profit Organizations? Evidence From California Hospitals.Ge Bai - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 118 (1):171-187.
    This study investigates how board size and occupational background of directors differentially influence social performance in for-profit and non-profit organizations. Using data from California hospitals, we develop a quantitative measure of social performance and provide the following empirical evidence. First, board size is negatively (positively) associated with social performance in for-profit (non-profit) hospitals. Second, the presence of government officials on the board is negatively (positively) related to social performance in for-profit (non-profit) hospitals. Third, representation of physicians on the board (...)
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  47. Unrealistic Assumptions in Rational Choice Theory.Aki Lehtinen & Jaakko Kuorikoski - 2007 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (2):115-138.
    The most common argument against the use of rational choice models outside economics is that they make unrealistic assumptions about individual behavior. We argue that whether the falsity of assumptions matters in a given model depends on which factors are explanatorily relevant. Since the explanatory factors may vary from application to application, effective criticism of economic model building should be based on model-specific arguments showing how the result really depends on the false assumptions. However, some modeling results in imperialistic applications (...)
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  48.  70
    Non-Rational Aspects of Skilled Agency.Yannig Luthra - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2267-2289.
    This paper criticizes two closely connected rationalist views about human agency. The first of these views, rationalism about agential control, claims that the capacities for agential control in normal adult human beings are rational capacities. The second view, rationalism about action, claims that the capacities for agential control in virtue of which the things we do count as our actions are rational capacities. The arguments of the paper focus on aspects of technical skills that control integral details of skillful action, (...)
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  49.  9
    Deep Disagreements: A Meta-Argumentation Approach.Maurice Finocchiaro & David M. Godden - unknown
    This paper examines the views of Fogelin, Woods, Johnstone, etc., concerning deep disa-greements, force-five standoffs, philosophical controversies, etc. My approach is to reconstruct their views and critiques of them as meta-arguments, and to elaborate the meta-argumentative aspects of radical disa-greements. It turns out that deep disagreements are resolvable to a greater degree than usually thought, but only by using special principles and practices, such as meta-argumentation, ad hominem argumentation, Ramsey’s principle, etc.
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  50.  49
    Integrating the Non‐Rational Soul.Jonathan Lear - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):75-101.
    Aristotelian theory of virtue and of happiness assumes a moral psychology in which the parts of the soul, rational and non-rational, can communicate well with each other. But if Aristotle cannot give a robust account of what communicating well consists in, he faces Bernard Williams's charge that his moral psychology collapses into a moralizing psychology, assuming the very categories it seeks to vindicate. This paper examines the problem and proposes a way forward, namely, that Freudian psychoanalysis provides the resources (...)
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