The paper inculcates the path of modern education by implementing cum ensuing the form and content of moral education from the stances of prescriptivist R. M Hare and existentialist Sartre. In the first part of the paper, Hare’s tune for language-centric moral concepts and its prescriptive plus universalistic application for society enhance an outlook for moral education where learners should be taught to apply morality from a prescriptive sense, not by memorizing it in a descriptive manner. (...) Besides, Sartre’s existentialist appeal delineates moral education as a free choice of a learner where any institutional hegemony becomes trivial. The second part of the paper focuses on the content of moral education. What sort of moral laws make the content of moral education justifiable? Here Russell’s approach takes a pertinent role. We should secure modern education from the social and state’s anarchism. A way out that I depict in the last section of the paper stresses on moral education that evades itself from the repression of the pedagogue or rigid principles. Modern education should quest for why and liberal neutrality not by following the rigid rules obediently. Moral education teaches children about their own rights and the rights of the other in a beneficial manner. (shrink)

Objectives To develop and test two educational programmes (interactive and passive) aimed at improving family doctors' (FD) prescribing practices and patient's knowledge and use of non-opioid analgesics (NOA).Methods The educational programmes were conducted in two family medicine clinics by using a three-stage approach: baseline evaluation, design, and implementation of educational activities, and post-programme evaluation. An interactive educational programme (IEP) was compared with a passive educational programme (PEP); both were participated by FDs and patients. The IEP for FDs comprised of workshops, (...) discussion groups, in-service training and guidelines, while for patients the IEP consisted of an interactive session with a video, leaflets and a discussion. The PEP consisted in delivering the guidelines to the FDs and the leaflets to patients. The effect of the programmes on the FDs was measured through the appropriateness of prescriptions and analysed using the differences-in-differences estimator (D-in-D), and on patients through changes in self-medication and in their knowledge about the proper use and adverse events by analysing the inter- and intra-group differences before and after the programmes.Results The IEP obtained better results to improve appropriate FDs prescription of NOA than PEP (D-in-D = 15%). Regarding the patients, the PEP group reached higher reduction of self-medication than the IEP group (13.4% vs. 9.1%); the knowledge of proper NOA use increased by 8.5% in both groups, whereas knowledge of NOA-related adverse events was better in the IEP (39.6%) than in the PEP group (9.2%).Conclusions The IEP was better to improve the doctors' abilities to prescribe NOAs, and both programmes improved patients' knowledge. (shrink)

This paper concludes a special feature of Sustainability Science that explores a broad range of social value theoretical traditions, such as religious studies, social psychology, indigenous knowledge, economics, sociology, and philosophy. We introduce a novel transdisciplinary conceptual framework that revolves around concepts of 'lenses' and 'tensions' to help navigate value diversity. First, we consider the notion of lenses: perspectives on value and valuation along diverse dimensions that describe what values focus on, how their sociality is envisioned, and what epistemic and (...) procedural assumptions are made. We characterise fourteen of such dimensions. This provides a foundation for exploration of seven areas of tension, between: (1) the values of individuals vs collectives; (2) values as discrete and held vs embedded and constructed; (3) value as static or changeable; (4) valuation as descriptive vs normative and transformative; (5) social vs relational values; (6) different rationalities and their relation to value integration; (7) degrees of acknowledgment of the role of power in navigating value conflicts. In doing so, we embrace the 'mess' of diversity, yet also provide a framework to organise this mess and support and encourage active transdisciplinary collaboration. We identify key research areas where such collaborations can be harnessed for sustainability transformation. Here it is crucial to understand how certain social value lenses are privileged over others and build capacity in decision-making for understanding and drawing on multiple value, epistemic and procedural lenses. (shrink)

This paper concludes a special feature of Sustainability Science that explores a broad range of social value theoretical traditions, such as religious studies, social psychology, indigenous knowledge, economics, sociology, and philosophy. We introduce a novel transdisciplinary conceptual framework that revolves around concepts of ‘lenses’ and ‘tensions’ to help navigate value diversity. First, we consider the notion of lenses: perspectives on value and valuation along diverse dimensions that describe what values focus on, how their sociality is envisioned, and what epistemic and (...) procedural assumptions are made. We characterise fourteen of such dimensions. This provides a foundation for exploration of seven areas of tension, between: (1) the values of individuals vs collectives; (2) values as discrete and held vs embedded and constructed; (3) value as static or changeable; (4) valuation as descriptive vs normative and transformative; (5) social vs relational values; (6) different rationalities and their relation to value integration; (7) degrees of acknowledgment of the role of power in navigating value conflicts. In doing so, we embrace the ‘mess’ of diversity, yet also provide a framework to organise this mess and support and encourage active transdisciplinary collaboration. We identify key research areas where such collaborations can be harnessed for sustainability transformation. Here it is crucial to understand how certain social value lenses are privileged over others and build capacity in decision-making for understanding and drawing on multiple value, epistemic and procedural lenses. (shrink)

The Deaf culture in the United States is a unique culture that is not widely understood. To members of the Deaf community in the United States, deafness is not viewed as a disease or pathology to be treated or cured; instead it is seen as a difference in human experience. Members of this community do not hide their deafness; instead they take great pride in their Deaf identity. The Deaf culture in the United States is very communitarian not individualistic. Mary (...) Beth and Dominic are a married couple in their late 20s who are genetically deaf. They are active members in the Deaf community and work as advocates for individuals who are deaf, family members of Deaf people and sign language interpreters who identify with the Deaf culture. Mary Beth and Dominic approach the fertility clinic with a request that they only want a child with the genetic gene for deafness. They would want the embryos that do not have the gene to be destroyed. This would entail creating a child who would have the gene for deafness. Medically and ethically, should the fertility clinic agree to the couple’s request? The authors argue that the couple's request should be denied and provide reasons for it from the perspectives of foundational and clinical ethics. (shrink)

In an engaging and provocative paper, Linda Trevino and Gary Weaver spell out the differences between the methodological approach characteristic of the natural sciences on the one hand and that of normative inquiry on the other (Trevino and Weaver, 1991). Near the end of their paper they raise a haunting question that will have increasing significance as the management literature in ethics evolves: namely, “Can the two approaches be integrated?”As C. P. Snow (1962) noted, no one can deny either the (...) stark differences between the two worlds of normative and empirical inquiry, or the mutual suspicion shown by their inhabitants. The methodology of natural science implies a non-normative, thoroughly descriptive vision of the world in which reality awaits discovery by the scientist prepared to use increasingly sophisticated techniques. In contrast, the methodology of normative inquiry, i.e., that of traditional moral philosophy, implies a world-vision in which most important issues are allocated to ethics, where empirical pursuits are frequently trivial and always require ethical guidance, and where empirical theories contain normative presuppositions unrecognized as normative even by their scientific adherents. (shrink)

In an engaging and provocative paper, Linda Trevino and Gary Weaver spell out the differences between the methodological approach characteristic of the natural sciences on the one hand and that of normative inquiry on the other (Trevino and Weaver, 1991). Near the end of their paper they raise a haunting question that will have increasing significance as the management literature in ethics evolves: namely, “Can the two approaches be integrated?”As C. P. Snow (1962) noted, no one can deny either the (...) stark differences between the two worlds of normative and empirical inquiry, or the mutual suspicion shown by their inhabitants. The methodology of natural science implies a non-normative, thoroughly descriptive vision of the world in which reality awaits discovery by the scientist prepared to use increasingly sophisticated techniques. In contrast, the methodology of normative inquiry, i.e., that of traditional moral philosophy, implies a world-vision in which most important issues are allocated to ethics, where empirical pursuits are frequently trivial and always require ethical guidance, and where empirical theories contain normative presuppositions unrecognized as normative even by their scientific adherents. (shrink)

To what extent should teachers promote the view from nowhere as an ideal to strive for in education? To address this question, I will use Mark Twain’s The Mysterious Stranger as an example, illustrating the stakes involved when the view from nowhere is taken to be an attainable educational ideal. I will begin this essay by offering a description of Thomas Nagel’s view from nowhere. Having done this, I will return to Twain’s story, providing some further examples of how access (...) to the view from nowhere comes to influence the educational process in different ways. I will then connect the educational question raised by Twain’s story to two radically different versions of the exemplar found in the works of Benedict de Spinoza: the philosopher and the prophet. These figures will help illustrate how the striving for philosophical truth can sometimes be educationally inapt, as education always needs to account for humans being human, all too human. (shrink)

There seems a potential tension between Hume's naturalistic project and his normative ambitions. Hume adopts what I call a methodological naturalism: that is, the methodology of providing explanations for various phenomena based on natural properties and causes. This methodology takes the form of introducing ‘the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects’, as stated in the subtitle of the Treatise; this ‘experimental method’ seems a paradigmatically descriptive one, and it remains unclear how Hume derives genuinely normative prescriptions from this (...) methodology. In resolving this problem, I will argue that Hume's naturalistic methodology – that is, his ‘experimental philosophy’, or what has come to be known as his experimental method – consists of the systematization of phenomena pertaining to human nature. In applying his experimental method to normative subjects, Hume systematizes our normative judgements, deriving general principles of normative justification; he then reflexivel... (shrink)

There seems a potential tension between Hume’s naturalistic project and his normative ambitions. Hume adopts what I call a methodological naturalism: that is, the methodology of providing explanations for various phenomena based on natural properties and causes. This methodology takes the form of introducing ‘the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects’, as stated in the subtitle of the Treatise; this ‘experimental method’ seems a paradigmatically descriptive one, and it remains unclear how Hume derives genuinely normative prescriptions from this (...) methodology. -/- In resolving this problem, I will argue that Hume’s naturalistic methodology – that is, his ‘experimental philosophy’ (THN Intro 7), or what has come to be known as his experimental method – consists of the systematisation of phenomena pertaining to human nature. In applying his experimental method to normative subjects, Hume systematises our normative judgments, deriving general principles of normative justification; he then reflexively applies these principles to the pre-philosophical judgments from which they derive, dismissing and/or correcting those that do not accord with his systematised account. I will argue that Hume’s experimental method, far from being wholly descriptive, is in fact thoroughly infused with normativity; furthermore, the very application of this methodology to our normative judgments reveals Hume’s normative ambitions. (shrink)

People’s beliefs about normality play an important role in many aspects of cognition and life (e.g., causal cognition, linguistic semantics, cooperative behavior). But how do people determine what sorts of things are normal in the first place? Past research has studied both people’s representations of statistical norms (e.g., the average) and their representations of prescriptive norms (e.g., the ideal). Four studies suggest that people’s notion of normality incorporates both of these types of norms. In particular, people’s representations of what (...) is normal were found to be influenced both by what they believed to be descriptively average and by what they believed to be prescriptively ideal. This is shown across three domains: people’s use of the word ‘‘normal” (Study 1), their use of gradable adjectives (Study 2), and their judgments of concept prototypicality (Study 3). A final study investigated the learning of normality for a novel category, showing that people actively combine statistical and prescriptive information they have learned into an undifferentiated notion of what is normal (Study 4). Taken together, these findings may help to explain how moral norms impact the acquisition of normality and, conversely, how normality impacts the acquisition of moral norms. (shrink)

IN this note I propose to make some general remarks concerning the analytical forays carried out into moral discourse by some leading figures in the modern ‘linguistic’ tradition. The philosophers I am going to speak of, may all be said to be attempting some sort of ‘descriptive’ analysis, but my thesis is that philosophers such as Toulmin and Baier are attempting something that is significantly different from what a philosopher such as Nowell-Smith is attempting. I will suggest, in the (...) following section, that the expression—‘the logic of moral discourse’—seems to be understood by these two groups of linguistic philosophers in two different ways and that one of these ways involves a more ambitious claim, than does the other, on behalf of the philosopher embarking upon a conceptual analysis of moral discourse. The manner in which, it seems to me, Toulmin and Baier understand this expression is the one that involves the more ambitious claim. In the final section of this paper I suggest that the more ambitious claim involves overloading the so-called Linguistic method to force it do a job that it seems at least not suited to perform. (shrink)

The contemporary sociology of morality is a form of descriptive ethics that shrinks away from any sort of prescriptive ethics. Building on the moral philosophies of John Dewey, and also of Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur, and in dialogue with recent work by Stefan Bargheer, this article proposes a more ambitious program of critical social ethics that connects concerns with character and the common good but tempers them with attention to alienation and oppression.

Abstract: It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are (...) contradictory theories: If moral judgments are descriptive, it is not possible to deduce norms from them. But if one can deduce norms from moral judgments, they are not descriptive. As a solution to this problem, the paper suggests that moral judgments represent institutional facts; the corresponding theory is moral institutionalism. A moral institutional fact – “an act X is Y”, Y” means “morally right” or “morally false” – is a hybrid of descriptive and prescriptive elements: It is stating a fact in descriptive language (“is”) and at the same time, it is short for the prescriptive constitutive rule “X is Y according to the moral rules of the language community C”. Institutional facts contain normative presuppositions without letting them appear in their grammatical form. Institutional facts are now (in relation to the language community C) objective and intersubjective and they can be generalized (cognitive aspect), although they cannot be reduced to brute physical or psychological facts, and it is also possible to deduce norms from them because they are built into them. The meta-ethical concept of moral institutionalism, which is evolved further in the paper, preserves the best intentions of emotivism and cognitivism without leading to contradiction. As a by-product, the article shows exactly the error in J. R. Searle’s alleged counterexample against the so-called naturalistic fallacy from “is” to “ought”. This lies in the normative “are” of the analytic premise or definition in “2a. All promises are [that is ought to be] acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised”. In “Key concepts in philosophy”, Sankt Augustin 2015, institutionalism is explained further (p.184-191) and confined to what Hegel has called “Sittlichkeit” that is customary morality in in distinction to the “morality” of my personal consciousness (p.212-213):. (shrink)

It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are contradictory (...) theories: If moral judgments are descriptive, it is not possible to deduce norms from them. But if one can deduce norms from moral judgments, they are not descriptive. As a solution to this problem, the paper suggests that moral judgments represent institutional facts; the corresponding theory is moral institutionalism. A moral institutional fact – “an act X is Y”, Y means “morally right” or “morally false” – is a hybrid of descriptive and prescriptive elements: It is stating a fact in descriptive language (“is”) and at the same time, it is short for the prescriptive constitutive rule “X is Y according to the moral rules of the language community C”. Institutional facts contain normative presuppositions without letting them appear in their grammatical form. Institutional facts are now (in relation to the language community C) objective and intersubjective and they can be generalized (cognitive aspect), although they cannot be reduced to brute physical or psychological facts, and it is also possible to deduce norms from them because they are built into them. The meta-ethical concept of moral institutionalism, which is evolved further in the paper, preserves the best intentions of emotivism and cognitivism without leading to contradiction. As a by-product, the article shows exactly the still undetected error in J. R. Searle’s alleged counterexample against the so-called naturalistic fallacy from “is” to “ought”. This lies in the normative “are” of the analytic premise or definition in “2a. All promises are [that is ought to be] acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised”. (shrink)

This thesis modifies the wording of William Clifford’s 1877 evidence principle (that ‘it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’) to propose an explicitly moral principle, restricted to descriptive beliefs (about what is or is not the case) and excluding prescriptive beliefs (about what ought or ought not to be the case). It considers potential counter-examples, particularly William James’s 1896 defence of religious belief; and concludes that the modified principle survives unscathed. It (...) then searches for suitable criteria for ‘sufficient’ and ‘insufficient’ evidence, first within a Bayesian framework enriched by pragmatic considerations, and finally by returning to Clifford’s conception of our shared responsibilities to our shared epistemic asset. Combined with elements of Edward Craig’s (1990, 1999) ‘state-of-nature’ theory of knowledge this gets us to a minimum threshold to avoid insufficient evidence and an aspirational criterion of sufficient evidence. (shrink)

In the context of a global pandemic that started in 2020, the Chilean higher education institution Universidad Andrés Bello faced the challenge of giving continuity to its already established blended program for English courses while also starting the implementation of a high-stakes certification assessment for its students using the Test of English for International Communication Bridge. This study sought to evaluate how much of a mediating factor online teaching presence could be in the context of test preparation within a language (...) course in aspects related to autonomous learning and perceived learning outcomes. A mixed-methods approach was used. It included a survey applied to 1,642 eligible students of the English program. These quantitative data were complemented with students’ comments and teacher interviews. After triangulating quantitative and qualitative data, teaching presence was clearly perceived to be a relevant aspect of the online experience in the studied courses. However, both students’ and teachers’ voices evidenced pervasive challenges and tensions that hinder the potentially transformative benefits that online learning is expected to bring about. (shrink)

This essay is part of a larger project aimed at making sense of rational thought and agency as part of the natural world. It provides a semantic framework for thinking about the contents of: 1) descriptive thoughts and sentences having a representational or mind-to-world direction of fit, and which manifest our capacity for theoretical rationality; and 2) prescriptive and intentional sentences having an expressive or world-to-mind direction of fit, and which manifest our capacity for practical rationality. I use (...) a modified version of Allan Gibbard’s hyperstate semantics, employing both maximally determinate possible worlds and maximally determinate plans of action, as a basis for providing a unified understanding of moral judgments and expressions of individual and collective intentionality – they one and all give voice to our ability as rational agents to adopt the perspectives of various individuals within a community and consider how we would behave were we in their positions. In the course of spelling out the view I draw on and criticize ideas that Wilfrid Sellars advanced in the middle of the 20th century, while employing the tools of contemporary modal logic and model-theoretic semantics to give perspicuous formulation to his thought that the moral judgment ‘one ought to do A’ should be understood in terms of the collective intention ‘we shall do A’, where the pronoun denotes the unrestricted class of rational agents and the ‘ought’ is in some sense unconditionally binding. (shrink)

The present paper analyses the topic of scientific discovery and the problem of the existence of a logical framework involved in such endeavour. We inquire how several non-monotonic logic frameworks and other formalisms can account for such a task. In the same vein, we analyse some key aspects of the historical and theoretical debate surrounding scientific discovery, in particular, the context of discovery and context of justification context distinction. We present an argument concerning the weakening of the discovery/justification context dichotomy (...) based on the descriptive accent contained in the non-monotonic logic perspective together with its epistemological concerns. (shrink)

The present study aimed to analyze the stability of the memory of a stressful event (medical examination within a hospital setting) over time in young people (age range 12 to 21, Mage = 15.11 years old, SD = 3.047) with mild or moderate intellectual disability (IQ = 54.32, SD = 13.47). The results show a stability of the memory of what happened an hour and a week after the event in relation to the people involved, the apparatus used, and the (...) parts of the body explored. No interaction effects were found between the stability of memory over time and the level of intellectual disability. The level of disability (mild or moderate) only affected the description of the doctor who performed the exploration and the explored parts of the body, showing better results for people with mild disability. In addition, the results highlight the relationship between memory and IQ, especially verbal IQ. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se aborda el tema de la "racionalidad" en la versión estándar del enfoque pragmadialéctico, que pretende superar la dicotomía entre los aspectos normativo y descriptivo que existe en los estudios sobre argumentación. Se señala que la pragmadialéctica, al conceptualizar su noción de racionalidad, asume explícitamente ciertos postulados popperianos y, dado que aquella también incluye elementos de Searle y Grice, se indaga si las ideas de racionalidad de estos filósofos están presentes implícitamente en el compromiso con la racionalidad. A su (...) vez, se da cuenta de algunos nexos del pensamiento aristotélico con los planteamientos de Popper, Searle y Grice con el fin de aclarar la concepción de la racionalidad que tienen los pragmadialécticos, y de estimular un regreso enriquecedor a las fuentes de la argumentación. ABSTRACT The article addresses the issue of "rationality" in the standard version of the pragma-dialectic approach, which aims at overcoming the dichotomy between the normative and descriptive aspects that are evident in studies on argumentation. It points out that when conceptualizing its notion of rationality, pragma-dialectics explicitly assumes some of Popper's postulates. Given that said conceptualization also includes elements from Searle and Grice, the paper also inquires into whether these philosophers' ideas on rationality are implicitly present in the commitment to rationality. Likewise, it discusses some connections between Aristotelian thought and the formulations of Popper, Searle, and Grice, in order to clarify the pragma-dialectic conception of rationality and foster an enriching return to the sources of argumentation. (shrink)

Se realizó una investigación en sistemas y servicios de salud de tipo descriptiva transversal, con el objetivo de elaborar un sistema de acciones de capacitación para el profesional de la enfermería comunitaria en la prevención del embarazo en la adolescencia. Se aplicaron métodos teóricos y empíricos propios de la investigación científica. El universo lo constituyeron 20 profesionales de enfermería que laboran en consultorios del Área Salud "Tula Aguilera". La muestra quedó conformada por los 12 profesionales que aceptaron participar en el (...) estudio. El criterio de exclusión fue la libre decisión de cada individuo para participar o retirarse de la investigación. Se aplicó una encuesta estandarizada, previo consentimiento informado, para determinar el nivel de conocimientos sobre salud reproductiva en la adolescencia. Los resultados constatados reflejaron que la mayoría de los encuestados tenían criterios estrechos, no fundamentados científicamente ni actualizados sobre el tema, por lo que se diseñó un sistema de acciones de capacitación basado en conocimientos científicos actualizados, pertinentes y contextualizados. Cada actividad se propuso demostrar la factibilidad e importancia de utilizar técnicas participativas y la fundamentación de las ventajas de su uso en diferentes actividades comunitarias, encaminadas a enfatizar en la organización, movilización, concientización y capacitación a los diferentes sujetos sociales involucrados en la prevención del embarazo en la adolescencia, para que estos se conviertan en transformadores de su propia realidad, en correspondencia con sus necesidades y demandas sociales. A descriptive transversal study was carried out on health systems and services aiming at designing a system of training actions for the community professional nurses in order to prevent pregnancy in adolescence. Theorical and empirical methods were applied. The universe was made up of twenty professionals who consented to participate in the study. The inclusion criterion was the free decision of each individual on either participating or not in the investigation. A standard survey was applied -with a previous informed consent , to determine the knowledge about reproductive health in adolescence. The results revealed that most of the surveyed people had narrow criteria with no updated scientific grounds on the issue, thus a system of training actions based on updated scientific pertinent contextualized information was designed Each activity aimed at demonstrating the feasibility study of using participative techniques as well as the reasons for the advantages of their use in a variety of community activities to emphasize the organization and understanding of the different social subjects involved in the prevention of pregnancy in adolescence. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that descriptive statements can be action-Guiding; that oughts and imperatives, If they are to be justified at all, Must be derived from statements of fact; that factual-Prudential moral reasoning is logically universalizable; and that the demand for universalizability, And thus ultimately for moral reasoning, Is itself only prudentially justifiable. These points are argued by way of an examination and criticism of hare's discussion of prescription and universalizability in moral reasoning.

Empirical ethics research is increasingly valued in bioethics and healthcare more generally, but there remain as yet under-researched areas such as pharmacy, despite the increasingly visible attempts by the profession to embrace additional roles beyond the supply of medicines. A descriptive and critical review of the extant empirical pharmacy ethics literature is provided here. A chronological change from quantitative to qualitative approaches is highlighted in this review, as well as differing theoretical approaches such as cognitive moral development and the (...) four principles of biomedical ethics. Research with pharmacy student cohorts is common, as is representation from American pharmacists. Many examples of ethical problems are identified, as well as commercial and legal influences on ethical understanding and decision making. In this paper, it is argued that as pharmacy seeks to develop additional roles with concomitant ethical responsibilities, a new prescription is needed for empirical ethics research in pharmacy—one that embraces an agenda of systematic research using a plurality of methodological and theoretical approaches to better explore this under-researched discipline. (shrink)

Many students struggle to enter moral debates in a productive way because they automatically think of moral claims as ‘just opinions’ and not something one could productively argue about. Underlying this response are various versions of a muddled distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘opinions.’ This paper outlines a way to help students overcome their use of this distinction, thereby clearing an obstacle to true moral debate. It explains why the fact-opinion distinction should simply be scrapped, rather than merely sharpened. It then (...) proposes a different distinction well suited to replace it. Finally, it outlines an activity which can be used to teach the new distinction, as well as a number of benefits to attempting the whole replacement process. (shrink)

This study compares cognitive and emotional responses to 360-degree vs. static (2D) videos in terms of visual attention, brand recognition, engagement of the prefrontal cortex, and emotions. Hypotheses are proposed based on the interactivity literature, cognitive overload, advertising response model and motivation, opportunity, and ability theoretical frameworks, and tested using neurophysiological tools: electroencephalography, eye-tracking, electrodermal activity, and facial coding. The results revealed that gaze view depends on ad content, visual attention paid being lower in 360-degree FMCG ads than in 2D (...) ads. Brand logo recognition is lower in 360-degree ads than in 2D video ads. Overall, 360-degree ads for durable products increase positive emotions, which carries the risk of non-exposure to some of the ad content. In testing four ads for durable goods and fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) this research explains the mechanism through which 360-degree video ads outperform standard versions. (shrink)

When do descriptive regularities become prescriptive norms? We examined children's and adults' use of group regularities to make prescriptive judgments, employing novel groups that engaged in morally neutral behaviors. Participants were introduced to conforming or non-conforming individuals. Children negatively evaluated non-conformity, with negative evaluations declining with age. These effects were replicable across competitive and cooperative intergroup contexts and stemmed from reasoning about group regularities rather than reasoning about individual regularities. These data provide new insights into children's group (...) concepts and have important implications for understanding the development of stereotyping and norm enforcement. (shrink)

When making moral judgments, people are typically guided by a plurality of moral rules. These rules owe their existence to human emotions but are not simply equivalent to those emotions. And people’s moral judgments ought to be guided by a plurality of emotion-based rules. The view just stated combines three positions on moral judgment: [1] moral sentimentalism, which holds that sentiments play an essential role in moral judgment,1 [2] descriptive moral pluralism, which holds that commonsense moral judgment is guided (...) by a plurality of moral rules2, and [3] prescriptive moral pluralism, which holds that moral judgment ought to be guided by a plurality of moral rules. In what follows, we will argue for all three positions. We will not present a comprehensive case for these positions nor address many of the arguments philosophers have developed against them. What we will try to show is that recent psychological work supports sentimentalist pluralism in both its descriptive and prescriptive forms. (shrink)

The idea of moral reform requires that morality be more than a description of what people do value, for there has to be some measure against which to assess progress. Otherwise, any change is not reform, but simply difference. Therefore, I discuss moral reform in relation to two prescriptive approaches to common morality, which I distinguish as the foundational and the pragmatic. A foundational approach to common morality (e.g., Bernard Gert’s) suggests that there is no reform (...) of morality , but of beliefs, values, customs, and practices so as to conform with an unchanging, foundational morality. If, however, there were revision in its foundation (e.g., in rationality), then reform in morality itself would be possible. On a pragmatic view, on the other hand, common morality is relative to human flourishing, and its justification consists in its effectiveness in promoting flourishing. Morality is dependent on what in fact does promote human flourishing and therefore, could be reformed. However, a pragmatic approach, which appears more open to the possibility of moral reform, would need a more robust account of norms by which reform is measured. (shrink)

In this collection of essays, some of today's most eminent political scientists and philosophers address the ethics of nationalism. Rather than focusing on descriptive and prescriptive themes or policy issues, this volume focuses on the deeper moral issues that must be addressed if a policy prescription is to be well grounded.

Psychological theory and research in ethical decision making and ethical professional practice are presently hampered by a failure to take appropriate account of an extensive background in moral philosophy. As a result, attempts to develop models of ethical decision making are left vulnerable to a number of criticisms: that they neglect the problems of meta-ethics and the variety of meta-ethical perspectives; that they fail clearly and consistently to differentiate between descriptive and prescriptive accounts; that they leave unexplicated the (...) theoretical assumptions derived from the underlying moral theories; and that they fail to accommodate the complexity and comprehensiveness of the processes involved in the making and implementing of ethical decisions. Many of these problems also have implications for the methodological domain. This paper offers an analysis of the difficulties, and makes a number of recommendations for future theory, research and practical applications, including: the need for training in moral philosophy; clarification of the status of Professional Codes in decisional models; the development of theoretically comprehensive prescriptive models; and the testing of these models in ways that do justice to their dimensional scope and theoretical complexity. (shrink)

An investigation into the assessment of the moral components which were developed by John Wilson, is reported. Tests fox the classroom measurement of two components were developed. The components were; PHIL(CC), the claiming of concern for other persons as an overriding, universal, and prescriptive principle in moral decision making; and; GIG, knowledge of factual information which is relevant in making moral decisions which subjects face. The test development exercise was undertaken at a time when public interest in moral education (...) was growing. The recent demand for moral education in Auckland is reviewed. Over the last fifteen years, since the Currie Commission Report, reports by committees investigating the purposes of schools have increasingly emphasised moral and social education as school objectives. The Department of Education appeared to be sympathetic towards the cause of moral education. The submissions made by the public during the Educational Development Conference suggested that, in general, parents and citizens were prepared to consider innovative programmes in social or moral education, although there was little agreement on what form such training or education should take. A number of teachers were supporters of moral education. The primary purpose in constructing tests for Wilson's components was to provide an instrument which would assist in the evaluation of moral education curriculum projects in Auckland secondary schools. Evidence concerning descriptive, content, domain selection, construct and concurrent validity is presented. Kuder-Richardson, retest and criterion-referenced reliability studies were undertaken. It is claimed that an instrument with sufficient validity and reliability has bean produced for the summative evaluation of curriculum projects, and the diagnostic investigation of class groups using the test as a criterion-referenced measure. Auckland intermediate and secondary school pupils were surveyed, using the tests produced and punch card recording in an attempt to identify significant variables. Over 1,100 children completed the tests under controlled conditions. Significant variables identified using the test for PHIL(CC) were socio-economic level for twelve-year-old children, and intelligence for sixteen-year-old children. The effect of schooling appeared to be significant at all levels. Age does not appear to markedly increase children's concern for others. Age was related to performance in the knowledge test. Older children knew more. Other significant variables for GIG were socio-economic level (middle levels performed better) and the effects of schooling. There was some evidence that females know more than males. In both tests it appears that there is considerable interaction between the variables. Suggestions for the further development of the tests are given. (shrink)

The present essay takes issue with the idea of moral supervenience. It is argued that this idea is subject to fatal objections that can be brought to light by utilizing the resources of a phenomenological approach guided by demands of descriptive authenticity and rational principles. This critical project is carried out by focusing on Robert Audi’s sophisticated moderate ethical intuitionism which has rightly gained prominence recently. The relevant problems are addressed by comparing Audi’s notion of supervenience with Edmund Husserl’s (...) account of foundation. The latter refers to different types of contents and their relatedness in terms of ontological dependence. Husserl’s notion of foundation challenges the view that higher-order complex intentional unities like evaluative acts could be analyzed in terms of ‘adding up’ purely descriptive and non- descriptive contents. Or : in terms of anchoring moral properties in natural properties. My main thesis is that applying the idea of supervenience to the field of morality involves a circularity problem that undermines the taken-for-granted presupposition of a clear-cut distinguishability of natural and moral properties. Appropriately specifying one’s duties in situations of moral conflicts, according to the idea of supervenience, calls for identifying all those natural properties or facts that are relevant for morally assessing the situation in the first place. This practical task of solving the problem of moral salience, however, cannot be met by referring to pure facts that could be determined in an independent manner, that is, as uninfluenced by those moral perceptions or moral assessments whose appropriateness or permissibility, as assumed, is under consideration. Though we may grant that supervenience delivers a plausible general or abstract picture of how morality can be part of the world we experience, it does not help us properly assessing moral issues in concrete situations. Rather, from a moral-practical point of view, it is a thoroughly suspicious idea. (shrink)

Ethicists differ considerably in their reasons for using empirical data. This paper presents a brief overview of four traditional approaches to the use of empirical data: “the prescriptive applied ethicists,” “the theorists,” “the critical applied ethicists,” and “the particularists.” The main aim of this paper is to introduce a fifth approach of more recent date (i.e. “integrated empirical ethics”) and to offer some methodological directives for research in integrated empirical ethics. All five approaches are presented in a table for (...) heuristic purposes. The table consists of eight columns: “view on distinction descriptive-prescriptive sciences,” “location of moral authority,” “central goal(s),” “types of normativity,” “use of empirical data,” “method,” “interaction empirical data and moral theory,” and “cooperation with descriptive sciences.” Ethicists can use the table in order to identify their own approach. Reflection on these issues prior to starting research in empirical ethics should lead to harmonization of the different scientific disciplines and effective planning of the final research design. Integrated empirical ethics (IEE) refers to studies in which ethicists and descriptive scientists cooperate together continuously and intensively. Both disciplines try to integrate moral theory and empirical data in order to reach a normative conclusion with respect to a specific social practice. IEE is not wholly prescriptive or wholly descriptive since IEE assumes an interdepence between facts and values and between the empirical and the normative. The paper ends with three suggestions for consideration on some of the future challenges of integrated empirical ethics. (shrink)

In this collection of essays, some of today's most eminent political scientists and philosophers address the ethics of nationalism. Rather than focusing on descriptive and prescriptive themes or policy issues, this volume focuses on the deeper moral issues that must be addressed if a policy prescription is to be well grounded.

The organizational climate is the work environment conceived by emotions and motivation of an organization and, an optimal way of increasing participation is with working groups in the dependencies to improve: objectives, processes, conflicts, leadership. Thus the objective was to determine the characterization of variables. The method incorporates the quantitative approach, non -experimental design, descriptive level, applied and transversal type, analysis and deductive methods. The results show, there is a high organizational climate level, due to the contribution of three (...) dimensions or aspects that are: economic conditions, management values and organizational policies. (shrink)

Confidence can dissociate from perceptual accuracy, suggesting distinct computational and neural processes underlie these psychological functions. Recent investigations have therefore sought to experimentally isolate metacognitive processes by creating conditions where perceptual sensitivity is matched but confidence differs (“matched-performance / different-confidence”; MPDC). Despite these endeavors’ success, much remains unknown about MPDC effects and how to best harness them in experimental settings. Here we developed a principled approach to comprehensively characterizing MPDC effects through analyzing metaperceptual (i.e., type 2 psychometric) functions relating objective (...) performance to subjective confidence across widely varying performance levels and experimental manipulations. We found that MPDC effect magnitude depends on stimulus properties, observers’ sensitivity level, and critically on trial type order (blocked or interleaved across stimulus property variations). Our findings provide the first comprehensive exploration of MPDC effects, offer a prescriptive guide to metaperceptual analysis, and suggest optimal experimental paradigms for experimentally isolating metacognition and awareness in future studies. (shrink)

In many vertebrates, the enzymatic oxidation of dietary yellow carotenoids generates red keto‐carotenoids giving color to ornaments. The oxidase CYP2J19 is here a key effector. Its purported intracellular location suggests a shared biochemical pathway between trait expression and cell functioning. This might guarantee the reliability of red colorations as individual quality signals independent of production costs. We hypothesize that the ornament type (feathers vs. bare parts) and production costs (probably CYP2J19 activity compromising vital functions) could have promoted tissue‐specific gene relocation. (...) We review current avian tissue‐specific CYP2J19 expression data. Among the ten red‐billed species showing CYP2J19 bill expression, only one showed strong hepatic expression. Moreover, a phylogenetically‐controlled analysis of 25 red‐colored species shows that those producing red bare parts are less likely to have strong hepatic CYP2J19 expression than species with only red plumages. Thus, both production costs and shared pathways might have contributed to the evolution of red signals. (shrink)

Background The birth plan is a tool that allows the self-learning and thoughtful analysis of the women during the birthing process, facilitating their making of decisions and participation, in agreement with the bioethical principles of autonomy and no malfeasance. Goal: To understand the perception and satisfaction of women who presented a birth plan. Methodology: Qualitative, descriptive, observational, retrospective and cross-sectional study. The population of the study was composed of 21 women who presented a birth plan regulated in a Hospital (...) ever since the recording of the presentation of the birth plan was started until 2015. Place: Cartagena. Techniques/methods: Semistructured interview. Results-Discussion: Most women considered the plan as a useful self-learning tool on the meaning of the birthing process, as it favored the communication between the expectant mothers/health professionals. Our informants sought information related to the birthing process from informal sources; most perceived a level of respect of their wishes during the process of giving birth. The use of the birth plan did not imply the perception of loss of the degree of control during the birth, although attention to the written document could be improved. Conclusions The use of the birth plan is a very satisfactory and useful experience for their involvement in their self-care, although in some cases, the births did not proceed according to their plans. Nevertheless, the prevalence of the principle of Non-Malfeasance over Autonomy was evidenced. (shrink)

The objective of the research is focused on the study of the evolution of sexism as a cultural parameter in the Roma population whose people maintain recognition as an ethnic minority in Europe. The design selected for this study is descriptive. This study involves testing the reliability of the reduced version of the ambivalent sexism inventory (ASI; Glick and Fiske, 1996) scale among a representative group of the Roma population belonging to the city of Toledo. A representative sample of (...) 44 people aged between 16 and 40 years was selected, with an average of 27.3. The results confirm the reliability of the scale and provide little differentiation and sex-disaggregated results. The responses on the items show a high degree of sexism among the participants. The obtained results give a better understanding of the scope of gender roles and, therefore, can help us to reorient interventions in the prevention of gender inequalities or early school dropouts among Roma girls. (shrink)

The causal characters (spacelike, lightlike, timelike) of the coordinate lines, coordinate surfaces and coordinate hypersurfaces of a coordinate system in Relativity define what is called its causal class. It is known that, in any relativistic space-time, there exist one hundred and ninety nine such causal classes. But in Newtonian physics (where only spacelike and timelike characters exist) the corresponding causal classes have not been discussed until recently. Here it is shown that, in sharp contrast with the relativistic case, in Newtonian (...) space-time the different causal classes of coordinate systems are drastically reduced to four. These causal classes admit simple geometric descriptions and physical interpretations. For example, it is shown that one can generate coordinate systems of the four causal classes by means of the sole linear synchronization group, i.e. by coordinate transformations that only change the origin of time linearly. The relativistic analogs of these examples are also considered. (shrink)

BackgroundImplementing the routine consultation of patient advance directives in hospital emergency departments and emergency medical services has become essential, given that advance directives constitute the frame of reference for care personalisation and respect for patients’ values and preferences related to healthcare. The aim of this study was to assess the levels and relationship of knowledge and attitudes of nursing and medical professionals towards advance directives in hospital emergency departments and emergency medical services, and to determine the correlated and predictor variables (...) of favourable attitudes towards advance directives.MethodsObservational, descriptive, and cross-sectional study. The study was conducted in the emergency department of a second-level hospital and in the emergency medical service. Data collection was performed from January 2019 to February 2020. The STROBE guidelines were followed for the preparation of the study.ResultsA total of 173 healthcare professionals responded to the questionnaire. Among them, 91.3% considered that they were not sufficiently informed about advance directives, and 74% acknowledged not having incorporated them into their usual practice. Multinomial analysis indicated a statistically significant relationship between the variable emergency medical service and having more favourable attitudes towards consulting the advance directives in their practical application (OR 2.49 [95% CI 1.06–5.88]; p = 0.037) and compliance in complex scenarios (OR 3.65 [95% CI 1.58 − 8.41]; p = 0.002). Working the afternoon and night shift was a predictor variable for obtaining a higher score with respect to attitudes in complex scenarios.ConclusionThere is an association between the level of knowledge that nursing and medical professionals have about advance directives and the scores obtained on the attitude scales at the time of practical implementation and in complex scenarios. This shows that the more knowledge professionals have, the more likely they are to consult patients' advance directives and to respect their wishes and preferences for care and/or treatment. (shrink)

Great thinkers have devoted to explaining morality and ethics in human beings. The major reflections have resulted in a well-known dichotomy, that of matters of fact and matters of value, or what is known as the theoretical world, which is objective, and the practical world, that of affections. With the birth of analytic philosophy, the emphasis is placed on language allowing to explain philosophical problems, such as validity. This study proposes the following thesis: it is possible to derive “ought” (...) from “is”, as it is evidenced in the Spanish verb “tocar” and several of its verbal periphrasis. To achieve this, a naturalization of morality is proposed from the postulates of two theories, namely, cognitive semantics (Talmy 2000) and the Modular Theory of Modalities (Gosselin 2010). The methodology applied consists of both a semantic and a cognitive analysis of “tocar”, for which a corpus was collected in literary texts and presidential speeches. The main result shows that “tocar” has a prototypical descriptive semantic value, alethic value, and new prescriptive semantic values. It is concluded that the new semantic values for this verb and its periphrasis are the deontic and the axiological ones, which demonstrates once again the evolutionary character of language and the need to provide empirical information on philosophical issues, such as morality. (shrink)

RESUMEN Introducción: El proceso de cuidar es el resultado de una construcción propia de cada situación, se origina con la identificación de los problemas de salud y las necesidades reales o potenciales de las personas, familia y comunidad que demandan cuidado. Objetivo: Evaluar el impacto del Diplomado Prevención del Síndrome de Burnout, en el autocuidado del personal de enfermería de la Atención Secundaria de Salud de la provincia Camagüey. Métodos: Se realizó un estudio descriptivo observacional, en el Hospital Amalia Simoni (...) Argilagos de Camagüey, durante el Diplomado Prevención del Síndrome de Burnout dirigido al personal de enfermería de la Atención Secundaria de Salud. Para ello se aplicó una encuesta y el Test Psicológico de Maslach y Jackson al inicio y al final de la aplicación del Diplomado. Los datos aportados por estos instrumentos se complementaron con los provenientes de la aplicación de la técnica del PNI. Resultados: Predominó el sexo femenino. El total de los cursistas son licenciados en Enfermería. Con la ejecución del diplomado se constatan cambios importantes en cuanto a la autopreparación, el rendimiento, los hábitos de descanso, satisfacción personal y realización de ejercicios físicos. Discusión: La aplicación del diplomado logró transformar estilos de trabajo, afrontamientos al estrés, así como una mejor satisfacción personal y colectiva. ABSTRACT Introduction: The process of taking care is the result of a proper construction of every situation, it originates with the identification of the problems of health and the real or potential needs of the persons, family and community that demand care. Objective: To evaluate the impact of Postgraduate Course Prevention of the Syndrome of Burnout, in the self-care of the personnel of infirmary of the Secondary Attention of Health of the Camagüey province. Methods: a descriptive, observational study was carried out in the Hospital Amalia Simoni Argilagos of Camagüey, during Postgraduate Course Prevention of the Syndrome of Burnout directed to the personnel of infirmary of the Secondary Attention of Health. For that reason, a survey and the Psychological Test of Maslach and Jackson was applied at the beginning and at the end of the application of the course. The information contributed by these instruments complemented itself with the originated ones from the application of the technique of the PNI. Results: The sex that predominated was the feminine one. All of the students are licensed in Infirmary. With the execution of the course important changes are stated as for the self-preparation, the yield, the habits of rest, personal satisfaction and achievement of physical exercises. Discussion: The application of the course managed to transform styles of work, confrontations to the stress, as well as a better personal and collective satisfaction. (shrink)

This article explores the pros and cons of teaching moral development and moral psychology theories and principles in media ethics courses. Five theorists are introduced: Kohlberg, Gilligan, Rest, Kierkegaard, and Perry. Debates over the descriptive-prescriptive nature of the models are discussed, and a number of suggestions about how to implement the models in the classroom are offered.

Probably no one has done more than Frankena to bring about the recent shift in philosophical interest from the primarily linguistic concerns of metaethics to what he calls “meta-morals,” that is, to questions about morality as a whole. Instead of investigating what so-called ethical terms stood for, or whether ethical utterances employed propositions or proposals or imperatives or whether they expressed feelings, beliefs, descriptions or prescriptions, or whether they conformed to ordinary propositional logic or to an imperatival or some (...) other logic of their own, Frankena set out to investigate the moral enterprise itself. Quite recently he put together the results of these reflections in two series of lectures, “Three Questions About Morality” and Thinking About Morality. My own views had always been very close to his, but these recent lectures, which for the first time put his thoughts on this topic together in a systematic way, have made clear to me that, while the starting point of our investigations is indeed the same, our conclusions diverge on a number of important points. I want to take up some of the problems to which we offer different solutions. (shrink)

I address three topics. First, I argue that the issue of corporate moral responsibility is an important one for business ethics.Second, I examine a core argument for the claim that the corporate organization is a separate moral agent and show it is based on anunnoticed but elementary mistake deriving from the fallacy of division. Third, I examine the assumptions collectivists make about whatit means to say that organizations act and that they act intentionally and show that these assumptions are mistaken (...) in their failure to understand the nature of intentional causality and of “as-if” intentionality. In exposing these mistakes I set out my own view in the form oftwo theses, the first of which states that individual members of an organization are always causally responsible for any corporate act,and the second of which states that attributions of intentions to corporations are always either descriptive or prescriptive attributionsof “as if” intentionality. (shrink)

In recent years an orthodox Marxist-Leninist ethics has been developing in the Soviet Union. It is metaphysically based, teleologically oriented, and objectivist in its claims. Soviet ethical writings encompass five different activities: description, interpretative classification, prescription, content-analysis, and refutation. Among the distinctive features of the new Soviet Moral Code are its requirement of devotion to the Communist cause, its exclusively social orientation, and its emphasis on work. Upon analysis it turns out to prescribe a completely externalized and provincial morality. (...) A comparison of Soviet ethics with recent ethical writings from other East-European countries, however, shows that Marxist ethics need not follow the Soviet pattern. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that an implication of the so-called ‘death of metaphysics’ is the imbrication of the normative and descriptive understandings of morality. This imbrication gives rise to a paradox, which amounts to the desire to refute both a priori moral justifications, and ‘the tyranny of the real’ or the socialisation and relativisation of our moral assertions and positions. I investigate three responses to this paradox, namely the pragmatic response, Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive response, and the ante-philosophical (...) response, which is based on the work of Jean-Luc Nancy. The reason for focusing on these three philosophical positions is that they all espouse an immanent view of morality. Through means of this analysis, I attempt to highlight the following implications of an immanently-defined moral position: the constitutive, as opposed to the pedagogical or prescriptive, nature of philosophy; the increasing focus on the performative force of doing philosophy and the importance of philosophical skill; the problematic nature of the distinctions between philosophy, moral theory, and applied ethics, and therefore also between the nature and function of morality; and the status of philosophy and moral theory as one type of praxis amongst many, rather than the definitive voice on praxis. (shrink)

Description: Why Be Moral? is designed as a textbook for beginners. It is also intended for all concerned with understanding ethics. It emphasizes fundamental questions about the nature of: 1. Good and bad, right and wrong, rights and duties. 2. Oughtness, intention, responsibility, conscience. 3. Self, self-as-social, self-interest, extensions of self. 4. Groups, conflicts of interests, reciprocity, justice. It examines persisting issues: 1. Individual vs. social ethics. 2. Selfishness vs. altruism. 3. Intentions vs. consequences. 4. Codes vs. principles. 5. Freedom (...) vs. determinism. 6. Capitalism vs. socialism. Insights into problems in individual and in social ethics are enriched by comparative parallel treatment by chapters. (shrink)