Spinoza’s Principles of Cartesian Philosophy is often presented simply as an interpretation of Descartes’ Principia that does not reveal anything significant about Spinoza’s philosophy and its development. This paper, however, shows that Spinoza altered Descartes’ text in a way congruent with what he would later write in his Theological Political Treatise and the Ethics. More precisely, this paper concentrates not on what Spinoza added to Descartes’ texts but on how he presented them. The paper furthermore examines questions that were (...) obviously important for Descartes but absent in Spinoza’s interpretation. Finally, this paper examines two concrete examples to show that Spinoza’s adaptations function as an unmasking of Descartes’ physics. (shrink)

German language. Michael Gottlieb Hansch (1683-1749) reprint. Deals with Leibnitz Metaphysik.

FOR PLATO, PRINCIPLES WERE THE ROOT-SOURCE of being or of knowledge. For Aristotle, they were the “first cause” of being, of becoming, or of being known. Much the same conception is at issue in Thomas of Aquinas, for whom a principle was something primary in the being of a thing, or in its becoming, or in knowledge of it. As standard philosophical usage has evolved in the light of these ideas, a principle is as something basic—as a fundamentum or archê. (...) It either admits no proof or it needs not proof. Moreover, it must be abstract by way of applying to a broad range of cases. Thus, all concerned seem agreed that principles are fundamental generalities governing our understanding of the modus operandi of some knowledge-accessible domain. (shrink)

FOR PLATO, PRINCIPLES WERE THE ROOT-SOURCE of being or of knowledge. For Aristotle, they were the “first cause” of being, of becoming, or of being known. Much the same conception is at issue in Thomas of Aquinas, for whom a principle was something primary in the being of a thing, or in its becoming, or in knowledge of it. As standard philosophical usage has evolved in the light of these ideas, a principle is as something basic—as a fundamentum or archê. (...) It either admits no proof or it needs not proof. Moreover, it must be abstract by way of applying to a broad range of cases. Thus, all concerned seem agreed that principles are fundamental generalities governing our understanding of the modus operandi of some knowledge-accessible domain. (shrink)

Bei den korpuskulartheoretischen Erklärungen von Naturphänomenen, wie sie Descartes in den Principia philosophiae vornimmt und im Discours de la methode anspricht, lassen sich zwei verschiedene und nur teilweise miteinander vereinbare Bedeutungsgruppen des Hypothesenbegriffs nachweisen. Sie verbinden sich mit unterschiedlichen Bewertungen des Status von Hypothesen im wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisprozeß. Einerseits findet man eine Verwandtschaft zum heute wissenschaftstheoretisch verbreiteten Verständnis von Hypothesen als positivem und integralem Bestandteil der Naturerkenntnis. Typischer für Descartes' Naturphilosophie ist jedoch die andererseits von ihm vertretene Vorstellung, daß (...) der Umfang des bloß hypothetischen Wissens im Fortgang der Naturerkenntnis zu minimieren sei. Mit dieser Forderung erweist sich Descartes als Vertreter einer neuzeitlichen Wissenschaftsauffassung, die deutlich vom modernen Verzicht auf ein ausschließlich geltendes System der Naturerkenntnis abgehoben ist. (shrink)

Summary Descartes' two treatises of corpuscular-mechanical natural philosophy—Le Monde (1633) and the Principia philosophiae (1644/1647)—differ in many respects. Some historians of science have studied their significantly different theories of matter and elements. Others have routinely noted that the Principia cites much evidence regarding magnetism, sunspots, novae and variable stars which is absent from Le Monde. We argue that far from being unrelated or even opposed intellectual practices inside the Principles, Descartes' moves in matter and element theory and (...) his adoption of wide swathes of novel matters of fact, were two sides of the same coin—that coin being his strategies for improving the systematic power, scope and consistency of the natural philosophy presented in the Principia. We find that Descartes' systematising strategy centred upon weaving ranges of novel matters of fact into explanatory and descriptive narratives with cosmic sweep and radical realist Copernican intent. Gambits of this type have recently been labelled as ‘cosmographical’ (the natural philosophical relating of heavens and earth in contemporary usage). Realist Copernican natural philosophers, from Copernicus himself, through Bruno, Gilbert and Galileo did this to varying degrees; but, we suggest, Descartes presented in Books III and IV of the Principia the most elaborate and strategically planned version of it, underneath the ostensible textbook style of the work. (shrink)

Anne Conway, née Finch, is arguably one of the most important British philosophers of the seventeenth century. Her main work, published posthumously, in 1690, "Principia Philosophiae Antiquissimae et Recentissimae", translated two years later into English as "The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy: Concerning God, Christ, and the Creature; that is, concerning Spirit and Matter in General", engages critically with most relevant thinkers of her time, in particular Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and her friend and mentor Henry (...) More. As the sub-title of the English translation suggests, the "Principia" are also influenced by Christian, and especially early Christian - Patristic, teaching. The chapter studies the "Principia" with a view to the way in which they use or engage with these teachings. Anne Conway was not a specialist historical theologian or Patristic scholar and no specific sources are explicitely referenced in her work. However, the way in which she approaches her main themes suggests that she was influenced by very specific early Christian thinkers, in particular Origen, whom she may have known through George Rust's "Letter of Resolution", which Henry More recommended to her in a letter in 1660. At the same time she also developed elements of early Christian thought independently, creatively, pursuing her very own agenda. Studying the "Principia" with a view to their exposure to early Christian thought reveals Anne Conway once more as a fascinating early modern philosopher who indeed combines very ancient with very recent thinking. (shrink)

Dans sa correspondance avec Descartes (1648-1649), Henry More cherche à amener l’auteur des Principia philosophiae à expliciter en une thèse infinitiste sur l’étendue matérielle la formule équivoque de mundus indefinite extensus dans l’article II.21. Les lettres de More, développant une indication rapidement esquissée dans son poème Democritus Platonissans (1646), font de l’infinitisme la condition nécessaire de la cohérence interne de la doctrine physique des Principia. Sans cela, l’hypothèse cosmologique des tourbillons dans Principia III entrerait en contradiction (...) avec les principes des choses matérielles dans Principia II. More associe en outre une exigence logique, relative à la définition du corps, à cette exigence physique. Le corps ne doit plus être défini comme substance étendue. Or, en subordonnant la philosophie naturelle des Principia à une ontologie générale selon laquelle une étendue non matérielle est la propriété de toute substance en tant que substance, les lettres de More à Descartes représentent surtout une étape-charnière dans la pneumatologie de More. La correspondance de 1648-1649 marque un début d’abandon du modèle « holenmérien » de l’étendue spirituelle adopté dans les poèmes philosophiques des années 1640. Au moyen de sa lecture des Principia, More opère un premier retour critique sur sa doctrine des substances immatérielles. (shrink)

pt. 1. Ius naturae generale (editio 2. emendata. 1906) -- pt. 2. Ius naturae speciale.

This paper has the aim to provide a general view of the so called Jesuit Edition (hereafter JE) of Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1739–1742). This edition was conceived to explain all Newton’s methods through an apparatus of notes and commentaries. Every Newton’s proposition is annotated. Because of this, the text – in four volumes – is one of the most important documents to understand Newton’s way of reasoning. This edition is well known, but systematic works on it (...) are still missing. We are going to fill this gap by means of a project exposed in the final remarks of this paper. In this paper we will: A) expound the way in which the notes and the additions to the JE were conceived by the commentators; B) provide some pieces of information about the commentators; C) summarize the most important of their notes; D) examine closely their notes as to a particularly important question: the so called "inverse problem of the central forces". (shrink)

In his monumental 1687 work, _Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica_, known familiarly as the _Principia_, Isaac Newton laid out in mathematical terms the principles of time, force, and motion that have guided the development of modern physical science. Even after more than three centuries and the revolutions of Einsteinian relativity and quantum mechanics, Newtonian physics continues to account for many of the phenomena of the observed world, and Newtonian celestial dynamics is used to determine the orbits of our space vehicles. (...) This authoritative, modern translation by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, the first in more than 285 years, is based on the 1726 edition, the final revised version approved by Newton; it includes extracts from the earlier editions, corrects errors found in earlier versions, and replaces archaic English with contemporary prose and up-to-date mathematical forms. Newton's principles describe acceleration, deceleration, and inertial movement; fluid dynamics; and the motions of the earth, moon, planets, and comets. A great work in itself, the _Principia_ also revolutionized the methods of scientific investigation. It set forth the fundamental three laws of motion and the law of universal gravity, the physical principles that account for the Copernican system of the world as emended by Kepler, thus effectively ending controversy concerning the Copernican planetary system. The translation-only edition of this preeminent work is truly accessible for today's scientists, scholars, and students. (shrink)