“Principium Sapientiae. Los orígenes del pensamiento filosófico griego” fue publicado póstumamente en 1952 y estaba prácticamente acabado, a salvo de algunos aspectos de los capítulos finales, cuando a Cornford le sobrevino la muerte. La edición ha sido preparada por W. K. C. Guthrie, que ha añadido una breve introducción y un apéndice. “Principium Sapientiae” ofrece una perspectiva general sobre el pensamiento de su autor a la vez que añade material nuevo a los trabajos anteriores. Hoy es ya una (...) obra clásica. (shrink)

This paper seeks to defuse two claims. On the one hand, I confront the Hildebrandian claim that Thomism, by placing the principium of love in the needs and desires of the lover rather than in the beloved, denies the possibility of transcendent love; on the other, I seek to refute the Thomistic objection that Hildebrand lacks a sufficient understanding of nature and its inherent teleology. In order to accomplish this, a distinction must be made between different kinds of (...) class='Hi'>principium or “for-its-own-sakeness.” Using St. Thomas’ theory of friendship-love, I show how every affective movement in fact has two fundamentally different principia: an “end-desired,” and an “end-for-whom” the former is desired. I next note that “value” and “bonum honestum” each encompass both of these types of “worthiness,” and that the failure to distinguish between these two has led to much of the misunderstanding between Thomists and Hildebrandians: for while the latter sometimes seem to include inanimate objects like sunsets under the higher “worthiness” (as “ends-for-whom”), the former often tend to classify even the beloved under the lower “worthiness” (as a mere “end-desired”), which are both untenable positions. It is shown, however, that for St. Thomas it is the higher, more ultimate sense of “worthiness” that is the foundation of friendship-love, and that thus love remains a truly “transcendent” or “ecstatic” phenomenon. Two objections are then addressed: 1) St. Thomas’ claim that substantial unity is the greatest cause of love, and 2) his claim that man’s primary end is Vision. In both these respects I argue that Aquinas’ position needs correction; still I maintain that neither claim should be taken to imply that, for Aquinas, man is his own center, his own chief “end-for-whom.” Finally, while Hildebrand emphatically denies that natural teleology can explain man’s transcendence (a Thomistic position), this denial seems to flow simply from confusing two ways in which “nature” can be invoked as an explanation: where he sees it invoked as the final cause, Thomists actually invoke it as simply the formal cause of our love for our true Final Cause. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 47 Heft: 1 Seiten: 185-208.

The article investigates the language of the faith of the Church on the mystery of God. It analyzes its origin and typology, its specificity and ecclesial meaning, its ecumenical relevance, its logical coherence and its theological actuality. It follows the definitions and declarations of the Magisterium while placing the doctrine within the bi-millennial history of Trinitarian theology. The study underlines the importance for the unity of the Church of the formulation of the faith which in adoring the inseparable Trinity proclaims (...) the Holy Monarchy - origin of the divine life and of the sacramental economy - of the eternal, unbegotten Father, principle of the whole deity. After having followed the efforts made by the first apologists to sketch out the language of the ineffable mystery, and the various models of trinitarian language, the study exposes the language used by the councils in East and West: Nicea I and II, Constantinople I to III, Lateran I to IV, Lyons II to Florence, Vatican I to II, so as better to formulate the principles which articulate the rule of faith of the Church. The logic of the ecclesial language is resumed in propositions concerned with the main affirmations of faith and the proclamation of the mystery. The first propositions treat the knowability of the mystery, the possibility of its verification and the dialectic of its language. The main propositions refer to the three divine hypostases, Father, Son and Spirit, in the economy of salvation and in. (shrink)

This research note identifies for the first time the principium on book I of the Sentences by the prolific polymath Henry of Langenstein. This discovery, when combined with the four principia of the Augustinian Denis of Modena, provides the evidence necessary to demonstrate that Langenstein lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1371-1372. The note also establishes the identity of the other eight bachelors of theology who participated in the principial debates that year.

John Wyclif’s principium biblicum, that is to say, his inception speech as a Master of Theology at Oxford, dating from 1372/1373, has received scant scholarly attention. Discovered and edited in the 1960s by Beryl Smalley, it has long been considered a typical representative of its genre. A closer look at Wyclif’s text in the light of current principia-scholarship, and in particular of Robert Grosseteste’s recently identified inception speech, shows, however, that Wyclif’s principium biblicum is all but traditional. Its (...) far-reaching claims concerning the importance of a thorough philosophical training as a prerequisite for the study of the Bible, as well as for that of theology, make this principium stand out amongst medieval inception speeches. (shrink)

Los llamados principios del pensamiento han tenido una vigencia casi incuestionable en la tradición de la filosofía y de las ciencias occidentales. Nos proponemos mostrar en este artículo la importancia que el principio de rationis sufficientis ha tenido en la modernidad partiendo de las reflexiones heideggerianas en torno a la proposición del fundamento, para develar el poder que dicho principio arrastra y su vigencia en los descubrimientos científicos más significativos. Pero por otra parte, se explicita la convocatoria a estar atentos (...) a la escucha de un pensar más radical del ser que obligue a una actitud en la cual se deponga dicha posición de dominio que ha acompañado a la racionalidad calculadora e instrumental en su interpretación y manipulación del ente. (shrink)