Results for 'Prisoners' Dilemma'

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  1.  21
    The Co‐Evolution of Cooperation and Complexity in a Multi‐Player, Local‐Interaction Prisoners' Dilemma.Peter S. Albin & Duncan K. Foley - 2001 - Complexity 6 (3):54-63.
  2.  93
    Newcomb's Problem, Prisoners' Dilemma, and Collective Action.S. L. Hurley - 1991 - Synthese 86 (2):173 - 196.
    Among various cases that equally admit of evidentialist reasoning, the supposedly evidentialist solution has varying degrees of intuitive attractiveness. I suggest that cooperative reasoning may account for the appeal of apparently evidentialist behavior in the cases in which it is intuitively attractive, while the inapplicability of cooperative reasoning may account for the unattractiveness of evidentialist behaviour in other cases. A collective causal power with respect to agreed outcomes, not evidentialist reasoning, makes cooperation attractive in the Prisoners' Dilemma. And a (...)
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  3.  18
    V. Is the Prisoners' Dilemma All of Sociology?Arthur L. Stinchcombe - 1980 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):187 – 192.
    If social relations often require the choice of a cooperative solution to a prisoners' dilemma, we must ask how people generally solve the games. Three possible devices are that those who choose non-cooperative strategies get a bad reputation and so learn to be cooperative, that people are taught by parents that non-cooperators have unhappy lives, or that an official can be paid a salary to make the cooperative choice. By analyzing erotic love and marriage, and why people try to (...)
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  4. Why Prisoners' Dilemma Is Not A Newcomb Problem.P. Woodward - 2006 - Sorites 17:81-84.
    David Lewis has argued that we can gain helpful insight to the Prisoners' Dilemmas that we face from the fact that Newcomb's Problems are easy to solve, and the fact that Prisoners' Dilemmas are nothing other than two Newcomb Problems side by side. The present paper shows that the Prisoners' Dilemmas that we face are significantly different from Newcomb Problems in that the former are iterated while the latter are not. Thus Lewis's hope that we can get insight into the (...)
     
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  5.  2
    The Law of Damages and the Prisoners' Dilemma: A Comment on ‘Pure and Utilitarian Prisoners' Dilemmas’: Hamish Stewart.Hamish Stewart - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (2):231-240.
    Kuhn and Moresi have proposed a useful taxonomy for classifying prisoners' dilemmas. This comment is concerned with K&M's observation that legal penalties for defection can transform PDs into cooperative games, and their argument that the role of the law may vary depending on how the PD is classified by their taxonomy. The purpose of this note is to support K&M's analysis by demonstrating that the law of damages, as understood by economic analysis, already performs the function that K&M assign to (...)
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  6.  6
    The Law of Damages and the Prisoners' Dilemma: A Comment on 'Pure and Utilitarian Prisoners' Dilemmas'.Hamish Stewart - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (2):231-.
    Kuhn and Moresi have proposed a useful taxonomy for classifying prisoners' dilemmas . This comment is concerned with K&M's observation that legal penalties for defection can transform PDs into cooperative games, and their argument that the role of the law may vary depending on how the PD is classified by their taxonomy. The purpose of this note is to support K&M's analysis by demonstrating that the law of damages, as understood by economic analysis, already performs the function that K&M assign (...)
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  7. Prisoners' Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (3):235-240.
  8. The Tortoise and the Prisoners' Dilemma.P. Shaw - 1996 - Mind 105 (419):475-483.
    Simon Blackburn has claimed that on a theory of revealed preference it is tautological that any eligible player - one whose preferences are consistent - plays hawk, chooses a strategy of non-cooperation with the other prisoner. This claim is examined and rejected. A prisoner in the appropriate sense is defined not by preferences over actions (playing hawk or playing dove) but by preferences over the four possible outcomes which result from the players' actions jointly (both playing hawk, both playing dove, (...)
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  9.  86
    A New Take From Nozick on Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma.S. L. Hurley - 1994 - Analysis 54 (2):65 - 72.
  10.  73
    The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Prisoners of the Prisoner's Dilemma.Daniel R. Gilbert Jr - 1996 - Business Ethics Quarterly 6 (2):165-178.
    The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a popular device used by researchers to analyze such institutions as business and the modem corporation. This popularity is not deserved under a certain condition that is widespread in college education. If we, as management educators, take seriouslyour parts in preparing our students to participate in the institutions of a democratic society, then the Prisoner’s Dilemma-as clever a rhetoricaldevice as it is-is an unacceptable means to that end. By posing certain questions about the prisoners (...)
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  11.  31
    The Value of Information in Newcomb's Problem and the Prisoners' Dilemma.Paul Snow - 1985 - Theory and Decision 18 (2):129-133.
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  12.  4
    A General Theory of Sympathy, Mind-Reading, and Social Interaction, with an Application to the Prisoners' Dilemma.D. Sally - 2000 - Social Science Information 39 (4):567-634.
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  13.  39
    That There is a Dilemma in the Prisoners' Dilemma.Lanning Sowden - 1983 - Synthese 55 (3):347 - 352.
  14.  26
    Reason, Egoism, and the Prisoners' Dilemma.Larry Eshelman - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):169 - 177.
  15.  18
    Prisoners' Dilemma for Prisoners.Sidney Gendin - 1989 - Criminal Justice Ethics 8 (1):23-25.
  16. Due to a Technical Error, Which Happened During the Printing Process, Table I, Appearing on Page 54 of the Article,“Does Ethics Training Neutralize the Incentives of the Prisoners Dilemma? Evidence From a Classroom Experience”(Journal of Business Ethics 50 (1), 2004, Pp. 53–61) is Incorrect. Below We Publish the Correct Version of the Table, with Our Sincere Apologies for Any Inconvenience Caused. [REVIEW]Cooperate Not Cooperate - 2004 - Journal of Business Ethics 51 (313).
     
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  17. Relationship Between Norm-Internalization and Cooperation in N-Person Prisoners' Dilemma Games.Mitsutaka Matsumoto - 2006 - Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 21:167-175.
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  18.  12
    Palestinian Prisoners' Hunger-Strikes in Israeli Prisons: Beyond the Dual-Loyalty Dilemma in Medical Practice and Patient Care.Dani Filc, Hadas Ziv, Mithal Nassar & Nadav Davidovitch - 2014 - Public Health Ethics 7 (3):229-238.
    The present article focuses on the case of the 2012 hunger-strike of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. We analyze the ethical dilemma involved in the way the Israeli medical community reacted to these hunger-strikes and the question of force feeding within the context of the fundamental dual-loyalty structure inherent in the Israeli Prison Services—system. We argue that the liberal perspective that focuses the discussion on the dilemma between the principle of individual autonomy and the sanctity of life tends (...)
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  19.  59
    Co-Operative Solutions to the Prisoner's Dilemma.Duncan Macintosh - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (3):309 - 321.
    For the tradition, an action is rational if maximizing; for Gauthier, if expressive of a disposition it maximized to adopt; for me, if maximizing on rational preferences, ones whose possession maximizes given one's prior preferences. Decision and Game Theory and their recommendations for choice need revamping to reflect this new standard for the rationality of preferences and choices. It would not be rational when facing a Prisoner's Dilemma to adopt or co-operate from Amartya Sen's "Assurance Game" or "Other Regarding" (...)
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  20. McClennen's Early Co-Operative Solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma.Duncan MacIntosh - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):341-358.
  21.  49
    Rationality, Group Choice and Expected Utility.Reed Richter - 1985 - Synthese 63 (2):203 - 232.
    This paper proposes a view uniformly extending expected utility calculations to both individual and group choice contexts. Three related cases illustrate the problems inherent in applying expected utility to group choices. However, these problems do not essentially depend upon the tact that more than one agent is involved. I devise a modified strategy allowing the application of expected utility calculations to these otherwise problematic cases. One case, however, apparently leads to contradiction. But recognizing the falsity of proposition (1) below allows (...)
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  22.  28
    Effective Choice in the Single-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament.Doede Nauta & Jeljer Hoekstra - 1995 - Theory and Decision 39 (1):1-30.
  23.  33
    The Impact of Personal and Organizational Moral Philosophies on Marketing Exchange Relationships: A Simulation Using the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. [REVIEW]Alison Watkins & Ronald Paul Hill - 2005 - Journal of Business Ethics 62 (3):253 - 265.
    The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of individual and firm moral philosophies on marketing exchange relationships. Personal moral philosophies range from the extreme forms of true altruists and true egoists, along with three hybrids that represent middle ground (i.e., realistic altruists, tit-for-tats, and realistic egoists). Organizational postures are defined as Ethical Paradigm, Unethical Paradigm, and Neutral Paradigm, which result in changes to personal moral philosophies and company and industry performance. The study context is a simulation of (...)
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  24. Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality.Duncan MacIntosh - 1998 - In Peter Danielson (ed.), Modeling Rationality, Morality and Evolution; Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science, Volume 7. Oxford University Press.
    David Gauthier suggested that all genuine moral problems are Prisoners Dilemmas (PDs), and that the morally and rationally required solution to a PD is to co-operate. I say there are four other forms of moral problem, each a different way of agents failing to be in PDs because of the agents’ preferences. This occurs when agents have preferences that are malevolent, self-enslaving, stingy, or bullying. I then analyze preferences as reasons for action, claiming that this means they must not target (...)
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  25. Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality.Duncan MacIntosh - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (1-2):3-32.
    I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and (...)
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  26. Libertarian Agency and Rational Morality: Action-Theoretic Objections to Gauthier's Dispositional Soution of the Compliance Problem.Duncan MacIntosh - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):499-525.
    David Gauthier thinks agents facing a prisoner's dilemma ('pd') should find it rational to dispose themselves to co-operate with those inclined to reciprocate (i.e., to acquire a constrained maximizer--'cm'--disposition), and to co-operate with other 'cmers'. Richmond Campbell argues that since dominance reasoning shows it remains to the agent's advantage to defect, his co-operation is only rational if cm "determines" him to co-operate, forcing him not to cheat. I argue that if cm "forces" the agent to co-operate, he is not (...)
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  27. Buridan and the Circumstances of Justice (On the Implications of the Rational Unsolvability of Certain Co-Ordination Problems).Duncan MacIntosh - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):150-173.
    Gauthier and Hobbes reduce Prisoners Dilemmas to co-ordination problems (CPs). Many think rational, face-to-face agents can solve any CP by agreed fiat. But though an agent can rationally use a symmetry-breaking technique (ST) to decide between equal options, groups cannot unless their members' STs luckily converge. Failing this, the CP is escapable only by one agent's non-rational stubbornness, or by the group's "conquest" by an outside force. Implications: one's strategic rationality is group-relative; there are some optimums groups in principle cannot (...)
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  28.  43
    In Defense of Moderate Envy.Bernd Lahno - 2000 - Analyse & Kritik 22 (1):98-113.
    In contrast to Axelrod's advice 'don't be envious' it is argued that the emotion of envy may enhance cooperation. TIT FOR TAT does exhibit a certain degree of envy. But, it does so in inconsistent ways. Two variants of TIT FOR TAT are introduced and their strategic properties are analyzed. Both generate the very same actual play as TIT FOR TAT in a computer tournament without noise. However, if noise is introduced they display some greater degree of stability. This is (...)
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  29.  17
    Two Gauthiers?Duncan MacIntosh - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (1):43-.
    David Gauthier claims that it can be rational to co-operate in a prisoner's dilemma if one has adopted a disposition constraining one's self from maximizing one's individual expected utility, i.e., a constrained maximizer disposition. But I claim cooperation cannot be both voluntary and constrained. In resolving this tension I ask what constrained maximizer dispositions might be. One possibility is that they are rationally acquired, irrevocable psychological mechanisms which determine but do not rationalize cooperation. Another possibility is that they are (...)
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  30.  56
    Marinoff on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies.Brad Armendt - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):789-793.
    Louis Marinoff [1990] criticizes Axelrod and Hamilton's [1981] use of the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy, and claims to find an inconsistency between their theory for repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games and empirical results. Marinoff seeks to resolve the inconsistency by arguing that Axelrod and Hamilton's model is ill conceived: he purports to prove, contra Axelrod and Hamilton, that no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. But his argument is flawed, and moreover, Marinoff gives no (...)
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  31.  19
    Book ReviewsRichard Tuck,. Free Riding.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. Pp. 223. $35.00. [REVIEW]S. M. Amadae - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):211-216.
    This review of Richard Tuck's Free Riding conveys Tuck's crucial distinction between the logic of collective action which fails due to the problem of causal negligibility, and free riding, which has been modeled as a Prisoner's Dilemma and involves casually impacting another actor in an adverse manner. Tuck also distinguishes the practice of voting which he argues neither fails due to the worry of causal negligibility or due to free riding; instead it represents a problem of achieving sufficiency of (...)
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  32.  33
    Cognitive Enhancement, Rational Choice and Justification.Veljko Dubljević - 2013 - Neuroethics 6 (1):179-187.
    This paper examines the claims in the debate on cognitive enhancement in neuroethics that society wide pressure to enhance can be expected in the near future. The author uses rational choice modeling to test these claims and proceeds with the analysis of proposed types of solutions. The discourage use, laissez-faire and prohibition types of policy are scrutinized for effectiveness, legitimacy and associated costs. Special attention is given to the moderately liberal discourage use policy (and the gate-keeper and taxation approaches within (...)
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  33.  97
    Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer.Chrisoula Andreou - 2006 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (1):95-108.
    I show, building on Warren Quinn's puzzle of the self-torturer, that destructive conduct with respect to the environment can flourish even in the absence of interpersonal conflicts. As Quinn's puzzle makes apparent, in cases where individually negligible effects are involved, an agent, whether it be an individual or a unified collective, can be led down a course of destruction simply as a result of following its informed and perfectly understandable but intransitive preferences. This is relevant with respect to environmental ethics, (...)
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  34. Preference-Revision and the Paradoxes of Instrumental Rationality.Duncan MacIntosh - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):503-529.
    To the normal reasons that we think can justify one in preferring something, x (namely, that x has objectively preferable properties, or has properties that one prefers things to have, or that x's obtaining would advance one's preferences), I argue that it can be a justifying reason to prefer x that one's very preferring of x would advance one's preferences. Here, one prefers x not because of the properties of x, but because of the properties of one's having the preference (...)
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  35.  21
    Conditional Preference and Causal Expected Utility.Brad Armendt - 1988 - In William Harper & Brian Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 3-24.
    Sequel to Armendt 1986, ‘A Foundation for Causal Decision Theory.’ The representation theorem for causal decision theory is slightly revised, with the addition of a new restriction on lotteries and a new axiom (A7). The discussion gives some emphasis to the way in which appropriate K-partitions are characterized by relations found among the agent’s conditional preferences. The intended interpretation of conditional preference is one that embodies a sensitivity to the agent’s causal beliefs.
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  36.  37
    Hyperbolic Discount Curves: A Reply to Ainslie. [REVIEW]Andrew Musau - 2014 - Theory and Decision 76 (1):9-30.
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  37.  11
    Stable Cooperation in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas.Elliott Sober - 1992 - Economics and Philosophy 8 (1):127.
    When does self-interest counsel cooperation? This question pertains both to the labile behaviors produced by rational deliberation and to the more instinctive and fixed behaviors produced by natural selection. In both cases, a standard starting point for the investigation is the one-shot prisoners' dilemma. In this game, each player has the option of producing one or the other of two behaviors. The pay-offs to the row player are as follows.
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  38.  31
    South-South Cooperation and Export.Sugata Marjit & Hamid Beladi - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (3):283-293.
    We study the possibility of cartel formation among primary exporters who face an inelastic world demand for their exports. The phenomenon of immiserizing export growth appears as a non-cooperative equilibrium in a two-country export game. With infinite repetitions of the one shot game, we show that `different country size' will be detrimental to the sustenance of the collusive behavior needed for eliminating the possibility of immiserization.
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  39.  64
    Newcomb’s Problem and Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemmas.Christoph Schmidt‐Petri - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1160-1173.
    I present a game-theoretic way to understand the situation describing Newcomb’s Problem (NP) which helps to explain the intuition of both one-boxers and two-boxers. David Lewis has shown that the NP may be modelled as a Prisoners Dilemma game (PD) in which ‘cooperating’ corresponds to ‘taking one box’. Adopting relevant results from game theory, this means that one should take just one box if the NP is repeated an indefinite number of times, but both boxes if it is a (...)
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  40.  1
    Stable Cooperation in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas * Article Author Query * Sober E [Google Scholar].Elliott Sober - 1992 - Economics and Philosophy 8 (1):127-138.
    When does self-interest counsel cooperation? This question pertains both to the labile behaviors produced by rational deliberation and to the more instinctive and fixed behaviors produced by natural selection. In both cases, a standard starting point for the investigation is the one-shot prisoners' dilemma. In this game, each player has the option of producing one or the other of two behaviors. The pay-offs to the row player are as follows.
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  41.  2
    The Impact of Personal and Organizational Moral Philosophies on Marketing Exchange Relationships: A Simulation Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.Alison Watkins & Ronald Paul Hill - 2005 - Journal of Business Ethics 62 (3):253-265.
    The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of individual and firm moral philosophies on marketing exchange relationships. Personal moral philosophies range from the extreme forms of true altruists and true egoists, along with three hybrids that represent middle ground. Organizational postures are defined as Ethical Paradigm, Unethical Paradigm, and Neutral Paradigm, which result in changes to personal moral philosophies and company and industry performance. The study context is a simulation of an exchange environment using a variation of (...)
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  42.  87
    The Ethics of Poverty and the Poverty of Ethics: The Case of Palestinian Prisoners in Israel Seeking to Sell Their Kidneys in Order to Feed Their Children.M. Epstein - 2007 - Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (8):473-474.
    Bioethical arguments conceal the coercion underlying the choice between poverty and selling ones organsIn mid-May 2006, three Palestinian prisoners detained in Israel applied to the Israeli Prison Service for permission to sell their kidneys in order to send money to their children for food. Whether truly sincere or merely propagandistic, the request was made against the background of Israel’s decision to suspend the transfer of Palestinian tax moneys to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, and the subsequent increasing poverty and famine in (...)
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  43.  70
    The Prisoner's Dilemma.Leon Felkins - unknown
    The "Prisoner's Dilemma" game has been extensively discussed in both the public and academic press. Thousands of articles and many books have been written about this disturbing game and its apparent representation of many problems of society. The origin of the game is attributed to Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher. I quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Puzzles with this structure were devised and discussed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, as part of the Rand CorporationÂ’s (...)
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  44.  36
    Structural Heterogeneity Mediates the Effect of Community Structure on Cooperation.Fengjie Xie, Wentian Cui & Jun Lin - 2012 - Complexity 17 (4):40-48.
  45.  43
    Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution.Peter Danielson (ed.) - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    This collection focuses on questions that arise when morality is considered from the perspective of recent work on rational choice and evolution. Linking questions like "Is it rational to be moral?" to the evolution of cooperation in "The Prisoners Dilemma," the book brings together new work using models from game theory, evolutionary biology, and cognitive science, as well as from philosophical analysis. Among the contributors are leading figures in these fields, including David Gauthier, Paul M. Churchland, Brian Skyrms, Ronald (...)
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  46.  34
    Student Evaluations and Moral Hazard.Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya - 2004 - Journal of Academic Ethics 2 (3):263-271.
    Most universities solicit feedback from students at the end of a course in order to assess student perceptions of the course. This feedback is used for various objectives, including for evaluating teaching by academic administrators. One would therefore expect faculty to rationally take this into account while formulating their teaching strategy. In certain cases, such strategic considerations can give rise to moral hazard. I have modelled the situation using the well-known Prisoners Dilemma game and found that in equilibrium, the (...)
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  47.  21
    Cooperating with Cooperators.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (1):23 - 55.
    Jan Österberg (Self and Others, 1988) argues that the most defensible form of egoism should not only tell each of us what to do but also tell us what we ought to do. He also claims that collective norms should take precedence over individual ones. An individual ought to do one's part in an action pattern that is prescribed for the group - provided that other members of the group do their part. question This paper questions Österberg's claim that Collective (...)
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  48. Are We Prisoners of Our Own Character? Replies to Kant, Sartre and Mounier.D. Smrekova - 2002 - Filozofia 57 (5):307-320.
    The paper gives an analysis of the problem of character, which goes beyond the limits of the traditional ethics of virtue and which aims at the resolution of the essential dilemma - namely the role of determinism in the play of human fortune. The author focuses on two important French authors, whose conceptions of character were based on Kant's philosophy and on its criticism at the same time. Whereas Mounier defends the idea that the constitution of character is shaped (...)
     
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  49.  18
    The Emergence of Norms.Lanning Sowden & Edna Ullmann-Margalit - 1981 - Philosophical Quarterly 31 (122):82.
    Edna Ullmann-Margalit provides an original account of the emergence of norms. Her main thesis is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. She presents illuminating discussions of Prisoners' Dilemma, co-ordination, and inequality situations.
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  50. The Possibility of Cooperation.Michael Taylor - 1987 - Cambridge University Press.
    This 1987 book offers a critique of the liberal theory of the state, focusing on a detailed study of cooperation in the absence of the state and of other kinds of coercion. The discussion includes an analysis of collective action and of the Prisoners' Dilemma supergame. It is a revised and expanded edition of the author's classic work of rational choice theory Anarchy and Cooperation, originally published with John Wiley in 1976. The analysis has been recast and developed here (...)
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