This paper has two aims. The first is to present and defend a new argument for rights contributionism – the view that the notion of a moral claim-right is a contributory (or pro tanto) rather than overall normative notion. The argument is an inference to the best explanation: it is argued that (i) there are contributory moral factors that contrast with standard moral reasons by way of having a number of formal properties that are characteristic of rights, even though (...) they can be overridden, and (ii) that this is best explained by a view that takes these factors to correlate with rights. The second aim is to show that the truth of rights contributionism matters for normative ethics. More specifically, it is argued that rights contributionism clears the way for deontologists to justify the pre-theoretically plausible verdict that we have a duty to save the greater number in so-called Taurek scenarios – scenarios in which we have to choose between saving either a greater or a smaller number of different people. The chapter offers a novel and distinctively deontological explanation of this verdict that is based on the assumption that everyone has a pro tanto right to be saved in a Taurek scenario. (shrink)

Judith Jarvis Thomson and others contend that rights are pro-tanto rather than absolute, that is, that rights may permissibly be infringed in some circumstances. Alan Gewirth maintains that there are some rights that are absolute because infringing them would amount to unspeakable evil. However, there seem to be possible circumstances in which it would be permissible to infringe even those rights. Specificationists, such as Gerald Gaus, Russ Shafer-Landau, Hillel Steiner and Kit Wellman, argue that all rights are absolute because (...) they have implicit exceptions, the exceptions being either right-voiding or right-compatible. Specificationists have charged pro-tantoism with preventing rights from being action-guiding, and pro-tantoists have levelled the same charge against specificationism. I show that both charges are mistaken. Pro-tantoists claim that specificationists cannot account for the moral remainder that we recognise in some circumstances and which can be explained by reference to a permissible right-infringement. Specificationists retort that the moral remainder can be explained by invoking compensation-rights. I show that the pro-tantoist claim is true and that the specificationist retort is false on two counts: explanation in terms of compensation-rights is not applicable to all cases; and it fails to account for the moral dynamic in the cases to which it is applicable. The contention that rights are pro-tanto does not conflict with the substance of the contention that rights are trumps, despite claims of specificationists to the contrary. (shrink)

In The Ethics of Whistleblowing (2019), Boot engages with the current literature on unauthorized disclosure of information, critically examines some positions, and defends others. One early step of the book’s main argument is to claim that whistleblowing is pro tanto wrong. This claim which many parties of the debate accept affects the narrative of the discussion and also plays a role against attempts to justify whistleblowing based on moral rights. In opposition to such a claim, I argue that one (...) can similarly ascribe pro tanto rightness to whistleblowing. However, this would also be a mistake. In principle, such claims are inaccurate concerning how pro tanto reasons work. Considering the motivations for taking up Ross’s idea of prima facie duties, and having in mind the theoretical role they are supposed to play, I suggest that only simple type-acts (as contrasted with complex act-types) may be called pro tanto right or wrong. Therefore, although widely appealed to, such claims about whistleblowing are neither helpful nor successful in the debate. (shrink)

I summarize a conception of morality as containing a set of rules which hold ceteris paribus and which impose pro-tanto obligations. I explain two ways in which moral rules are ceteris-paribus, according to whether an exception is duty-voiding or duty-overriding. I defend the claim that moral rules are ceteris-paribus against two qualms suggested by Luke Robinson’s discussion of moral rules and against the worry that such rules are uninformative. I show that Robinson’s argument that moral rules cannot ground pro- (...) class='Hi'>tanto obligations is unsound, because it confuses an absolute reason for an obligation with a reason for an absolute obligation, and because it overlooks the possibility that priority rules may be rules for ordering pro-tanto obligations rather than rules for eliminating contenders for the status of absolute obligation. (shrink)

In _The Ethics of Whistleblowing_ (2019), Boot engages with the current literature on unauthorized disclosure of information, critically examines some positions, and defends others. One early step of the book’s main argument is to claim that whistleblowing is _pro tanto_ wrong. This claim which many parties of the debate accept affects the narrative of the discussion and also plays a role against attempts to justify whistleblowing based on moral rights. In opposition to such a claim, I argue that one can (...) similarly ascribe _pro tanto_ rightness to whistleblowing. However, this would also be a mistake. In principle, such claims are inaccurate concerning how _pro tanto_ reasons work. Considering the motivations for taking up Ross’s idea of _prima facie_ duties, and having in mind the theoretical role they are supposed to play, I suggest that only simple type-acts (as contrasted with complex act-types) may be called _pro tanto_ right or wrong. Therefore, although widely appealed to, such claims about whistleblowing are neither helpful nor successful in the debate. (shrink)

There are many uses in English of the word “ought” (see Ought). This essay concerns the normative uses and the concepts or properties denoted thereby. In particular, it concerns two nonfinal oughts commonly used in the philosophical literature: prima facie oughts and pro tanto oughts.

I defend one way of solving the Impermissibility Problem—that is, the problem that on moralized approaches to coercion, coerciveness and permissibility are mutually exclusive. This brings up intuitive difficulties for cases such as taxation, which seem to be both coercive and permissible. I gloss three popular theories of coercion—the moralized baseline, nonmoralized baseline, and enforcement approaches—and conclude that only the nonmoralized baseline approach clearly solves the problem. However, Robert Nozick’s famous “slave case” raises another serious issue for the nonmoralized baseline (...) approach. So, in order to solve both the slave case and the Impermissibility Problem, I draw on Grant Lamond’s discussion of the coerciveness of law to propose the pro tanto wrong approach. On this approach, coercion is not impermissible simpliciter, but requires some sort of special justification. The pro tanto wrong approach is moralized, but on it, moralization comes in coercion’s need for justification, not in whether it is, in fact, justified. Thus impermissibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for coerciveness, and the Impermissibility Problem is avoided. I conclude that solving the problem in this way is desirable because it preserves a core belief of liberalism: certain acts, including taxation, may be both coercive and permissible. (shrink)

Some recent scholarship in the philosophy of criminal law has claimed that sexual penetration ‘per se’—meaning, consensual or otherwise—is pro tanto morally wrong, or that there exist ‘general reasons’ against it. On such a view, penetrative sex is only ever at best justified wrongdoing. When paired with an influential view about the theoretical basis of the offence-defence distinction in criminal law, the apparent implication is that sexual penetration alone ought to constitute the actus reus of rape, with the question (...) of consent relegated to a defence matter. This article firstly sets out some of the difficult upshots of considering all sexual penetration to be pro tanto wrong, particularly when one attends to the full moral entailments of justified wrongdoing. Assuming, arguendo, that sexual penetration is pro tanto wrong, it is also far from clear, I suggest, that consent, of all things, amounts to a justification for penetrative sex. This creates further difficulties for the pro tanto wrong view. Finally, I argue that even if penetrative sex is a pro tanto moral wrong of some kind, it does not follow, as some scholars have suggested, that there is a case for making penetrative sex as such the offence element of rape. (shrink)

In Climate Matters (2012), John Broome argues that individuals have private duties to offset all emissions for which they are causally responsible, grounded in the general moral injunction against doing harm. Emissions do harm, therefore they must be neutralized. I argue that individuals' private duties to offset emissions cannot be grounded in a duty to do no harm, because there can be no such general duty. It is virtually impossible in our current social context―for those in developed countries at least―to (...) do no harm, and we cannot have duties to do what we cannot do. I argue that this shifts the general injunction from 'do no harm' to 'do the least harm', and thereby reopens the question of tradeoffs which Broome had set aside as a matter of 'goodness' rather than 'justice'. He admits that when it comes to goodness, reducing emissions is not the best way to promote the good. The focus of this paper is on whether when it comes to minimizing injustice, reducing emissions is the best way. Climate change is undoubtedly one of the most important issues we face; it's clear that it matters prima facie. The question is whether―and to what extent―it matters all-things-considered. (shrink)

Critics often argue that Ross’s metaphysical and epistemological accounts of all-things-considered duties suffer from the problem of explanation. For Ross did not give us any clear explanation of the combination of pro tanto duties, i.e. how principles of pro tanto duties can combine. Following from this, he did not explain how we could arrive at overall justified moral judgements. In this paper, I will argue that the problem of explanation is not compelling. First of all, it is based (...) on the classical account of pro tanto duties. Principles of pro tanto duties can be understood in another way, i.e. in terms of reason-giving account that might be of help to provide a response to the critics. Furthermore, critics fail to see some evidence in Ross about how we can arrive at moral judgements. (shrink)

Quienes nos adscribimos al realismo metafísico y tenemos a Robert Spaemann como uno de nuestros filósofos de referencia, celebramos que Comares haya editado una “introducción a la ética de Robert Spaemann”, elaborada por la profesora de la Universidad Católica de Ávila y de la Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca Mª Luisa Pro Velasco (Pro Velasco, 2021). En su introducción, la autora señala que su estudio viene a cubrir el vacío provocado por la escasez de trabajos sobre el filósofo alemán. Y ciertamente (...) lo hace. Por eso, no se trata tanto de un ensayo dirigido a quienes ya conocemos a Spaemann, cuanto de una síntesis orientada a seducir a un público culto de amplio espectro, interesado por la filosofía y cansado de las propuestas éticas idealistas (e ideológicas), para que descubra la obra de este gran filósofo y se adhiera a su idea de que la verdad, por más que sea perspectivista y se deje decir desde múltiples ubicaciones, es siempre verdad y se asienta sobre la realidad. En lo que sigue, ofrecemos una breve recensión del contenido del libro, al objeto de ayudar a los lectores a decidirse en favor de su lectura. (shrink)

La fenomenologia possiede un implicito potenziale pedagogico estremamente promettente e tuttavia ancora largamente inesplorato. Il presente articolo suggerisce che l’orientamento fenomenologico-esistenziale nella didattica e nell’educazione rappresenti una possibile soluzione per: 1) riportare tutti i differenti aspetti metodologici del processo formativo ad una unità tematica; 2) sviluppare negli studenti che si preparano ad esercitare una professione di cura l’attitudine a svolgere il loro servizio in modo autentico, sostenendo la motivazione, rendendo possibile il coinvolgimento emotivo senza il quale il gesto di cura (...) non potrebbe nascere, favorendo la realizzazione di significati e di valori e prevenendo il rischio sempre presente di burnout. Viene qui esplorato il significato dei termini fenomenologia ed esistenzialismo, intendendo con il primo una particolare postura metodologica dinanzi alla realtà, e con l’altro un ambito di ricerca concernente il senso dell’esistenza umana. In tal modo, la formazione del professionista, ancorché scientificamente fondata, non perde di vista i due riferimenti ineludibili che sostengono le professioni d’aiuto: il contatto con la soggettività e la coltivazione dell’umanità quale imprescindibile risorsa professionale . Poiché l’approccio fenomenologico-esistenziale abitua ad un sapere contestualizzato,individualizzato e “sapienziale”, i professionisti del lavoro cura che sono stati formati secondo una sensibilità fenomenologico-esistenziale saranno meglio equipaggiati per fronteggiare e gestire le sfide che quotidianamente coloro che svolgono un lavoro di cura devono affrontare, nonché più preparati a cogliere in modo profondo i bisogni della popolazione e a rispondervi in modo creativo ed efficace. È una questione di sguardo: l’atteggiamento fenomenologico forma nei professionisti la capacità di “vedere” ciò che altrimenti resterebbe implicito, latente, imbrigliato nelle maglie dell’ovvietà e della routine. In questo senso si parla qui di una sorta di “oftalmologia” pedagogica: perché lo scopo della formazione non consiste tanto nel trasmettere una nozione della realtà , quanto nell’affinare la capacità di coglierne l’essenza e il significato più profondo. L’articolo offre alcune suggestioni rispetto al modo in cui i formatori possono trasferire queste nozioni nella costruzione di un ambiente di apprendimento aperto all’esperienza viva e aderente al mondo della vita.This paper poses the suggestion that existential phenomenology provides an ideal solution for 1) integrating all of the different methodological aspects of the educational process into a thematic unity for the student and 2) empowering students entering the caring professions to best serve their intended populations authentically, while avoiding the ever-present peril of burnout. The meanings of both phenomenology and existentialism are clarified, with phenomenology indicating a particular methodological stance toward phenomena, and existentialism indicating research content concerned with domains of human meaning. It is anticipated that students preparing to enter the caring professions who have training in existential phenomenology will be better equipped to manage challenges commonly faced by those in the caring vocations, as well as to prepare them to assist the populations they serve with meaning-oriented crises and needs. A few suggestions on how educators might bring these notions into the classroom environmentensue. (shrink)

Resumen Nuestro trabajo presenta una nueva propuesta de lectura de una inscripción hallada en Emporiae en honor de un M. Iuṇ[ius] cuya identidad tratamos de determinar, planteando la posibilidad de que se trate del pretor M. Iunius citado por Cicerón en su discurso Pro Cluentio y de que, por lo tanto, la inscripción corresponda a su posible proconsulado en Hispania Citerior hacia el año 68 a. C. Dicho supuesto nos permite al mismo tiempo poner al personaje en relación con (...) las circunstancias fundacionales de la ciudad romana de Emporiae, cuyo nacimiento sitúan hoy ciertos arqueólogos en las primeras décadas del siglo I a. C. (shrink)

El artículo estudia esa obra de Agustín, señalando que la sección de relatos de sueños y visiones en que se aparecen tanto vivos como muertos, está vinculada fuertemente a la parte anterior del tratado, mediante mecanismos lingüísticos. Muestra también que la tercera sección de la obra no es una digresión, sino un elemento esencial de la argumentación.

Charles Fourier propounded a socialist and, at the same time, libertarian utopia: a harmonious project of living together in solidarity, of cooperative work and sexual freedom. Historians interested in its reception in Spain have underlined the lack of thinkers capable of developing Fourier’s thinking along original lines or from a certain theoretical level. Moreover, it has been affirmed that Fourier’s original doctrine was impoverished in Spain because it was stripped of a large part of its utopian aspects and reduced to (...) a doctrinaire framework for social criticism and reform.1 Nonetheless, the evolution of Spanish Fourierism is comparable to that which the movement underwent in other countries, including France.. (shrink)