Results for 'Probabilistic opinion pooling'

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  1. Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hajek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This article reviews several proposed solutions to this problem. We focus on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). We present axiomatic characterisations of (...)
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  2. Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalized. Part One: General Agendas.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2017 - Social Choice and Welfare 48 (4):747–786.
    How can different individuals' probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classic results on this problem assume that the set of relevant events -- the agenda -- is a sigma-algebra and is thus closed under disjunction (union) and conjunction (intersection). We drop this demanding assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. One might be interested in the probability of rain and that of an interest-rate increase, but not in the probability (...)
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  3. Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (1):17-45.
    The question of how the probabilistic opinions of different individuals should be aggregated to form a group opinion is controversial. But one assumption seems to be pretty much common ground: for a group of Bayesians, the representation of group opinion should itself be a unique probability distribution, 410–414, [45]; Bordley Management Science, 28, 1137–1148, [5]; Genest et al. The Annals of Statistics, 487–501, [21]; Genest and Zidek Statistical Science, 114–135, [23]; Mongin Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 313–351, (...)
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  4. Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalised. Part Two: The Premise-Based Approach.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2017 - Social Choice and Welfare 48 (4):787–814.
    How can different individuals' probability functions on a given sigma-algebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem often require 'event-wise independence': the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals' probabilities for that event. In practice, however, some events may be 'basic' and others 'derivative', so that it makes sense first to aggregate the probabilities for the former and then to let these constrain the probabilities for the latter. We formalize (...)
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  5. Aggregating agents with opinions about different propositions.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-25.
    There are many reasons we might want to take the opinions of various individuals and pool them to give the opinions of the group they constitute. If all the individuals in the group have probabilistic opinions about the same propositions, there is a host of pooling functions we might deploy, such as linear or geometric pooling. However, there are also cases where different members of the group assign probabilities to different sets of propositions, which might overlap a (...)
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  6. Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2018 - Philosophy of Science (2):236-254.
    Merging of opinions results underwrite Bayesian rejoinders to complaints about the subjective nature of personal probability. Such results establish that sufficiently similar priors achieve consensus in the long run when fed the same increasing stream of evidence. Initial subjectivity, the line goes, is of mere transient significance, giving way to intersubjective agreement eventually. Here, we establish a merging result for sets of probability measures that are updated by Jeffrey conditioning. This generalizes a number of different merging results in the literature. (...)
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  7.  78
    Aggregating Large Sets of Probabilistic Forecasts by Weighted Coherent Adjustment.Guanchun Wang, Sanjeev R. Kulkarni & Daniel N. Osherson - unknown
    Stochastic forecasts in complex environments can benefit from combining the estimates of large groups of forecasters (“judges”). But aggregating multiple opinions faces several challenges. First, human judges are notoriously incoherent when their forecasts involve logically complex events. Second, individual judges may have specialized knowledge, so different judges may produce forecasts for different events. Third, the credibility of individual judges might vary, and one would like to pay greater attention to more trustworthy forecasts. These considerations limit the value of simple aggregation (...)
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  8. The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...)
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  9. A Theory of Bayesian Groups.Franz Dietrich - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):708-736.
    A group is often construed as one agent with its own probabilistic beliefs (credences), which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance through averaging. In their celebrated “Groupthink”, Russell et al. (2015) require group credences to undergo Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever individual credences undergo Bayesian revision based on this information. To obtain a fully Bayesian group, one should often extend this requirement to non-public or even private information (learnt by not all (...)
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  10. Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.
    Decision-making typically requires judgments about causal relations: we need to know the causal effects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. We investigate how several individuals' causal judgments can be aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments, and identify the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce the problem of (...)
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  11. Opinion Pooling Under Informational Asymmetries.Franz Dietrich - unknown
    If a group as a whole is modelled as a single Bayesian agent, what should its beliefs be? I propose an axiomatic model that connects group beliefs to beliefs of group members, who are themselves modelled as Bayesian agents, possibly with di¤erent priors and di¤erent information. Group beliefs are shown to take a simple multiplicative form if people’s information is independent, and a more complex form if information can overlap arbitrarily. This shows that group beliefs can incorporate all information spread (...)
     
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  12.  4
    Resolving Some Contradictions in the Theory of Linear Opinion Pools.A. Philip Dawid & Julia Mortera - 2020 - Theory and Decision 88 (3):453-456.
    Bradley develops some theory of the linear opinion pool, in apparent contradiction to results of Dawid et al.. We investigate the sources of these contradictions, and in particular identify a mathematical error in Bradley that invalidates his main result.
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  13.  39
    Aggregating Infinitely Many Probability Measures.Frederik Herzberg - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (2):319-337.
    The problem of how to rationally aggregate probability measures occurs in particular when a group of agents, each holding probabilistic beliefs, needs to rationalise a collective decision on the basis of a single ‘aggregate belief system’ and when an individual whose belief system is compatible with several probability measures wishes to evaluate her options on the basis of a single aggregate prior via classical expected utility theory. We investigate this problem by first recalling some negative results from preference and (...)
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  14.  16
    An Interpretation of Weights in Linear Opinion Pooling.Jan-Willem Romeijn - forthcoming - Episteme:1-15.
    This paper explores the fact that linear opinion pooling can be represented as a Bayesian update on the opinions of others. It uses this fact to propose a new interpretation of the pooling weights. Relative to certain modelling assumptions the weights can be equated with the so-called truth-conduciveness known from the context of Condorcet's jury theorem. This suggests a novel way to elicit the weights.
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  15.  13
    Order Effects and Display Persistence in Probabilistic Opinion Revision.Robert A. Edenborough - 1975 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 5 (1):39-40.
  16.  1
    Probabilistic Horn Abduction and Bayesian Networks.David Poole - 1993 - Artificial Intelligence 64 (1):81-129.
  17.  46
    Aggregating Opinions Through Logarithmic Pooling.C. Genest, S. Weerahandi & J. V. Zidek - 1984 - Theory and Decision 17 (1):61-70.
  18.  2
    Probabilistic Conflicts in a Search Algorithm for Estimating Posterior Probabilities in Bayesian Networks.David Poole - 1996 - Artificial Intelligence 88 (1-2):69-100.
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  19. Pooling: A User's Guide.Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg - manuscript
    We often learn the credences of others without getting to hear the evidence on which they’re based. And, in these cases, it is often unfeasible or overly onerous to update on this social evidence by conditionalizing on it. How, then, should we respond to it? We consider four methods for aggregating your credences with the credences of others: arithmetic, geometric, multiplicative, and harmonic pooling. Each performs well for some purposes and poorly for others. We describe these in Sections 1-4. (...)
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  20.  67
    Introduction to the Special Issue “Beliefs in Groups” of Theory and Decision.Franz Dietrich & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):1-4.
    This symposium in the overlap of philosophy and decision theory is described well by its title “Beliefs in Groups”. Each word in the title matters, with one intended ambiguity. The symposium is about beliefs rather than other attitudes such as preferences; these beliefs take the form of probabilities in the first three contributions, binary yes/no beliefs (‘judgments’) in the fourth contribution, and qualitative probabilities (‘probability grades’) in the fifth contribution. The beliefs occur in groups, which is ambiguous between beliefs of (...)
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  21.  10
    Rights and Opinion: Or, The Progress of Sentiments.Thomas Poole - 2016 - Law and Ethics of Human Rights 10 (2):453-478.
    Journal Name: The Law & Ethics of Human Rights Issue: Ahead of print.
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  22.  1
    Rights and Opinion: Or, The Progress of Sentiments.Poole Thomas - 2016 - The Law and Ethics of Human Rights 10 (2).
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  23. The Debate on Probable Opinions in the Scholastic Tradition.Rudolf Schuessler - 2019 - Brill.
    A portrait of scholastic approaches to a qualified disagreement of opinions, focusing on the antagonism of scholastic probabilism and anti-probabilism in the early modern era.
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  24. Support for Geometric Pooling.Jean Baccelli & Rush T. Stewart - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-40.
    Supra-Bayesianism is the Bayesian response to learning the opinions of others. Probability pooling constitutes an alternative response. One natural question is whether there are cases where probability pooling gives the supra-Bayesian result. This has been called the problem of Bayes-compatibility for pooling functions. It is known that in a common prior setting, under standard assumptions, linear pooling cannot be non-trivially Bayes-compatible. We show by contrast that geometric pooling can be non-trivially Bayes-compatible. Indeed, we show that, (...)
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  25. Independent Opinions? On the Causal Foundations of Belief Formation and Jury Theorems.Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):655-685.
    Democratic decision-making is often defended on grounds of the ‘wisdom of crowds’: decisions are more likely to be correct if they are based on many independent opinions, so a typical argument in social epistemology. But what does it mean to have independent opinions? Opinions can be probabilistically dependent even if individuals form their opinion in causal isolation from each other. We distinguish four probabilistic notions of opinion independence. Which of them holds depends on how individuals are causally (...)
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  26. Regret Averse Opinion Aggregation.Lee Elkin - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    It is often suggested that when opinions differ among individuals in a group, the opinions should be aggregated to form a compromise. This paper compares two approaches to aggregating opinions, linear pooling and what I call opinion agglomeration. In evaluating both strategies, I propose a pragmatic criterion, No Regrets, entailing that an aggregation strategy should prevent groups from buying and selling bets on events at prices regretted by their members. I show that only opinion agglomeration is able (...)
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  27.  45
    Learning and Pooling, Pooling and Learning.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):1-21.
    We explore which types of probabilistic updating commute with convex IP pooling. Positive results are stated for Bayesian conditionalization, imaging, and a certain parameterization of Jeffrey conditioning. This last observation is obtained with the help of a slight generalization of a characterization of externally Bayesian pooling operators due to Wagner :336–345, 2009). These results strengthen the case that pooling should go by imprecise probabilities since no precise pooling method is as versatile.
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  28.  13
    The Probabilistic Logic of Eusebius Amort.Miroslav Hanke* - 2019 - Early Science and Medicine 24 (2):186-211.
    While classical sources including Aristotle, Cicero and Boëthius addressed different notions of probability, medieval contributions to probability seem rather scarce. The situation changes during the Second Scholasticism with the post-Tridentine debates on “probable opinion” in moral theology and the introduction of “moral necessity” and “moral implication” in the debates on compatibilism and theological optimism. The eighteenth-century transformation of scholastic philosophy was marked, among other characteristics, by a gravitation towards the early modern scientific revolution. In his Philosophia Pollingana ad normam (...)
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  29.  12
    Probabilism, Just War and Sovereing Supremacy in the Work of Gabriel Vazquez.Daniel Schwartz - 2013 - History of Political Thought 34 (2):177-194.
    Proponents of probabilism argued that 'when an opinion is probable it may be followed even when the contrary opinion is more probable'. Gabriel Vazquez (1549-1604) was the first Jesuit theologian to defend and expand this doctrine. The prevalent theory of sovereignty at the time held that: (1) when sovereigns are victims of wrongs, they take on the role of international judges (thus just wars are just punishments); and (2) the sovereign need not stand before the judgment of any (...)
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  30. Arguments From Expert Opinion – An Epistemological Approach.Christoph Lumer - 2020 - In Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Henrike Jansen, Jan Albert Van Laar & Bart Verheij (eds.), Reason to Dissent. Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Argumentation. College Publications. pp. 403-422.
    In times of populist mistrust towards experts, it is important and the aim of the paper to ascertain the rationality of arguments from expert opinion and to reconstruct their rational foundations as well as to determine their limits. The foundational approach chosen is probabilistic. However, there are at least three correct probabilistic reconstructions of such argumentations: statistical inferences, Bayesian updating, and interpretive arguments. To solve this competition problem, the paper proposes a recourse to the arguments' justification strengths (...)
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  31.  15
    On Modelling Non-Probabilistic Uncertainty in the Likelihood Ratio Approach to Evidential Reasoning.Jeroen Keppens - 2014 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 22 (3):239-290.
    When the likelihood ratio approach is employed for evidential reasoning in law, it is often necessary to employ subjective probabilities, which are probabilities derived from the opinions and judgement of a human. At least three concerns arise from the use of subjective probabilities in legal applications. Firstly, human beliefs concerning probabilities can be vague, ambiguous and inaccurate. Secondly, the impact of this vagueness, ambiguity and inaccuracy on the outcome of a probabilistic analysis is not necessarily fully understood. Thirdly, the (...)
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  32. On Accuracy and Coherence with Infinite Opinion Sets.Mikayla Kelley - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    There is a well-known equivalence between avoiding accuracy dominance and having probabilistically coherent credences (see, e.g., de Finetti 1974, Joyce 2009, Predd et al. 2009, Pettigrew 2016). However, this equivalence has been established only when the set of propositions on which credence functions are defined is finite. In this paper, I establish connections between accuracy dominance and coherence when credence functions are defined on an infinite set of propositions. In particular, I establish the necessary results to extend the classic accuracy (...)
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  33.  4
    A Seismic Facies Classification Method Based on the Convolutional Neural Network and the Probabilistic Framework for Seismic Attributes and Spatial Classification.Zhege Liu, Junxing Cao, Yujia Lu, Shuna Chen & Jianli Liu - 2019 - Interpretation 7 (3):SE225-SE236.
    In the early stage of oil and gas exploration, due to the lack of available drilling data, the automatic seismic facies classification technology mainly relies on the unsupervised clustering method combined with the seismic multiattribute. However, the clustering results are unstable and have no clear geologic significance. The supervised classification method based on manual interpretation can provide corresponding geologic significance, but there are still some problems such as the discrete classification results and low accuracy. To solve these problems, inspired by (...)
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  34.  5
    Polarization and Bipolar Probabilistic Argumentation Frameworks.Carlo Proietti - unknown
    Discussion among individuals about a given issue often induces polarization and bipolarization effects, i.e. individuals radicalize their initial opinion towards either the same or opposite directions. Experimental psychologists have put forward Persuasive Arguments Theory as a clue for explaining polarization. PAT claims that adding novel and persuasive arguments pro or contra the debated issue is the major cause for polarization. Recent developments in abstract argumentation provide the tools for capturing these intuitions on a formal basis. Here Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks (...)
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  35.  2
    Polarization and Bipolar Probabilistic Argumentation Frameworks.Carlo Proietti - 2017 - CEUR Workshop Proceedings 2012.
    Discussion among individuals about a given issue often induces polarization and bipolarization effects, i.e. individuals radicalize their initial opinion towards either the same or opposite directions. Experimental psychologists have put forward Persuasive Arguments Theory as a clue for explaining polarization. PAT claims that adding novel and persuasive arguments pro or contra the debated issue is the major cause for polarization. Recent developments in abstract argumentation provide the tools for capturing these intuitions on a formal basis. Here Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks (...)
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  36.  23
    Bending the Law: Geometric Tools for Quantifying Influence in the Multinetwork of Legal Opinions.Greg Leibon, Michael Livermore, Reed Harder, Allen Riddell & Dan Rockmore - 2018 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 26 (2):145-167.
    Legal reasoning requires identification through search of authoritative legal texts that apply to a given legal question. In this paper, using a network representation of US Supreme Court opinions that integrates citation connectivity and topical similarity, we model the activity of law search as an organizing principle in the evolution of the corpus of legal texts. The network model and probabilistic search behavior generates a Pagerank-style ranking of the texts that in turn gives rise to a natural geometry of (...)
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  37. Elevated Inter-Brain Coherence Between Subjects With Concordant Stances During Discussion of Social Issues.Christian Richard, Marija Stevanović Karić, Marissa McConnell, Jared Poole, Greg Rupp, Abigail Fink, Amir Meghdadi & Chris Berka - 2021 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 15.
    Social media platforms offer convenient, instantaneous social sharing on a mass scale with tremendous impact on public perceptions, opinions, and behavior. There is a need to understand why information spreads including the human motivations, cognitive processes, and neural dynamics of large-scale sharing. This study introduces a novel approach for investigating the effect social media messaging and in-person discussion has on the inter-brain dynamics within small groups of participants. The psychophysiological impact of information campaigns and narrative messaging within a closed social (...)
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  38.  2
    The Structure of Men's and Women's Feminist Orientations: Feminist Identity and Feminist Opinion.Laurie A. Rhodebeck - 1996 - Gender and Society 10 (4):386-403.
    This study considers two problems: the extent to which feminist opinions are distinct from feminist identity and the generalizability of these separate constructs across gender and time. Using pooled cross-sectional data from the six National Election Study surveys conducted from 1972 through 1992, the author employs a series of measurement and structural equation models to evaluate the validity and reliability of various feminist orientations and to estimate the relationships among feminist identity, feminist opinion, and individual characteristics associated with feminism. (...)
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  39. An Integrated Consensus Improving Strategy Based on PL-Wasserstein Distance and Its Application in the Evaluation of Network Public Opinion Emergencies.Shitao Zhang, Zhenzhen Ma, Xiaodi Liu, Zhiying Wang & Lihui Jiang - 2020 - Complexity 2020:1-24.
    In real life, multiple network public opinion emergencies may break out in a certain place at the same time. So, it is necessary to invite emergency decision experts in multiple fields for timely evaluating the comprehensive crisis of the online public opinion, and then limited emergency resources can be utilized to give priority to respond to the one with the highest crisis. Due to the complexity of network public opinion emergencies and the limited cognition of experts, most (...)
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  40. On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    to appear in Szabó Gendler, T. & J. Hawthorne (eds.) Oxford Studies in Epistemology volume 6 We often ask for the opinion of a group of individuals. How strongly does the scientific community believe that the rate at which sea levels are rising increased over the last 200 years? How likely does the UK Treasury think it is that there will be a recession if the country leaves the European Union? What are these group credences that such questions request? (...)
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  41.  60
    Beyond linear conciliation.Ko-Hung Kuan - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11483-11504.
    Formal epistemologists criticise the Conciliatory View of peer disagreement for being non-commutative with conditionalisation, path dependent and does not preserve the independence between propositions. Failing to commute with conditionalisation, one may switch the order between conciliating and conditionalising and obtain different outcomes. Failing to be path independent, the outcome of conciliation varies with the order of the acquisition of new testimonies. Failing to preserve the independence between propositions, one may suffer from a sure-loss and hence be deemed irrational. The three (...)
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  42.  29
    On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    We often ask for the opinion of a group of individuals. How strongly does the scientific community believe that the rate at which sea levels are rising has increased over the last 200 years? How likely does the UK Treasury think it is that there will be a recession if the country leaves the European Union? What are these group credences that such questions request? And how do they relate to the individual credences assigned by the members of the (...)
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  43. Aggregation for Potentially Infinite Populations Without Continuity or Completeness.David McCarthy, Kalle M. Mikkola & J. Teruji Thomas - 2019 - arXiv:1911.00872 [Econ.TH].
    We present an abstract social aggregation theorem. Society, and each individual, has a preorder that may be interpreted as expressing values or beliefs. The preorders are allowed to violate both completeness and continuity, and the population is allowed to be infinite. The preorders are only assumed to be represented by functions with values in partially ordered vector spaces, and whose product has convex range. This includes all preorders that satisfy strong independence. Any Pareto indifferent social preorder is then shown to (...)
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  44. Bayesian Group Belief.Franz Dietrich - 2010 - Social Choice and Welfare 35 (4):595-626.
    If a group is modelled as a single Bayesian agent, what should its beliefs be? I propose an axiomatic model that connects group beliefs to beliefs of group members, who are themselves modelled as Bayesian agents, possibly with different priors and different information. Group beliefs are proven to take a simple multiplicative form if people’s information is independent, and a more complex form if information overlaps arbitrarily. This shows that group beliefs can incorporate all information spread over the individuals without (...)
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  45.  42
    Policymaking Under Scientific Uncertainty.Joe Roussos - 2020 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
    Policymakers who seek to make scientifically informed decisions are constantly confronted by scientific uncertainty and expert disagreement. This thesis asks: how can policymakers rationally respond to expert disagreement and scientific uncertainty? This is a work of non-ideal theory, which applies formal philosophical tools developed by ideal theorists to more realistic cases of policymaking under scientific uncertainty. I start with Bayesian approaches to expert testimony and the problem of expert disagreement, arguing that two popular approaches— supra-Bayesianism and the standard model of (...)
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  46.  48
    Learning From Others: Conditioning Versus Averaging.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):5-20.
    How should we revise our beliefs in response to the expressed probabilistic opinions of experts on some proposition when these experts are in disagreement? In this paper I examine the suggestion that in such circumstances we should adopt a linear average of the experts’ opinions and consider whether such a belief revision policy is compatible with Bayesian conditionalisation. By looking at situations in which full or partial deference to the expressed opinions of others is required by Bayesianism I show (...)
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  47.  26
    All Agreed: Aumann Meets DeGroot.Jan-Willem Romeijn & Olivier Roy - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):41-60.
    We represent consensus formation processes based on iterated opinion pooling as a dynamic approach to common knowledge of posteriors :1236–1239, 1976; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis in J Econ Theory 28:192–200, 1982). We thus provide a concrete and plausible Bayesian rationalization of consensus through iterated pooling. The link clarifies the conditions under which iterated pooling can be rationalized from a Bayesian perspective, and offers an understanding of iterated pooling in terms of higher-order beliefs.
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  48. Fully Bayesian Aggregation.Franz Dietrich - forthcoming - Journal of Economic Theory.
    Can a group be an orthodox rational agent? This requires the group's aggregate preferences to follow expected utility (static rationality) and to evolve by Bayesian updating (dynamic rationality). Group rationality is possible, but the only preference aggregation rules which achieve it (and are minimally Paretian and continuous) are the linear-geometric rules, which combine individual values linearly and combine individual beliefs geometrically. Linear-geometric preference aggregation contrasts with classic linear-linear preference aggregation, which combines both values and beliefs linearly, but achieves only static (...)
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  49.  11
    Contradictory Information: Better Than Nothing? The Paradox of the Two Firefighters.J. Michael Dunn & Nicholas M. Kiefer - 2019 - In Can Başkent & Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (eds.), Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency. Springer Verlag. pp. 231-247.
    Prominent philosophers have argued that contradictions contain either too much or too little information to be useful. We dispute this with what we call the “Paradox of the Two Firefighters.” Suppose you are awakened in your hotel room by a fire alarm. You open the door. You see three possible ways out: left, right, straight ahead. You see two firefighters. One says there is exactly one safe route and it is to your left. The other says there is exactly one (...)
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  50.  40
    The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.Franz Dietrich & List & Christian - 2010 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 215-234.
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to …lling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...)
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