Results for 'Projectivism'

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  1. Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?Richard Joyce - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.
    Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but (...)
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  2. Projectivist Representationalism and Color.Wayne Wright - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):515-529.
    This paper proposes a subjectivist approach to color within the framework of an externalist form of representationalism about phenomenal consciousness. Motivations are presented for accepting both representationalism and color subjectivism, and an argument is offered against the case made by Michael Tye on behalf of the claim that colors are objective, physical properties of objects. In the face of the considerable difficulties associated with finding a workable realist theory of color, the alternative account of color experience set out, projectivist representationalism, (...)
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  3.  94
    Further Problems with Projectivism.Thomas Pölzler - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):92-102.
    From David Hume onwards, many philosophers have argued that moral thinking is characterized by a tendency to “project” our own mental states onto the world. This metaphor of projection may be understood as involving two empirical claims: the claim that humans experience morality as a realm of objective facts (the experiential hypothesis), and the claim that this moral experience is immediately caused by affective attitudes (the causal hypothesis). Elsewhere I argued in detail against one form of the experiential hypothesis. My (...)
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  4. Zombies Defeated: A Projectivist Account of Third-Person Consciousness Ascriptions.Howard J. Simmons - manuscript
    I defend an argument from Lauren Ashwell and Eric Marcus to the effect that the zombie idea is meaningless. I consider whether this idea could be saved from the force of the argument by adopting a projectivist account of third-person consciousness ascriptions. I decide that it cannot, but endorse that account anyway.
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  5.  29
    Causal Projectivism, Agency, and Objectivity.Elena Popa - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (2):147-163.
    This article examines how specific realist and projectivist versions of manipulability theories of causation deal with the problem of objectivity. Does an agent-dependent concept of manipulability imply that conflicting causal claims made by agents with different capacities can come out as true? In defence of the projectivist stance taken by the agency view, I argue that if the agent’s perspective is shown to be uniform across different agents, then the truth-values of causal claims do not vary arbitrarily and, thus, reach (...)
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  6. Humeanism Without Humean Supervenience: A Projectivist Account of Laws and Possibilities.Barry Ward - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (3):191-218.
    Acceptance of Humean Supervenience and the reductive Humean analyses that entail it leads to a litany of inadequately explained conflicts with our intuitions regarding laws and possibilities. However, the non-reductive Humeanism developed here, on which law claims are understood as normative rather than fact stating, can accommodate those intuitions. Rational constraints on such norms provide a set of consistency relations that ground a semantics formulated in terms of factual-normative worlds, solving the Frege-Geach problem of construing unasserted contexts. This set of (...)
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  7.  83
    Toward a Projectivist Account of Color.Edward Wilson Averill - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (5):217-234.
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  8. Projectivism and Error in Hume’s Ethics.Jonas Olson - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (1):19-42.
    This essay argues that while Hume believes both that morality is grounded in our ordinary moral practices, sentiments, and beliefs, and that moral properties are real, he also holds that ordinary moral thinking involves systematically erroneous beliefs about moral properties. These claims, on their face, seem difficult to square with one another but this paper argues that on Hume’s view, they are reconcilable. The reconciliation is effected by making a distinction between Hume’s descriptive metaethics, that is, his account of vulgar (...)
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  9.  31
    Projectivism and the Metaethical Foundations of the Normativity of Law.Shivprasad Swaminathan - 2016 - Jurisprudence 7 (2):231-266.
    A successful account of the ‘normativity of law’ is meant to inter alia establish how legal requirements come to be morally binding. This question presupposes taking a stance on the metaethical debate about the nature of morality and moral bindingness between the cognitivist and non-cognitivist camps. An overwhelming majority of contemporary legal philosophers have an unspoken adherence to a cognitivist metaethic and the model of normativity of law emerging from it: the impinging model. Consequently, the problematic of the normativity of (...)
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  10. Projectivism Without Error.Andy Egan - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 68.
    I argue that a theory according to which some of the content of perception is self-locating gives us the resources to cash out the central thought behind projectivism, without having to go in for an error theory about the projected qualities. I first survey some of the phenomena that might motivate what I take to be the central projectivist thought, and then look at some ways of cashing out just what it would amount to for the thought to be (...)
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  11. Locating Projectivism in Intentionalism Debates.Derek H. Brown - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):69-78.
    Intentionalism debates seek to uncover the relationship between the qualitative aspects of experience—phenomenal character—and the intentionality of the mind. They have been at or near center stage in the philosophy of mind for more than two decades, and in my view need to be reexamined. There are two core distinct intentionalism debates that are rarely distinguished (Sect. 1). Additionally, the characterization of spectrum inversion as involving inverted qualities and constant intentional content is mistaken (Sect. 3). These confusions can be witnessed (...)
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  12. Color Objectivism and Color Projectivism.Edward Wilson Averill & Allan Hazlett - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):751 - 765.
    Objectivism and projectivism are standardly taken to be incompatible theories of color. Here we argue that this incompatibility is only apparent: objectivism and projectivism, properly articulated so as to deal with basic objections, are in fundamental agreement about the ontology of color and the phenomenology of color perception.
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  13.  22
    Hume’s Projectivist Legacy for Environmental Ethics.Paul Haught - 2006 - Environmental Ethics 28 (1):77-96.
    Hume’s projectivist theory of value suggests that (environmental) values are either individually or culturally relative and that intrinsic value ascriptions are incoherent. Previous attempts to avert these implications have typically relied on modified Humean accounts that either universalize human sensitivity to the value of the more-than-human world or that adapt the concept of intrinsic value to suit a world in which all values are projected. While there are merits to these approaches, there is another alternative. Hume’s own moral theory promises (...)
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  14.  15
    Projectivism Psychologized: The Philosophy and Psychology of Disgust.Daniel R. Kelly - unknown
    This dissertation explores issues in the philosophy of psychology and metaphysics through the lens of the emotion of disgust, and its corresponding property, disgustingness. The first chapter organizes an extremely large body of data about disgust, imposes two constraints any theory must meet, and offers a cognitive model of the mechanisms underlying the emotion. The second chapter explores the evolution of disgust, and argues for the Entanglement thesis: this uniquely human emotion was formed when two formerly distinct mechanisms, one dedicated (...)
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  15.  10
    Rey and the Projectivist Account.Ksenija Puškarić - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):441-445.
    The paper discusses Rey’s projectivism. It offers an argument against it and in favor of the reliability of introspection. In short, if it is fallible, then at least sometimes it has to be veridical. Therefore, introspection can’t be systematically deceptive. But then, some introspective beliefs are true and at least some phenomenal conscious states exist.
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  16. Sensibility Theory and Projectivism.Justin D'Arms & Dan Jacobson - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 186--218.
    This chapter explores the debate between contemporary projectivists or expressivists, and the advocates of sensibility theory. Both positions are best viewed as forms of sentimentalism — the theory that evaluative concepts must be explicated by appeal to the sentiments. It argues that the sophisticated interpretation of such notions as “true” and “objective” that are offered by defenders of these competing views ultimately undermines the significance of their meta-ethical disputes over “cognitivism” and “realism” about value. Their fundamental disagreement lies in moral (...)
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  17.  54
    Hume on Causation : The Projectivist Interpretation.Helen Beebee - 2007 - In Huw Price & Richard Corry (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell's Republic Revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  18.  52
    Toward a Projectivist Account of Conscious Experience.Georges Rey - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 123--42.
  19.  30
    Review: The Compleat Projectivist. [REVIEW]Bob Hale - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142):65 - 84.
  20. Blackburn's Projectivism — an Objection.M. H. Brighouse - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (2):225 - 233.
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  21.  46
    Projectivism, Empathy, and Musical Tension.Kendall L. Walton - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):407-440.
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  22.  28
    Projectivism and the Last Person Argument.Alan Carter - 2004 - American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):51-62.
  23.  23
    Is Kantian Projectivism the Only Hope for Grounding the Principal Principle?Lange Marc - 2017 - The Monist 100 (3):422-436.
  24. Hume on Causality: Projectivist and Realist?Edward Craig - 1987 - In R. Read & K. Richman (eds.), The New Hume Debate. Routledge. pp. 113-121.
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  25.  26
    Loving Attention: A Realist, Projectivist Theory of Value.Mark T. Nelson - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (4):415-433.
    I try out a tentative hypothesis in speculative philosophy, by sketching a theory of value modelled on John Locke's theory of acquisition. I argue that this theory has all the advantages of Locke's theory of acquisition, but few of its disadvantages. Moreover, it allows us to reconcile two attractive, but apparently incompatible, ideas about value: the real-value idea (that animals, plants, artifacts, and landscapes really are valuable) and the subject-dependence idea (that things have value only in relation to experiencing subjects). (...)
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  26.  28
    Doubts About Projectivism.A. W. Price - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (236):215 - 228.
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  27.  55
    The Incompleat Projectivist: How to Be an Objectivist and an Attitudinist.T. D. J. Chappell - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):50-66.
    What is at stake in the dispute between moral objectivism and subjectivism is how we are to give a rational grounding to ethical first principles or basic commitments. The search is for an explanation of what if anything makes any commitments good. Subjectivisms such as Blackburn's quasi‐realism can give any set of commitments no ‘rational grounding’ in this sense except in considerations about internal consistency. But this is inadequate. Internal consistency is not sufficient for ethical rationality, since a set of (...)
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  28.  19
    Projectivism.Anthony W. Price - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  29.  7
    Doubts About Projectivism: A. W. Price.A. W. Price - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (236):215-228.
    How, in pursuit of ontological neutrality, should one talk about values? I propose to say: there are values . Those three words do nothing to define within what kind of conception of a world values are at home. 1 I take it that the ‘realist’ must have more to say about values and their world . I recognize that an ‘anti-realist’ may prefer to talk of value- terms ; I ask him to wait and see whether taking the linguistic turn (...)
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  30.  40
    Realism, Projectivism and Response-Dependence: On the Limits of 'Best Judgement'.Christopher Norris - 2002 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2):123-152.
    This essay offers a critical appraisal of some claims recently advanced by Crispin Wright and others in support of a response-dispositional (RD) approach to issues in epistemology, ethics, political theory, and philosophy of the social sciences. These claims take a lead from Plato's discussion of the status of moral value-judgements in the Euthyphro and from Locke's account of 'secondary qualities' such as colour, texture and taste. The idea is that a suitably specified description of best opinion (or optimal response) for (...)
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  31.  29
    Expressivism, Projectivism, and Santayana.Glenn Tiller - 2000 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2):239-258.
  32.  29
    Projectivist Utilitarianism and the Satisfaction of Desire.David Gordon - 1988 - Erkenntnis 29 (3):437 - 443.
    N. M. L. Nathan's argument that IDP utilitarianism, if universally adopted, is inconsistent, does not succeed. The argument requires that if an IDP utilitarian has only self-regarding desires, then none of these desires can be informed. This rests on a partial misuse of the expression satisfaction of desire. For an individual attempting to realize his self-regarding desires, the satisfaction of the satisfaction of a desire is unmeaning. The naming of an object of the desire is an intrinsic part of the (...)
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  33.  21
    Nathan on Projectivist Utilitarianism.David Gordon - 1985 - Erkenntnis 23 (2):201 - 202.
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  34.  9
    Quantification Within Projectivist Analyses of Belief Attributions.Gary W. Levvis - 1996 - Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (2):207-222.
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  35.  12
    Projectivist Utilitarianism: Reply to Gordon. [REVIEW]N. M. L. Nathan - 1987 - Erkenntnis 26 (1):129 - 130.
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  36.  12
    Projectivist Utilitarianism.N. M. L. Nathan - 1983 - Erkenntnis 20 (2):207 - 211.
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  37.  8
    Project or Symbol?: (On N.F. Fedorov's Religious Projectivism).S. Golovanenko - 2008 - Russian Studies in Philosophy 47 (2):49-64.
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  38. Projectivism.James Dreier - 1996 - In Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan.
     
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  39.  69
    Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences.Thomas Pölzler - 2018 - New York: Routledge.
    Are there objective moral truths, i.e. things that are morally right, wrong, good, or bad independently of what anybody thinks about them? To answer this question more and more scholars have recently turned to evidence from psychology, neuroscience, cultural anthropology, and evolutionary biology. This book investigates this novel scientific approach in a comprehensive, empirically-focused, and partly meta-theoretical way. It suggests that while it is possible for the empirical sciences to contribute to the moral realism/anti-realism debate, most arguments that have so (...)
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  40.  34
    Presentism Without Truth-Makers.Barry Ward - forthcoming - Chronos.
    We construct a presentist semantics on which there are no truth-makers for past and future tensed statements. The semantics is not an expressivist or projectivist one, and is not susceptible to the semantical difficulties that confront such theories. We discuss how the approach handles some standard concerns with presentism.
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  41.  79
    Projecting Chances: A Humean Vindication and Justification of the Principal Principle.Barry Ward - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (1):241-261.
    Faced with the paradox of undermining futures, Humeans have resigned themselves to accounts of chance that severely conflict with our intuitions. However, such resignation is premature: The problem is Humean supervenience (HS), not Humeanism. This paper develops a projectivist Humeanism on which chance claims are understood as normative, rather than fact stating. Rationality constraints on the cotenability of norms and factual claims ground a factual-normative worlds semantics that, in addition to solving the Frege-Geach problem, delivers the intuitive set of possibilia (...)
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  42. The End of Moral Realism?Steven Ross - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (1):43-61.
    The author considers how constructivism, presently known to us essentially as a theory for generating rules of social cooperation, embodies a certain conception of justification that in turn may be thought of as a general theory. It is argued that moral realism and projectivism are by turns platitudinous and unsatisfactory as conceptions of justification; by contrast the general conception of justification in constructivism makes sense of reason giving and coherent rivalry. The author argues that once the right picture of (...)
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  43.  69
    Projections and Relations.R. M. Sainsbury - 1998 - The Monist 81 (1):133-160.
    The paper evaluates Hume's alleged projectivism about causation and moral values.
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  44. Meta-Ethics and Justification.Steven Ross - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (2):91-114.
    The author takes up three metaphysical conceptions of morality — realism, projectivism, constructivism — and the account of justification or reason that makes these pictures possible. It is argued that the right meta-ethical conception should be the one that entails the most plausible conception of reason-giving, rather than by any other consideration. Realism and projectivism, when understood in ways consistent with their fundamental commitments, generate unsatisfactory models of justification; constructivism alone does not. The author also argues for a (...)
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  45. What Is Logical Validity?Hartry Field - 2015 - In Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford University Press.
    What are people who disagree about logic disagreeing about? The paper argues that (in a wide range of cases) they are primarily disagreeing about how to regulate their degrees of belief. An analogy is drawn between beliefs about validity and beliefs about chance: both sorts of belief serve primarily to regulate degrees of belief about other matters, but in both cases the concepts have a kind of objectivity nonetheless.
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  46.  49
    Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation.Dominic K. Dimech - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise the (...)
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  47. Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences.Thomas Pölzler - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Graz
    Are there things that are objectively right, wrong, good, bad, etc.: moral properties that are had independently of what we ourselves, our culture, God or any other subjects think about them? Philosophers have traditionally addressed this question from the “armchair.” In recent years, however, more and more participants of the debate have begun to appeal to evidence from science as well. This thesis examines such novel approaches. In particular, it asks what the empirical sciences can contribute to the moral realism/anti-realism (...)
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  48. Perceived Colors and Perceived Locations: A Problem for Color Subjectivism.Peter W. Ross - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):125-138.
    Color subjectivists claim that, despite appearances to the contrary, the world external to the mind is colorless. However, in giving an account of color perception, subjectivists about the nature of perceived color must address the nature of perceived spatial location as well. The argument here will be that subjectivists’ problems with coordinating the metaphysics of perceived color and perceived location render color perception implausibly mysterious. Consequently, some version of color realism, the view that colors are (physical, dispositional, functional, sui generis, (...)
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  49. Emotions, Morals, Modals.Daniel Dohrn - manuscript
    I scrutinize the relationship between the way emotions give rise to modal judgement and the metaphysical necessity we ascribe to the latter. While moral concepts are often described as response-dependent, I propose to analyse them as response-enabled or grokking. I discuss how grokkingness is embedded in the emotional mechanisms that provoke imaginative resistance; how it shapes our manifest image of the world and the place of morality in it; the latter’s deep contingency as contrasted to its metaphysical necessity; and what (...)
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  50.  20
    Modals Vs. Morals. Blackburn on Conceptual Supervenience.Daniel Dohrn - 2012 - GAP 7 Proceedings.
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