There has been much written of late on the topic of panentheism. Dissatisfied with many contemporary descriptions of “panentheism” and the related “pantheism,” which we feel arise out of theistic presuppositions, we produce our own definition of sorts, rooted in and paying respect to the term’s etymology and the concept’s roots in Indian religion and western philosophy. Furthermore, we consider and comment on the arguments and comments concerning panentheism’s definition and plausibility put forth by Göcke, Mullins, and Nickel.

This essay in the comparative metaphysic of nothingness begins by pondering why Leibniz thought of the converse question as the preeminent one. In Eastern philosophical thought, like the numeral 'zero' (śūnya) that Indian mathematicians first discovered, nothingness as non-being looms large and serves as the first quiver on the imponderables they seem to have encountered (e.g., 'In the beginning was neither non-being nor being: what was there, bottomless deep?' RgVeda X.129). The concept of non-being and its permutations of nothing, negation, (...) nullity, etc., receive more sophisticated treatment in the works of grammarians, ritual hermeneuticians, logicians, and their dialectical adversaries variously across Jaina and Buddhist schools. The present analysis follows the function of negation/the negative copula, nãn, and dialetheia in grammar and logic, then moves onto ontologies of non-existence and extinction and further suggestive tropes that tend to arrest rather than affirm the inexorable being-there of something. After a discussion of interests in being (existence), non-being and nothingness in contemporary metaphysics, the article examines Heidegger’s extensive treatment of nothingness in his 1929 inaugural Freiburg lecture, 'Was ist Metaphysik?', published later as 'What is Metaphysics?' The essay however distances itself from any pretensions toward a doctrine of Metaphysical Nihilism. (shrink)

A number of different kinds of negation and negation of negation are developed in Indian thought, from ancient religious texts to classical philosophy. The paper explores the Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Jaina and Buddhist theorizing on the various forms and permutations of negation, denial, nullity, nothing and nothingness, or emptiness. The main thesis argued for is that in the broad Indic tradition, negation cannot be viewed as a mere classical operator turning the true into the false, nor reduced to the mainstream Boolean (...) dichotomy: 1 versus 0. Special attention is given to how contradiction is handled in Jaina and Buddhist logic. (shrink)

The History of Indian Philosophy is a comprehensive and authoritative examination of the movements and thinkers that have shaped Indian philosophy over the last three thousand years. An outstanding team of international contributors provide fifty-eight accessible chapters, organis[=z]ed into three clear parts: knowledge, context, concepts philosophical traditions engaging and encounters: modern and postmodern. This outstanding collection is essential reading for students of Indian philosophy. It will also be of interest to those seeking to explore the lasting significance of this rich (...) and complex philosophical tradition, and to philosophers who wish to learn about Indian philosophy through western philosophical and contemporary comparative lens. For complete Contents and authors' abstracts per chapters go to title of the book under Routledge Taylor & Francis ; it is a usual http link not allowed to enter here.> Click on the External Links below . (shrink)

This essay in the comparative metaphysic of nothingness begins by pondering why Leibniz thought of the converse question as the preeminent one. In Eastern philosophical thought, like the numeral 'zero' (śūnya) that Indian mathematicians first discovered, nothingness as non-being looms large and serves as the first quiver on the imponderables they seem to have encountered (e.g., 'In the beginning was neither non-being nor being: what was there, bottomless deep?' RgVeda X.129). The concept of non-being and its permutations of nothing, negation, (...) nullity, etc., receive more sophisticated treatment in the works of grammarians, ritual hermeneuticians, logicians, and their dialectical adversaries variously across Jaina and Buddhist schools. The present analysis follows the function of negation/the negative copula, nãn, and dialetheia in grammar and logic, then moves onto ontologies of non-existence and extinction and further suggestive tropes that tend to arrest rather than affirm the inexorable being-there of something. After a discussion of interests in being (existence), non-being and nothingness in contemporary metaphysics, the article examines Heidegger’s extensive treatment of nothingness in his 1929 inaugural Freiburg lecture, 'Was ist Metaphysik?', published later as 'What is Metaphysics?' The essay however distances itself from any pretensions toward a doctrine of Metaphysical Nihilism. (shrink)

Nietzsche represents in an interesting way the well-worn Western approach to Asian philosophical and religious thinking: initial excitement, then neglect by appropriation, and swift rejection when found to be incompatible with one’s own tradition, whose roots are inexorably traced back to the ‘ancient’ Greeks. Yet, Nietzsche’s philosophical critique and methods - such as ‘perspectivism’ - offer an instructive route through which to better understand another tradition even if the sole purpose of this exercise is to perceive one’s own limitations through (...) the eyes of the other: a self-destruktion of sorts. To help correct this shortcoming and begin the long overdue task of even-handed dialogue - or contemporary comparative philosophy - we will be served well by looking at Nietzsche’s mistakes, which in turn informed the tragic critic of the West of the last century, Martin Heidegger. We may learn here not to cast others in one’s own troubled image; and not to reverse cultural icons: Europe’s Superman, and Asia’s Buddha. (shrink)

Two of the most important contributions that Bimal Krishna Matilal made to comparative philosophy are his doctoral dissertation The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation: The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-Nyāya Philosophy and his classic: Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowing. In this essay, we aim to carry forward the work of Bimal K. Matilal by showing how ideas in classical Indian philosophy concerning absence and perception are relevant to recent debates in Anglo-analytic philosophy. In particular, (...) we focus on the recent debate in the philosophy of perception centering on the perception of absence. In her Seeing Absence, Anya Farennikova argues for the thesis that we literally see absences. Her thesis is quite novel within the contexts of the traditions that she engages: analytical philosophy of perception, phenomenology, and cognitive neuroscience. In those traditions there is hardly any exploration of the epistemology of absence. By contrast, this is not the case in classical Indian philosophy where the debate over the ontological and epistemological status of absence is longstanding and quite engaging. In what follows, we engage Farennikova’s arguments, and those of John-Rémy Martin and Jérome Dokic in their response to her work. Using the work of Matilal, Bilimoria and Shaw we show that there are several engaging ideas that can be taken from Indian philosophy into the terrain explored by Farennikova, and Martin & Dokic. Our aim is to provide an updated comparative engagement on absence and its perception for the purposes of enhancing future discussions within global philosophy. However, we do not aim to do this merely by focusing on the history of primary texts or on twentieth century commentary on primary texts. Instead, we hope to show that the living tradition of Indian philosophy that Matilal embodied carries forward in his students and colleagues as they revive, revise, and extend Indian philosophy. (shrink)

The paper considers various ruminations on the aftermath of the death of a close one, and the processes of grieving and mourning. The conceptual examination of how grief impacts on its sufferers, from different cultural perspectives, is followed by an analytical survey of current thinking among psychologists, psychoanalysts and philosophers on the enigma of grief, and on the associated practice of mourning. Robert C. Solomon reflected deeply on the 'extreme emotion' of grief in his extensive theorizing on the emotions, particularly (...) in his essay 'On Grief and Gratitude', commenting that grief is 'often described as a very private, personal emotion, characterized by social withdrawal and shutting oneself off from the world' (2004: 73). While dialoguing with the spirit of Solomon by way also of a tribute to his immense insights, the paper engages in critical reflections on recent thinking in this area elsewhere - notably, in Heidegger, Freud, Nussbaum, Casey, Gustafson, and Kristeva - and offers a refreshing critique toward an alternative to the received wisdom. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe commentary engages Hegel’s anxieties as discussed in Robert Pippin’s lead paper on the question of Western ‘modernity’ in early 19th century: how did we get there, to the ‘dissatisfactions of European high culture’, after all the promises of the teleology of world-spirit and hermeneutik that Hegel mapped in the inexorable march of history. More importantly, we ask how does the rest of the world – the non-European, non-modern regions – fare or compare? Where do they belong in the larger (...) scheme of the world historical picture? Hegel was not blinded by the lure of a modernising West that he had created; rather, he valued the contributions of other civilizations to the growth of the West. At least references to India, China, or Asia at large, from Herder onwards, did not escape him. But this part of the story is left out from modern accounts. While he suggested turning the gaze toward the East could be instructive for the triumphalism of the West, he was not sanguine about the prospect of the East ever catching up with the West; imperializing the aliens might work. But his anxiety about the incomplete determinate subjectivity of the modern West was not assuaged. That Hegel flirted with the Orient in moments of disappear tells us something about how he both drew West’s attention to the hidden philosophies of the East—especially to Indian dialectical logic—and paved the way for the ‘Europeanisation of the Earth’. (shrink)

There is a lot of talk around about Globalisation and its mana-like benefits; indeed, there are many, in areas such as the spread of communication capabilities, social media, and wider distribution of goods in the free trade marketplace that in previous decades were ‘protected’ by exorbitant excise tariffs, licensing restrictions, and low turn-overs. Since Weber, Robertson, Wallerstein, Appadurai, Tambiah et al, there has been much theorizing on the inevitability of Globalisation and its neat corollaries, Free Trade, Liberalisation, Parallel Modernities, and (...) Economic Rationalism. Yet, Globalisation has both its protagonists and antagonists alike. The paper focuses on case studies from the Indian-end, impelled by the question: in what ways has Globalisation benefited and hurt India’s economy, the slow growth and periodic stagnation of its capabilities, the stability of the nation and its people? As part of the reciprocal deal on Liberalisation, Free Trade agreement has enabled myriads of TNCs with to reign in large Western capital-investment and start-up industrial bases, which have undoubtedly helped push India to becoming the third largest world economy. However, the encroachments of TNCs and their impact on agro-economics, biodiversity, the plight of farmers, the further disenfranchisement of numerically small from a share in the national weal, the uneven regional deliverance from poverty, malnutrition, the disproportionate gender-ratio, rural illiteracy among the neglected, and other fall-outs, have worried critics of India’s ‘easy ride’ on the highway of Globalisation. The arguments will be developed extensively with illustrations. (shrink)

This paper arises from a symposium on philosophical reconstructions of religious doctrines within the 16th conference of the Australasian Association for the Study of Religions held in the Armidale, N.S.W., July, 1993. The convenor, Peter Forrest, read a paper on ‘Making sense of karma and original sin’, and I elected to discuss the doctrine of karma in the context of the problem of evil. Forrest's paper appeared in the previous issue ofSophia and I shall be making reference to this paper (...) as Forrest, 1993. On process theory of karman and the issue of personal identity, see also Peter Forrest, ‘Reincarnation without survival of memory or character’,Philosophy East and West 28, No. 1, January 1978, pp. 91–97, I would also take this opportunity to record special thanks to Dr Bruce Langtry and Mr Patrick Hutchings for their invaluable comments on an earlier draft. (shrink)

Studies in Indian Traditions, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, A Division of Indian Books Centre, 1994.

Varieties of Ethical Reflection brings together new cultural and religious perspectives—drawn from non-Western, primarily Asian, philosophical sources—to globalize the contemporary discussion of theoretical and applied ethics.

Abstract The paper considers the question of whether ?rights? as we have it in modern Western thinking has an equivalence within the Indian framework of Dharma. Under Part I we look at purus?rthas to see if the desired human goals imply rights by examining the tension between aspired ?values? and the ?ought? of duty. Next, a potential cognate in the term ?adhik?ra? is investigated via the derivation of a refined signification of ?entitlements?, especially in the exegetical hermeneutics of the Mim?ms?. (...) Finally, adhik?ra's re?emergence in the Bhagavadgit? is considered. We suggest that while the boundary is significantly extended, the Git? too appears to be circumspect in opening up the discourse in the more abstract and absolute sense which the term ?rights? nowadays enjoys. (shrink)

This paper argues that Śrī Swāminārāyaṇ espoused a position on the pramāṇa-s, and his theory was that among these it is śabdapramāṇa that is the important and authoritative pramāṇa. However, in delineating the precise sources and textual authority that fall within the ambit of śabdapramāṇa, he privileged mostly the Smṛti texts, along with Vedānta and Bhagavadgītā commentaries, to which was added later his own Gujarati text Vachanāmrut, as canonical texts of the particular Sampradāya. In so doing, he would be seen (...) to be departing somewhat from classical positions on authoritative scriptures, in particular of Śaṅkara and, to an extent, Rāmānuja, for whom Śruti and Smṛti scriptures respectively denote quite different genre of texts, and with graded degree of authority; the former could even be apauruṣeya, authorless scriptures. The paper analyses the precise reasons for Swāminārāyaṇ arriving at this qualified position and the arguments he garnishes towards this doctrinal hermeneutic, concluding with comments on his slight departure from the classically accepted understanding of śabdapramāṇa where scriptural sources are the preeminent concern with a somewhat different epistemological trajectory. (shrink)

Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, clearly one of the early modern doyens of Indian Philosophy, remained much enamored of Western thought—of which he took the ancient to classical tradition as his model—and he spent a good part of his speculative life attempting to reconfigure Indian thought to fit the vesture, maybe the toga, of his Greek heroes, namely Plato and Plotinus, and to an extent of Hegelianism that came across via F. H. Bradley: Occidental in form, and Indian in content. It was (...) as if this ‘fusion’ or ‘harmonization’ was easy of making without compromising what since Max Müller has come to be called ‘Indian Philosophy’. The paper intends to demonstrate this worrisome yet compelling motif by advancing an analysis of certain representative texts and arguments from Radhakrishnan’s prolific writing on Indian Philosophy and East-West Thinking; particularly as these relate to the question of the ‘appearances’, their alignment with Platonic ‘shadows,’ while finding their redemption in the realism propelled by modern empirical science. The paper traces the justification for Radhakrishnan’s variegated moves to ‘save the appearances’ through his strained reading of the Upaniṣadic texts and under-standing of Śaṅkara’s nondualism, leading to the argument that although the world is brought about by māyā, it is not an illusion or nonexistent, or unhinged from the Absolute, but rather naïvely real. There may have been a supplementary political motivation as well inspired by the burgeoning nationalist spirit, after Gandhi, and the need for India to become culturally and morally strong in its own terms. (shrink)

I wish to take up some of the sentiments we have towards animals and put them to test in respect of the claims to moral high grounds in Indian thought-traditions vis-à-vis Abrahamic theologies. And I do this by turning the focus in this instance—on a par with issues of caste, gender, minority status, albeit still within the human community ambience—to the question of animals. Which leads me to ask how sophisticated and in-depth is the appreciation of the issues and questions (...) that are currently being debated in contemporary circles? What degree of awareness could we say has been present in the traditions—not just in some perfunctory, platitudinal, belief-based descriptions or prescriptions, but in actual explanatory and morally sensitized senses? (shrink)

Abstract In this paper I am concerned to address the question of voluntary or self?willed death from two distinct positions?a particular community's socio?religious practice (viz. Jaina sallekhan?) and as the matter stands in law (penal code, constitution, judicial wisdom, etc.) in India?in the light of the recent move by a bench of its apex court striking down the penal code section proscribing suicide. I also wish to draw out some implications of these deliberations for the beneficence of medical practice and (...) related bio?ethical ramifications in the Indian context. (shrink)

Apart from the said AAR Symposium, a central part of the paper was also earlier presented in the Philosophy Department Colloquia, in the University of Melbourne; and it has benefited from my research in the Gibson Library as a Senior Fellow in the Department. I note gratidue also to my #259 colleagues, Dr Guy Petterson and Patrick Hutchings for help with research and/or comments on various excerpted drafts from the evolving work. And to many friends who have heard my wailings (...) on this problematic across the Tasman-Pacific-Indian-Atlantic waters. (shrink)

A stimulating account of the wide range of approaches towards conceptualising emotions in classical Indian philosophical–religious traditions, such as those of the Upanishads, Vaishnava Tantrism, Bhakti movement, Jainism, Buddhism, Yoga, Shaivism, and aesthetics, this volume analyses the definition and validity of emotions in the construction of identity and self-discovery.

The vexed issue of the precise connection between words and things has been a major preoccupation over the centuries summoning the resources of metaphysics, philosophy of language, linguistics, ontology and increasingly semiological analysis. Philosophy in India produced a number of different and often conflicting solutions, only to be rivalled by an equally bewildering variety witnessed in the ancient and modern West. I want to bring to the foreground the late Professor Bimal K. Matilal’s development of Nyaya-Vaisesika realist approach to the (...) aporia, and interject the analysis with dissident voices, especially of Mimamsakas and Buddhists. Significantly, it will be the living ghosts of Putnam and Dummett that I will invoke to haunt Matilal’s variation on metaphysical realism. Matilal veered closer to a realist metaphysic, which is inflected in his own formulation of a theory of language appropriate to this ontology, this despite his idealized attraction to phenomenalist-constructivism ; his flirtations with Bhartrharian holism and lately with Derridean deconstruction in his epiloquia. But my critique focuses on his famous earlier analysis of Jnana or cognition and his defence of a particular linguistic-ontology within a narrowly circumscribed naturalized epistemology. (shrink)

This book negotiates and engages with the ideas and influence of one of the leading theoreticians in social science research-Gayatri Spivak. It discusses the impact of her arguments on postcolonialism, cultural studies, ethnography, feminist studies, and anthropology.