Face à la démarche théologique qui commence à partir de concepts dogmatiques existants, E. Schillebeeckx, en renversant cette démarche du déductif à l'inductif, élabore une théologie basée sur l'herméneutique de l'expérience et de la praxis. Ainsi aborde-t-il la question de l'actualisation de la foi, en montrant la relation dialectique entre la tradition de la foi et le contexte où vivent les croyants. Se situant dans le champ culturel asiatique, Agnès Kim rappelle qu'il y a là un champ d'interprétation façonné tout (...) autrement que celui que le christianisme a connu jadis. Mais ce champ asiatique est également en train d'être modifié par les expériences nouvelles qui critiquent aussi l'ensemble de l'expérience acquise. S'imposent ainsi à elle de doubles contextes existentiels qui la conduisent à poser la question des énoncés dogmatiques en situant cette question au sein de ces contextes, qui sont quelque peu en discontinuité par rapport à l'ancien, et qu'elle considère comme paradigmes du contexte interculturel. In face of the theological approach that begins with existing dogmatic concepts, E. Schillebeeckx, in reversing the approach from the deductive to the inductive, develops a theology based on a hermeneutics of experience and praxis. Thus he approaches the question of the actualization of the faith by showing the dialectical relationship between the tradition of faith and the context in which believers live. Putting herself in the Asian cultural context, Agnès Kim reminds us it is a sphere of interpretation that has been fashioned quite differently from the one experienced by Christianity in the past. But this Asian context is also being modified by new experiences that criticize acquired experience as a whole. Twofold existential contexts thus dominate her approach, leading her to raise the question of dogmatic statements while situating the question in these contexts, which are somewhat discontinuous in relation to the former one and which she considers to be paradigms of the intercultural context. (shrink)
The purpose of this study was to examine how young publics in the United States and South Korea perceive the corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices of multinational corporations and evaluate the effectiveness of CSR practices in terms of organization–public relationship (OPR). Results showed that young publics in the United States and South Korea differently characterized CSR practices of multinational corporations and evaluated relationships with them. Young American participants evaluated the CSR practices of multinational corporations more favorably than did the young (...) Korean participants. In addition, four CSR practices (internal environment, moral, discretionary, and relational) were associated with OPR dimensions in the United States, while only relational CSR practices were significantly related to OPR dimensions in South Korea. Overall, the findings highlight that cultural and societal meanings were embedded in identifying CSR practices and evaluating the relationship with multinational corporations involved in CSR practices. (shrink)
The principle of fairness holds that individuals (beneficiaries) who benefit from a cooperative scheme of others (cooperators) have an obligation to do their share in return for their benefit. The original proponent of this principle, H. L. A. Hart suggests ‘mutuality of restrictions’ as a moral basis because it is fair to mutually restrict the freedom of both beneficiaries and cooperators; so called the fairness obligation. This paper explores ‘mutuality of restrictions’, which is interpreted as a right-based and an equality-based (...) justification of the fairness obligation. It is not argued whether both ways of justifying the obligation makes a success, but that they are in need of presupposing that there is a duty for beneficiaries to do their share in return for their benefit. This suggests turning to a duty-based justification of the fairness obligation. (shrink)
In understanding Peirce's unique system of pragmatism following three theories are helpful: first, Herakleitos' saying that 'one can never step into a same river twice', second, Protagoras' saying that 'men are the measure of the world', and third, Darwin's theory of evolution. It is always the case that epistemology takes place on top the metaphysical and cosmological bases. Peirce's metaphysics and cosmology is considered to line up with above three theories. It is interesting fact that Peirce who started up his (...) work in science ended up with such somehow unscientific cosmology. Peirce believes that the world is constantly changing. Inknowing the world Peirce says that the subject of knowing takes a part doing a certain role. Peirce says that 'to believe A', 'to think of A' and 'to think of A as true' are all same sort of mental act. Therefore, to Peirce, truth is only a kind of 'opinion'. This means that the subject of knowing has something to do with truthfulness. In this kind of knowing process 'knowing truth' can only be acquired when possibility of 'inaccuracy' and 'onesideness' are opened. Thus, Peirce's definition of knowing or truth is quite indefinite definition. According to Peirce, we only know the world partially, and moreover, even we get the total sum data about the world,the world will move on forward changing. On this ground, it might be helpful that we look in to current matters in philosophy of mind in different angle. (shrink)
BackgroundExperience with open disclosure and its study are restricted to certain western countries. In addition, there are concerns that open disclosure may be less suitable in non-western countries. The present study explored and compared the in-depth perceptions of the general public and physicians regarding open disclosure in Korea.MethodsWe applied the COREQ checklist to this qualitative study. We conducted 20 in-depth interviews and four focus group discussions with 16 physicians and 18 members of the general public. In-depth interviews and focus group (...) discussions were performed according to semi-structured guidelines developed according to a systematic review of open disclosure. We conducted a directed content analysis by analyzing the verbatim transcripts and field notes in accordance with the predetermined guidelines.ResultsOpen disclosure perceptions were summarized in terms of the “five Ws and one H”. All physician and general public participants acknowledged the normative justifiability of open disclosure. The participants mostly agreed on the known effects of open disclosure, but the physicians had negative opinions on its expected effects, such as decreased intention of the general public to file lawsuits and increased credibility of medical professionals. Generally, the participants thought that open disclosure is required for medical errors causing major harm. However, the physicians and general public had conflicting opinions on the need for open disclosure of near misses. Most physicians did not know how to conduct open disclosure and some physicians had bad experiences due to inappropriate or incomplete open disclosure.ConclusionPhysicians and the general public in Korea acknowledge the need for open disclosure. Guidelines according to the type of patient safety incident are required to encourage physicians to more readily conduct open disclosure. Furthermore, hospitals need to consider organizing a dedicated team and hiring experts for open disclosure. (shrink)
Kim :1099–1112, 2013) defends a logicist theory of numbers. According to him, numbers are adverbial entities, similar to those denoted by “frequently” and “at 100 mph”. He even introduces new adverbs for numbers: “1-wise”, “2-wise”, and so on. For example, “Fs exist 2-wise” means that there are two Fs. Kim claims that, because we can derive Dedekind–Peano axioms from his definition of numbers as adverbial entities, it is a new form of logicism. In this paper, I will, however, argue that (...) his theory is vulnerable to an analogue of the so-called Bad Company objection to neo-Fregeanism. This means that we cannot be sure that numbers are actually given to us by Kim’s definition; for, we don’t know whether it is indeed a good definition. So, unless Kim, or somebody else, provides a demarcation criterion between good and bad adverbial definitions, Kim’s theory will remain incomplete. (shrink)
It was about half a century ago that the mind–body problem, which like much else in serious metaphysics had been moribund for several decades, was resurrected as a mainstream philosophical problem. The first impetus came from Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind, published in 1948, and Wittgenstein's well-known, if not well-understood, reflections on the nature of mentality and mental language, especially in his Philosophical Investigations which appeared in 1953. The primary concerns of Ryle and Wittgenstein, however, focused on the logic (...) of mental discourse rather than the metaphysical issue of how our mentality is related to our bodily nature. In fact, Ryle and Wittgenstein would have regarded, each for different reasons, the metaphysical problem of the mind-body relation as arising out of deplorable linguistic confusions and not amenable to intelligible discussion. There was C. D. Broad's earlier and much neglected classic, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, which appeared in 1925, but this work, although robustly metaphysical, failed to connect with, and shape, the mind–body debate in the second half of this century. (shrink)
The last decade has seen an explosion of interest in the health and welfare of marginalized communities around the world. In one striking indicator, public and private development assistance for health programs increased from $8.65 billion in 1998 to $21.79 billion in 2007 . There has been emergent academic interest as well, with growing ranks of undergraduate and graduate students and professionals adopting the field as their specialty. Despite the burgeoning interest, however, much about the field remains unclear. Reimagining Global (...) Health is an important contribution to this budding field for two reasons: it proposes a cohesive introductory text for a field in desperate need of one, and it seeks to “reimagine” some key concepts in global health in an effort to provide a bold new direction for the field. Its stated aim is to move global health from a mere “collection of problems” into an identifiable discipline .As a textbook, the work succeeds admirably. The book .. (shrink)
Introduction 1) Une épistémologie non fondationnelle § 1. Concernant l?usage philosophique de l?adjectif « vital », on s?attend à voir surgir une distinction entre le vivant et le vécu, comme si d?emblée nous pouvions et devions accepter que le vital soit aussi quelque chose d?éprouvé par la conscience, par opposition au vivant qui serait simplement observé et expliqué par la science. Pourquoi, dès lors, faudrait-il rechercher dans ou chez les êtres vivants quelque chose de vital ? Cela ne reviendrait-il pas (...) à multiplier les entités et à transformer subrepticement le prédicat « vivant » en être ? Cela ne nous engagerait-t-il pas vers une substantialisation de la vie érigée ainsi en réalité métaphysique ? N?est-ce pas justement le défaut des vitalistes comme Bergson (1907) ou Driesch, de créer un tel processus de surdétermination (Mayr, 1961 ; Kim, 1993, 1998) par et à travers lequel, à un phénomène inconnu X devrait correspondre en même temps des causes observables X?, X?? et une force vitale inobservable Y ? Ce processus introduirait ainsi une entité supranaturelle dans le cours des événements naturels et rendrait impossible toute forme de stabilité et de généralité pour la relation associant X à X?, X?? et X???. § 2. Nous allons pourtant partir d?une position épistémologique inédite. Il n?est pas question pour nous d?imposer d?emblée aux biologistes l?existence. (shrink)
Jaegwon Kim’s views on mental causation and the exclusion argument are evaluated systematically. Particular attention is paid to different theories of causation. It is argued that the exclusion argument and its premises do not cohere well with any systematic view of causation.
In Mind in a Physical World (1998), Jaegwon Kim has recently extended his ongoing critique of `non-reductive materialist' positions in philosophy of mind by arguing that Nagel's model of reduction is the wrong paradigm in terms of which to contest the issue of psychophysical reduction, and that an altogether different model of scientific reduction – a functional model of reduction – is needed. In this paper I argue, first, that Kim's conception of the Nagelian model is substantially impoverished and potentially (...) misleading; second, that his own functional model is problematic in several respects; and, third, that the basic idea underlying his functional model can well be accommodated within a properly reinterpreted Nagelian model. I conclude with some reflections on the issue of psychophysical reduction. (shrink)
An analysis and rebuttal of Jaegwon Kim's reasons for taking nonreductive physicalism to entail the causal irrelevance of mental features to physical phenomena, particularly the behaviour of human bodies.
The aim of this paper is to show that Kim’s ‚supervenience argument’ is at best inconclusive and so fails to provide an adequate challenge to nonreductive physicalism. I shall argue, first, that Kim’s argument rests on assumptions that the nonreductive physicalist is entitled to regard as question-begging; second, that even if those assumptions are granted, it is not clear that irreducible mental causes fail to␣satisfy them; and, third, that since the argument has the overall structure of a reductio, which of (...) its various premises one performs the reductio on remains open to debate in an interesting way. I shall finally suggest that the issue of reductive vs. nonreductive physicalism is best contested not in the arena of mental causation but in that in which the issues pertaining to theory and property reduction are currently being debated. (shrink)
In a recent critique of the doctrine of emergentism championed by its classic advocates up to C. D. Broad, Jaegwon Kim (Philosophical Studies 63:31–47, 1999) challenges their view about its applicability to the sciences and proposes a new account of how the opposing notion of reduction should be understood. Kim is critical of the classic conception advanced by Nagel and uses his new account in his criticism of emergentism. I question his claims about the successful reduction achieved in the sciences (...) and argue that his new account has not improved on Nagel’s and that the critique of emergentism he bases on it is question-begging in important respects. (shrink)
By quantifying over properties we cannot create new properties any more than by quantifying over individuals we can create new individuals. Someone murdered Jones, and the murderer is either Smith or Jones or Wang. That “someone”, who murdered Jones, is not a person in addition to Smith, Jones, and Wang, and it would be absurd to posit a disjunctive person, Smith-or-Jones-or-Wang, with whom to identify the murderer. The same goes for second-order properties and their realizers. (Kim (1997a), p.201).
The aim of my paper is to highlight that for Peirce the reality of God makes sense of the whole scientific enterprise. The belief in God is a natural product of abduction, of the "rational instinct" or educated guess of the scientist or the layman, and also the abduction of God may be understood as a "proof" of pragmatism. Moreover, I want to suggest that for Peirce scientific activity is a genuine religious enterprise, perhaps even the religious activity par excellence, (...) and that to divorce religion from science is antithetical to both the scientific spirit and the real Peirce. Understanding the real Peirce requires to deal with his religious concerns, which are increasingly recognized as being perhaps as philosophically important as his scientific concerns. Since a key notion in this project is the idea of "il lume naturale" that Peirce borrowed from Galileo, I want also to pay attention to that expression which during years I have been following through Peirce's papers and books. -/- In order to try to explain some of this, my paper is arranged into four brief sections after this already long introduction: 1) God and scientific inquiry; 2) The belief in God as a product of abduction; 3) Galileo and Peirce: Il lume naturale; and by way of conclusion 4) Some remarks on the religious framework of Peirce's approach. (shrink)
In this paper I examine Jaegwon Kim’s view that emergent properties are irreducible to the base properties on which they supervene. Kim’s view assumes a model of ‘functional reduction’ which he claims to be substantially different from the traditional Nagelian model. I dispute this claim and argue that the two models are only superficially different, and that on either model, properly understood, it is possible to draw a distinction between a property’s being reductively identifiable with its base property and a (...) property’s being reductively explainable in terms of it. I propose that we should take as the distinguishing feature of emergent properties that they be truly novel properties, i.e., ontologically distinct from the ‘base’ properties which they supervene on. This only requires that emergent properties cannot be reductively identified with their base properties, not that they cannot be reductively explained in terms of them. On this conception the set of emergent properties may well include mental properties as conceived by nonreductive physicalists. (shrink)